IF YOU see a crowd outside a department store it is reasonable to assume that there is a sale. If you see a queue outside a bank there is a good chance that nervous depositors are trying to withdraw funds. In both cases the actions of other people send a signal that may be useful for others to follow.
如果你看见一家百货公司的外面有人挤挤攘攘，便可以合乎情理地猜测那儿有减价品出售；如果你看见银行外面有人排成长龙，那很可能就是一些慌张的存款人打算取回老本。这两种情况说明了一个道理：某些人的行为所传递的信息可能会对跟风从众有利。
But does the wisdom of crowds apply to investment? At the peaks it certainly pays to head in the opposite direction from the masses. Bubbles occur when the population develops an enthusiasm for a particular asset class, whether it be technology stocks in the late 1990s or houses in the mid-2000s. The story goes that in 1929 Joseph Kennedy liquidated his portfolio when he heard that a shoeshine boy (in some versions, an elevator boy) was giving stock tips.
但从众的智慧适是否用于投资
?
如果买进高涨至顶时，与大众的走向反道而行却一定有利。无论是上世纪
90
年代末的科技股，还是
2000
年中旬的房产，一旦大众对某种资产类特别热衷起来之后，泡沫便应运而生。故有这么一个传说：
1929
年，当约瑟夫•肯尼迪听到一个擦鞋小弟
(
在一些版本中是个开电梯的小弟
)
给他股票建议时，立马开始清盘自己的投资组合。
Bubbles are relatively rare, however. In the normal course of events, following the crowd may be more profitable. After all, bond-market vigilantes are supposed to keep a wary eye out for inflation, while the stockmarket ought to give an early indication of coming recessions.
不过，泡沫相对少见。在事态正常的进程中
,
跟风逐流可能比较有利。毕竟
,
债券市场的义务治安员本该对通货膨胀密切关注
,
而股市则应对未来的衰退给点前兆迹象。
To investigate the investment success of crowds, The Economist asked Morningstar, an investment-research firm, to send us fund-flow data and performance statistics for its American mutual-fund range. We then applied some simple tests. Did investors plonk their money into an asset class that had been performing strongly over the previous 12 months? And was their judgment borne out over the subsequent 12 months?
为了探讨从众投资的成功之道
,
《经济学人》向晨星投资研究公司征集了它在美国共同基金范围内资金流向数据及其收益表现统计，然后据此采用了一些简单的测试进行分析：当某种资产类在之前的
12
个月内中表现强劲，投资者是否对此资产类纷纷买进？继而在随后的
12
个月中，投资者的判断是否得到了证实
?
The chart shows that the crowd was more foolish than wise. The most popular sector, measured by the net inflow of money, had generally performed well in the previous year, beating the average sector by more than two percentage points. Investors were clearly chasing the trend. Alas, over the next 12 months that most popular sector lagged behind the average by just under three percentage points. On around 60% of occasions, there turn of the most popular sector was much lower after investors bought it than before.
数据图表显示，从众的愚昧超过其智慧。通过测出最受追捧行业的净资金流
,
在前一年的基本收益表现都不错，比平均行业略多过
2
个百分点，投资者十分明显地在追逐这一趋势。不妙的是
,
在随后
12
个月中
,
最受追捧行业变得滞后于平均行业几近
3
个百分点。在大约有
60%
的投资情况中，最受追捧行业的回报远远低于投资者的初始购入价格。
The mob’s behaviour might still be useful if it acted as a contrarian indicator. Here there is good news and bad news.So-called “pariah funds” did beat the most popular sectors, but they also failed to beat the average.
作为一个逆向标示，跟风从众的行为或许仍然具有价值。它反映出褒贬两面的收益表现：所谓的“高风险资金”
居然击败了最受追捧行业的收益，不过也未能胜过平均行业。
There is another test of how psychic investors have been, which is to see how good they were at picking the best-performing sectors and avoiding the worst ones over any given 12-month period. Because the star performers tend to be fairly specialised, covering areas like China, property or Latin America, they are never likely to receive the biggest fund flows. Most American investors opt for broad equity or government-bond portfolios. Again, investors were more Nostradumbus than Nostradamus. The average fund flow into what turned out to be the worst-performing sector over the subsequent 12-month period was $166m; the average flow into the best was only $72m.
此外，还有一项对投资者是否能一直保持灵异的检验。该测试检查他们在任意一年期限内，是如何挑选收益表现最佳和避开最差行业的。因为明星股往往相当特殊，包括如中国、地产和拉丁美洲之类
,
向来都不大可能得到最高的资金流。美国投资者大多选择多股或政府债券的投资组合。这项分析数据再次表明，不比诺查丹玛斯【法国占星家】，投资者却更多像“诺查丹盲从”。在随后的
12
个月中，平均资金流有
1.6
亿美元进了业绩最差的行业，而只有
7.2
万美元进了最佳行业。
Perhaps investors get led astray by the advice they receive. The earnings forecasts compiled by investment-bank analysts and stockbrokers are often used as a basis for valuing shares and for predicting long-term earnings. But in the past quarter of a century the consensus forecast for the long-term annual earnings growth of American companies has never dipped significantly below 10%.
也许投资人因为误导的信息而误入歧途。由投资银行分析师和股票经纪人作出的收益预测常常被作为评估股票的依据
,
并被用来预测长期投资的回报。可是在过去
25
年中，那些对美国公司长期年收入增长的普遍预测从未明显过低于
10%
。
Such a rate was not achieved, of course. Itwas far faster than the annual growth rate of the American economy, which made the forecasts implausible to begin with. The long-term growth rate of earnings per share on the stockmarket has lagged behind that of American GDP because many of the fastest-growing companies are not quoted. Worse, earnings for ecastspeaked in 2000 just as the stockmarket was about to fall. The experts were no wiser than those they advised.
