Abstract：We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration, have severe behavioral constraints because the fines induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration. Incorporating reciprocity preferences into the theory explains the observed behavioral patterns and helps us develop a new mechanism that is more robust and achieves high rates of truth-telling and efficiency. Our results highlight the importance of tailoring implementation mechanisms to the underlying behavioral environment.
参考文献：Fehr, Ernst, Michael Powell, and Tom Wilkening. 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms." American Economic Review, 111 (4): 1055-91.
Abstract：This paper studies how changes in oil supply expectations affect the oil price and the macroeconomy. Using a novel identification design, exploiting institutional features of OPEC and high-frequency data, I identify an oil supply news shock. These shocks have statistically and economically significant effects. Negative news leads to an immediate increase in oil prices, a gradual fall in oil production, and an increase in inventories. This has consequences for the US economy: activity falls, prices and inflation expectations rise, and the dollar depreciates, providing evidence for a strong channel operating through supply expectations.
参考文献：Känzig, Diego R. 2021. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Supply News: Evidence from OPEC Announcements." American Economic Review, 111 (4): 1092-1125.
Abstract：This paper studies the large concentration of retirement behavior around statutory retirement ages, a puzzling stylized fact. To investigate this fact, I estimate bunching responses to 644 pension benefit discontinuities, using administrative data on the universe of German retirees. Financial incentives alone cannot explain retirement patterns, but there is a large direct effect of statutory retirement ages. I argue that the framing of statutory ages as reference points for retirement provides a plausible explanation. Simulations based on a model with reference dependence highlight that shifting statutory ages via pension reforms is an effective policy to influence retirement behavior.
参考文献：Seibold, Arthur. 2021. "Reference Points for Retirement Behavior: Evidence from German Pension Discontinuities." American Economic Review, 111 (4): 1126-65.
Abstract：We develop an equivalence between the equilibrium effects of incomplete information and those of two behavioral distortions: myopia, or extra discounting of the future; and anchoring of current behavior to past behavior, as in models with habit persistence or adjustment costs. We show how these distortions depend on higher-order beliefs and GE mechanisms, and how they can be disciplined by evidence on expectations. We finally illustrate the use of our toolbox with a quantitative application in the context of inflation, a bridge to the HANK literature, and an extension to networks.
参考文献：Angeletos, George-Marios, and Zhen Huo. 2021. "Myopia and Anchoring." American Economic Review, 111 (4): 1166-1200.
Abstract：We examine US children whose parents won the lottery to trace out the effect of financial resources on college attendance. The analysis leverages federal tax and financial aid records and substantial variation in win size and timing. While per-dollar effects are modest, the relationship is weakly concave, with a high upper bound for amounts greatly exceeding college costs. Effects are smaller among low-SES households, not sensitive to how early in adolescence the shock occurs, and not moderated by financial aid crowd-out. The results imply that households derive consumption value from college, and household financial constraints alone do not inhibit attendance.
参考文献：Bulman, George, Robert Fairlie, Sarena Goodman, and Adam Isen. 2021. "Parental Resources and College Attendance: Evidence from Lottery Wins." American Economic Review, 111 (4): 1201-40.
Abstract：US policy increasingly ties payments for providers to performance on quality measures, though little empirical evidence guides the design of such incentives. I deploy administrative data to study a large federal program that penalizes hospitals with high readmissions rates. Using policy-driven variation in the penalty incentive across hospitals for identification, I find that hospital responses to the penalty account for two-thirds of the observed decrease in readmissions over this period, as well as a decrease in heart attack mortality. Quality improvement accounts for about one-half of the decrease in readmissions; the remainder is explained by selective admission of returning patients.
参考文献：Gupta, Atul. 2021. "Impacts of Performance Pay for Hospitals: The Readmissions Reduction Program." American Economic Review, 111 (4): 1241-83.
Abstract：Between 1921 and 1956, French colonial governments organized medical campaigns to treat and prevent sleeping sickness. Villagers were forcibly examined and injected with medications with severe, sometimes fatal, side effects. We digitized 30 years of archival records to document the locations of campaign visits at a granular geographic level for five central African countries. We find that greater campaign exposure reduces vaccination rates and trust in medicine, as measured by willingness to consent to a blood test. We examine relevance for present-day health initiatives; World Bank projects in the health sector are less successful in areas with greater exposure.
参考文献：Lowes, Sara, and Eduardo Montero. 2021. "The Legacy of Colonial Medicine in Central Africa." American Economic Review, 111 (4): 1284-1314.
Abstract：This paper studies whether adverse selection can rationalize a universal mandate for unemployment insurance (UI). Building on a unique feature of the unemployment policy in Sweden, where workers can opt for supplemental UI coverage above a minimum mandate, we provide the first direct evidence for adverse selection in UI and derive its implications for UI design. We find that the unemployment risk is more than twice as high for workers who buy supplemental coverage. Exploiting variation in risk and prices, we show how 25–30 percent of this correlation is driven by risk-based selection, with the remainder driven by moral hazard. Due to the moral hazard and despite the adverse selection we find that mandating the supplemental coverage to individuals with low willingness-to-pay would be suboptimal. We show under which conditions a design leaving choice to workers would dominate a UI system with a single mandate. In this design, using a subsidy for supplemental coverage is optimal and complementary to the use of a minimum mandate.
参考文献：Landais, Camille, Arash Nekoei, Peter Nilsson, David Seim, and Johannes Spinnewijn. 2021. "Risk-Based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications." American Economic Review, 111 (4): 1315-55.
Abstract：We revisit one of the results in Cicala (2015) and show that the previously estimated large and significant effects of US electricity restructuring on fuel procurement are not robust to the presence of outliers. Using methodologies from the robust statistics literature, we estimate the effect to be less than one-half of the previous estimate and not statistically different from zero. The robust methodology also identifies as outliers the plants owned by a single company whose coal contracts were renegotiated before discussions about restructuring even started.
参考文献：Han, Jin Soo, Jean-François Houde, Arthur A. van Benthem, and Jose Miguel Abito. 2021. "When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in US Electricity Generation: Comment." American Economic Review, 111 (4): 1356-72.
Abstract：The average effect of deregulatory policies on fuel prices at coal-fired power plants is strongly influenced by plants that were initially paying the highest prices for fuel. Primary sources document that these plants were locked into long-term, high-cost fuel contracts, and only secured market rates post-deregulation. While these plants' fuel costs were unusual, their response to deregulation was not: both coal- and gas-fired plants reduce fuel prices one-for-one with the amount they were initially paying above their neighbors' costs. Our understanding of deregulation is not improved by excluding those who stand to benefit most.
