【保险学术前沿】NBER 2024年3月-5月保险精选文章目录与摘要

声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。

平台介绍：

“National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Papers Series” NBER（美国国家经济研究局）工作论文系列是一个广泛认可的经济学研究发布渠道。这些工作论文在同行评审前发布，以便更广泛地分发和讨论。NBER每年发布超过1200篇工作论文，这些论文由NBER的附属成员撰写，可能包含对政策影响的分析结果。

本期看点：

● 失业保险：

身份筛查可能是减轻失业保险系统中欺诈行为的有效机制，对于更广泛的福利计划也是如此。

● 教育保险：

对教育融资中收入保险的强调使收入分享协议的接受率提高了43%，特定条款的表述可以增加对高等教育保险的需求，以潜在地解决不同结果学生的风险问题。

● 医疗保险：

当个人能够使用MediSave（新加坡的一项全国性医疗储蓄计划）资金支付他们的医疗保险保费时，他们对价格的敏感度较低，更愿意参保更慷慨的计划。

● 工资保险：

工资保险资格增加了短期内的就业概率，并导致长期累计收入的提高。

● 信贷对保险价值的影响：

对于平均受益人来说，获得五年期贷款会使得基于社区评级和经验评级的保险价值分别减少232至366美元（58%至61%）。

Benjamin G. Hyman (纽约联邦储备银行), Brian K. Kovak (卡内基梅隆大学), Adam Leive(加州大学伯克利分校)

Sonia Jaffe(微软), Anup Malani (芝加哥大学), Julian Reif (伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校)

摘要：We analyze the value of insurance when individuals have access to credit markets. Loans allow consumers to smooth financial shocks over time, decreasing the value of consumption smoothing from insurance. We derive formulas for the value of insurance that can be taken to data, and show how that value depends on individual characteristics and features of loans. We estimate that access to a five-year loan decreases the values of community- and experience-rated insurance for the average beneficiary by $232-$366 (58--61%). Even for the sickest decile, this loan access reduces the value of community-rated insurance by $1,099 (17%).

我们分析了个人在能够获得信贷市场服务时保险的价值。贷款使消费者能够随时间平滑金融冲击，从而降低了保险的消费平滑价值。我们推导出可以用于数据的保险价值公式，并展示了该价值如何依赖于个人特征和贷款特征。我们估计，对于平均受益人来说，获得五年期贷款会使得基于社区评级和经验评级的保险价值分别减少232至366美元（58%至61%）。即使是对于最差情形的十分位群体，这种贷款机会也会使社区评级保险的价值减少1,099美元（17%）。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32395

Pinka Chatterji (纽约州立大学奥尔巴尼分校), Chun-Yu Ho (奥尔巴尼大学), Tao Jin (纽约州立大学奥尔巴尼分校), Yichuan Wang (纽约州成瘾服务与支持办公室)

摘要：Since the inception of Medicare Part D in 2006, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and regulatory changes have led to increased concentration and reduced plan variety in the standalone prescription drug plan (PDP) portion of the market. We examine how this industry consolidation affects Medicare beneficiaries’ enrollment in PDPs and their out-of-pocket (OOP) drug expenditures using individual-level data from the 2006-2018 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) merged with PDP market-level characteristics. Overall, we find that lower plan variety in the PDP market decreases the likelihood that elderly individuals enroll in PDPs, and higher PDP market concentration increases OOP drug expenditures. Our main results are robust to considering possible effects of unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, region-specific time trends, and entry/exit of insurers, as well as to the use of an alternative identification scheme based on a quasi-experimental design. Further, we find that younger, more advantaged, and healthier individuals respond differently to industry consolidation compared to their older, less advantaged, and sicker counterparts. The former groups are more likely to adjust their PDP enrollment in response to reduced PDP variety and have higher OOP drug expenditures in response to increased PDP market concentration compared to the latter groups. Finally, we find that not only do lower PDP variety and greater PDP market concentration directly affect PDP enrollment and OOP drug expenditures, but these changes also affect Medicare beneficiaries indirectly through impacting PDP characteristics.

自2006年Medicare Part D成立以来，合并和收购（M&A）以及监管变化导致了市场独立处方药计划（PDP）部分的集中度增加和计划种类减少。我们利用2006-2018年健康与退休研究（HRS）的个体级数据，并结合PDP市场层面的特征，研究了这种行业整合如何影响医疗保险受益人参与PDP的情况以及他们的自付（OOP）药品支出。总体而言，我们发现PDP市场计划种类的减少降低了老年人参与PDP的可能性，而PDP市场集中度的提高增加了OOP药品支出。我们的主要结果对考虑了未观察到的个体层面异质性、地区特定时间趋势、保险公司的进入/退出以及基于准实验设计的替代识别方案的可能影响都是稳健的。此外，我们发现较年轻、更有优势、更健康的个体与较年老、较无优势、病情较重的个体相比，对行业整合的反应不同。前者更有可能根据PDP种类的减少调整他们的PDP参与，并且在PDP市场集中度增加时有更高的OOP药品支出。最后，我们发现，PDP种类的减少和PDP市场集中度的提高不仅直接影响PDP参与和OOP药品支出，这些变化还通过影响PDP特征间接影响医疗保险受益人。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32267

Umang Khetan (爱荷华大学), Jetson Leder-Luis (波士顿大学), Jialan Wang (伊利诺伊大学香槟分校), Yunrong Zhou (普渡大学)

摘要：We study fraud in the unemployment insurance (UI) system using a dataset of 35 million debit card transactions. We apply machine learning techniques to cluster cards corresponding to varying levels of suspicious or potentially fraudulent activity. We then conduct a difference-in-differences analysis based on the staggered adoption of state-level identity verification systems between 2020 and 2021 to assess the effectiveness of screening for reducing fraud. Our findings suggest that identity verification reduced payouts to suspicious cards by 27%, while non-suspicious cards were largely unaffected by these technologies. Our results indicate that identity screening may be an effective mechanism for mitigating fraud in the UI system and for benefits programs more broadly.

我们利用3500万笔借记卡交易数据集研究失业保险(UI)系统中的欺诈行为。我们应用机器学习技术对涉嫌不同程度可疑或潜在欺诈活动的借记卡进行聚类。然后，我们基于2020年至2021年间各州逐步采用身份验证系统的情况，进行双重差分分析，以评估筛查在减少欺诈方面的有效性。我们的发现表明，身份验证使对可疑卡片的支付减少了27%，而对非可疑卡片的影响不大。我们的结果表明，身份筛查可能是减轻失业保险系统中欺诈行为的有效机制，对于更广泛的福利计划也是如此。

原文链接： https://www.nber.org/papers/w32527

Matthew S. Jaremski (犹他州立大学), Steven Sprick Schuster (中田纳西州立大学)

摘要：The lack of universal deposit insurance coverage can create liquidity risk during financial crises. This aspect of deposit insurance is hard to test in modern data because of the broad coverage of most systems. We, therefore, study the role that the U.S. Postal Savings System played in commercial bank closures during the Great Depression. The system offered households a federally insured deposit account at post offices throughout the nation, and its structure provides a near-ideal environment to identify this competitive liquidity risk during a crisis. We find that banks that operated nearby a post office that accepted deposits were more likely to close between 1929 and 1935. We further make use of a structural change in the availability of postal depositories in the early 1910 to estimate an IV regression that confirms the results. In either model, the effect is strongest for those banks with low reserves, suggesting that the mechanism was through depositor withdrawals rather than other factors.

普遍存款保险覆盖的缺失可能在金融危机期间造成流动性风险。由于大多数系统覆盖面广泛，这一方面的存款保险很难用现代数据进行测试。因此，我们研究了美国邮政储蓄系统在大萧条期间商业银行倒闭中的作用。该系统在全国范围内的邮局为家庭提供了联邦保险的存款账户，其结构提供了一个近乎理想的环境，以识别危机期间的这种竞争性流动性风险。我们发现，在1929年到1935年间，那些在附近邮局接受存款的银行更有可能倒闭。我们进一步利用1910年代初邮政储蓄库可用性的结构变化来估计一个工具变量回归模型，以确认这一结果。在任何模型中，对于储备金较低的银行，这种影响最为强烈，这表明影响机制是通过存款人的提款而不是其他因素。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32284

Sidhya Balakrishnan (Jain Family Institute), Eric Bettinger (斯坦福大学),  Michael S. Kofoed (田纳西大学诺克斯维尔分校), Dubravka Ritter(费城联邦储备银行), Douglas A. Webber (联邦储备委员会), Ege Aksu (Jain Family Institute), Jonathan S. Hartley(斯坦福大学)

摘要：We conduct a survey-based experiment with 2,776 students at a non-profit university to analyze income insurance demand in education financing. We offered students a hypothetical choice: either a federal loan with income-driven repayment or an income-share agreement (ISA), with randomized framing of downside protections. Emphasizing income insurance increased ISA uptake by 43%. We observe that students are responsive to changes in contract terms and possible student loan cancellation, which is evidence of preference adjustment or adverse selection. Our results indicate that framing specific terms can increase demand for higher education insurance to potentially address risk for students with varying outcomes.

我们在一个非营利性大学对2,776名学生进行了一项基于调查的实验，以分析教育融资中收入保险的需求。我们向学生提供了一个假设性选择：要么选择有收入驱动还款的联邦贷款，要么选择收入分享协议（ISA），并随机设定了下行保护的框架。强调收入保险使ISA的接受率提高了43%。我们观察到学生对合同条款的变化和可能的学生贷款取消做出了反应，这是偏好调整或逆向选择的证据。我们的结果表明，特定条款的表述可以增加对高等教育保险的需求，以潜在地解决不同结果学生的风险问题。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32260

Anup Malani (芝加哥大学), Cynthia Kinnan (塔夫茨大学), Gabriella Conti (伦敦大学学院), Kosuke Imai(哈佛大学), Morgen Miller, Shailender Swaminathan(印度金融市场研究中心, IFMR), Alessandra Voena(斯坦福大学), Bartosz Woda(芝加哥大学法学院)

摘要：Universal health coverage is a widely shared goal across lower-income countries. We conducted a large-scale, 4-year trial that randomized premiums and subsidies for India’s first national, public hospital insurance program, called RSBY. We find substantial demand (∼ 60% uptake) even when consumers were charged a price equal to the premium the government paid for insurance. We also find substantial adverse selection into insurance at positive prices. Insurance enrollment increases insurance utilization, partly due to spillovers from use of insurance by neighbors. However, healthcare utilization does not rise substantially, suggesting the primary benefit of insurance is financial. Many enrollees attempted to use insurance but failed, suggesting that learning is critical to the success of public insurance. We find very few statistically significant impacts of insurance access or enrollment on health. Because there is substantial willingness-to- pay for insurance, and given how distortionary it is to raise revenue in the Indian context, we calculate that our sample population should be charged a premium for RSBY between 67-95% of average costs (INR 528-1052, $30-60) rather than a zero premium to maximize the marginal value of public funds.

全民健康覆盖是低收入国家的共同目标。我们对印度首个国家公共医院保险计划RSBY进行了一项大规模、为期四年的随机试验，对保费和补贴进行了随机分配。我们发现，即使消费者支付的保费与政府支付的保费相等，需求仍然很大（约60%的接受率）。我们还发现，在正价格下，保险中存在大量的逆向选择。保险登记增加了保险的使用，部分原因是邻居使用保险的溢出效应。然而，医疗保健的使用并没有显著增加，这表明保险的主要好处是财务上的。许多登记者尝试使用保险但失败了，这表明学习对于公共保险的成功至关重要。我们发现保险接入或登记对健康的影响在统计上几乎没有显著影响。由于存在相当大的支付保险的意愿，并且考虑到在印度背景下筹集收入的扭曲性，我们计算出我们的样本人群应该为RSBY支付平均成本的67-95%的保费（印度卢比528-1052，约30-60美元），而不是零保费，以最大化公共资金的边际价值。

原文链接：https://www.nber.org/papers/w32239