中文导读
中国与东南亚国家联盟在南海上的问题始终相持不下，这个棘手的问题似乎是无法解决。从1996年开始，中国在南海问题上一直签署着不具法律效力的“行文准则”的条约，使其在南海的行为不受限制。菲律宾以及其他东南亚国家的顺从，美国军舰在南海无意义的试探，都意味着中国在南海领域的地位愈加稳固。
A new agreement between China and South-East Asia is less than it seems
TO CALL negotiations between China and the ten-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) over rival claims in the South China Sea “drawn out” would be a gross understatement. At the centre of the matter is an unsquareable circle: the competing claims of China and several South-East Asian countries. Nobody wants to go to war; nobody wants to be accused of backing down.
Still, at a meeting of senior Chinese and ASEAN officials on May 18th, something happened: the two sides agreed on a “framework” for a code of conduct. An official from Singapore (which currently co-ordinates ASEAN-China relations) called the agreement a sign of “steady progress”.
ASEAN members called for a legally binding code of conduct as far back as 1996. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed a “declaration of conduct”, which recognised that a fully fledged code would be nice to have; it also committed both sides to peaceful dispute resolution and “self-restraint” in doing anything that could “escalate disputes [or] affect peace and stability”.
Since then, code-of-conduct negotiations have proceeded glacially. And in 2013 China embarked on a vast effort to build up seven reefs and rocks into islands suited for military use. Last July, after China received an unfavourable ruling on its maritime claims in a case brought by the Philippines to a tribunal in The Hague, China agreed to expedite the talks.
The draft framework will be presented to ASEAN and Chinese foreign ministers at a conference in August. This will then form the basis for the thorny negotiations to follow. The text has not (yet) been leaked. But its most salient feature may be what it appears to lack: any hint of enforcement mechanisms or consequences for violations. China has long rejected a legally binding agreement—or indeed any arrangement that could limit its actions in the South China Sea.
The result, explains Ian Storey, of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a think-tank in Singapore, is a framework “that makes China look co-operative…without having to do anything that might constrain its freedom of action”. ASEAN, meanwhile, gets the appearance of progress. “The ASEAN secretariat is a bureaucracy, and bureaucrats like process,” explains Mr Storey.
But a toothless agreement need not augur further Chinese aggression. And why should it? Under Rodrigo Duterte the Philippines has turned from China’s chief regional rival into an ally. The two countries recently reiterated their desire in principle for joint exploration for resources, something Manila had resisted for fear it would validate China’s expansionary claims. Other countries seem resigned, in fact if not in principle, to its island-building.
On May 24th America carried out its first freedom-of-navigation operation (sending warships through international waters) since the election of Donald Trump. But he seems less willing than his predecessor to enforce a rules-based order; his transactional mercantilism will reassure China. Extended talks on a code of conduct probably mean that China will be free to consolidate its gains with minimal interference from rivals near or far.
