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解析作者 | 唧唧堂管理学研究小组：
Liujia
1、在分配任务中如何筛选人才：绝对值还是百分比阈值？
人才与任务的匹配是工作设计的重要组成部分。组织通常使用绩效阈值来根据人才对代理商进行分组。我们看到阈值是根据个人自身的表现(绝对值)和同龄人的表现(百分比)来定义的。直觉表明了对百分位阈值的偏好，因为由此产生的排名统计量足以评估相关人才。然而，在任务分配问题中，目标是将人才与任务类型(使用两种代理和两种任务类型)匹配，我们证明了绝对阈值可以在两种条件中的任何一种下控制百分位数阈值。首先，任务分配的灵活性使平衡倾向于绝对阈值。其次，绩效操纵会对百分比阈值固有的优势产生不利影响，因为它们会促使代理商在个人成本高昂的影响活动上投入相对更多的资金，以使其绩效处于有利的地位。我们研究了在有相当多的代理商时这些结果如何维持，并讨论了实证上的意义。
Matching talents to tasks is an important part of job design. Organizations routinely use performance thresholds to group agents by talent. We see thresholds defined both in terms of an individual's own performance (absolute value) and in terms of peer performance (percentile). Intuition suggests a preference for percentile thresholds because the resulting rank‐order statistic is sufficient to assess relative talent. Yet, in the context of a task assignment problem in which the objective is to match talent with task type (using two agents and two task types), we show that absolute thresholds can dominate percentile thresholds under either of two conditions. First, flexibility in task assignment tilts the balance toward absolute thresholds. Second, performance manipulation can adversely affect the inherent advantage of percentile thresholds because they motivate agents to invest relatively more in personally costly influence activities to cast their performance in a favorable light. We examine how these results hold up when there are countably large number of agents and discuss empirical implications.
参考文献：Balakrishnan, Ramji, et al. “Screening Talent for Task Assignment: Absolute or Percentile Thresholds?” Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 58, no. 4, 2020, pp. 831–868.
2、微小交易规模和财务报告质量的关系：来自一项自然实验的研究
利用自然实验(美国证券交易委员会的2016年微小交易规模试点计划)，我们调查了微小交易规模增加对财务报告质量的影响。最小交易规模试点计划减少了算法交易(AT)，增加了基本投资者的信息获取和交易活动。这反过来又增加了对管理者选择财务报告的审查，减少了他们进行错误报告的动机。采用DID双重差分的研究设计，我们发现可操控性应计利润金额显著降低，仅达到或超过分析师预测的可能性显著降低，试点项目中已被处理企业的重述也略微显著减少。此外，我们发现，财务报告质量的变化集中在经历AT减少和信息获取活动增加的被处理的公司。我们还发现，应计项目的错误定价在被处理过的公司中显著降低。综上所述，我们的结果表明，刻度数量的增加对公司的财务报告质量有因果关系。
Using a natural experiment (the SEC's 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program), we investigate the effects of an increase in tick size on financial reporting quality. The tick size pilot program reduces algorithmic trading (AT) and increases fundamental investors information acquisition and trading activities. This in turn increases the scrutiny of managers’financial reporting choices and reduces their incentives to engage in misreporting. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find a significant decrease in the magnitude of discretionary accruals, a significant reduction in the likelihood of just meeting or beating analysts’forecasts, and a marginally significant decrease in restatements for the treated firms in the pilot program. Furthermore, we find that the change in financial reporting quality is concentrated in treated firms experiencing decreases in AT and increases in information acquisition activities. We also find that the mispricing of accruals is significantly lower for treated firms. Taken together, our results suggest that an increase in tick size has a causal effect on firms’financial reporting quality.
参考文献：Ahmed, Anwer S., et al. “Tick Size and Financial Reporting Quality in Small‐Cap Firms: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 58, no. 4, 2020, pp. 869–914.
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3、有政治关联的政府
本文考察了强大的政治关系对地方政府的影响。我们发现，位于有权势的国会议员选区内并因此与之建立联系的政府减少了对公共资源的管理。利用外源性国会代表权看似合理的下降，我们表明这种影响是因果关系。为了更好地理解为什么相互关联的地方政府能够减少管理，我们研究了选举特征。我们的研究结果表明，随着强大的国会代表权带来的资源增加，地方政府官员可以减少管理工作，而不会对他们的连任前景产生实质性的负面影响。总而言之，我们提供了政治关系成本的证据:它们削弱了地方政府以社会最优方式行事的动机
This paper examines the consequences of powerful political connections for local governments. We find that governments located within the constituencies of, and thus connected to, powerful congressional members reduce their stewardship over public resources. Using plausibly exogenous declines in the power of congressional representation, we show that the effect is causal. To better understand why connected local governments can reduce stewardship, we study electoral characteristics. Our findings suggest that the increased resources that come with powerful congressional representation allow local‐government officials to reduce stewardship without material adverse effects on their reelection prospects. In sum, we provide evidence of a cost of political connections: they weaken local governments' incentives to act in a socially optimal manner
参考文献：Cuny, Christine, et al. “Politically Connected Governments.” Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 58, no. 4, 2020, pp. 915–952.
4. 海外交易风险，套期保值和与税收为动机的对外收入转移
虽然将境外收入转移到低税收地区可以节省税收，但通常伴随着非税成本。在本研究中，我考察了外汇(FX)风险是否限制了美国跨国公司以税收为动机的对外收入转移。我的研究结果表明，汇率波动较大的风险敞口与较低的对外收入转移有关，而对于使用外币的外国子公司，这种影响更强。我还调查了套期保值是否有利于对外转移收入。与对冲降低、汇率波动相关成本相一致的是，我发现使用更多货币衍生品的美国公司往往会将更多收入转移到较低税率的外国管辖区。总体而言，这些研究结果表明，外汇风险是对外收入转移的重要成本。
Although outbound income shifting to low‐tax jurisdictions provides tax savings, it is often accompanied by nontax costs. In this study, I examine whether foreign exchange (FX) risk constrains tax-motivated outbound income shifting by U.S. multinational corporations. My findings indicate that exposure to greater currency volatility is associated with less outbound income shifting, and this effect is stronger for firms with foreign affiliates using foreign functional currencies. I also investigate whether hedging facilitates outbound income shifting. Consistent with hedging lowering costs associated with exchange rate volatility, I find that U.S. firms that use more currency derivatives tend to shift more income to low‐tax foreign jurisdictions. Overall, these findings suggest that FX risk is an important cost of outbound income shifting.
参考文献：Deng, Zero. “Foreign Exchange Risk, Hedging, and Tax‐Motivated Outbound Income Shifting.” Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 58, no. 4, 2020, pp. 953–987.
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5. 不对称的成本行为对公司股利政策的影响
平均而言，成本具有粘性，也就是说，销售减少时成本下降的幅度小于同等销售增加时成本上升的幅度。我们研究了这种不对称的成本行为对公司股利政策的影响。考虑到投资者对削减股息的厌恶情绪，我们预测，具有较高资源调整成本和粘性成本的公司会比同行支付更低的股息，因为它们无法在未来维持更高水平的股息支付。我们找到了与这一预测相符的证据。此外，使用回归不连续设计，利用工会选举产生的劳动力调整成本的变化，我们提供的证据表明，成本粘性和股息支付之间的负相关性是由资源调整成本驱动的。我们的论文阐明了股利政策的决定因素，并证明了成本行为在公司决策中的作用。
Costs are sticky on average, that is, they fall less for sales decreases than they rise for equivalent sales increases. We examine the effect of this asymmetric cost behavior on a firm's dividend policy. Given investors’aversion to dividend cuts, we predict that firms with higher resource adjustment costs and stickier costs pay lower dividends than their peers because they are less able to sustain any higher level of dividend payouts in the future. We find evidence consistent with this prediction. Further, using a regression discontinuity design that exploits variation in labor adjustment costs generated by close‐call union elections, we provide evidence suggesting that the negative relation between cost stickiness and dividend payouts is driven by resource adjustment costs. Our paper sheds new light on the determinants of dividend policy and demonstrates the role of cost behavior in corporate decisions.
参考文献：He, Jie, et al. “Asymmetric Cost Behavior and Dividend Policy.” Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 58, no. 4, 2020, pp. 989–1021.
6. 披露医生的评级：改变评级共识的难点和绩效影响
我研究了一个医疗系统公开披露病人对其医生评价的政策的效果。我发现有证据表明，通过公开的主观评分和不公开的客观质量衡量，可以改善绩效。这些效应与多任务处理理论是一致的，因为医生通过提供更多的共享输入（与患者在一起的时间）来响应披露，从而通过评分和基本质量来提高绩效。我还发现，正如信息级联理论所预测的那样，评级在某种程度上与最初披露的值接近。具体来说，评级机构会观察最初评级的模式，并通过提供相似的评级来跟进。最后，我发现有证据表明医生预期评级会受到干扰，因此将精力集中在早期的表现，以设置一个后来评级更高的评级模式。这些结果表明，主观评分的披露对绩效有广泛的好处，但也能将工作努力转向更早的表现。
I examine effects of a health care system's policy to publicly disclose patient ratings of its physicians. I find evidence that this policy leads to performance improvement by the disclosed, subjective ratings and also by undisclosed, objective measures of quality. These effects are consistent with multitasking theory, in that physicians respond to the disclosure by providing more of a shared input—time with patients—that benefits performance by ratings and underlying quality. I also find, as predicted by information cascade theory, that the ratings become jammed to some degree near initially disclosed values. Specifically, raters observe the pattern of initial ratings and follow suit by providing similar ratings. Finally, I find evidence that physicians anticipate rating jamming and so concentrate their effort on earlier performance in order to set a pattern of high ratings that later ratings follow. These results demonstrate that the disclosure of subjective ratings can benefit performance broadly but can also shift effort toward earlier performance.
