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解析作者 | 唧唧堂管理学研究小组：
WINDYH
1、审计师特殊任务专长：以公允价值会计为例
Auditor Task-Specific Expertise: The Case of Fair Value Accounting
PCAOB（美国公众公司会计监督委员会）的审查一再表明，审计中对公允价值（fair-value, FV）的计算是存在缺陷的，这也不断激励着监管机构对相关审计准则的改进。本文认为，审计师在审计工作中获得的关于计算公允价值的相关经验，会使其在公允价值这类特殊任务中更具专长，并有助于提高审计的质量。本文利用与公允价值相关的重述和沟通函，研究发现第三层级或是部门级的公允价值专长与公允价值审计质量正相关，而第二层级或是国家级的公允价值专长与公允价值审计质量之间不存在相关关系。文章进一步发现，当收到沟通函后，审计师的公允价值专长与补救成本负相关，与公允价值披露质量正相关。最后，文章还发现，第三层级公允价值披露的价值相关性会随审计师公允价值专长的增加而增加。总之，本文研究突出表明，审计师的公允价值专长有助于提高公允价值披露的可靠性和可用性。
PCAOB inspections repeatedly indicate deficiencies in audits of fair-value (FV) estimates, prompting regulators to improve the related auditing standards. We predict that auditor task-specific FV expertise, gained from work experience during the audit of FV measurements, can contribute to higher audit quality. Utilizing FV-related restatements and comment letters, we find that expertise in auditing Level 3 FV estimates at the office level is associated with greater FV audit quality. Level 2 FV expertise or national level FV expertise is not associated with higher FV audit quality. Following the receipt of a comment letter, we further find that auditor FV expertise is associated with lower comment letter remediation costs and higher FV disclosure quality. Finally, we find that the value relevance of Level 3 FV disclosures increases with the extent of auditor FV expertise. Collectively, our results highlight that auditor fair value expertise contributes to the credibility and usefulness of FV disclosures.
参考文献：Jaehan Ahn, Rani Hoitash, Udi Hoitash. Auditor Task-Specific Expertise: The Case of Fair Value Accounting. The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 1–32.
2、临时变化和预期对个体决策的影响：来自税收遵从环境的证据
The Effect of Temporary Changes and Expectations on Individuals' Decisions: Evidence from a Tax Compliance Setting
本文基于前景理论的价值函数，研究了在临时税收变化之中和之后，参照点选择对个体逃税决策的影响。通过多轮的实验，本文结果表明，个体对临时变化的反应，是变化方向和预期方向共同作用的结果。具体而言，当税收增加时，正在经历增税的个体会进行更多的逃税行为。有趣的是，与不知情的个体相比，那些知道减税只是临时变化的个体，会在这一临时变化之后进行更多的逃税行为，并且可能会减少个体在这一临时变化之中的逃税行为。在补充条件下，本文通过多次将减税进行延长，来增加不确定性。结果发现，在引入不确定性之后，个体通过得知减税的临时性而获得的两个优势均会消失。总体结果与个体对损失状态（loss state）的难以接受和对获得状态（gain state）的轻易接受现象相一致，除非个体能够确定这种获得状态只是临时的。
Based on prospect theory's value function, we predict how reference points adapt to influence individuals' tax evasion choices during and after experiencing temporary tax changes. Results from a multi-round experiment indicate reactions to temporary changes depend jointly on the direction of the change and expectations. Specifically, individuals experiencing a tax increase evade more while the increase is in effect. More interestingly, knowing, versus not knowing, a tax decrease is temporary prevents an increase in evasion after the temporary change expires, and may lead individuals to reduce evasion during the change. In a supplemental condition, we induce uncertainty by repeatedly extending a tax decrease. We find when uncertainty is introduced, both benefits of knowing the temporal nature of the decrease are lost. Overall results are consistent with individuals failing to adapt to a loss state and adapting quickly to a gain state unless they are certain the gain state is temporary.
参考文献：Chelsea Rae Austin, Donna D. Bobek, Ethan G. LaMothe. The Effect of Temporary Changes and Expectations on Individuals' Decisions: Evidence from a Tax Compliance Setting. The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 33–58.
3、信任在信息处理中的作用：来自安全分析师的证据
The Role of Trust in Information Processing: Evidence from Security Analysts
股票分析师对他人的信任会影响外源信息的处理吗？为了对这一问题进行研究，本文基于对分析师所在国籍的调查问卷来对信任进行度量。研究发现，与信任水平较低的分析师相比，信任水平较高的分析师会对管理导向（management guidance）和盈余公告（earnings announcement）做出更快的反应，而且他们会更加重视管理者和其他分析师发出的信息。这一结果与预测准确率之间呈倒U型关系：信任水平较低的分析师对外界信息的重视程度过低，而信任水平较高的分析师对外界信息的重视程度过高，因此二者预测的准确度都不如“中等”信任水平的分析师。对于有更多工作经验的分析师而言，信任度对预测准确度的影响较弱，这表明随着分析师对信息源质量的了解越来越多，他们也越来越不再依赖自己所处文化中的信任观念。
Does an equity analyst's trust in others impact the processing of information from outside sources? We investigate this question using a measure of trust based on surveys conducted in analysts' countries of origin. We find that more trusting analysts not only react faster to management guidance and earnings announcements, they also weight information from management and other analysts more heavily than less trusting analysts. This results in a nonlinear inverted-U relationship with forecast accuracy. Analysts with low trust place too little weight on outside information, while analysts with high trust place too much weight and are, thus, both less accurate than “medium” trust analysts. This effect on accuracy is weaker for those with more on-the-job experience, indicating that analysts rely less on their cultural trust beliefs as they learn more about the quality of information sources.
参考文献：Vineet Bhagwat, Xiaoding Liu. The Role of Trust in Information Processing: Evidence from Security Analysts. The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 59–83.
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4、银行资本与贷款监管
Bank Capital and Loan Monitoring
本文实证研究了银行资本与银行监管工作（monitoring effort，也可理解为监管力度）的关系。我们使用了四个代理变量，来对不可观测的银行监管工作进行度量。其中两个代理变量基于贷款质量（监管工作之后的结果变量），另外两个代理变量基于薪酬支出（监管工作之前的代理变量，用于衡量监管工作中投入的劳动力的质量和数量）。本文通过控制银行个体和时间固定效应研究发现，银行资本与我们所用的四种监管工作的代理变量之间均为正相关关系。本文还发现，这一相关关系在较小的银行、以及进行了更多的关系型贷款的银行中更加显著。本文还进行了众多补充检验和稳健性检验，包括通过匹配样本分析、利用工具变量解决内生性等，结论依然保持稳健。总之，本文的结论与Mehran and Thakor (2011) 的预测相一致：保持更高资本的银行会进行更多的监管工作。
This paper empirically examines the association between bank capital and banks' monitoring effort. We use four proxies to measure the unobservable monitoring effort. Two of the proxies are based on loan quality (ex-post outcomes of monitoring effort). The other two proxies are based on salary expense (ex-ante proxies intended to capture the quality and quantity of labor input into monitoring effort). Using a bank and time fixed effects estimation, we find a positive association between bank capital and each of our measures of monitoring effort. We find that this association is more pronounced for smaller banks and banks that engage in higher levels of relationship lending. Numerous additional tests and robustness checks, including matched sample analysis and instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity, confirm our main findings. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the prediction in Mehran and Thakor (2011) that banks that keep higher capital monitor more.
参考文献：Gauri Bhat, Hemang A. Desai. Bank Capital and Loan Monitoring. The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 85–114.
5、拥有同一个签字审计师的公司间是否表现出更高的盈余可比性？
Do Firms That Have a Common Signing Auditor Exhibit Higher Earnings Comparability?
本文假设，如果某些审计师个人拥有一些独特的审计风格、并且会始终如一地将其应用于不同的审计业务，那么拥有同一个签字审计师（signing auditor）的客户公司之间就会表现出更高的盈余可比性。本文使用中国公司的大样本数据研究发现，如果多个公司是由同一个审计师个人（与下列其他情形相比：1.不同的审计公司；2.同一个审计公司，但是不同的审计部门；3.同一个审计部门，但是不同的审计师）进行审计的话，这些客户公司会做出更具可比性的盈余公告。对于规模更大的审计事务所、更资深的签字审计师、以及团队合作经验更稳定的签字审计师而言，审计师个人风格的影响更强。本文还证明，客户公司选择了同一个签字审计师与较低的分析盈余预测误差和离差有关。本文的主要贡献在于，表明了审计师个人对客户公司的盈余可比性有着显著的影响。
We hypothesize that if individual auditors possess unique audit styles that they consistently apply to different audit engagements, then client firms with a common signing auditor will exhibit higher earnings comparability. Using a large sample of Chinese firms, we find that client firms report more comparable earnings when they are audited by the same individual auditor than when they are audited by (1) different audit firms, (2) the same audit firm, but different audit offices, and (3) the same audit office, but different individual auditors. The individual auditor style effect is stronger for larger audit firms, senior signing auditors, and signing auditors with more stable teamwork experience. We also document that having a common signing auditor is associated with lower analyst earnings forecast error and dispersion for client firms. This study contributes to the literature by showing that individual auditors have a significant impact on client firms' earnings comparability.
参考文献：Jeff Zeyun Chen, Mei-Hui Chen, Chen-Lung Chin, Gerald J. Lobo. Do Firms That Have a Common Signing Auditor Exhibit Higher Earnings Comparability? The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 115–143.
6、IPO高管使用税收优惠信托的决定因素，和其对IPO估值与未来绩效的影响
Tax-Advantaged Trust Use Among IPO Executives: Determinants and Implications for Valuation and Future Performance
本文研究了CEO在公司进行IPO前使用税收优惠信托（tax-advantaged trusts）的普遍性和其决定因素。有23%的CEO使用了IPO前的税收优惠信托，并且当CEO的股权财富、遗产税和世袭倾向（dynastic preferences，其含义参照后文的“世袭财富”）越高时，就会有越多的股权被转让于税收优惠信托。我们预测，IPO前信托的使用会使CEO的世袭财富（dynastic wealth，家族代代相传的财富）平均增加83万美元。接下来，本文构建了一个简单的模型，并预测信托的使用与IPO期间股价的增长正相关。我们发现，信托的使用能够使IPO一年后的回报率提高12%，但信托的使用不会对IPO的估值、报价修正（filing price revision）和抑价（underpricing）产生显著影响。这一结论表明，CEO在IPO前的个人财务决策包含了与价值相关的信息，而这些信息并未立即体现在市场价格中。
We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively related to IPO-period stock price appreciation. We find that trust use is associated with 12 percent higher one-year post-IPO returns, but is not significantly related to the IPO's valuation, filing price revision, or underpricing. This evidence is consistent with CEOs' personal finance decisions prior to the IPO containing value-relevant information that is not immediately incorporated into market prices.
参考文献：Michael J. Dambra, Matthew Gustafson, Phillip J. Quinn. Dispersion. The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 145–175.
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7、美国跨国公司：创新和不断增长的海外盈利能力
R&D and the Rising Foreign Profitability of U.S. Multinational Corporations
本文研究了研发是如何通过工资和税收优惠来提高美国跨国公司的海外盈利能力的。研究结果表明，海外研发产生的工资储蓄，和国内研发产生的税收优惠，都能够提高海外的边际利润。通过对二者重要性的进一步探讨，本文发现当工资折扣大大超过税收优惠时，工资储蓄会比税收优惠发挥更大的作用，反之亦然。横截面的测试则表明：企业通过进行海外研发而产生工资储蓄的行为，会随企业获得当地人才机会的提高而增加，并随开展海外研发成本的提高而减少；企业通过国内研发而产生税收优惠并以此转移收入的行为，会随转移定价风险（transfer pricing risk）的提高而减少。本文的研究表明了与研发相关的收入转移的重要性，这可能会导致企业经济活动的地点与收入来源地点的分离。
We investigate how R&D contributes to rising foreign profitability in U.S. multinational corporations through wage and tax incentives. Our results suggest that wage savings increase foreign profit margins derived from foreign R&D, while tax incentives increase foreign profit margins derived from domestic R&D. By exploring their relative importance, we find that wage savings are more important than tax incentives in explaining foreign profit margins when the wage discount substantially exceeds tax incentives, and vice versa. Cross-sectional tests show that firms respond more to foreign R&D wage savings when they have access to local human talent, but less as the cost of conducting foreign R&D increases. Firms respond less to tax incentives to shift income derived from domestic R&D as transfer pricing risk increases. Our evidence sheds light on the importance of R&D-related income shifting that potentially separates the location of economic activity from the location of income.
参考文献：Lisa De Simone, Jingjing (Jing) Huang, Linda K. Krull. R&D and the Rising Foreign Profitability of U.S. Multinational Corporations. The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 177–204.
8、劳动力市场中奖金契约与罚金契约效果的差异依然存在吗？
Do Effort Differences between Bonus and Penalty Contracts Persist in Labor Markets?
传统经济学假设，如果奖金契约与罚金契约在经济上是等同的，那么工人会付出相同的努力。然而之前的研究却发现，尽管奖金契约更受工人偏好，但罚金契约会使工人付出更多的努力。基于这些发现，奖金契约在实践中的普遍性似乎令人费解。既然罚金契约能够使工人付出更多的努力，那么雇主为何不更多地使用它？为此，我们进行了劳动力市场实验，来检验当工人可以选择他们的契约类型、并且知道雇主有意提供他们所选择的契约时，已有关于“罚金契约比奖金契约更能让工人付出努力”的研究（例如关于契约的框架效应的研究）结论是否依然成立。与预测相一致，研究发现劳动力市场的这些特征消除了之前研究认为的奖金契约与罚金契约效果的差异。这一结论表明，雇主可能会更多地使用奖金契约而非罚金契约，是因为可以在不牺牲员工努力值的前提下提供更符合员工偏好的合同。
Conventional economics assumes workers provide the same effort under penalty contracts and economically equivalent bonus contracts. However, prior research finds that although workers prefer bonus contracts, they provide more effort under penalty contracts. Given these findings, the prevalence of bonus contracts in practice is puzzling. If penalty contracts yield more worker effort, why would employers not use them more often? We conduct experimental labor markets to test whether the prior finding of more effort under penalty contracts than bonus contracts (i.e., the contract frame effect) persists when workers can choose their contract and know that their employer intentionally offered the contract they choose. As predicted, these features of labor markets eliminate the difference in effort between penalty and bonus contracts reported in prior studies. This finding suggests employers may use bonus contracts more often than penalty contracts because they can offer the contract most workers prefer without sacrificing worker effort.
参考文献：George C. Gonzalez, Vicky B. Hoffman, Donald V. Moser. Do Effort Differences between Bonus and Penalty Contracts Persist in Labor Markets? The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 205–222.
9、信息摩擦与生产率分散：会计信息的作用
Information Frictions and Productivity Dispersion: The Role of Accounting Information
已有研究认为，即使是在狭义定义的行业中，也存在大量、持久的生产率分散（productivity dispersion），表明摩擦的存在阻碍了资源的有效配置。本文的研究考虑了信息摩擦（information frictions）的作用。我们假设，高质量的与企业生产率相关的财务报告能够减少信息摩擦，进而促进企业间资源的有效配置。本文利用制造业企业的大样本数据进行研究，实证结果支持了我们的预期：具有较大生产率信息量的行业，往往有更低的行业内生产率分散。进一步的研究表明，二者的关系在更加依赖外部融资的行业中更强，这说明至少在一定程度上，报告的质量能够通过资本市场渠道影响配置效率。这些发现表明，那些提供了有效的生产率信息的财务报告，能够影响资源配置效率，进而在宏观层面产生实际影响。
Prior research documents large, persistent productivity dispersion even within narrowly defined industries, suggesting the presence of frictions that impede the efficient allocation of resources. In this paper, we consider the role of information frictions. We posit that high-quality financial reporting with respect to firm productivity can mitigate information frictions and hence facilitate the efficient allocation of resources across firms. Using a large sample of firms in the manufacturing sector, we find evidence consistent with our prediction—industries with higher productivity informativeness tend to have smaller within-industry productivity dispersion. We further find that this relation is stronger in industries with greater dependence on external financing, suggesting that reporting quality affects allocation efficiency, at least in part, through the capital market channel. These findings suggest that the extent to which financial reporting is informative about productivity can affect resource allocation efficiency and hence have real effects at the macro level.
参考文献：Rebecca N. Hann, Heedong Kim, Wenfeng Wang, Yue Zheng. Information Frictions and Productivity Dispersion: The Role of Accounting Information. The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 223–250.
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10、诉讼对真实盈余管理的影响：阻碍还是促进？
Does Litigation Deter or Encourage Real Earnings Management?
本文借助一个外生冲击来检验诉讼风险对真实盈余管理（REM）的影响。由于一次意料之外的法庭裁决，总部设置在美国第九辖区（the Ninth Circuit）企业的诉讼风险大大降低，我们以此进行了双重差分（DID）检验。实证结果表明，在这一判决后，与其他公司相比，受此判决影响企业的REM水平显著提高，说明诉讼风险能够抑制REM。进一步研究表明，信息披露更加乐观的企业在判决后提高了更高的REM水平，这说明诉讼风险抑制REM的机制在于能够抑制管理者发布过于乐观或是误导性的信息披露，而这类的信息能够隐瞒管理者进行REM的短视动机和机会主义动机。本文的研究还表明，当管理者操纵盈余动机较强、公司治理机制较弱时，REM与诉讼风险的负相关关系更强。
In this paper, we rely on an exogenous shock to examine the impact of litigation risk on real earnings management (REM). We conduct difference-in-differences tests centered on an unanticipated court ruling that reduced litigation risk for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. REM increases significantly following the ruling for Ninth Circuit firms relative to other firms, consistent with litigation risk deterring REM. Additional analyses reveal that REM rises more following the ruling when firms issue more optimistic disclosures. The evidence is consistent with litigation deterring REM by constraining managers' ability to issue optimistic and misleading disclosures that can conceal the myopic and opportunistic motives underlying REM. We further document that an increase in REM in response to a decline in litigation risk is more pronounced when managers have higher incentives to manipulate earnings and governance mechanisms are weaker.
参考文献：Sterling Huang, Sugata Roychowdhury, Ewa Sletten. Does Litigation Deter or Encourage Real Earnings Management? The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 251–278.
11、财报质量与国家特征：研究的挑战与机遇
On the Relation between Financial Reporting Quality and Country Attributes: Research Challenges and Opportunities
本文为国家特征与财务报告质量之间的相互依赖性提供了新的证据。首先，本文展示了21个强制采用了国际财务报告准则（IFRS）的国家，他们在国家特征变化过程中表现出较高的同步性。尽管IFRS的采用能够“解释”报告质量的增加，但在考虑了其他会对变化中国家的财务报告质量产生影响的因素后，这一结论不再成立。第二，存在一个潜在的因素，能够涵盖国际文献中所使用的众多关于财报质量的指标。第三，在考察了72种能够在国家层面衡量财报质量的候选指标后，本文发现了4种潜在的因素，能够在很大程度上囊括这些单一的变量。最后，本文为未来关于国际报告质量的研究做出了启示和建议。
We provide new evidence on the codependence among the many country attributes previously linked to financial reporting quality. First, we show that the synchronicity of 21 changing country attributes spikes surrounding mandatory IFRS adoption. Thus, while IFRS adoption “explains” increased reporting quality, this finding disappears after including other changing country determinants of reporting quality. Second, a single underlying factor distills the numerous reporting quality measures used in the international literature. Finally, we document that four underlying country factors largely subsume the individual explanatory power of 72 candidate country attributes in explaining reporting quality levels across countries. We conclude with implications and suggestions for future research on international reporting quality.
参考文献：Helena Isidro, Dhananjay (DJ) Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki. On the Relation between Financial Reporting Quality and Country Attributes: Research Challenges and Opportunities. The Accounting Review, 2020, 95(3): 279–314.
12、隐形税收vs收入转移
Implicit Corporate Taxes and Income Shifting
税率变化对公司盈利能力的影响尚未明确。一方面，隐形税收理论认为，（国家层面的）税率与（公司层面的）税前利润正相关；另一方面，收入转移又会使公告的税前利润与税率负相关。本文研究发现：对单一国家经营的欧洲公司而言，公司的隐形税收会随税率而变化，这主要集中在较少依赖无形资产的公司和封闭经济体（非欧盟国家）的公司中；对跨国公司而言，收入转移的影响则要大于隐形税收，这主要集中于较高无形资产的公司和开放经济体的公司中。这一结论表明，在经济开发且企业具有独特的投入或产品的情况下，由于隐形税收的影响，仅使用公告利润来估算收入转移具有较低的偏误。这同样有助于解释已有研究的结论：公司的隐形税收效应会随时间而降低，尤其是对跨国公司而言。
The effects of tax rate changes on corporate profitability are not fully understood. Implicit tax theory predicts a positive relation between country-level tax rates and firm-level pretax returns. Conversely, income shifting should make reported pretax returns inversely related to tax rates. Among single-country European firms, we find robust evidence of corporate implicit taxes following tax rate changes, concentrated in firms that rely less on intangible assets and firms in closed economies (non-EU countries). Among multinational firm affiliates, we find the effects of income shifting outweigh the effects of implicit taxes for firms with high intangibles and in countries with open borders. Our results imply income shifting estimated using only reported profits is less biased by implicit taxes in settings with open economies and firms with unique inputs or products. Our evidence also helps explain prior evidence of decreasing corporate implicit tax effects over time, particularly for multinationals.
