主讲人:
郑家昆,法国艾克斯-马赛经济学院(AMSE)和地中海中央理工双聘助理教授(高级)
主持人:
(北大经院)贾若
(人大财金)陈泽
(清华经管)冯润桓
参与老师:
(北大经院)郑伟
(人大财金)魏丽
时间:
2024年5月21日(周二)
10:00-11:30
线上形式:
腾讯会议
会议号:643 669 255
线下地点:
北京大学经济学院302会议室
主讲人简介:
郑家昆
,
2020年博士毕业于法国图卢兹经济学院, 现任法国艾克斯-马赛经济学院(AMSE)和地中海中央理工双聘助理教授(高级), 曾执教于法国图卢兹第一大学和中国人民大学, 主要研究方向包括行为决策, 风险管理与保险, 以及长期公共投资评估。他在这些领域的研究目前已发表于
JEEM, JHE, JEBO, IME
等期刊, 并获得欧洲风险与保险经济学家协会青年经济学家最佳论文奖, 中国行为与实验经济学论坛最佳论文奖, 国家优秀留学生奖等。此外, 他的研究还获得了中国国家自然科学基金委和法国国家研究署(ANR)的资助。
摘要:
Are people born moral (人之初,性本善?)? Recent literature shows that they may not be, but rather seek to feel moral. In particular, decision environments can influence observed morality. In a series of studies, we demonstrate that risk embedded in decision outcomes can serve as excuses for selfishness, irrespective of whether outcomes result in benefits or losses. The extent of excuse-driven behaviors varies widely and depends on various factors, such as one’s own risk preferences and the perceived risk preferences of others. A self-signaling model can account for this heterogeneity. Additionally, we show that the results observed in a non-strategic setting (i.e., dictator games) are applicable to an interpersonal strategic setting (i.e., public good games). It also appears that people hold relatively accurate beliefs about others’ excuse-driven behavior. Finally, we demonstrate that insurance plays an important role beyond being a standard risk management tool. Specifically, we need to be cautious when promoting insurance policies targeting individual risks when there is a clear trade-off between self-interest and the interests of others, as it could potentially erode morality.