摘要:Maritime insurance developed in medieval Europe is the ancestor of all forms of insurance that appeared subsequently. We address the question of why modern insurance was first invented in medieval Europe, and neither earlier nor elsewhere. Drawing from insights from the literature on uncertainty aversion, we show that medieval merchants had to bear more frequently natural risks (they traveled longer distances) and new human risks with unknown probabilities (they faced unpredictable attacks by corsairs due to increased political fragmentation and commercial competition in Europe). The increased demand for protection in medieval seaborne trade met the supply of protection by a small group of wealthy merchants with a broad information network who could pool risks and profit from selling protection through a novel business device: the insurance contract. A new market—the market for insurance—was then born. Next, analyzing more than 7,000 insurance contracts redacted by notaries and about 100 court proceedings housed in the archives of Barcelona, Florence, Genoa, Palermo, Prato, and Venice, we study the main features of medieval trade, the type of risks faced by merchants, and the characteristics of insurance contracts and markets from 1340 to 1500.The empirical analysis delivers two main findings. First, risks related to human activities (e.g., attacks by corsairs) seem to have had a relatively greater impact on insurance premia compared to natural risks (proxied by seasonal risks). Second, distance mattered but the route seems to have had a greater impact on insurance premia. Specific routes (e.g., in the Tyrrhenian and the western Mediterranean) were more plagued by human risks, which were harder to avoid for the majority of merchants who did not have a broad information network compared to the few wealthy merchants, who became the key players in selling insurance in the early stages of the development of insurance markets.
起源于中世纪欧洲的海上保险是所有后续出现的保险形式的鼻祖。我们探讨了为什么现代保险首次在中世纪欧洲诞生,而不是更早或在其他地方。借鉴对不确定性厌恶的研究,我们发现,中世纪商人频繁面临自然风险(因为他们长途跋涉)和新的人为风险(由于欧洲政治分裂和商业竞争加剧,他们面临海盗攻击的不可预测性)。中世纪海上贸易中对风险保护的需求增加,与一小群拥有广泛信息网络的富裕商人提供的保护供应相契合,这些商人能够通过一种新的商业工具——保险合同,来分担风险并从中获利。于是,一个新的市场——保险市场——应运而生。通过分析巴塞罗那、佛罗伦萨、热那亚、巴勒莫、普拉托和威尼斯档案馆保存的7000多份保险合同和约100份法庭诉讼记录,我们研究了1340年至1500年间中世纪贸易的主要特点、商人面临的风险类型以及保险合同和市场的特征。实证分析得出两个主要发现:首先,人为风险(如海盗攻击)对保险费的影响似乎大于自然风险(通过季节性风险来衡量);其次,距离虽然重要,但路线对保险费的影响更大。特定路线(如第勒尼安海和西地中海)更容易受到人为风险的困扰,这些风险对于大多数没有广泛信息网络的商人来说更难规避,而少数富有商人则成为保险市场发展初期的关键参与者。