TE过刊封面文章
EVEN by its own aggressive standards, North Korea's actions over the past couple of weeks have been extraordinary. Kim Jong Un, the country's young dictator, has threatened the United States with nuclear Armageddon, promising to rain missiles on mainland America and military bases in Hawaii and Guam; declared a “state of war” with South Korea; announced that he would restart a plutonium-producing reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear site,while enriching uranium to build more nuclear weapons; and barred South Korean managers from entering the Kaesong industrial complex, almost the only instanceof North-South co-operation. All this comes after the regime set off a nuclear test, its third, in February. Tensions are the worst on the peninsula since1994, when North Korea and America were a hair's breadth from war.
即便以其自身那种好斗的习性来衡量，北韩在过去几周内的行为也是非常罕见的。该国年少轻狂的独裁者金正恩以核末日来威胁美国，甚至叫嚣要将导弹倾泻到美国本土以及夏威夷和关岛的军事基地；他宣称已与南韩处于“战争状态”；他一边宣布重启宁边核设施的钚反应堆，一边进行铀浓缩以制造更多的核武器；他还禁止南韩管理人员进入作为北南合作唯一成果的开城工业园。上述所有行为都是这个政权于今年
2
月进行了第三次核试验之后发生的，当前这种紧张气氛是朝鲜半岛自
1994
年——当时北韩与美国差一点爆发战争——以来最为严重的一次。
The questions are what to make of all this, and how to respond. Neither is easy. The White House has tried to play down the aggression, talking of a “disconnect between rhetoric and action”, and some parts are pure bluster. The nuclear threat against mainland America is patently hollow: it will be years before the North has the technology to dispatch nuclear-tipped missiles. North Korea has yet to order a large-scale mobilisation of its 1.1m-strong army. Pyongyang, the capital, does not seem like a city that is about to go to war.
摆在我们面前的问题是：他们这样做的原因是什么，我们又应该如何去应对这些行为。然而，对于这两个问题，哪一个都不容易得到解答。白宫对北韩的叫嚣一直采取淡化处理的原则。在谈到这些行为时
，白宫除了称他们的“言辞与行动脱节”之外，还表示有些行为完全是赤裸裸的恐吓。至于对美国本土的核威胁，那是没有任何实质内容的东西。比如说，北韩需要数年才能具备发射带核弹头导弹的技术，他们到目前为止还没有对
110
多万人的军队进行大规模的调动，而首都平壤看上去也不像是一个做好战争准备的城市。
But there are also depressing reasons totake Mr Kim all too seriously. It does not take much to imagine the cycle of provocation and deterrence getting out of hand, especially if South Korea and the United States misjudge North Korea's actions—or vice versa. And even without nuclear missiles, conflict on the crowded Korean peninsula would be savage. Decrepit North Korea would certainly be outgunned by South Korea and America. But nobody should doubt the cult-like commitment of the North's armed forces. The human cost of war would be huge: 1.7m men serve in uniform on the peninsula, and North Korean artillery batteries are trained on the megalopolis of Seoul. American generals guess that a conflict could kill at least 1m, including thousands of Americans. Oh, and it would also be curtains for Asia's thriving economy.
但是，我们也用理由严肃认真地对待金正恩。不难想象，不管是南韩与美国对北韩的行为做出误判，还是北韩对南韩与美国的行为做出误判，这种挑衅与威慑或者威慑与挑衅的循环就会失去控制。同时，即使没有核武器，在这个人口密集的半岛上发生冲突也是一种野蛮的行为。装备陈旧的北韩肯定打不过美国与南韩。但是，没有人会对北韩军队那种类似于邪教的战斗力表示怀疑。战争的人力成本是巨大的：半岛上的现役军人达
170
万人之多，而北韩的火炮训练也是以首尔这座特大城市为目标。据美国军方高层估计，冲突至少会造成包括数千名美国士兵在内的
100
万军人的死亡。同时，战争还可能给正处于繁荣之中的亚洲经济带来灾难。
Moreover, Mr Kim heads a regime that cares nothing for its own brutalised people. Some 150,000-200,000 North Koreans—individuals and often whole families—rot as political prisoners in a vast gulag. Farmers are herded into collectives and forced into gruelling manual labour. Women trying to make a living by smuggling refugees across the border with China are shot if they do not know the right people to bribe.
除此之外，金正恩所领导的政权是一个对自己的民众受虐待也丝毫不关心的政权。同时，还有大约
150000-200000
北韩人——常常是一家人——被当做政治犯被关进规模庞大的集中营，任他们在那里受尽折磨。农民被圈禁在合作社中，被迫从事非人的体力劳动。妇女靠穿越边境把难民偷渡到中国的方式来支撑生活，如果她们在这个过程中不知道去贿赂应该贿赂的人，她们就有可能被打死。
In some ways the North is even scarier under its new ruler than it was under his father, who died in 2011. Early hopes that Mr Kim might prove a youthful agent of change seem entirely dashed by his nuclear explosion and boundless bombast. He is thought to have ordered the sinking of a South Korean naval corvette in 2010, with the deaths of 46 crewmen, and the shelling of a South Korean island later that year. Whereas Kim Jong Il was practised in the calibrated calculation of shaking down the outside world, his callow son has escalated tensions wildly. Nobody knows how to walk him back from the brink.
从某种程度上来看，相比已于
2011
年死去的父亲统治下的北韩，这个年轻人统治下的国家更加可怕。外界曾预期对金正恩有可能证明自己是一个年轻改革者，但是在他进行了核爆炸和漫无边际地大放厥词后，这种预期已经彻底破灭。据称，他曾在
2010
年下令击沉南韩海军的一艘小型军舰，结果导致
46
名船员死亡；当年晚些时候，他又下令对南韩的一座岛屿进行炮击。金正日的手法是根据情况来降低外界对的计算，相比之下，他那位羽翼未丰的儿子疯狂地调高调门，制造紧张气氛。没有人知道该如何让他悬崖勒马。
Doing so depends partly on Mr Kim's motives. Perhaps aggression is a rite of passage to prove his leadership credentials to the country's ancient generals. Perhaps he will shrewdly claim he has seen off the imperialist threat and back down. Perhaps he gets a thrill from orchestrating the chaos—as if he were playing a video game. Or, most worrying, perhaps he is out of his depth and therefore more prone to miscalculation.
金正恩这样做部分取决与他自己想干什么。也许，他的咄咄逼人只是一种传递信息的方式，为的是证明他对国内那些老朽的将军们仍具有领导力；也许，他会适可而止地宣称已经粉碎了帝国主义的威胁，并且还让他们做出让步；也许，他在亲自指挥这场混乱的过程中如同玩电子游戏那样，体验到了某种刺激；最令人担心的是，也许他已经完全丧失理智，因而会更容易做出误判。
Whenever Mr Kim's father ratcheted uptensions, at least the pretence held that a bargain was to be had. In return for aid, oil or respect, North Korea would agree to discussions over dismantling its nuclear-weapons programme. The process was often a charade, butit kept the North engaged and it probably helped slow the development of nuclear weapons, as with the agreement to mothball the Yongby on reactor in2007. Now Mr Kim has declared that his nuclear capability is non-negotiable.
以前，每当金正恩的父亲挑起紧张之时，他至少还装出一付准备进行交易的样子。为了换来援助、石油和西方对他的尊敬，北韩会在解除核武器计划问题上同意进行谈判。虽然过程常常犹如猜谜一样，但是这能把北韩留在谈判桌上，并且还可能有助于延缓其开发核武器的进程，
2007
年达成的关闭宁边反应堆协议正是这种谈判的一个结果。如今，金正恩却宣称说，他的核能力不容讨价还价。
What should the West do? In the long term, the best way to destabilise Mr Kim is from within. A new merchant class is emerging—the only prospering bit of the economy. The world must redouble its efforts to engage with these and other possible agents of change. This includes teaching more mid-ranking officials how societies work when they are organised around market economies and underpinned by laws; and funding defector radio stations beaming news back into the North.
西方应该怎么办？从长期来看，动摇金正恩政权的最佳方法是从内部着手。一个处于萌芽状态的商人阶层正在从北韩内部崛起，同时这也是该国经济的唯一亮点。世界各国必须加倍努力来扶持他们，同时还要扶持其他那些有可能支持变革的人们。这包括以下一些做法：当更多的中层官员因市场经济而形成一个团体并且还能够得到法律支持的时候，向他们传授社会是如何运作的知识；给叛逃者的广播电台提供资金，让他们把自己的声音传回北韩。
