许多投资者都跟格隆汇平台反映希望能多看到价值投资的内容，为此我们特意组织力量按照问题由浅至深的顺序汇总并翻译了巴菲特及其挚友查理芒格近几年在各大公开场合回答的关于估值的问题。您即将看到的可能是史上最全股神问答整理，希望对您有所帮助。
We don’t formally have discount rates. Every time we start talking about this, Charlie reminds me that I’ve never prepared a spreadsheet, but I do in my mind.
我们没有正式的折现率。每次我们聊起这个话题的时候查理都会提醒我我还没准备试算表格，但是我脑子里已经在算了呀。
We just try to buy things that we’ll earn more from than a government bond – the question is, how much higher? If government bonds are at 2%, we’re not going to buy a business that will return 4%.
我们买的就是比ZF债券回报高的投资—问题在于，高多少呢？要是ZF债券是2%的回报率，低于4%的企业我们一般都不会买。
I don’t call Charlie every day and ask him, “What’s our hurdle rate?” We’ve never used the term.
我也不会每天给查理打电话问他“我们要求最低回报率是多少？”因为我们压根不用这东西。
Munger: The concept of a hurdle rate makes nothing but sense, but a lot of people using this make terrible errors. I don’t think there’s any substitute for thinking about a whole lot of investment options and thinking about the returns from each.
查理芒格：要求回报率这个概念有意义但是没用，很多人都错用了这个东西。我觉得想到投资选择和每个投资的回报都没有替代品吧。
The trouble isn’t that we don’t have one [a hurdle rate] – we sort of do – but it interferes with logical comparison. If I know I have something that yields 8% for sure, and something else came along at 7%, I’d reject it instantly. It’s like the mail-order-bride firm offering a bride who has AIDS – I don’t need to waste a moment considering it. Everything is a function of opportunity cost.
问题不在于我们没有要求最低回报率这个东西，在于它会干扰逻辑思考。如果我确定我有一个能回报8%的项目，还有一个是7%，我马上就会把另一个拒绝掉。就好像邮购新娘（澳大利亚电视剧）里给你邮一个携带艾滋病毒的新娘一样—我根本不会浪费时间去考虑。一切都是机会成本在起作用。（查理芒格在这里的意思是指要求最低回报率会干扰到显而易见的投资选择。）
Buffett: I’ve been on 19 boards and seen a zillion presentations projecting a certain IRR [internal rate of return]. If the boards had burned them all, they’d have been better off. The IRR is based on what the CEO wants. The numbers are made up.
巴菲特：我在19个公司的董事会都有席位，看过了无数有具体IRR数字的报告。要是董事会能把它们都烧了，公司会做得更好的。IRR的数字完全就是根据CEO想要的设置，都是编的。
Munger: I have a young friend who sells private partnership interests to investors, and it’s hard to get returns in that field. I asked him, “What returns do you tell them you can get?” He said “20%.” I said, “How did you come up with that number?” He said, “If I told them anything lower, they wouldn’t give me the money.”
查理芒格：我有一个忘年交是卖私人合伙利息给投资者的，这一行几乎就没有回报可言。我问他，“你一般跟你的客户说回报率是多少？”他说“20%。”我又问，“为啥挑这个数字？”他答道，“我说的再低点他们不会乖乖给我钱啊。”
Buffett: There’s no one in the world who can earn 20% on big money. It’s amazing how gullible pension funds and other investors are. They want it so badly that they’ll believe even total nonsense.
巴菲特：世界上根本没人能用一大笔钱赚20%啊。养老基金和其他投资者真是太容易上当受骗了。他们贪婪到都愿意相信毫无根据的谎言。
Q: Is the skill of judging risk just as important as calculating intrinsic value?
问：判断风险的能力是否和计算内在价值的能力同样重要？
• Source：BRK Annual Meeting 2000
• 来源：2000年BRK年会
• Time：April 29th 2000
• 时间：2000年4月29日
We perceive risk as items that impair future business. Wants to have mathematical risk on their side over a group of decisions. Not in the business of assuming a lot of risk in business. We look for moats around businesses. We look for castles (businesses) that have a moat surrounding it which is expanding as a primary consideration of a great business.
我们把风险看做影响未来生意的一种事物。我们想要让数学上的风险存在于群体决策之上而不是在承担生意上的大量风险的过程之中。我们寻找生意的护城河，我们也寻找那些有护城河围绕的城堡（生意）而且它们的护城河能够延伸成为使生意做大做强的首要考虑因素。
Q: What valuation metrics do you use?
问：您用的是什么估值指标？
• Source：BRK Annual Meeting 2002 Tilson Notes
• 来源：BRK 2002年股东大会 Tilson Notes
• Time：2002
• 时间：2002
The appropriate multiple for a business compared to the S&P 500 depends on its return on equity and return on incremental invested capital. I wouldn't look at a single valuation metric like relative P/E ratio. I don't think price-to-earnings, price-to-book or price-to-sales ratios tell you very much. People want a formula, but it's not that easy. To value something, you simply have to take its free cash flows from now until kingdom come and then discount them back to the present using an appropriate discount rate. All cash is equal. You just need to evaluate a business's economic characteristics.
对于生意来说一个合理的价值倍数与标准普尔500指数相比孰优孰劣取决于生意的股本回报率和增量投资资本回报率。我不会只盯着像PE这样的单一估值指标看。我也不认为像市盈率、股价净值比、股价营收比这样的指标能告诉你什么有价值的信息。人们想要一个规律的公式，但这并不容易。想要对某门生意进行估值，你只需要掌握它从现在开始直到玩完的自由现金流量动向然后把它们以一个合理的折扣率折现回来。现金面值多少就是多少，你只需要评估这门生意的经济特征。
Q: What do you think of the use of book values in making investment decisions?
问：您对投资决策中对账面价值的使用有什么看法？
• Source：BRK Annual Meeting 1995
• 来源：BRK 1995年股东大会
• Time：1995
• 时间：1995
Book value is virtually not a consideration in investment decision-making at Berkshire. Their pursuit of high return businesses usually leads to companies with minimal book values. He added that the book value approach could work well with small sums of money, like Graham had managed, and that the approach had worked well for Graham-type practitioners like Buffett’s friend Walter Schloss. The three most important concepts conveyed by Graham in ““The Intelligent Investor”” were the investor’s attitude toward the market, the ““margin of safety””, and the practice of looking at companies as businesses, not stocks.
在Berkshire公司，账面价值极少作为投资决策过程中的考量因素。他们对高回报率生意的追求通常会把公司注意力引向最小账面价值上来。他还补充说计算账面价值的方法与少量资金相搭配时会运作更加良好。
就像Graham所做的一样，这种方法在其他与之类似的从业者们身上也发挥了积极作用，像巴菲特先生的朋友Walter Schloss。Graham所提出的的最重要的三个概念即“聪明的投资者”，即投资者对市场的态度，还有“安全系数”，以及学着把公司看成生意本身，而不是股票。
Munger proffered that ““projections generally do more harm than good, and are usually prepared by persons who have some sort of an interest in the outcome of actions based on the projections. They often have a precision that’s deceptive.”” Buffett added that they’ve never looked at a projection in connection with an equity or business that they’ve acquired. ““It’s a ritual to justify doing what an executive or a board wanted to do in the first place.”
查理芒格提出“推算在通常情况下带来的负面影响会大于正面影响，推算也通常是由那些对推算所带来的结果感兴趣的人所提出的。他们的所谓精确结果多数情况下是具有欺骗性的。” 巴菲特补充说这类人从不关注推算本身与资产和他们已经得到的生意之间的联系。“证明什么是决策者正在做的或者什么是董事会想做的已经成为了一种惯例。”
• Source：BRK Annual Meeting 2007 Tilson Notes
• 来源：BRK 2007年度股东大会 Tilson Notes
• Time：2007
• 时间：2007
We have a bias toward investing in the U.S., but I bought my first stock outside the United States at least 50 years ago and we’ve looked at plenty of marketable securities overseas. It would make no difference to us if Coke was headquartered in Amsterdam.
我们偏爱在美国本土市场投资，但是我至少在五十年前就购买了第一支美国市场以外的股票而且我们已经观察了大量的海外有价证券，即使可口可乐总部设在阿姆斯特丹也对我们不会造成任何影响。
But nobody outside the U.S. has heard of us. Eitan Wertheimer found us. The Iscar acquisition has contributed to our becoming better known. Eitan is going through a procedure to get us better known abroad. [Buffett did not give any details about this “procedure”.]
但此时仍然没有任何美国以外的生意人听说过我们，然后Eitan Wertheimer找到了我们，Iscar公司的收购使我们开始出名，Eitan在日后也使得我们更加名声大噪【Buffett对于这个过程没有透露任何细节】
I haven’t done a good selling job abroad. We could be fairly criticized for not doing enough to become better known [overseas].
我在海外的销售业务做的并不十分优秀,所以我们理应为没有在海外闯出更好的名声而被批评。
We own stocks in Germany and 4% of POSCO, which is based in South Korea – it’s now worth over $1 billion. I can think of a half dozen investments [we currently have] outside the U.S. We don’t have to report them in our [SEC Form] 13F, so they don’t get picked up like our domestic investments.
我们在德国的股票和4%POSCO公司的股权，也就是韩国的那家公司----现在价值超过一百万美元，我能想到半打我们不需要向13F报告的海外投资【我们当前所进行的】而且它们不会像国内投资一样被记录在案。
We have to report our holdings in Germany once we reach 3% ownership. So if we buy a $10 billion [market-cap] company, that means once we buy $300 million worth we have to tell the world, and Charlie and I don’t like doing that. It screws up our future buying, so the 3% rule is a real minus.I can assure you that the entire world is on our radar screen and we hope to be on its radar screen.
当我们在德国任一家公司的股票持有权到达3%的时候需要上报，举例来说就是如果我们买入了一家市值一百亿的公司，当我们持股三亿的时候就需要公开。但我和查理并不想这样做因为这会搅黄我们未来的购入计划。所以这个3%规则实在是抠。我们可以确信的是全世界都在我们的商业规划之中而我们也很乐意作为全世界的商业规划的一份子。
Munger: John Templeton made a fortune being in Japan very early and stocks there went to 30-40x earnings. It was an admirable piece of investment, but you know, we did alright during the same period.
查理芒格：John Templeton早早的在日本就赚了大钱，买入的股票也获得了30-40倍的收益，这是一笔值得称道的投资，但是你懂的，我们在同一时期也做到了~
Q: If you can’t talk with management, and can’t read the annual report, and didn’t know the price, but could only look at the financial statements, what metric would you look at?
问：如果你不能与管理层交流，不能看年报，也不知道股价，只能看到财务报表，你会关注哪一项指标？
• Source： BRK Annual Meeting 2008 Boodell Notes
• 来源：BRK 2008年度股东大会 Boodell Notes
• Time：2008
• 时间：2008
WB: Investing is laying out money now to get more money later on. Let’s leave the market price out. If you were buying a farm, you would think about bushels per acre — you are looking to the asset itself. Ask yourself: do I understand enough about the business so that the financials will be able to tell me meaningful things that will help me to foresee the statements in the future? I have bought stocks the way you describe. They were in businesses I understood, and if I could buy at 40% of X, I’d be okay with the margin of safety. If you don’t tell me the nature of the business, financial statements won’t tell me much. We’ve bought many securities, and with most, we’ve never met management. We use our general understanding of business and look to specifics from financial statements.
WB：投资就是布局现有的钱去赚更多的钱，我们先把市值放在一边，如果你买了一个农场，你会看看这个农场每英亩产多少蒲式耳的粮食----此时你就是在关注资产本身。问问你自己：我是否对这门生意足够熟悉从而使得当下它的财政状况能告诉我一些对未来的发展有价值的信息？我已经依据你们所描述的买入了股票，它们正处于一个我所了解的行业之中，如果我能买入它的40%,一个在安全边界之内的比值，如果你不告诉我它的业务性质，单纯的财务报表也无法告诉我更多。我们买了很多支证券，他们之中的大多数管理者我从未见过，我们只能运用生意常识来从财务报表中寻找细节信息。
CM: One metric catches people. We prefer businesses that drown in cash. An example of a different business is construction equipment. You work hard all year and there is your profit sitting in the yard. We avoid businesses like that. We prefer those that can write us a check at the end of the year.
CM：单一的估值指标固然抓人眼球，但我们更喜欢浸淫在现金里的生意，像那些出租施工设备之类的生意，劳劳碌碌一年到头，你的收益却和那些设备一样呆坐在小院里，我们会尽量避免做此类生意，我们更喜欢那些到了年底能给我们开出真金白银支票票的生意。
WB: We could value an apartment if we knew where the apartment is, and we know the monthly checks. I have bought a lot of things off the financials. There is a lot I wouldn’t buy even if it had the best management in the world, as it doesn’t make much difference in a bad business.
WB：我们可以通过得知一套楼盘的所在地来给这套楼盘估值，我们也能知道每月的分红是多少，我们根据财政状况买了很多这样的楼盘但也有很多本来我不会买的，即使它有世界上最好的管理，因为它在一个烂生意中起不了多大作用。
Q: How do you think about growth rates when you value businesses?
问：当你在给一项业务做估值的时候你怎么看待它的增长率？
• Source：BRK Annual Meeting 2004 Tilson Notes
• 来源：BRK 2004年度股东大会 Tilson Notes
• Time：2004
• 时间：2004
When the [long-term] growth rate is higher than the discount rate, then [mathematically] the value is infinity. This is the St. Petersburg Paradox, written about by Durand 30 years ago. [Click here for a copy of the original 1957 article. For more on this topic, I recommend Integrating the Outliers: Two Lessons from the St. Petersburg Paradox, by CSFB’s (now Legg Mason’s) Michael Mauboussin.].Some managements think this [that the value of their company is infinite]. It gets very dangerous to assume high growth rates to infinity – that’s where people get into a lot of trouble. The idea of projecting extremely high growth rates for a long period of time has cost investors an awful lot of money. Go look at top companies 50 years ago: how many have grown at 10% for a long time? And [those that have grown] 15% is very rarified. Charlie and I are rarely willing to project high growth rates. Maybe we’re wrong sometimes and that costs us, but we like to be conservative.
如果一门生意的长期增长率大于折现率则理论上来说它的估值是无限的，这就是三十年前Durand提出的圣彼得堡悖论。一些管理者认为[对他们的公司估值无限大]这样把增长率估到无限大是很危险的，它会导致人们因此陷入麻烦。长期来说会导致投资者浪费大量资金，纵观五十年来的顶尖企业，有多少是能长期保持10%的增长率的？至于15%增长率的就更是比鸡嘴里的牙还少，Charlie和我很少愿意去预计高增长率，也许有的时候这样也会错，也会让我们付出代价，但我们仍然还是愿意保守一些。
[CM: If your growth rate is so high that you conclude the business has an infinite valuation, you have to use more realistic numbers. What else could anyone do?]
[CM:如果你的增长率高到你认为这门生意有着无限的增值空间的话，你就必须用更多的实际数据来佐证这一点。不然你还能怎么做？]
利益声明：本文内容和意见仅代表作者个人观点，作者未持有该公司股票，作者提供的信息和分析仅供投资者参考，据此入市，风险自担！
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