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解析作者 | 唧唧堂经管理学写作小组：
Yangzhen
1. 沉默的大多数：美国私营企业与财务报告选择
本文基于全面的纳税申报表，分析了美国大中型私营企业的财务报告的选择。这些企业控制着超过9万亿美元的资本，远远超过各行各业的上市公司，但它们没有进行财务报告的强制要求。本文发现这些企业中，近三分之二没有编制经审计的基于通用会计准则（GAAP）的财务报表。基于代理理论的研究框架，本文发现企业规模、所有权分散程度、外部债务和商业信用等因素与企业选择编制经审计的基于通用会计准则（GAAP）财务报告正相关；而有形资产、企业年龄和内部债务通常与此编制审计过的财务报告负相关。研究表明：（1）股权资本和商业信用是解释（是否编制财务报告）行为的要素，而不仅仅是已有文献中所关注的债务因素；（2）公司的年轻程度(即初创企业）、成长性和研发（强度）与经审计的基于通用会计准则（GAAP）财务报告呈正相关，这些因素在促进企业编制财务报告中扮演着重要的监督作用；（3）许多公司违反了财务报告选择的标准解释，并且存在大量无法解释的异质性问题。本文也对未来研究提出了展望。
This study uses a comprehensive panel of tax returns to examine the financial reporting choices of medium-to-large private U.S. firms, a setting that controls over $9 trillion in capital, vastly outnumbers public U.S. firms across all industries, yet has no financial reporting mandates. We find that nearly two-thirds of these firms do not produce audited GAAP financial statements. Guided by an agency theory framework, we find that size, ownership dispersion, external debt, and trade credit are positively associated with the choice to produce audited GAAP financial statements, while asset tangibility, age, and internal debt are generally negatively related to this choice. Our findings reveal that (1) equity capital and trade credit exhibit significant explanatory power, suggesting that the primary focus in the literature on debt is too narrow; (2) firm youth, growth, and R&D are positively associated with audited GAAP reporting, reflecting important monitoring roles of financial reporting; and (3) many firms violate standard explanations for financial reporting choices and substantial unexplained heterogeneity in financial reporting remains. We conclude by identifying opportunities for future research.
原文：Lisowsky, P., & Minnis, M. (2020). The Silent Majority: Private U.S. Firms and Financial Reporting Choices. Journal of Accounting Research, 58(3), 547-588. doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12306
2. 为什么政治家会干预会计监管——意识形态与特定利益的作用
政治家们经常干预会计的监管。会计类文献表明，特殊利益对监管的捕获有助于解释这些干预措施。但是，一些会计准则会对经济社会产生广泛的影响，例如它们会影响收入分配或私营部门的补贴。对这些影响的看法却因政治人物的意识形态而异。因此，如果会计准则产生了这些影响，那么政治家的意识形态的作用就会凸显，并可以解释他们（为什么会）有关会计技术手段问题上的立场，而不仅仅是（由于）特定的利益压力。本文基于美国进行过的两次有关公允价值会计和员工认股权费用的政治辩论，以区分意识形态的作用与特定利益压力。在这两次辩论中，意识形态因素解释了政治家（为什么会）介入有关会计监管的经济后果（即对银行的紧急援助和高管薪酬）的辩论。一旦辩论集中在更多的技术手段的问题上，（政治家）有关特定利益的考量仍然是主导因素。
Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician’s ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician’s stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.
原文：Bischof, J., Daske, H., & Sextroh, C. J. (2020). Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests. Journal of Accounting Research, 58(3), 589-642. doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12300
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3. 战略性的子公司信息披露
尽管企业会在美国证券交易委员会（SEC）所要求的公司备案文件中披露子公司信息，以尽可能详尽地公开公司的地理足迹，但对披露质量的研究却很少，且有证据表明企业可能未完全按要求披露。本文基于跨国公司向国税局提供的外国子公司所在地的数据，研究其依据美国证券交易委员会（SEC）要求所披露10-K报告（注：10-K报告即美国上市企业年报）中表21部分所公开子公司信息的准确性。研究发现，总的来说，这些企业很少不披露相关（子公司）信息，这表明大多数公司都遵守表21的披露规则；并且通常情况下，表21的所披露的信息，可以成为重要子公司的所在地信息的代理变量。但是，当子公司处于避税天堂、媒体对公司的关注程度较高、公司收到美国证券交易委员会（SEC）意见函等有关表明企业信息披露质量较低的特征时，仍有证据表明企业会隐藏某些信息。
Although subsidiary disclosures in firms’ filings with the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC; Exhibit 21) represent the most granular required public disclosure of a firm’s geographic footprint, little is understood about the quality of the disclosure, and anecdotal evidence suggests firms may not fully comply with the disclosure requirements. We use data provided by multinational firms to the Internal Revenue Service regarding their foreign subsidiary locations to explore the accuracy of public subsidiary disclosures on Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K per SEC rules. The overall incidence of nondisclosure is low, suggesting that most firms comply with Exhibit 21 disclosure rules, and that for most applications, Exhibit 21 disclosures provide a reasonable proxy for locations of significant subsidiaries. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of nondisclosure, particularly when subsidiaries are in tax havens, when the firm is more highly scrutinized in the media, or when the firm has other characteristics consistent with low-quality disclosures such as SEC comment letters.
原文：Dyreng, S. D., Hoopes, J. L., Langetieg, P., & Wilde, J. H. (2020). Strategic Subsidiary Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 58(3), 643-692. doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12308
4. 信用评级对信息披露的影响：基于穆迪市政信用评级的证据
本文研究了信用评级如何影响市政债务发行人的信息披露决策。利用穆迪（Moody）2010年重新调整市政信用等级而导致的信用评级水平变化（这个）外生事件，发现相对于未受影响的自治市来说，受该事件影响的自治市会明显地少披露所需持续财务信息。与债务人对驱动这些结果的信息的需求减少相同，当市政债券由更多事前依赖披露的投资者持有时，信息披露的减少会更明显。但是，当发行人受专业的发行承销商的监督或受到联邦资金的直接监管时，其很少会减少信息披露。总体而言，本文发现较高的信用评级水平会降低投资者在市政市场上对信息披露的需求，尤其在投资者需求较低时，承销商和直接监管机构在维持信息披露水平方面起着一定作用。
This paper examines how credit rating levels affect municipal debt issuers’ disclosure decisions. Using exogenous upgrades in credit rating levels caused by the recalibration of Moody’s municipal ratings scale in 2010, we find that upgraded municipalities significantly reduce their disclosure of required continuing financial information, relative to unaffected municipalities. Consistent with a reduction in debtholders’ demand for information driving these results, the reduction in disclosure is greater when municipal bonds are held by investors who relied more on disclosure ex ante. However, we also find that the reduction in disclosure does not manifest when issuers are monitored by underwriters with greater issuer-specific expertise and when issuers are subject to direct regulatory enforcement through the receipt of federal funding. Overall, our results suggest that higher credit rating levels lower investor demand for disclosure in the municipal market, and highlight the role of underwriters and direct regulatory enforcement in maintaining disclosure levels when investor demand is low.
原文：Gillette, J. R., Samuels, D., & Zhou, F. S. (2020). The Effect of Credit Ratings on Disclosure: Evidence from the Recalibration of Moody's Municipal Ratings. Journal of Accounting Research, 58(3), 693-739. doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12307
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5. 移动设备的使用如何影响投资者对企业信息披露的反应
本文研究了投资者信息访问工具的特征如何影响其对信息披露的反应。基于信息（获取中的）选择性（即允许投资者可选择信息的出现顺序和阅读的部分）和空间布局（即如何显示信息）的背景下研究了相关问题。实验结果与信息选择性相符，如果在计算机屏幕上查看企业所披露内容，会改善投资者的判断力。相反，与认知超负荷（的发现）相一致，较小的屏幕上（例如在移动设备上）查看时，信息（获取中的）选择性会损害投资者的判断。进一步实验表明，更改企业披露的信息显示方式，如减少（投资者阅读时翻页）滚动需求，可以改善投资者在较小（或移动）屏幕上的阅读时的判断力。本文的发现具有一定警示意义，企业和监管机构在扩大所披露的信息范围（可选择性）时，却忽视了（投资者等受众）访问这些信息时屏幕尺寸的问题。
I examine how characteristics of investors’ information access tools change investors’ reactions to firm disclosures. I examine my research question in the context of information choice (i.e., allowing investors to choose the order of information and sections to read within a disclosure) and spatial layout (i.e., how information is displayed when viewing the disclosure). Results of an experiment are consistent with information choice improving investors’ judgments if the disclosure is viewed on a computer screen. Conversely, and consistent with cognitive overload, information choice harms investors’ judgments if the disclosure is viewed on a smaller screen, such as that of a mobile device. Follow-up experiments show that changing the disclosure presentation to reduce the need to scroll is one way to improve investors’ judgments on a smaller (or mobile) screen. My findings caution firms and regulators about expanding information choice within disclosures without considering the screen size used to access the disclosure.
原文：Grant, S. M. (2020). How Does Using a Mobile Device Change Investors’ Reactions to Firm Disclosures? Journal of Accounting Research, 58(3), 741-775. doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12299
6. 公众关注与审计师选择：基于胡润富豪榜的证据
不利的客户宣传可能会导致对经审计的财务报表受到（更严格的）监管审查，并给审计师带来政治成本。基于控股股东出现在中国“胡润富豪榜”所引起的客户宣传变化，本文分析了审计师保守性会随客户（不利的）宣传而增加的假设。研究表明，当(企业主)出现在富豪榜后，审计师会向客户出示更多的负面审计意见，并收取更高的费用。此外，审计师会战略性地回应具有不同属性的客户，对于那些以较为可疑的方式积累财富的客户，审计师会进行更严格的审计报告，以更好地保护自己免受监管审查；对于没有这种属性的客户，审计师主要依靠增加审计费用来应对上市后审计风险（的增加）。研究还表明，(企业主)出现在富豪榜的所产生影响，通常集中在声誉关注度更高的大型审计机构或报告风格较为保守的审计师中。研究探讨了审计师如何应对与公众关注相关的政治风险，对审计和政治成本假说相关的研究做出了贡献。
