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Does Tightening Auditing Standards Improve or Impair Welfare?

Tong Lu  （The University of Houston）

2019年7月5日（星期五）9:00-11:30

中山大学南校园管理学院M311

刘运国教授

Tong Lu，休斯敦大学鲍尔商学院会计与税收系、会计学副教授。1991年毕业于中国人民大学，获经济学学士；1995年毕业于俄亥俄州立大学，获经济学硕士；2004年毕业于明尼苏达大学，获工商管理（会计学）博士学位。研究兴趣包括披露理论与资本市场、会计准则制定、审计准则制定、会计真实效应、审慎监管与银行会计等。目前已经在TAR、JAR、JAPP等国际顶级期刊发表论文6篇，并担任JAR、TAR、CAR等国际顶级期刊的匿名审稿人。

This study investigates the effects of tightening auditing standards on corporate welfare, audit firms' welfare, and social welfare. The audit quality of an audit firm has a dual role: (a) the precision effect, in which the audit quality affects the credibility of the accounting reports; (b) the signaling effect, in which a company's choice of a high-quality versus a low-quality audit firm signals its hidden information about its economic prospects. In addition, the audit firms engage in a two-stage competition: in an earlier stage, they compete in audit quality; in a later stage, they compete in audit fee.

We make the following contributions to the literature. (1) We show how a social planner sets the optimal auditing standard. (2) We employ a general equilibrium framework which incorporates an oligopolistic audit market and a competitive capital market. In addition, we identify different commitment devices in an unregulated economy and a regulated economy that cause diametrically opposite equilibrium results and welfare effects. (3) We make a set of empirical predictions on both the supply of audits and the demand for audits.