国际三大评级机构之一的穆迪下调了中国评级。一石激起千层浪，相比以前的“我们不care！”这次，无论是媒体、学者、经济学家还是政府机构都群起而攻之。市场上都是对于穆迪的口诛笔伐，根本看不到反面声音，不得不说舆论控制Good Job。
关于穆迪这次下调中国评级的具体情况，无论是媒体还是反驳类文章都只是概述了穆迪的观点。至于穆迪究竟说了似乎没人关心。笔者从穆迪官方网站上复制了这篇文章做一个梳理。（翻译不足之处望大家见谅，穆迪官网原文链接https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Chinas-rating-to-A1-from-Aa3-and-changes--PR_366139）
Singapore, May 24, 2017 -- Moody's InvestorsService has today downgraded China's long-term local currency and foreigncurrency issuer ratings to A1 from Aa3 and changed the outlook to stable fromnegative.
2017年5月24日，位于新加坡的穆迪下调中国长期本币和外币发行人评级，从Aa3下调至A1，并将评级展望从负面调整为稳定。
The downgrade reflects Moody's expectationthat China's financial strength will erode somewhat over the coming years, witheconomy-wide debt continuing to rise as potential growth slows. While ongoingprogress on reforms is likely to transform the economy and financial systemover time, it is not likely to prevent a further material rise in economy-widedebt, and the consequent increase in contingent liabilities for the government.
此次降级是穆迪对中国经济未来预期的体现。穆迪认为，未来几年，随着中国整体债务上涨以及潜在经济增长放缓，中国财政实力将被削弱。虽然，中国国内的改革进程在不断推进，但不认为其能够阻止整体债务扩张和政府或有债务的增长。
The stable outlook reflects our assessmentthat, at the A1 rating level, risks are balanced. The erosion in China's creditprofile will be gradual and, we expect, eventually contained as reforms deepen.The strengths of its credit profile will allow the sovereign to remainresilient to negative shocks, with GDP growth likely to stay strong compared toother sovereigns, still considerable scope for policy to adapt to support theeconomy, and a largely closed capital account.
从A1评级的角度来看，中国的风险较为平衡。中国信用质量的下降将是一个渐进的过程，穆迪预计改革的深入最终将控制其下降趋势，因为给予“稳定”的评级展望。由于中国的 GDP 增长率会保持在与其他主权政府相比较为强劲的水平，政府有相当大的政策空间来支持经济，并且资本账户基本处于封闭状态，因此中国仍可抵御负面冲击。
China's local currency and foreign currencysenior unsecured debt ratings are downgraded to A1 from Aa3. The senior unsecuredforeign currency shelf rating is also downgraded to (P)A1 from (P)Aa3.
中国的本币和外币高级无抵押债务评级从Aa3下调至A1，已核准但未发行的高级无抵押外币债务的评级也从(P)Aa3下调至(P)A1。
China's local currency bond and depositceilings remain at Aa3. The foreign currency bond ceiling remains at Aa3. Theforeign currency deposit ceiling is lowered to A1 from Aa3. China's short-termforeign currency bond and bank deposit ceilings remain Prime-1 (P-1).
中国的本币债券和存款评级仍为Aa3，外币债券评级仍为Aa3，外币存款评级已从 Aa3降至A1，短期外币债券和银行存款评级上限仍为Prime-1 (P-1) 。
RATINGS RATIONALE
评级理由
RATIONALE FOR THE RATING DOWNGRADE TO A1
评级下调至 A1 的理由
Moody's expects that economy-wide leveragewill increase further over the coming years. The planned reform program islikely to slow, but not prevent, the rise in leverage. The importance theauthorities attach to maintaining robust growth will result in sustained policystimulus, given the growing structural impediments to achieving current growthtargets. Such stimulus will contribute to rising debt across the economy as awhole.
穆迪预计未来几年中国经济整体杠杆率将进一步上升。改革有望减缓但不大可能阻止该趋势。鉴于实现当前经济增长目标存在越来越多的结构性障碍，中国政府将继续实施刺激政策，以维持经济强劲增长的目标。政策刺激将导致整体债务增加。
RISING DEBT WILL ERODE CHINA'S CREDITMETRICS, WITH ROBUST GROWTH INCREASINGLY RELIANT ON POLICY STIMULUS
由于中国经济增长对刺激政策的依赖性加大，债务上升将削弱中国的信用体系。
While China's GDP will remain very large, andgrowth will remain high compared to other sovereigns, potential growth islikely to fall in the coming years. The importance the Chinese authoritiesattach to growth suggests that the corresponding fall in official growthtargets is likely to be more gradual, rendering the economy increasinglyreliant on policy stimulus. At least over the near term, with monetary policylimited by the risk of fuelling renewed capital outflows, the burden ofsupporting growth will fall largely on fiscal policy, with spending bygovernment and government-related entities -- including policy banks andstate-owned enterprises (SOEs) -- rising.
虽然与其他主权国家相比，中国的GDP规模依旧很大，经济增长也会保持在较高水平，但未来几年潜在的增速可能会下降。中国政府对经济增长的重视意味着官方相应下调增长目标的速度可能会放缓，由此导致经济对于刺激政策的依赖更大。货币政策受到新一轮资本外流风险的制约，所以至少在短期内，政府将主要依靠财政政策来支持经济增长，造成政府和政府相关实体 (包括银行和国企) 的支出上升。
GDP growth has decelerated in recent yearsfrom a peak of 10.6% in 2010 to 6.7% in 2016. This slowdown largely reflects astructural adjustment that we expect to continue. Looking ahead, we expectChina's growth potential to decline to close to 5% over the next five years,for three reasons. First, capital stock formation will slow as investmentaccounts for a diminishing share of total expenditure. Second, the fall in theworking age population that started in 2014 will accelerate. Third, we do notexpect a reversal in the productivity slowdown that has taken place in the lastfew years, despite additional investment and higher skills.
近几年，中国GDP增速已经下降，从2010年10.6%的近年高点降至2016年6.7%。增长放缓在很大程度上反映了中国经济的结构性调整，我们预计这种趋势将会持续。未来5年，中国经济的潜在增速将降至近5%，原因有以下3点：首先，随着投资在总支出中的占比逐渐下降，资本存量将会减少；其次，2014年开始的劳动人口萎缩将会加快；第三，尽管投资增加及生产技术提高，但我们预计过去几年出现的生产率放缓势头不会逆转。
Official GDP growth targets have alsoadjusted downwards gradually and the authorities' emphasis is progressivelyshifting towards the quality rather than the quantity of growth. However, theadjustment in official targets is unlikely to be as fast as the slowdown inpotential growth as robust economic growth is essential to fulfilment of thecurrent Five Year Plan and appears to be considered by the authorities asimportant for the maintenance of economic and social stability.
官方GDP增长目标也在逐渐下调，政府的重点逐步从经济增速转向经济质量。但是，由于强劲的经济增长对实现十三五计划十分重要，并且中国也可能认为这对维持经济和社会稳定性至关重要，故而官方调整增长目标的幅度不大可能与经济潜在增长放缓的幅度一致。
As a consequence, notwithstanding themoderate general government budget deficit in 2016 of around 3% of GDP, weexpect the government's direct debt burden to rise gradually towards 40% of GDPby 2018 and closer to 45% by the end of the decade, in line with the 2016 debtburden for the median of A-rated sovereigns (40.7%) and higher than the medianof Aa-rated sovereigns (36.7%).
因此，尽管2016年一般政府预算赤字不高，约占GDP的3%，但我们预计到2018年和2020年，政府债务将逐渐升至GDP的40%，或者接近45%，与A评级主权政府2016年债务负担的中值(40.7%) 一致，同时又高于Aa评级主权政府的中值 (36.7%)。
We also expect indirect and contingentliabilities to increase. We estimate that in 2016 the outstanding amount ofpolicy bank loans and of bonds issued by Local Government Financing Vehicles(LGFVs) increased by a combined 6.2% of 2015 GDP, after 5.5% the previous year.In addition to investment by LGFVs, investment by other SOEs increasedmarkedly. Similar increases in financing and spending by the broader publicsector are likely to continue in the next few years in order to maintain GDPgrowth around the official targets.
我们也预计政府的间接债务和或有负债将会增长。我们预计，2016年政策性银行的贷款余额和地方政府融资平台 (平台公司) 的未偿债券余额在2015年GDP中的占比合计增长了6.2%，高于上年的5.5%。除了平台公司的投资之外，其他国企投资显著增长。未来几年公共部门融资和支出的增长可能会持续，从而将GDP增速维持在官方目标左右的水平。
More broadly, we forecast that economy-widedebt of the government, households and non-financial corporates will continueto rise, from 256% of GDP at the end of last year according to the Institute ofInternational Finance. This is consistent with the gradual approach todeleveraging being taken by the Chinese authorities and will happen becauseeconomic activity is largely financed by debt in the absence of a sizeableequity market and sufficiently large surpluses in the corporate and governmentsectors. While such debt levels are not uncommon in highly-rated countries, theytend to be seen in countries which have much higher per capita incomes, deeperfinancial markets and stronger institutions than China's, features whichenhance debt-servicing capacity and reduce the risk of contagion in the eventof a negative shock.
我们预计由政府部门、家庭部门和非金融企业部门构成的整体债务将自去年年底占GDP的 256% (国际金融协会数据)水平继续增长。这符合中国政府逐步去杠杆的调控路径。债务增长的原因是因为没有足够大规模的股市承接以及足够高的企业和政府盈余支撑。经济活动的资金主要源自债务。虽然上述债务水平在高评级国家或地区并不罕见，但这些国家或地区的人均收入水平、金融市场发达度及体制健全性均优于中国，这些特征可提高偿债能力，并降低发生负面冲击时的蔓延风险。
Taken together, we expect direct government,indirect and economy-wide debt to continue to rise, signalling an erosion ofChina's credit profile which is best reflected now in an A1 rating.
综上所述，我们预计政府的直接、间接债务和整体债务将继续上升。这意味着中国信用质量下降，符合当前的A1评级。
REFORMS WILL NOT FULLY OFFSET THE RISE INECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RISK
改革不会完全抵消上升的经济风险和金融风险
The authorities are part of the way through areform program intended to sustain and enhance the quality of growth over thelonger term, as well as to reduce the risks to the economy and the financialsystem posed by high corporate and, in particular, SOE debt. One relatedobjective is to contain, and ultimately reduce, SOE leverage.
政府已在逐步落实改革计划，目的是维持经济长期增长、提升经济质量及降低企业 (尤其是国企)债务对经济和金融体系造成的风险。其中一个目标是控制并最终降低国企杠杆率。
The authorities' commitment to reform isclear. It is quite likely that their efforts will, over time, improve theallocation of capital in the economy. Over the nearer term, the authoritieshave taken steps to contain the rise in SOE debt and to discourage some SOEs fromfurther domestic and external investment, particularly in over capacitysectors.
政府改革的决心明确。改革很可能会逐渐改善资本在经济中的资产错配现象。短期内政府已采取措施控制国企债务增长，并抑制部分国企在国内外进行投资的规模，尤其是对产能过剩行业的投资。
However, we do not think that the reformeffort will have sufficient impact, sufficiently quickly, to contain theerosion of credit strength associated with the combination of risingeconomy-wide leverage and slower growth. In particular, in our view, the keymeasures introduced to date will have a limited impact on productivity and theefficiency with which capital is allocated over the foreseeable future.
但是，我们认为改革不足以立刻对经济杠杆率上升和经济增长放缓共同对信用体系的损害产生抑制作用。穆迪认为，迄今为止，落实的主要措施对未来生产率和资本配置效率只有有限的影响。
For example, one key set of reforms is theprogram of debt-equity swaps which aims to lower leverage in parts of the SOEsector, transferring the associated risks to the banking sector. At present, weestimate that the value of swaps announced is a very small fraction -- around1% -- of SOE liabilities. Moreover, there is very little transparency about theterms of these transactions or their likely impact on SOEs' and banks'creditworthiness.
例如，作为主要改革内容之一的债转股旨在降低部分国企杠杆率，将相关风险转向银行业。根据我们的测算，目前已公布的债转股交易在国企负债中的占比极低，约为1%。此外，关于上述交易的条款或其对国企及银行信用度潜在影响的透明度也非常低。
Other measures intended to improve investmentallocation include negative lists on investment in excess capacity sectors andthe introduction of mixed ownership. The former will likely reduce the majorlosses on investments of the past. However, excess capacity sectors onlyaccount for a small proportion of total investment. Only limited improvement inthe allocation of capital would result from such measures. Meanwhile, mixedownership is at a very preliminary stage, having been introduced in only a fewdozen SOEs, and on too small a scale for now to have any impact on productivityin the economy as a whole.
其他改善资本错配的措施包括制定产能过剩行业的投资负面清单及进行混合所有制改革。前者可能会降低过去发生的某些重大投资损失。但是，对于产能过剩行业的投资仅占总投资的一小部分。上述措施对资本错配的改善有限。与此同时，混合所有制改革处于非常初级的阶段，仅在少数国企开展，目前规模很小，不足以对经济整体生产力产生影响。
Looking beyond the corporate sector, thefinancial sector remains under-developed, notwithstanding reforms introduced toimprove the provision of credit; pricing of risk remains incomplete, with thecost of debt still partly determined by assumptions of government support topublic sector or other entities perceived to be strategic. And with increasedscrutiny of capital outflows, the capital account remains largely closed. Whilethat insulates the economy and financial system from global volatility, it alsoconstrains the development of domestic capital markets by limiting the flow ofinward and outbound capital.
除了企业部门外，金融部门改革虽然改善了信贷供应，但行业发展依然不足，风险定价尚不完整，债务成本在一定程度上仍由政府向公共领域或其他具有战略意义的产业所决定。由于政府加大了对资本外流的审查力度，资本项基本处于封闭状态。尽管这保护了经济和金融体系免受全球波动性的影响，但也限制了资本流动，因而制约了国内资本市场的发展。
Overall, we believe that the authorities'reform efforts are likely, over time, to achieve some measure of economicrebalancing and improvement in the allocation of capital. But we think thatprogress will be too slow to arrest the rise in economy-wide leverage.
整体来看，我们认为政府的改革措施可能在一定程度上逐步改善经济结构和资本错配现象。但我们认为其进展会较慢，无法遏制经济体系杠杆率的上升。RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK
稳定评级展望的理由
The stable outlook reflects our assessmentthat, at the A1 rating level, risks are balanced.
从A1评级的角度来看，中国的风险较为平衡。
China's credit profile incorporates a numberof important strengths, most notably its very large and still fast-growingeconomy. The government's control of parts of the economy and financial systemand cross-border financial flows provides policy and financial scope tomaintain economic, financial and social stability in the near term. Inparticular, China's largely closed capital account significantly reduces therisks that financial instability could arise as it attempts to reduce leveragewhen the economy has been reliant on new debt.
中国的信用状况综合了多项优势，最明显的是其经济规模巨大且仍在快速增长。政府对经济和金融领域及跨境金融流动的控制提供了在短期内维持经济、金融和社会稳定性的政策和财政空间。在经济目前仍依赖债务的情况下，中国试图降低杠杆率可能会导致金融动荡，不过，基本被封闭的资本项大大降低了该风险。
Large household savings at around 40% ofincomes, according to the IMF and OECD, reinvested within China, provide amplefinancing for new debt. As long as liquidity can be quickly funnel led to whereit is needed, financial stability risks will remain low.
根据IMF和OECD数据，中国家庭储蓄约占收入的40%在其国内提供再投资资金，这为新增债务提供了充足的资金。只要流动性可迅速导向有资金需求的领域，金融稳定风险将会维持在较低水平。
In addition, China's sizeable foreignexchange reserves of around $3 trillion give the central bank abundantfinancial power to preserve the stability of the currency and thereby avoidfinancially destabilising scenarios of capital flight.
此外，中国约3万亿美元的庞大外汇储备使央行具备充足的财力保持汇率稳定，从而避免资本外流造成金融动荡。
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
可能引起评级上调/下调的原因
The stable outlook denotes broadly balancedupside and downside risks. Evidence that structural reforms are effectivelystemming the rise in leverage without an increase in risks in the banking andshadow banking sectors could be positive for China's credit profile and rating.
稳定评级展望说明上行和下行风险基本平衡。如有迹象表明结构性改革有效控制了杠杆率上升，而并未增加银行业和影子银行的风险，则可能对中国的信用质量和评级具有正面影响。
Conversely, negative rating pressures couldstem from leverage continuing to rise faster than we currently expect andcontinuing to involve significant misallocation of capital that weighs ongrowth in the medium term. In particular, in this scenario, the risk offinancial tensions and contagion from specific credit events could rise,potentially to levels no longer consistent with an A1 rating.
与之相反，如有迹象表明杠杆率继续上升，速度超过我们现在的预期，并且资本错配现象依然严重，这在中期内将影响经济增长，从而可能会对中国的评级产生负面压力。尤其是在上述情况下，财政压力和特定信用事件的蔓延风险可能会上升，并可能达到不再符合A1评级的水平。
上图为穆迪给予中国评级的逻辑推理表。纵观穆迪报告全文，实在难以找出漏洞。想要推翻穆迪的结论只有从模型可靠性、匹配度与假设基础入手。可反观国内的反驳观点，要么是偷换概念、要么是语无伦次、要么是强词夺理的辩驳。而且，嘴上一边说不合理，实际操作中却在按照穆迪的警告偷偷改正。（笔者也是无语了，接受别人的批评和建议就这么难吗？）
反驳观点一：此次穆迪下调我国主权信用评级，是基于“顺周期”评级的不恰当方法，其关于中国实体经济债务规模将快速增长、相关改革措施难见成效、政府将继续通过刺激政策维持经济增速等观点，在一定程度上高估了中国经济面临的困难，低估了中国政府深化供给侧结构性改革和适度扩大总需求的能力。
实际情况：评级不按“顺周期”推演难道按“逆周期”？中国经济发展趋势有丝毫拐头迹象吗？“权威人士”多次声明，中国经济将长期保持L型走势，不要指望短期内出现U型或V型。自己都承认了“顺周期”的合理性还好意思说别人。
反驳观点二：《中华人民共和国预算法》规定，发行地方政府债券是地方政府举借债务的唯一合法形式，除此以外，地方政府及其所属部门不得以任何方式举借债务。因此，目前我国政府债务范围依法是指中央国债、地方政府债券以及清理甄别认定截至2014年末的非政府债券形式存量政府债务，除此以外我国不存在其他任何政府直接债务。
实际情况：穆迪重点指出的问题在于整体债务，而非政府债务。中国债务的焦点集中于企业部门而非政府部门，典型的偷换概念。
反驳观点三：穆迪所谓的地方政府融资平台、国有企业等债务水平持续增长会增加政府或有债务的说法，是根本不成立的。
实际情况：笔者别的不说了，敢不敢把地方政府每年债务置换金额数据拿出来看？每年债务置换上限都在上升，以城投债为例代表的地方债务发行也在扩容。国有企业如果债务规模不大为何要积极推进债转股？这些如果都政府无关的话，债务除了问题就别兜底，既然宣誓要守住不发生系统性风险的底线，到时候就必然会出现兜底债务的情况，穆迪的预测有什么问题？
反驳观点四：相比国际水平，中国经济体总体负债水平不高。
实际情况：美国、日本、法国、加拿大、英国的总体负债率为255.7%、372.5%、299.9%、301.1%、283.1%，都高于中国是事实。然而，这些国家的债务主要集中于政府部门，而中国债务主要集中于企业部门。政府信用高还是企业信用高？既然以债务作为评价标的难道不应以偿债能力作为最主要评价指标吗？
反驳观点五：中国的负债主要是内债，对外风险很低。
实际情况：莫名其妙的理由。国内储蓄率高没错，但这是社会资本。中国债务问题集中于企业部门，难道要拿老百姓的储蓄去替企业债务买单？
反驳观点六：各部门债务压力不大，负债水平大幅上升可能性较小。
实际情况：穆迪下调评级后不久，5月31日江苏省财政厅联合多个部门以“特急文件”形式转发了《关于进一步规范地方政府举债融资行为的通知》，并提出了省级层面的补充意见。“特急文件”都出来了，压力还不大啊。所谓的负债水平大幅上升可能性较小，可你敢不敢说负债水平上升可能性较小？
反驳观点七：中国财政实力雄厚，财政状况较为健康。
实际情况：中国财政收支自2008年开始就一直入不敷出。在金融危机后，大规模刺激救市措施更是导致财政收支不平衡扩大。中国财政收入在增加没错，可财政支出增加的更多怎么不说？算账只算收入不算支出？这种财政状况称得上“健康”吗？
为了给某些人留点面子，其他的就不多说了。这篇文章笔者自知是肯定要被多数平台封杀的，但笔者希望大家至少把穆迪报告原文那部门多多转发。每个人心中都有杆秤，穆迪评的到底有没有道理，自己判断吧。（翻译报告很费时间的）
