We analyze the information content of a digital footprint—that is, information that users leave online simply by accessing or registering on a Web site—for predicting consumer default. We show that even simple, easily accessible variables from a digital footprint match the information content of credit bureau scores. A digital footprint complements rather than substitutes for credit bureau information and affects access to credit and reduces default rates. We discuss the implications for financial intermediaries’ business models, access to credit for the unbanked, and the behavior of consumers, firms, and regulators in the digital sphere.
参考文献：Tobias Berg, Valentin Burg, Ana Gombović, Manju Puri, On the Rise of FinTechs: Credit Scoring Using Digital Footprints, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2020, Pages 2845–2897, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz099
We provide a new framework for using text as data in empirical models. The framework identifies salient information in unstructured text that can control for multidimensional heterogeneity among assets. We demonstrate the efficacy of the framework by reexamining principal-agent problems in residential real estate markets. We show that the agent-owned premiums reported in the extant literature dissipate when the salient textual information is included. The results suggest the previously reported agent-owned premiums suffer from an omitted variable bias, which prior studies incorrectly ascribed to market distortions associated with asymmetric information.
参考文献：Liu, C. H., Nowak, A. D., & Smith, P. S. (2019). Asymmetric or Incomplete Information about Asset Values? The Review of Financial Studies. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhz096
We examine the determinants of vertical acquisitions using product text linked to product vocabulary from input-output tables. We find that the innovation stage is important in understanding vertical integration. R&D-intensive firms are less likely to become targets of vertical acquisitions. In contrast, firms with patented innovation are more likely to sell to vertically related buyers. Firms’ R&D intensity is a more important deterrent to their vertical acquisitions when the provision of innovation incentives by potential acquirers is more difficult. The role of patents in fostering vertical acquisitions is more prevalent when potential buyers face a higher risk of holdup.
参考文献：Laurent Frésard, Gerard Hoberg, Gordon M Phillips, Innovation Activities and Integration through Vertical Acquisitions, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2020, Pages 2937–2976, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz106
We examine the role of cultural heritage in shaping U.S. CEOs’ attitudes toward uncertainty, in the context of their corporate acquisition decisions. We find that CEOs with a more uncertainty-avoiding cultural heritage are less likely to engage in acquisitions. Conditional on making an acquisition, uncertainty-averse CEOs prefer targets in familiar industries and targets that can be more easily integrated. The emphasis on cultural identity by CEOs’ parents and the ethnic composition of CEOs’ early life environment significantly influence the cultural transmission process. Cultural differences about uncertainty attitudes persist over multiple generations, but become less pronounced over time.
参考文献：Yihui Pan, Stephan Siegel, Tracy Yue Wang, The Cultural Origin of CEOs’ Attitudes toward Uncertainty: Evidence from Corporate Acquisitions, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2020, Pages 2977–3030, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz109
We document a political cycle in the investment decisions of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by using the constitutionally mandated election schedule in India as a source of exogenous variation in politicians’ incentive to cater to voters. Using a project-level investment database, we find that SOEs announce more capital expenditure projects in election years, especially in infrastructure, and in districts with close elections, high-ranking politicians, and left-wing incumbents. SOE projects in election years have negative announcement returns, suggesting a loss in shareholder value. These patterns are not seen in nongovernment firms or in off-election years.
参考文献：Shashwat Alok, Meghana Ayyagari, Politics, State Ownership, and Corporate Investments, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2020, Pages 3031–3087, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz102
Using a large panel of more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this study examines SOEs’ investment behavior surrounding 82 national elections in 25 European countries between 2001 and 2015. We find that SOEs increase their corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years. This effect is more pronounced in fixed timing and closely contested elections. The effect is also stronger in countries with low institutional quality, more centralized political systems, and state-controlled banking systems. In contrast, we find the matched non-SOEs significantly decrease their corporate investment during national election years.
参考文献：Qingyuan Li, Chen Lin, Li Xu, Political Investment Cycles of State-Owned Enterprises, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2020, Pages 3088–3129, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz090
We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers’ compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely with their weak-vote peers in the executive labor market, and when those peers perform well. Reductions occur following peers’ disclosures of revised pay and are proportional to those needed to retain firms’ relative positions in their peer groups. We conclude that the spillover effects of shareholder voting occur through both learning and compensation targeting channels.
参考文献：Diane K Denis, Torsten Jochem, Anjana Rajamani, Shareholder Governance and CEO Compensation: The Peer Effects of Say on Pay, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2020, Pages 3130–3173, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz104
In this study, we take a comprehensive look at asymmetry in pay for luck, which is the finding that CEOs are rewarded for good luck, but are not penalized to the same extent for bad luck. Our main takeaway, which is based on over 200 different specifications, is that there is no asymmetry in pay for luck. Our finding is important given that the literature widely accepts the idea of asymmetry in pay for luck and typically points to this as evidence of rent extraction.
参考文献：Naveen D Daniel, Yuanzhi Li, Lalitha Naveen, Symmetry in Pay for Luck, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2020, Pages 3174–3204, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz057
IPO firms’ rivals tend to experience performance declines following an IPO in the industry. Why? We estimate a dynamic structural oligopoly model to distinguish between alternative theories that can explain an industry’s evolution post-IPO. We find that most changes in rivals’ performance are due to industry trends that also drive IPOs. However, we also find some “competitive” IPOs where the IPO enhances the IPO firm’s performance at the expense of competitors. These findings help reconcile prior evidence of average performance reductions of both IPO firms and their rivals with well-known cases in which firms have benefited from going public.
参考文献：Matthew Spiegel, Heather Tookes, Why Does an IPO Affect Rival Firms?, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2020, Pages 3205–3249, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz081
We study when and why firms exercise real options. Using detailed project-level investment data, we find that the likelihood that a firm exercises a real option is strongly related to peer exercise behavior. Peer exercise decisions are as important in explaining exercise behavior as variables commonly associated with standard real option theories, such as volatility. We identify peer effects using localized exogenous variation in peer project exercise decisions and find evidence consistent with information externalities being important for exercise behavior.
参考文献：Paul H Décaire, Erik P Gilje, Jérôme P Taillard, Real Option Exercise: Empirical Evidence, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2020, Pages 3250–3306, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz092
