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1、搜索时长
在研究消费者搜索行为时，研究人员通常关注消费者在他们的考虑集合中添加了哪些产品（搜索的广泛范围）。在此文中，作者们试图通过分析消费者花费在搜索上的时间（搜索持续时间）来进一步研究消费者搜索单个产品的程度（搜索密度）。作者们开发了一个序列搜索模型，通过这个模型，那些对产品搜索的匹配值不确定（并且有先入为主信念）的消费者可以揭示关于产品搜索的（噪声）信号，然后他们用贝叶斯的方式更新他们的信念。在这种情况下，搜索持续时间是消费者决定多次搜索同一产品上信息的结果；在单位时间对应一个信号的情况下，搜索到的信号数量越多，搜索持续时间就越大。作者们还展示了如何使用该模型来研究访问，这是Weitzman的顺序搜索模型不容易实现的功能。作者们以Chick和Frazier的框架为基础，描述消费者做出的全套决策（搜索哪些产品、搜索时间、搜索顺序以及是否购买）的最优搜索规则，并开发了模型的经验对应关系。作者们使用消费者在网上搜索餐馆的数据来估计所提出的模型。作者们记录到，即使消费者搜索的餐馆很少，搜索时间也相当长，搜索时间较长的餐馆更有可能被购买。利用此模型，作者们量化了偏好和搜索成本，以及消费者先前的信念，为消费者的搜索过程提供了额外的见解。最后，考虑到这将影响搜索持续时间，从而影响搜索和购买决策，作者们提出了有关公司应向消费者提供的信息量的管理建议。
In studying consumer search behavior, researchers typically focus on which products consumers add to their consideration sets (the extensive margin of search). In this article, we attempt to additionally study how much consumers search individual products (the intensive margin of search) by analyzing the time they spend searching (search duration). We develop a sequential search model by which consumers who are uncertain (and have prior beliefs) about their match value for a product search to reveal (noisy) signals about it that they then use to update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. Search duration, in this context, is an outcome of the decision by a consumer to seek information on the same product multiple times; with a unit of time corresponding to one signal, the more the number of signals sought greater is the search duration. We also show how the model can be used to study revisits, a feature not easily accommodated in Weitzman’s sequential search model. We build on the framework by Chick and Frazier for describing the optimal search rules for the full set of decisions consumers make (which products to search, for how long, in what order, and whether to purchase) and develop the model’s empirical counterpart. We estimate the proposed model using data on consumers searching for restaurants online. We document that search duration is considerable, even when consumers search few restaurants, and that restaurants that are searched longer are more likely to be purchased. Using our model, we quantify preferences and search costs, as well as consumer prior beliefs, providing additional insights into consumers’ search process. Finally, we develop managerial implications related to the amount of information companies should provide to consumers, given that this will affect search duration and thus search and purchase decisions.
参考文献：Raluca M. Ursu , Qingliang Wang , & Pradeep K. Chintagunta (2020). Search Duration. Marketing Science, 39(5), 849-871.
2、空战与地面博弈：美国总统选举中的多渠道营销分析
这项研究将电视广告和实地行动结合起来研究美国总统选举中的影响，前者被称为“空战”，后者被称为“地面游戏”。这项研究的重点是不同的竞选活动，候选人和外部来源以实地行动和大众媒体广告的形式进行个人推销，对具有不同政治倾向的选民的效果如何不同。投票选择模型考虑了选民的异质性，分析了三次总统选举（2004-2012）的综合数据，包括投票结果、详细的竞选活动和选民的党派关系。结果显示，不同的竞选活动对选民的政党归属有不同的影响。来自外部团体的实地行动和政治广告对党派人士更有效，而候选人的广告对无党派人士更有效。这些发现有助于战略家更好地在渠道内和渠道间分配资源，设计有效的政治营销活动。
This study jointly examines the effects of television advertising and field operations in U.S. presidential elections, with the former referred to as the “air war” and the latter as the “ground game.” Specifically, the study focuses on how different campaign activities—personal selling in the form of field operations and mass media advertising by the candidates and by outside sources—vary in their effectiveness with voters who have different political predispositions. The voting choice model takes into consideration voter heterogeneity and analyzes comprehensive data that include voting outcomes, detailed campaign activities, and voters’ party affiliation for three presidential elections (2004–2012). The results reveal that different campaign activities have heterogeneous effects depending on voters’ party affiliation. Field operations and political advertising from outside groups are more effective with partisans, whereas a candidate’s advertising is more effective with nonpartisans. These findings can help strategists better allocate resources across and within channels to design an effective political marketing campaign.
参考文献：Zhang, L., & Chung, D. J. (2020). The Air War vs. the Ground Game: An Analysis of Multichannel Marketing in US Presidential Elections. Marketing Science, 39(5), 872-892.
3、聚合商的价值
聚合网站正面临监管部门日益严格的审查，这表明这些网站拥有相当大的市场影响力。另一个极端是，企业绕过聚合网站，转而选择直接向消费者销售。这就产生了一个问题，即哪一方拥有更大的市场支配力：聚合网站还是个体企业。以航空业为重点，作者们调查了谁在航空公司聚合关系中受益最大。具体来说，在没有综合性聚合网站的情况下，航空公司和聚合的站点访问和购买会发生什么情况。作者们首先在西南航空公司探索消费者的搜索模式，这家航空公司从未加入过任何聚合网站。在描述性练习中，作者们发现在西南航空订票的消费者最不可能访问聚合网站。第二，把2011年美国与Orbitz的争端当作外生事件，导致美国票价在Orbitz上5个月内不再显示。作者们利用这起纠纷来确定了在纠纷发生后的几个月里受到伤害最大的是聚合商还是航空公司。研究结果表明，聚合商在不全面时损失最大。
Aggregators are facing increased scrutiny by regulatory authorities, suggesting these sites have considerable market power. On the other extreme, firms are bypassing aggregators, choosing instead to sell directly to consumers. This raises the question as to which party has more market power: the aggregator or the individual firm. Focusing on the airline industry, we investigate who benefits most in the airline-aggregator relationship. Specifically, we ask what would happen to airline and aggregator site visits and purchases in the absence of a comprehensive aggregator. We first explore consumers’ search patterns on Southwest, an airline that has never been part of any aggregator. In a descriptive exercise, we find that consumers who book on Southwest are the least likely to visit aggregator sites. Second, we use the 2011 American dispute with Orbitz as an exogenous event, which led to American fares no longer being displayed on Orbitz for five months. We use this dispute to identify who was hurt the most—the aggregator or the airline—in the months following the dispute. Our findings indicate the aggregator loses the most when it is not comprehensive.
参考文献：Selin Akca, & Anita Rao (2020). Value of Aggregators. Marketing Science, 39(5), 893-922.
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4、上游开发与战略性披露
企业可以通过向潜在买家披露其优势（例如质量）的自有信息来改善市场需求。关于自愿性信息披露的文献中，传统的预测是，由于买方的理性预期，任何自有信息都会在均衡中被完美地解开。然而，无论是低质量公司还是高质量公司，在实践中都可以有隐瞒。此文基于下游制造商减少投入供应商上游开发的动机，提出了一种新的解释。作者们强调提高质量的两个自然结果：更高的产品价值和更少的弹性需求。后一种力量会推高中间价格，从而产生质量对制造商均衡收益的非单调影响。因此，即使披露是无成本的，也可能存在中间披露平衡，制造商会同时保留低质量和高质量水平。此外，部分披露不仅有利于渠道成员，也有利于买家。即使供应商影响信息披露结果的行为是内生的，中间披露均衡仍然存在。此外，战略隐瞒可能会削弱垂直整合的动机。
Firms can improve market demand by disclosing privately known information on their advantages (e.g., quality) to potential buyers. The conventional prediction in the literature on voluntary disclosure is that, because of rational buyer expectation, any private information would be perfectly unravelled in equilibrium. However, concealments can be seen in practice for both low- and high-quality firms. This paper proposes a new explanation for this puzzle, based on downstream manufacturers’ incentive to mitigate upstream exploitation by input suppliers. We highlight two natural consequences of increasing quality: higher product value and less elastic demand. The latter force would push up the wholesale price to yield a nonmonotonic impact of quality on equilibrium manufacturer payoff. Therefore, there may exist intermediate-disclosure equilibria where the manufacturer withholds both low- and high quality levels, even when disclosure is costless. In addition, partial disclosure can benefit not only channel members but also buyers. The intermediate-disclosure equilibria can survive even when supplier actions to influence the disclosure outcome are endogenized. Moreover, strategic concealment may undermine incentives for vertical integration.
参考文献：Guo, L. (2020). Upstream Exploitation and Strategic Disclosure. Marketing Science, 39(5), 923-938.
5、供应关系中的定价与质量供给：一个有效的关系契约模型
作者们建立了质量问题如何影响公司和供应商之间关系的模型。担心定制商品的质量问题的公司必须支付更高的价格才能维持与供应商的关系。如果可定制商品的需求具有足够的波动性，那么仅包含该商品固定单价溢价的合同将无法维持。相反，下游公司为可定制商品和与可定制商品需求相关的具有更稳定需求的商品支付溢价。结果表明，定制商品的供应商也应该提供其他产品，其中可以包括不需要定制的商品，买卖多个商品可以使定价方更加灵活，从而使买卖双方都受益。
We model how quality concerns affect the relationship between a firm and its supplier. A firm concerned about uncontractible quality for a customizable good has to pay higher prices to sustain a relationship with the supplier. If the customizable good has sufficiently volatile demand, then a contract that includes a constant unit price premium only for this good cannot be sustained. Instead, the downstream firm pays a premium both for the customizable good and also for a good with more stable demand that is correlated with the demand for the customizable good. Our results imply that a supplier of customized goods should also supply other products, which can include goods that do not require customization, and both the supplier and buyer benefit from the greater pricing flexibility they achieve by trading multiple goods.
参考文献：Nistor, C., & Selove, M. (2020). Pricing and Quality Provision in a Supply Relationship: A Model of Efficient Relational Contracts. Marketing Science, 39(5), 939-955.
6、管理客户流失以实现利润最大化
客户流失威胁着许多行业，促使公司部署有针对性的、积极主动的客户保留计划和服务。传统的方法是根据客户的预测流失率，或者他们对保留报价的响应来确定目标客户。然而，这两种方法都忽略了一些客户对保留活动的利润贡献大于其他客户。这项研究通过定义一个基于利润的损失函数来解决这个问题，从而为每个客户预测保留干预的财务影响。该基于利润的损失函数使估算算法的目标与最大化活动利润的管理目标保持一致。它确保（1）在考虑了干预成本后，根据干预对客户流失和活动后现金流的增量影响对客户进行排名；（2）该模型通过根据客户的预期利润提升惩罚客户，将预测误差的成本最小化。最后，它提供了一种优化保留活动规模的方法。两个现场实验证实，这种方法比竞争模式带来更大的利润。
Customer defection threatens many industries, prompting companies to deploy targeted, proactive customer retention programs and offers. A conventional approach has been to target customers either based on their predicted churn probability, or their responsiveness to a retention offer. However, both approaches ignore that some customers contribute more to the profitability of retention campaigns than others. This study addresses this problem by defining a profit-based loss function to predict, for each customer, the financial impact of a retention intervention. This profit-based loss function aligns the objective of the estimation algorithm with the managerial goal of maximizing the campaign profit. It ensures (1) that customers are ranked based on the incremental impact of the intervention on churn and postcampaign cash flows, after accounting for the cost of the intervention, and (2) that the model minimizes the cost of prediction errors by penalizing customers based on their expected profit lift. Finally, it provides a method to optimize the size of the retention campaign. Two field experiments affirm that this approach leads to significantly more profitable campaigns than competing models.
参考文献：Lemmens, A., & Gupta, S. (2020). Managing churn to maximize profits. Marketing Science, 39(5), 956-973.
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7、从诱饵效应中获利：以在线钻石零售商为例
通过实验室实验，诱饵效应（DE）已经在几十种产品类别和选择设置中得到了充分的记录。然而，在实际的产品市场中，这一点从未得到文献的证实。此文对一家领先的在线珠宝零售商的钻石销售数据进行了实证检验和量化。作者们开发了一个钻石级比例风险框架，通过联合建模市场级诱饵-优势检测概率和检测到优势的销售额的增长。结果表明，在钻石市场上，诱饵-优势检测概率较低（11%-25%）；然而，一旦检测到，诱饵效应显著增加了主导钻石的销售风险（1.8-3.2倍）。在管理意义上，作者发现钻石零售商的利润大幅增加14.3%。作者们会进一步进行模拟研究，以了解在不同的优势情形下，诱饵效应的利润影响。
The decoy effect (DE) has been robustly documented across dozens of product categories and choice settings using laboratory experiments. However, it has never been verified in a real product market in the literature. In this paper, we empirically test and quantify the DE in the diamond sales of a leading online jewelry retailer. We develop a diamond-level proportional hazard framework by jointly modeling market-level decoy–dominant detection probabilities and the boost in sales upon detection of dominants. Results suggest that decoy–dominant detection probabilities are low (11%–25%) in the diamond market; however, upon detection, the DE increases dominant diamonds’ sale hazards significantly (1.8–3.2 times). In terms of the managerial significance, we find that the DE substantially increases the diamond retailer’s gross profit by 14.3%. We further conduct simulation studies to understand the DE’s profit impact under various dominance scenarios.
参考文献：Wu, C., & Cosguner, K. (2020). Profiting from the Decoy Effect: A Case Study of an Online Diamond Retailer. Marketing Science, 39(5), 974-995.
8、不完全竞争的价格歧视和市场支配力
两个双寡头垄断者在市场上竞争同类产品的价格。他们可以“描述”消费者，即以某种可能性确定其估值。如果两家公司都能描述消费者，但能力不同，那么他们在均衡状态下会获得正的预期利润。这为公司（部分、不平等地）共享消费者数据或数据代理向竞争对手出售不同的客户分析提供了依据。消费者倾向于两个公司描述完全相同的一组消费者，或者只有一个公司描述消费者，因为这需要边际成本定价（要求标价公开的政策也是如此）。否则，更多的隐私保护条例会对消费者剩余产生模棱两可的影响。
Two duopolists compete on price in the market for a homogeneous product. They can “profile” consumers, that is, identify their valuations with some probability. If both firms can profile consumers but with different abilities, then they achieve positive expected profits at equilibrium. This provides a rationale for firms to (partially and unequally) share data about consumers or for data brokers to sell different customer analytics to competing firms. Consumers prefer that both firms profile exactly the same set of consumers or that only one firm profiles consumers as this entails marginal cost pricing (so does a policy requiring list prices to be public). Otherwise, more protective privacy regulations have ambiguous effects on consumer surplus.
参考文献：Belleflamme, P., Lam, W. M. W., & Vergote, W. (2020). Competitive imperfect price discrimination and market power. Marketing Science, 39(5), 996-1015.
9、季节性炫耀性商品的降价
通常来讲，奢侈品和降价促销在许多方面是相互矛盾的概念。降价促销降低了产品的排他性，因此降低了消费者的支付意愿（即势利效应），因为大多数购买奢侈品的消费者都渴望独特性。降价促销还鼓励战略（前瞻性）消费者等待更低的价格（即战略效果）。然而，奢侈品零售商在实践中经常采用降价促销以刺激对其季节性产品的需求（即销售效果）。为了研究这三种抵消作用对奢侈品零售商的降价政策和配给策略的影响，此文建立了一个具有策略性和排他性的消费者的博弈模型，这些消费者具有异质性（高和低）估值。作者们描述了奢侈品零售商的均衡降价和配给策略，发现当消费者充分寻求排他性时，零售商会诱导购买狂热（即故意低于需求量销售），以提高消费者的支付意愿。当高估值消费者的比例不太高或太低时，零售商的减价政策取决于消费者对排他性的渴望。在这种情况下，消费者对排他性的更高渴望并没有促使零售商增加排他性并采取统一定价。相反，它激励零售商减少排他性并采用降价促销。通过这样做，作者们将寻求排他性的消费者行为作为降价定价背后的另一个理由。最后，结果表明向追求排他性的消费者销售产品时，战略性消费者行为的负面影响较小；但是，忽略它可能会付出更大的代价。
