Empirical estimation of the bullwhip effect poses several challenges, although the bullwhip effect has been well studied in modeling papers. Using a dataset from a large supermarket chain, we estimate the product level bullwhip effect using various methods, analyze consequences of its different measurements and aggregations, and examine its impact on supply chain performance in terms of inventory ratio and stockouts. We have three major findings. (a) Bullwhip effect estimates exhibit different magnitudes dependent on how they are measured. The material bullwhip effect is greater in magnitude than the information bullwhip effect in our data, where demand correlations are sufficiently low. (b) The aggregated bullwhip effect ratios by store and by time are lower than the disaggregated bullwhip effect ratios, indicating that the aggregated bullwhip effect ratios underestimate the bullwhip effect. The aggregated bullwhip effect ratios by product are lower than the disaggregated bullwhip effect ratios, indicating the bullwhip effect is not as strong as theory predicts due to order pooling. (c) The bullwhip effect is associated with poor supply chain performance, as measured by elevated inventory ratio and stockouts. However, if the bullwhip effect is measured inaccurately, these benefits can be underestimated as much as 75% for inventory and 25% for stockouts.
参考文献：Yao, Y, Duan, Y, Huo, J. 2021. On Empirically Estimating Bullwhip Effects: Measurement, Aggregation, and Impact. Journal of Operation Management, 67: 5– 30. https://doi.org/10.1002/joom.1090
Retailers procure inventory by placing purchase orders (POs) with suppliers. POs specify product price, quantity, quality, delivery times, and other aspects of the fulfillment process, such as carton labeling requirements and packaging formats. When servicing an order, a supplier may fail to meet the fulfillment terms, thus committing a fulfillment error and triggering a chargeback penalty. We collect supplier compliance manuals from 111 retailers to characterize fulfillment errors and chargebacks in practice. The majority of chargeback penalties listed by retailers pertain to execution quality: aspects of the fulfillment process beyond product price, quantity, quality, and delivery time. We use an empirically grounded analytical model in combination with game‐theoretic analysis to demonstrate that the chargebacks most commonly used in practice do a poor job coordinating supply chains around execution quality.
参考文献：Craig, N, DeHoratius, N, Klabjan, D. 2021. Execution Quality and Chargeback Penalties in Retail Supply Chains. Journal of Operation Management, 67: 31– 48. https://doi.org/10.1002/joom.1092
Research on supply chain relationships tends to focus on power and asymmetric dependency. Our objective is to complement this by examining contractual challenges in the context of bilateral dependency. Our specific empirical focus is on how Indian Railways, one of the largest railroads in the world, manages warranty claims related to engine failures. Warranty resolution is complex, because failures typically involve the simultaneous failure of several engine subsystems provided by different suppliers, giving rise to supplier performance ambiguity. Through a combination of theoretical reflection rooted in transaction cost economics and an empirical analysis of Indian Railways' supply chain, we argue that in the case of bilateral dependency, “the benign approach” is more efficient than “the muscular approach,” to use Oliver Williamson's terminology. Specifically, while the latter is founded on unilateral decisions by the comparatively more powerful party, the former is based on voluntary long‐term cooperation, and calls for mutual credible commitments and joint problem‐solving. Additionally, we highlight that even if dependency is asymmetric at the outset, it can develop bilateral features over time. Theoretically, our research offers an enhanced understanding of trust in buyer–supplier relationships, emphasizing its organizational as opposed to personal basis.
参考文献：Bhardwaj, A, Ketokivi, M. 2021. Bilateral Dependency and Supplier Performance Ambiguity in Supply Chain Contracting: Evidence From The Railroad Industry. Journal of Operation Management, 67: 49– 70. https://doi.org/10.1002/joom.1103
We investigate the impact of using a clear scoring rule in a sealed bid multi‐dimensional (A+B) procurement auction, as frequently used in government procurement. The central procurement agency in Chile (ChileCompra) asked for help to understand how concealing the scoring rule affected buyers. Using an experiment, we analyze the effect of transparently communicating the scoring rule on bidding outcomes by comparing the buyer's surplus and supplier profits when buyers expressly communicate the weight they place on a nonmonetary (B) attribute, versus when this information is concealed from bidders. In addition, we compare outcomes where the scoring rule is made visible only after the offers are submitted. If the scoring rule is not disclosed, outcomes are poorer for buyers, and sellers see their profits increase.
参考文献：Quiroga, BF, Moritz, BB, Guide, VDR. 2021. The Role of Transparency in Procurement: Revealed Versus Concealed Scoring Rules in Sealed Bid A + B Auctions. Journal of Operation Management, 67: 71– 81. https://doi.org/10.1002/joom.1104
参考文献：Ben‐Jebara, M, Modi, SB. 2021.Product Personalization and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis of the Pharmaceutical Industry. Journal of Operation Management, 67: 82– 104. https://doi.org/10.1002/joom.1109
Operations and supply chain management (OSCM) scholars have generally not engaged in the robust discourse over the extent and implications of science's replication crisis, perhaps because replication studies remain exceedingly rare in the discipline. In this manuscript, I encourage more replications. However, I also assume that such studies will remain rare. Therefore, it is argued that the replication crisis in OSCM can be partially addressed by conducting theory testing and refining research in a more systematic fashion that acknowledges researchers' and journals' incentives to publish new knowledge, while also efficiently helping to ensure that the foundations of that new knowledge are generalizable and not based on idiosyncratic, spurious, or questionable findings. Hence, I focus on ways to conduct a replication within a larger theory testing or refining study in a manner that makes it possible to explain the results, even if they differ from past research. This is achieved via enhanced transparency, designing research to include tests of nomological validity and account for the possibility that the results will not replicate, and more careful consideration of controls. The payoff from this investment in designing replication logic into theory testing and refining research would be that in the course of conducting normal science, we would be able to make much stronger claims about the veracity of our theories, facts, and predictions.
