战争仍然是意志的较量，但科技竞赛和地缘政治的角逐正改变着战争的性质。
全球战争走势预测
译者：邵海灵&王津雨
校对：徐嘉茵
编辑：赵萌萌
War is still a contest of wills, but technology and geopolitical competition are changing its character, argues Matthew Symonds.
战争仍然是意志的较量，但科技竞赛和地缘政治的角逐正改变着战争的性质。
——引自马太·西蒙兹
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IN THE PAST, predictions about future warfare have often put too much emphasis on new technologies and doctrines. In the 19th century the speedy victory of the Prussian army over France in 1870 convinced European general staffs that rapid
mobilisation
by rail, quick-firing artillery and a focus on attack would make wars short and decisive. Those ideas were put to the test at the beginning of the first world war. The four years of trench warfare on the western front proved them wrong.
过去，对未来战争的预测往往偏重新型技术和理念的作用。在19世纪，普鲁士军队在1870年的普法战争中迅速获胜，这让欧洲各国的军事参谋们确信，藉由铁路实现的快速军事
调配
、速射火炮和集中于进攻的战略，会让战争得以速战速决，胜负立分。这些想法在第一次世界大战前期受到了检验，可西线纠缠了四年之久的壕沟战证明了它们的错误。
mobilisation
/məubilai'zeiʃən/ n. act of assembling and putting into readiness for war or other emergency （针对军事或紧急情况的）动员或调配
In the 1930s it was widely believed that
aerial
bombardment of cities would prove devastating enough to prompt almost immediate
capitulation
. That forecast came true only with the invention of nuclear weapons a decade later. When America demonstrated in the first Gulf war in 1990-91 what a combination of its precision-guided munitions, new intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance methods, space-based communications and
stealth
technology could achieve, many people assumed that in future the West would always be able to rely on swift, painless victories. But after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11th 2001, wars took a different course.
到了二十世纪三十年代，人们普遍认为，单是对城市进行
空中
轰炸，其破坏力就足以迫使对手就范，而且几乎是立马
投降
。然而直到十年后人类发明了核武器，这一预言才成为现实。1990至1991年的第一次海湾战争中，美国向世界展示了集精度制导武器、新型情报机构、侦察监视手段、天基通讯系统和军事
隐形
技术于一体的恢恢战网所能达到的成效。许多人因此相信，西方国家将来能一直指望不费兵卒就轻而易举地获得胜利了。可是当美国于2001年9月11日遭受恐袭后，战争又走上了不同以往的轨道。
aerial
/ˈeriəl/ adj. in or belonging to the air or operating (for or by means of aircraft or elevated cables) in the air 空中的，航空的
capitulation
/kəˌpɪtʃəˈleʃən/ n. the act of surrendering (under agreed conditions)（有条件的）投降
stealth
/stɛlθ/ adj. avoiding detection by moving carefully 潜行的、隐身的
stealth technology:
also termed LO technology (low observable technology), a sub-discipline of military tactics and passive electronic countermeasures 隐形技术俗称隐身技术，准确的术语应该是“低可探测技术”,即通过研究利用各种不同的技术手段来改变己方目标的可探测性信息特征。
This special report will therefore offer its predictions with humility. It will also limit them to the next 20 years or so, because beyond that the uncertainties become overwhelming. And it will not speculate about the clear and present danger of war breaking out over North Korea's nuclear weapons, which with luck can be contained. Instead, it will outline the long-term trends in warfare that can be identified with some confidence.
有鉴于此，本篇特别报道将以谦卑之心呈上对未来战争的预测，并将预测的有效期限定在二十年左右，因为再往后的不确定性又将盖过一切了。朝鲜核武器引发战争是明确而现时的危险，但是运气好的话，局势也可以控制住，对此作者不会再赘文推测。本文将概述战争的长期态势，且得出以下结论是有一定把握的。
In the past half-century wars between states have become exceedingly rare, and those between great powers and their allies almost non-existent, mainly because of the mutua
lly destr
uctive power of nuclear weapons, international legal constraints and the declining appetite for violence of relatively prosperous societies. On the other hand,
intrastate
or civil wars have been relatively numerous, especially in fragile or failing states, and have usually proved long-lasting. Climate change, population growth and sectarian or ethnic ext
re
mi
sm are likely to ensure that such wars will continue.
在过去半个世纪里，国家之间的战争已经十分罕见了，大国及其同盟国之间的战争更已近乎绝迹，这主要是因为一旦动用核武器就会两败俱伤，加上国际法律的制约，以及相对发达的社会对动武的兴趣日益降低。另一方面，
国家内部的
战争相对而言就不计其数了，特别是在力量薄弱或岌岌可危的地区，而且往往会持续非常久。气候变化、人口增长、宗派或民族极端主义的兴起，很可能会让此类战争继续下去。
intrastate:
intrastate violence is the most common form of conflict today. It describes sustatined political violence that takes place between armed groups representing the state, and one or more non-state groups. Violence of this sort usually is confined within the borders of a single state, but usually has significant international dimensions and holds the risk of spilling over into bordering states (the current conflict in Syria would be described as a Intrastate conflict). 国家内部的
内部敌人：按类型区分的武装冲突数量
黄色：一个国家与其他尚未得到国际承认的政治实体之间的战争
深蓝色：州间战争
浅蓝色：州内战争
Increasingly, they will be fought in urban environments, if only because by 2040 two-thirds of the world's population will be living in cities. The number of megacities with populations of more than 10m has doubled to 29 in the past 20 years, and each year nearly 80m people are moving from rural to urban areas. Intense urban warfare, as demonstrated by the recent battles for
Aleppo
and
Mosul
, remains grinding and indiscriminate, and will continue to present difficult problems for well-meaning Western intervention forces. Technology will change war in cities as much as other types of warfare, but it will still have to be fought at close quarters, block by block.
此类战争仍会发生，但战场会向城市转移，这样说只有一个原因：到2040年，三分之二的世界人口都将生活在城市里。人口超过一千万的巨型城市在过去二十年里数量翻了一倍，目前已有29座，且每年都有近八千万人从农村搬到城市地区。近年发生在
阿勒颇
和
摩苏尔
的争夺战表明，激烈的城市巷战仍然会打个没完没了，滥伤无辜，也会继续给好意插手的西方势力制造棘手的难题。科技会改变其他类型的战争，也会同样改变城市战争，但不管怎样，城市战争仍然必须是近距离的交火，一块一块地攻克。
Aleppo
/ə'lepoʊ/ n. a city in northwestern Syria 叙利亚北部城市，内战期间，政府军与反政府武装分别占据阿勒颇不同区域，战火给这座城市造成巨大破坏。经过长期拉锯战，政府军于2016年12月22日宣布完全收复阿勒颇。
Mosul
/moˈsul/ n. a city in northern Iraq on the Tigris across from the ruins of Nineveh伊拉克北部城市，位于底格里斯河畔，尼尼微遗址对面。2017年7月9日，在炮火不断的3年伊拉克总理阿巴迪宣布从伊斯兰国手中全面解放摩苏尔。
Latest updates
最新战报
Even though full-scale interstate warfare between great powers remains improbable, there is still scope for less severe forms of military competition. In particular, both Russia and China now seem unwilling to accept the international dominance of America that has been a fact of life in the 20 years since the end of the cold war. Both have an interest in challenging the American-sponsored international order, and both have recently shown that they are prepared to apply military force to defend what they see as their legitimate interests: Russia by annexing Crimea and destabilising Ukraine, and China by building militarised artificial islands and exerting force in disputes with regional neighbours in the South and East China Seas.
尽管大国之间全面开战的可能性仍微乎其微，但形式相对缓和的军备竞赛依旧有展开的余地。特别要指出的是，俄罗斯和中国如今看来都不肯接受美国的国际主导地位了，而自冷战结束后的二十年以来，美国稳坐头号交椅都是不争的事实。中俄两国都意图挑战美国一手支撑起来的国际秩序，并且都于最近表现出了强硬的一面：俄罗斯吞并了克里米亚，搅乱了乌克兰的政治局势，中国则建造了军事化的人工岛屿，在与邻国就南海和东海问题而爆发的争端中也开始发力。这表明他们已做好准备，不惜使用武力来捍卫那些在他们看来理应属于自己的利益。
In the past decade, both China and Russia have spent heavily on a wide range of military capabilities to counter America's capacity to project power on behalf of threatened or bullied allies. In military jargon, these capabilities are known as anti-access/area denial or A2/AD. Their aim is not to go to war with America but to make an American intervention more risky and more costly. That has increasingly enabled Russia and China to exploit a "grey zone" between war and peace. Grey-zone operations aim to reap either political or territorial gains normally associated with overt military aggression without tipping over the threshold into open warfare with a powerful adversary. They are all about calibration, leverage and ambiguity. The grey zone particularly lends itself to hybrid warfare, a term first coined about ten years ago. Definitions vary, but in essence it is a blurring of military, economic, diplomatic, intelligence and criminal means to achieve a political goal.
美国向来会为受到威胁或不公正待遇的同盟国站出来说话，运用自己的影响力为他们撑腰。过去十年中，为了对抗美国向其他国家施加影响的能力，中俄两国都斥以巨资，大范围地提升各自的军事实力。在军事术语中，这种实力被称为“反介入/区域拒止”作战能力（A2/AD）。这样做并非为了与美国开战，而是要让美国为其介入国际事务承担更大的风险、付出更高的成本。这让俄罗斯和中国愈加能从战争与和平之间的“灰色地带”谋取利益。在灰色地带动手脚，通常伴有明目张胆的军事侵略，但还不至于闹到要跟实力强大的对手公开交火的地步，目的是收割政治或领土的利益。说来说去都是精细筹划、巧施影响和含糊其辞那一套。灰色地带对混合作战尤其有利，这是大约十年前被造出来的一个词。混合作战的定义，可谓众说纷纭，莫衷一是，但从本质上讲，就是将军事、经济、外交、情报和犯罪手段模糊化，以达到某种政治目的。
The main reason why big powers will try to achieve their political objectives short of outright war is still the nuclear threat, but it does not follow that the "
balance of terror
" which characterised the cold war will remain as stable as in the past. Russia and America are modernising their nuclear forces at huge expense and China is enlarging its nuclear arsenal, so nuclear weapons may be around until at least the end of the century. Both Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, in their very different ways, enjoy a bit of nuclear
sabre-rattling
. Existing nuclear-arms-control agreements are fraying. The protocols and understandings that helped avert
Armageddon
during the cold war have not been renewed.
大国不会通过公开宣战来实现自己的政治目标，主要原因仍然在于核威胁，但这并不表示冷战时期的标志性特征“
恐怖平衡
”还会像
过去一样稳定不变。俄罗斯和美国正在耗用巨额经费加强核武力的现代化，中国也正在扩大自己的核武库，因此核武的困扰至少要持续到本世纪末。普京和特朗普对于各自的
核武力多少都有点沾沾自喜的
炫耀
，虽然在方式上完全不是一路的。现有的核军备控制协议正在瓦解。在冷战时期帮助人类避免了
末日大战
的那些协议和共识已经过了有效期，但还没有重修和续签。
balance of terror:
The phrase "balance of terror" is usually used in reference to the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 美苏在冷战时期通过庞大的核武库建立了一种“恐怖平衡”，指在双方都能够保证毁灭对方的前提下保持一种微妙的和平状态。
sabre-rattling:
the ostentatious display of military power (with the implied threat that it might be used) 武力恫吓；炫耀武力
Armageddon
/
a:mə'gedn/ n. (New Testament) the scene of the final battle between the kings of the Earth at the end of the world; any catastrophically destructive battle 大决战；世界末日善恶决战的战场（源于《圣经》）；将导致世界或人类彻底毁灭的大决战
Russia and China now fear that technological advances could allow America to threaten their nuclear arsenals without resorting to a nuclear first strike. America has been working at a concept known as Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) for over a decade, though weapons have yet to be deployed. The idea is to deliver a conventional warhead with a very high degree of accuracy, at
hypersonic
speeds (at least five times faster than the speed of sound), through even the most densely defended air space. Possible missions include countering anti-satellite weapons; targeting the command-and-control nodes of enemy
A2/AD
networks; attacking the nuclear facilities of a rogue proliferator such as North Korea; and killing important terrorists. Russia and China claim that CPGS could be highly destabilising if used in conjunction with advanced missile defences. Meanwhile they are developing similar weapons of their own.
目前中俄两国都在忧心，由于具备科技优势，美国可能无需采取先发制人的核打击，就能威胁到中俄两国的核武库。美国致力打造所谓“常规快速全球打击”（CPGS）的理念已有十多个年头了（尽管尚未部署相关武器）。美国的设想是，即使在防御最密集的空中领域，也能以极高的精准度并按
高超音速
（超过音速五倍以上）投射常规弹头。为此可能进行的任务包括：对抗反卫星武器；以敌方
A2/AD
网络内的指挥控制节点为靶向；打击朝鲜这种肆意发展核武的流氓国家的核设施；射杀重大恐怖分子。中俄两国称，如果与先进的导弹防御系统结合使用，CPGS会严重破坏其他国家的稳定。而与此同时，他们自己也在开发类似武器。
hypersonic
/haɪpə'sɒnɪk/ adj. at five times the speed of sound or faster 高超音速的，特超音速的，超过音速五倍以上的
A2/AD:
全称ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA DENIAL，反介入和区域阻绝武器，为美国五角大楼创造，在描述中国的特殊导弹和其他先进武器所构成的威胁时使用。
Other potential threats to nuclear stability are attacks on nuclear command-and-control systems with the cyber- and anti-satellite weapons that all sides are investing in, which could be used to disable nuclear forces temporarily. Crucially, the identity of the attacker may be ambiguous, leaving those under attack uncertain how to respond.
用网络武器和反卫星武器对核指挥控制系统发动攻击，对核势力的平衡构成了另一种潜在的威胁。目前各方都在投资这些武器，用它们来让核武力短时失效。至关重要的一点是，攻击者的身份可能很模糊，这令遭受攻击的一方不确定如何去应对。
