Why Is the Speculator (Almost) Always Long?
Perhaps
the longest-running bear show in recent memory was the foreign currency
slide (the dollar bull market) that continued from 1978 through 1985.
The Swiss franc declined from 69.00 to 35.00, the D-mark from 58.00 to
29.00, and the British pound from 2.40 to around 1.05. Notwithstanding
this very long-term bear market, we have witnessed a near continuous
round of bottom-picking, with both professional and commission house
speculators chasing after the most elusive prize of all - the reversal
of the strong dollar. There were probably more traders throughout the
world watching and waiting for a bottom in currencies during much of
that seven-year period than for any other future traded. The key
questions traders had to face and will continue to face in similar
situations in the future are these:
记忆所及，最长的空头秀当属1978年——1985年的外汇跌势（美元的多头市场）：瑞士法郎从69.00跌到35.00，德国马克从58.00跌到29.00，英镑从2.40跌到1.05左右。虽然有这么长时间的空头市场，我们却不断见到有人在抄底，专业和经纪行的投机者一直在追逐一个大奖——强势美元趋势反转。这7年时间内，全世界密切注意和等待外汇见底的交易者人数，可能比其它任何种类的期货都要多。交易者必须面对的关键问题，以及将来在类似的情况中必须继续面对的关键问题是下面这些：
1. Were the currency markets forming a significant reversal from down to up at various times during the seven-year bear market?
1. 这7年的空头市场期间内不同的时间中，外汇市场是不是由下而上形成显著的反转？
2.
How could the operator have participated in such a reversal while
maintaining reasonable loss protection in the event, as actually
occurred, the reversal signals were false and the market continued to
decline?
2. 交易者要怎么参与这种反转，同时保持合理的止损保护，以免反转信号是错误的，市场最后还是继续下跌？事实上这样的事就曾经发生过。
3.
Assuming the trader had reversed to long and had been stopped out, how
could he have gotten back short in conformity with the ongoing bear
trend?
3. 假如交易者已经转而做多，而且因止损而平仓，那么他要怎样回到空方阵营，继续在空头市场中玩下去？
I
have often noted that major, long-standing trends, particularly
downtrends, do not reverse very quickly. They generally take an
intolerable amount of time and are accompanied by innumerable false
signals that cause many operators to be whipsawed in and out to an
exasperating degree. However, there is a logical way to shift the odds a
bit more in your favor. Avoid trying to pick off tops and bottoms
because, at best, it is a subjective and arbitrary way to time trades.
Moreover, it hardly ever succeeds. Rather, you must exercise the
patience and discipline to wait until your technical indicators or
system tell you that the flip has occurred, at which point you should
get aboard in the direction of the newly emerged trend. If your
indicator reverses you, protect the new position with a reasonable stop.
This could also be a reversal stop to return you into the ongoing trend
if the reversal turns out to be false and untenable.
我一再指出，长期的大趋势，尤其是下跌趋势，不会很快反转。它们常常会维持一段令人难以忍受的时间，伴随难以计数的假信号，造成很多交易者惨遭洗盘出场。但是，我们还是能够找到合乎逻辑的方式，使得运气稍微对你有利。你一定要避免去抓头部和底部，因为那顶多是种主观和没有根据的进出方式。此外，这种做法很少能够成功。还有，你必须发挥耐心和严守纪律，等候你的技术指标或系统告诉你反转已发生，在这个时候才跳上新出现的趋势。如果你的指标带着你走向另一个方向，也应该用合理的止损保护你建立的新仓位。万一反转是虚假的，无法维持的，反转止损也能把你带回持续进行中的趋势。
In
the specific case of the currencies and their seven-year bear market,
we discreetly avoided probing for the bottom so long as markets
continued to slide within a broad succession of lower highs and lower
lows. There was no logical way to form a sufficiently strong prediction
of a market reversal on which to place a large bet. Overeager traders
had been chopped up for years trying unsuccessfully to do just that.
Instead, we approached these markets in the following manner: At each
point where it appeared the market might be making a bottom (or a flip
from short to long), we identified the respective resistance points.
Each currency market would have to close through these in order to
justify in our analysis that the trend had flipped. We had a number of
close calls and “almosts,” but as you can see from the accompanying
long-term chart of the Swiss franc (Figure 9-2), the trend was clearly
down. No rally high surpassed any previous rally high until first half
of 1985, after the market hit bottom around the 34.00 level. One of the
long-term trading systems we follow gave an initial buy signal on March
12, 1985, and a subsequent buy signal on June 13 of the same year. This
analysis was further confirmed by our technical advisory, issued after
the first rally from 34.00 to 41.00 and the subsequent 50 percent
retracement to the 37.00 level. It suggested the purchase of Swiss at
38.05 stop, close only (basis long-term weekly). We would wait to buy on
the failure of the reaction and on the resumption of the rally.
以上面外汇长达7年的空头市场来说，只要市场继续在一个宽广，连续的区间内下滑，也就是，这个区间内一个高点比一个高点低，一底比一底低。那我们就要十分小心谨慎，避免去抄底。我们找不到合乎逻辑的方式，提出强而有力的论点，去预测市场的反转点，从而下很大的赌注在那一点上。一些过分急切的交易者，一直想这么做，多年来都徒劳无功。相反，我们要按下面所述的方式去面对市场：在市场可能筑底（或者由空翻多）的每一点，我们会找出相对的个别压力点。每一个外汇市场收盘价都必须站上这些点，才能在我们的分析中合乎趋势已反转的论调。我们有很多千钧一发或“差一点”的时刻，但是你从所附的瑞士法郎长期趋势图（图9-2），可以看出趋势明显向下。1985年上半年市场在34.00左右触底以前，没有一次反弹的高点能够超越上一次反弹的高点。我们所用的一个长期交易系统，在1985年3月12日发出了初步的买入信号，同年6月13日发出了后续的买入信号。当价格从34.00反弹到41.00之后，接下来出现50%的回调跌到37.00，我们的技术顾问确认可以买入了。以38.05的收盘价为买点（基于长期周线图）。我们等着在回调结束和反弹恢复时进场买入。
图9-2 瑞士法郎（最近期）长期月线图
【Here
is the quintessential long-term roller-coaster market. The Swiss franc
topped out around the 69.00 level in late 1978, remaining within the
major bear trend until first-half 1985. This seven-year-long bear market
was a near total disaster for the majority of public speculators who
were committed to the bull side regardless of market trend. By the time
the trend reversed to north in mid-1985, most speculators missed the
turn. They were too exhausted, both financially and emotionally, from
fighting the markets with their losing long positions over the past
several years. A number of public commodity funds, however, scored
impressive profits on short currency positions during this period.
这是个典型，过山车的长期市场趋势。1978年底瑞士法郎在69.00左右做头反转，1985年上半年以前，一直处在大空头趋势里面。大部分投机大众不管市场趋势，执意做多，这7年的空头市场几乎是一场浩劫。1985年年中，趋势反转向上，大多数的投机者错过了列车。不管是在感情上，还是在财力上，他们都已经筋疲力尽。过去几年，他们持有亏钱的多头仓，已经无力跟市场战斗。但是在这段期间内，很多公共商品基金因做空外汇，得到了可观的利润。】
Even
after taking a position on a projected trend reversal, it is necessary
to protect the new position with reasonable stops. So what is
reasonable? That is a function of the trader's personal pain level. In
my book, it can be set at anywhere from 50 to 100 percent of the margin
requirement which, in actual dollar terms, is from $600 to around
$1,500. Obviously, how much you are willing to risk is clearly related
to how much you logically project to win. So, if you are a very
long-term operator with a history of taking thousands from a winning
long-term move, you can obviously afford a somewhat higher risk on a
given position than a trader who is quicker to jump out.
预估趋势会反转，建立了新仓位之后，有必要用合理的止损来保护新的仓位。那什么才叫做合理？这要看交易者个人可以忍受多大程度的“痛苦”而定。在我的书中，可以设定为保证金的50%到100%，换算成金额，也就是600元到1500元。很明显的，你愿意冒多大的风险，跟你预算获胜的概率多大有关系。所以说，如果你是个非常长线的交易者，一向能从赚钱的长线交易中赚到数千元，那显然你可以比那些时进时出的人承受更大的风险。
We
have all seen too many examples of antitrend trading. The same goes for
top or bottom picking against major trending markets, where the
operator loses - $15,000 or more per contract - all out of proportion to
what he could reasonably have expected to win. And, as you can surmise,
after taking a bath of that magnitude, he isn’t likely to have much
enthusiasm for getting back aboard when the market signals its next
turn, even though this is just when he should be back in. But what if,
instead of having lost several thousand per contract, he had lost under a
thousand? He could then patiently wait for the next opportunity as
signaled by his system or other technical method. He would again risk
another thousand on the new position. Assuming his system or technical
method was viable, he would ultimately score on the position,
notwithstanding the few small losses along the way.
我们都看过许许多多逆势交易的例子。同样的，无数人硬要在趋势明显的市场中抓头部和底部，输掉的钱跟他可以合理预期赚到的钱根本不成比例——每份合约亏15000元或更多。而且，你可以想象，一旦亏掉那么多，当市场发出下一个趋势的信号时，这是真实的信号，亏损严重的人也不会有太大的兴趣。但是如果不是每手输掉几千元，而是不到1000元，情况会怎么样？他可以耐心地等待系统或其它技术方法发出的信号。他可以在新的仓位再拿1000元去冒险。假使他的系统或技术方法是可行的，那么迟早他会在自己的仓位上赚大钱，而不必计较以前亏损的小钱。
Remember
the old children’s rhyme, “He who fights and runs away lives to fight
another day.” I would dedicate to the speculator a revised version: “He
who has a bad trade and runs away, lives to trade (and make profits)
another day.”
过去有一首老童谣唱道：“在战场上能打还能逃的人，有机会再上战场。”我愿为投机者改成：“交易不当而跑开的人，只要留一口气，改天还能再进场（并赚钱）。”
Have
you ever tried to quantify the long-short mix of your portfolio versus
the long-short mix of the actual market trends? I have, and the results
were quite revealing. In May of 1985, I called several of my colleagues
to inquire how they and their clients were positioned in the markets. I
also called a number of overseas traders and money managers.
