摘要原文：We generalize the scope of random allocation mechanisms, in which the mechanism first identifies a feasible “expected allocation” and then implements it by randomizing over nearby feasible integer allocations. The previous literature has shown that the cases in which this is possible are sharply limited. We show that if some of the feasibility constraints can be treated as goals rather than hard constraints, then, subject to weak conditions that we identify, any expected allocation that satisfies all the constraints and goals can be implemented by randomizing among nearby integer allocations that satisfy all the hard constraints exactly and the goals approximately. By defining ex post utilities as goals, we are able to improve the ex post properties of several classic assignment mechanisms, such as the random serial dictatorship. We use the same approach to prove the existence of ϵ-competitive equilibrium in large markets with indivisible items and feasibility constraints.
参考文献：Mohammad Akbarpour, Afshin Nikzad. Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：We estimate production functions for cognition and health for children aged 1–12 in India, based on the Young Lives Survey. India has over 70 million children aged 0–5 who are at risk of developmental deficits. The inputs into the production functions include parental background, prior child cognition and health, and child investments, which are taken as endogenous. Estimation is based on a nonlinear factor model, based on multiple measurements for both inputs and child outcomes. Our results show an important effect of early health on child cognitive development, which then becomes persistent. Parental investments affect cognitive development at all ages, but more so for younger children. Investments also have an impact on health at early ages only.
参考文献：Orazio Attanasio, Costas Meghir, Emily Nix. Human Capital Development and Parental Investment in India. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：While potentially more productive, more complex tasks generate larger agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old agents, however, are imperfect substitutes for young ones, because the latter are easier to incentivize, thanks to longer horizons. This reduces competition between generations, enabling young managers to go for larger complexity than their predecessors. Consequently, equilibrium complexity and rents gradually increase beyond what is optimal for the principal and for society.
参考文献：B Biais, A Landier. Endogenous Agency Problems and the Dynamics of Rents. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：This article presents a dynamic political-economic model of total government obligations. Its focus is on the interplay between debt and entitlements. In our model, both are tools by which temporarily powerful groups can extract resources from groups that will be powerful in the future: debt transfers resources across periods; entitlements directly target the future allocation of resources. We prove the following results. First, the presence of endogenous entitlements dampens the incentives of politically powerful groups to accumulate debt, but it leads to an increase in total government obligations. Second, fiscal rules can have perverse effects: if entitlements are unconstrained, and there are capital market frictions, debt limits lead to an increase in total government obligations and to worse outcomes for all groups. Analogous results hold for entitlement limits. Third, our model sheds some lights on the influence of capital market frictions on the incentives of governments to adopt fiscal rules, and implement entitlement programs. Finally, we identify preference polarization as a possible explanation for the joint growth of debt and entitlements.
参考文献：Laurent Bouton, Alessandro Lizzeri, Nicola Persico. The Political Economy of Debt and Entitlements. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：We document that postwar U.S. elections show a strong pattern of “incumbency disadvantage”: if a party has held the presidency of the country or the governorship of a state for some time, that party tends to lose popularity in the subsequent election. We show that this fact can be explained by a combination of policy inertia and unpredictability in election outcomes. A quantitative analysis shows that the observed magnitude of incumbency disadvantage can arise in several different models of policy inertia. Normative and positive implications of policy inertia leading to incumbency disadvantage are explored.
参考文献：Satyajit Chatterjee, Burcu Eyigungor. Policy Inertia, Election Uncertainty, and Incumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：The large regional variation in minimum wage levels during the period 2002–8 in China implies that Chinese manufacturing firms experienced competitive shocks as a function of firm location and their low-wage employment share. We find that minimum wage hikes accelerate the input substitution from labour to capital, reduce employment growth and accelerate total factor productivity growth—particularly among the less productive firms under private Chinese or foreign ownership, but not among state-owned enterprises. The heterogeneous firm response to labour cost shocks can be explained by differences in management practices and suggests that management quality and competitive pressure are complementary.
参考文献：Harald Hau, Yi Huang, Gewei Wang. Firm Response to Competitive Shocks: Evidence from China’s Minimum Wage Policy. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：How far should an industry be allowed to consolidate when competition and innovation are endogenous? We develop a stochastically alternating-move game of dynamic oligopoly and estimate it using data from the hard disk drive industry, in which a dozen global players consolidated into only three in the last 20 years. We find plateau-shaped equilibrium relationships between competition and innovation, with heterogeneity across time and productivity. Our counterfactual simulations suggest the current rule-of-thumb policy, which stops mergers when three or fewer firms exist, strikes approximately the right balance between pro-competitive effects and value-destruction side effects in this dynamic welfare trade-off.
参考文献：Mitsuru Igami, Kosuke Uetake. Mergers, Innovation, and Entry-Exit Dynamics: Consolidation of the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1996–2016. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：We surveyed a large sample of Swedish lottery players about their psychological well-being 5–22 years after a major lottery event and analysed the data following pre-registered procedures. Relative to matched controls, large-prize winners experience sustained increases in overall life satisfaction that persist for over a decade and show no evidence of dissipating over time. The estimated treatment effects on happiness and mental health are significantly smaller. Follow-up analyses of domain-specific aspects of life satisfaction implicate financial life satisfaction as an important mediator for the long-run increase in overall life satisfaction.
参考文献：Erik Lindqvist, Robert Östling, David Cesarini. Long-Run Effects of Lottery Wealth on Psychological Well-Being. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：An increasing number of police departments use information technology (IT) to optimize patrolling strategies, yet little is known about its effectiveness in preventing crime. Based on quasi-random access to “predictive policing,” this study shows that IT improves police productivity as measured by crime clearance rates. Thanks to detailed information on individual incidents and offender-level identifiers it also shows that criminals strategies are predictable. Moreover, the introduction of predictive policing coincides with a large negative trend-discontinuity in crime rates. The benefit–cost ratio of this IT innovation appears to be large.
参考文献：Giovanni Mastrobuoni. Crime is Terribly Revealing: Information Technology and Police Productivity. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：U.S. monetary policy shocks induce comovements in the international financial variables that characterize the “Global Financial Cycle.” A single global factor that explains an important share of the variation of risky asset prices around the world decreases significantly after a U.S. monetary tightening. Monetary contractions in the US lead to significant deleveraging of global financial intermediaries, a decline in the provision of domestic credit globally, strong retrenchments of international credit flows, and tightening of foreign financial conditions. Countries with floating exchange rate regimes are subject to similar financial spillovers.
参考文献：Silvia Miranda-Agrippino, Hélène Rey. U.S. Monetary Policy and the Global Financial Cycle. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：This article establishes a new fact about educational production: ordinal academic rank during primary school has lasting impacts on secondary school achievement that are independent of underlying ability. Using data on the universe of English school students, we exploit naturally occurring differences in achievement distributions across primary school classes to estimate the impact of class rank. We find large effects on test scores, confidence, and subject choice during secondary school, even though these students have a new set of peers and teachers who are unaware of the students’ prior ranking in primary school. The effects are especially pronounced for boys, contributing to an observed gender gap in the number of Maths courses chosen at the end of secondary school. Using a basic model of student effort allocation across subjects, we distinguish between learning and non-cognitive skills mechanisms, finding support for the latter.
参考文献：Richard Murphy, Felix Weinhardt. Top of the Class: The Importance of Ordinal Rank. The Review of Economic Studies.
摘要原文：Insurance benefit design has important implications for consumer welfare. In this article, we model insurer behaviour in the Medicare prescription drug coverage market and show that strategic private insurer incentives impose a fiscal externality on the traditional Medicare program. We document that plans covering medical expenses have more generous drug coverage than plans that are only responsible for prescription drug spending, which translates into higher drug utilization by enrolees. The effect is driven by drugs that reduce medical expenditure and treat chronic conditions. Our equilibrium model of benefit design endogenizes plan characteristics and accounts for asymmetric information; the model estimates confirm that differential incentives to internalize medical care offsets can explain disparities across plans. Counterfactuals show that strategic insurer incentives are as important as asymmetric information in determining benefit design.
参考文献：Amanda Starc, Robert J Town. Externalities and Benefit Design in Health Insurance. The Review of Economic Studies.
