Topic 64 : Corporate Disclosure and Incentives
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Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission
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Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations
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Voluntary Disclosure, Moral Hazard and Default Risk
1、Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission
Working paper
,
issued in November 2019.
Paul Povel,
University of Houston
Günter Strobl,
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
We show that firms may benefit from allowing some earnings management,
because it can make noisy signals more informative. We model a firm that
cannot observe a manager's cost of effort, her effort choice, and
whether she manipulated a publicly observable signal. An optimal
contract links compensation to both the eventually realized firm value
and the (possibly manipulated) signal, since both are noisy measures of
effort provision. It may be optimal to allow for manipulation of the
signal by a manager who exerted a high effort level: Doing so can
convert a falsely unfavorable signal into a favorable signal, thereby
strengthening the link between effort and compensation.
原文链接：
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3488734
2、Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations
Working paper
,
issued in
June 2019.
Thomas Bourveau,
Columbia University
Guoman She,
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Alminas Zaldokas,
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms’
financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel
enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their
financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products.
This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly
coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are
associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the
potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.
原文链接：
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2954382
3、 Voluntary Disclosure, Moral Hazard and Default Risk
Working paper
,
issued in February 2018.
Shiming Fu,
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Giulio Trigilia,
University of Rochester
