How do firms respond to the diverging demands between controlling and minority shareholders? Utilizing family firms’ newly established foreign direct investment (FDI) as a natural laboratory, we propose that firms can reconcile these shareholder demands by strategizing their voluntary information disclosure. Specifically, firms can adopt a balanced approach by adjusting the amount of information disclosure and the contents of information disclosed. When there is a higher level of controlling family involvement, there will be a larger amount of information disclosure to satisfy the needs of minority shareholders on the one hand, and a lower ratio of socioemotional wealth (SEW) sensitive information disclosed to meet the demands of the controlling families on the other hand. Furthermore, this balanced approach is modified by the social norms in the host countries. A stronger norm of minority shareholder protection will strengthen the positive effect of controlling family involvement on the amount of information disclosure, and a stronger norm of family value preservation will weaken its influence on the ratio of SEW sensitive information disclosed. Using a sample of publicly listed family firms in China, we find empirical support for our theoretical predictions.