Platforms are the future—but not for everyone.
平台才是未来——但因人而异。
“Interesting thesis, but don’t use the word ‘platform’ in the title. No one knows what it means.”
“论题很有意思，但是标题里不要加 ‘平台’ 这个词，没人明白那是什么意思。”
That was the reaction of a professor at MIT in 2000 upon reading the dissertation of Annabelle Gawer, now co-director of the Centre for Digital Economy at the University of Surrey.
这是2000年，一位麻省理工的教授在读现任萨里大学数字化经济中心联席主任安娜贝尔·加威尔的研究论文时候的反应。
She ignored the advice and kept the title.
加威尔没有理会这条建议，在标题中保留了这个词。
If anyone were to counsel Ms Gawer against using the word today, it would be for the opposite reason: overuse.
如果今天再有人劝加威尔女士不要使用 “平台” 这个词，那一定是出于相反的理由：这个词已经被用滥了。
Academic papers on the concept are now legion.
关于这个概念的学术论文不胜枚举。
Books are multiplying, too: after “Platform Revolution” in March, this month will see the release of “Matchmakers” (with the p-word in the subtitle) .
相关书籍的数量也成倍增长：在三月份的 “平台革命” 后，即将迎来这个月 “中介” 概念的爆发 (副标题里有 “专业的” 这个词)。
Rare is the startup that does not want to be a platform.
很少有创业公司不想搭建平台。
A rapidly growing number of incumbent firms, too, are striving to build platforms.
与此同时，越来越多的在位企业也在加入这个行列。
Yet the professor’s problem remains pertinent: confusion still reigns over what exactly platforms are.
但麻省理工那位教授提出的问题依然适用：平台究竟是什么，人们对此还是一头雾水。
And this, combined with the hype, hides the fact that they are not for everyone.
这些疑惑再加上媒体天花乱坠的报导掩盖了真相：平台的战略并非适合所有人。
Broadly defined, platforms are a type of market place where people and businesses trade under a set of rules set by the owner or operator.
广义上来讲，平台即用户及商业机构在业主或经营者建立的规则范围内进行交易的市场。
Among the first were the emporiums in ancient Greece, designated places near docks where traders could exchange merchandise.
平台的最初形态即古希腊港口边指定场所的商业中心，在这里商人们可以交换货物。
More recently, digitisation and the internet have given rise to a new type that is both marketplace and shared base.
最近，随着数字化与互联网的发展而兴起了基于商业和共享的新型平台。
Operating systems are an example, such as Windows for personal computers and Android for smartphones.
操作系统就是一个很好的例子，比如个人电脑上的 “视窗” 操作系统以及智能手机上的安卓系统。
These programs provide basic services that applications developed by others need to run.
这些程序提供的基础服务使他人开发的应用得以运行。
Another version is e-commerce sites, including Amazon and eBay, which connect sellers and buyers (hence the title “Matchmakers” ) .
另一个例子是包括亚马逊和易贝等电商网站，他们提供的平台就将买家和卖家连结起来 (所以才叫 “中介” )。
Social networks, too, are platforms: they bring together consumers, advertisers and software developers.
社交网络也是平台，他们将客户/广告商/软件开发商连结起来。
These modern platforms have three things in common.
现代的平台有三个共同点。
They are “multi-sided”, meaning they have more than one group of customers.
“多边性”，这意味着多个客户群。
They exhibit strong “network effects” : a growing group of one sort of customer attracts more of the other, which again draws in more of the first and so on.
“强大的网络效应” : 某类客户群的增长会吸引更多的使用者，以此类推形成正反馈。
And they are controlled by one company, which can dictate the terms of trade, such as what type of businesses are allowed on its digital property and what they have to pay for the privilege.
这些平台都受制于某个公司，公司规定了贸易条款，比如自身的数字资产将决定何种商业类型会被允许以及搭建平台所需的代价。
Such features have allowed American companies in particular to build global digital emporiums that have come to dominate the technology industry.
这样的特征尤其有利于美国的公司构建全球性的数字化贸易市场，由此支配科技领域。
In late 2015 the 44 platform firms based in Silicon Valley alone boasted a combined market capitalisation of $2.2 trillion, according to the Centre for Global Enterprise (CGE) , a think-tank.
根据全球企业中心智库表示，2015年中仅凭44家硅谷的平台公司就霸踞了2.2万亿美金的资本市场。
Among them, Apple’s iPhone exemplifies best how to run a platform: anybody can write an app, but it has to pass strict tests and the firm keeps 30% of all sales.
其中，苹果公司的Iphone就是平台运作的典型：任何人都可以在上面编写应用，但是需要通过平台严格的审查并且切分掉30%的销售收入。
As everything from tooth brushes to tractors grows more connected, the phenomenon is spreading to other industries.
现在，从牙刷到拖拉机都充满了连接，这个现象已经扩展到了其他领域。
The latest iterations gather mounds of data, analyse them and serve up the results, thus enabling all kinds of digital offerings, from predicting failures to giving advice.
电子产品不断更新迭代聚集了大量数据，分析后再将结果上传，那么从预测失败到给出建议它都做得到。
One example of such a data platform is Nest, a subsidiary of Alphabet, Google’s holding company.
数据平台的一个典型例子就是Nest，谷歌母公司Alphabet的子公司。
It sells devices, such as wireless thermostats and smoke detectors, which double as vehicles to collect information, allowing the company to offer tailored energy and security services.
它的主要产品是像无线恒温器和烟雾探测器之类的电子设备，这些设备同时也是信息收集工具，以便公司在信息的基础上为用户提供量身定做的能源及安保服务。
This trend alarms non-tech firms.
这个趋势警醒了非科技类公司。
They fret that if the likes of Apple and Google come to control such data platforms, these new intermediaries will seize a big chunk of their profits.
他们担心苹果和谷歌这类科技公司控制了作为中介的数据平台，他们一大部分利润将会被瓜分掉。
This fear has sparked a rush to build or buy such systems.
这种恐慌激起了一股系统购买潮。
Last year car-makers Audi, BMW and Daimler acquired Here, a digital-mapping firm.
去年，汽车制造商奥迪，宝马和戴姆勒收购了Here，这是一家地图系统平台公司。
General Electric, an American conglomerate, is betting big on Predix, which helps customers improve how they run locomotives, jet engines and other gear.
美国企业集团通用电气对Predix压下巨注，帮助客户的机车，喷气引擎及其他装置跑得更好。
Apollo Hospitals in India is creating a marketplace for health-care services.
印度的阿波罗医院为保健服务开创了一片市场。
Many more established companies are sure to follow suit, as are thousands of startups.
很多大公司对此都如法炮制，创业公司亦是如此。
But before they tread this path, they should consider a few caveats.
但在他们涉足前，还是要考虑一些注意事项。
First, most products and services are not substantial enough to make a good platform.
首先，大部分产品和服务都没有大到能撑起一个平台的量。
And even if they are, it is not always a good idea to turn them into one, says Ms Gawer, who is co-authoring a book to debunk myths about the concept.
正与人合著一本揭示平台概念的书的加威尔女士表示，即使他们足够大，转型为平台也并不一定是一个很好的选择。
The late Steve Jobs, for instance, long resisted opening Apple’s app store to others for fear of losing control.
例如，已故的乔布斯就因为担心失控而一直抵触开放苹果应用商店。
Second, network effects often fizzle.
其次，网络效应往往虎头蛇尾。
All sides of an online marketplace have to be nurtured in parallel to avoid imbalances, such as having far more sellers than buyers.
在线市场的方方面面一定要平行发展才能避免出现例如卖家远远超过买家的不平衡的场面。
During the dotcom bubble most business-to-business marketplaces failed because their pursuit of growth led to such lopsidedness.
在互联网泡沫时代，大部分B2B电子商务的失败就是因为单方面追求增长而导致失衡。
Even firms that had a head start, such as MySpace and Nokia, a social network and a mobile-phone maker respectively, didn’t manage to turn them- selves into fully fledged platforms.
即使像社交网络我的空间和手机制造商诺基亚这样有先发优势的公司，也没有成长为一个成熟完整的平台。
Most successful ones are the product of specific circumstances and even chance, reckons Peter Evans of CGE.
法国通用电气公司的皮特·埃文斯回想，其实成功的平台都是某些特定环境和均等机会下的产物。
Amazon, for example, took off in part because its customers did not have to pay sales tax if they were outside the firm’s home state, Washington.
例如亚马逊，能够迅速取得成功的而部分原因就是因为如果用户本人不在公司所在地华盛顿购物，通过其平台购买就不用缴付营业税。
Third, it is not always easy to make money from platforms.
再次，通过平台赚钱并不容易。
Misjudge how much to charge each group of customers, and the flywheel can come to a juddering halt.
对不同客户群的定价策略判断失误，利润的飞轮就戛然而止了。
What is more, for a platform to make good money, switching to a rival has to be costly, argues Andrei Hagiu of Harvard Business School.
更何况哈佛商学院的安德烈·哈邱也表示，平台要赚很多钱的话，竞争战非常消耗成本。
This risk even hangs over Uber, the fast-expanding taxi-hailing service: using a competitor is easy for both passengers and drivers.
这种风险也困扰着扩张最迅速的租车服务公司Uber：无论对于司机还是乘客来说，转换到其竞争对手门下极其容易。
Platforms with a leg in the physical world are likely to take more time to emerge than the purely digitalsort.
较纯数字平台而言，立足于现实的平台想获得生存的话，很可能需要付出更多的时间。
And firms have some alternatives: those with outstanding products and a strong brand can try to forgo others’ platforms, hoping that they succeed on their own.
公司也不是没有选择：产品出众且品牌能力强的公司，即使不依靠平台也可以凭借自身成功。
But ultimately most firms will have no choice but to do business on somebody else’s digital property, and to agitate for better terms if the owner gets too greedy.
但最终大多数公司都没得选择，只能和其他人的数字资产交易，并且在资产所有者太过贪婪时焦虑的争取更好的交易条款。
Call it the class struggle of platform capitalism.
我们姑且称之为平台资本主义的阶级斗争好了。
