翻译：廖斌
正确的估值方法只有一种
At Berkshire we take a more demanding
approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now
with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power – after taxes
have been paid on nominal gains – in the future. More succinctly,investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a
later date.
1
Intrinsic value is an all-important concept
that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness
of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the
discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its
remaining life.
2
Leaving aside tax factors, the formula we use for
evaluating stocks and businesses is identical. Indeed, the formula for valuing
all
assets that are purchased for financial gain.
3
在伯克希尔，我们对投资有更严格的定义：把当前的购买力转让给他人并合理预期未来可以获得更多的税后的购买力。简单讲，投资就是放弃现在的消费以期在未来消费更多。
而比较一项投资划不划算，正确的方法只有一种：把未来所有能赚到的现金折算成现值。这是投资最重要的概念——内生价值（Intrinsic value）。（估算内生价值的过程就叫估值），剔除税收因素，股票与企业的估值方法是一样的。实际上，为了经济回报而购买的
所有
资产类型，估值方法都是一样的。
The calculation of intrinsic value, though,
is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate
rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be
changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised.
Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreover – and this would apply
even to Charlie and me – will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly
different intrinsic value figures.
2
概念虽简单，计算却不容易。根据定义，内生价值首先是一个估计值而不是精确的数字；其次，如果利率水平或者你对公司未来现金流的预期变了，就必须要跟着调整。所以不同人面对同一事实，哪怕是查理和我，得出的结论也难免会有所差异。
一鸟在手胜过二鸟在林
The formula for valuing
all
assets……has been unchanged since it was first laid out by a very smart man in
about 600 B.C.
The oracle was Aesop and his enduring,
though somewhat incomplete, investment insight was “a bird in the hand is worth
two in the bush.” To flesh out this principle, you must answer only three
questions. How certain are you that there are indeed birds in the bush? When
will they emerge and how many will there be? What is the risk-free interest
rate (which we consider to be the yield on long-term U.S. bonds)? If you can
answer these three questions, you will know the maximum value of the bush——and the maximum number of the birds you now possess that should be
offered for it. And, of course, don’t literally think birds. Think dollars.
这种估值方法早在公元前600年被一位大智者首次提出来后就从来没变过。这位智者就是伊索，其经久不衰（虽然不是很完整）的投资洞见是：一鸟在手胜过二鸟在林。为了充实这条原则，你只需要回答三个问题：
-
1.
林中有鸟的确定性有多高？
-
2.
林中鸟什么时候会出现，有多少只？
-
3.
无风险利率是多少？（我们采用美国长期国债收益率）
如果你能回答以上三个问题，你就可以估算这片林子的最大价值，然后愿意最多拿手上的多少只鸟去交换。
当然，不是字面意义上的“鸟”，而是美元。
Aesop’s investment axiom, thus expanded and
converted into dollars, is immutable. It applies to outlays for farms,
oilroyalties, bonds, stocks, lottery tickets, and manufacturing plants. And
neither the advent of the steam engine, the harnessing of electricity nor the
creation of the automobile changed the formula one iota — nor will the
Internet. Just insert the correct numbers, and you can rank the attractiveness
of all possible uses of capital throughout the universe.
无论是买农场、油田、股票、债券、彩票还是工厂，伊索的投资公理都同样适用（把鸟换成美元即可）。蒸汽机的问世、电力的普及、汽车的发明未曾改变分毫，互联网时代也不会有什么不同。只要输入正确的数字，你就可以把全宇宙所有能投的东西按照吸引力来进行排序。
Common yardsticks such as dividend yield,
the ratio of price to earnings or to book value, and even growth rates have
nothing
to do with valuation except to the extent they provide clues to the amount and
timing of cash flows into and from the business. Indeed, growth can destroy
value if it requires cash inputs in the early years of a project or enterprise
that exceed the discounted value of the cash that those assets will generate in
later years.
Market commentators and investment managers
who glibly refer to “growth” and “value” styles as contrasting approaches to
investment are displaying their ignorance, not their sophistication. Growth is
simply a component——usually a plus, sometimes a minus ——in the value equation.
常见的指标，比如股息率、市盈率、市净率甚至增长率都跟估值
没有任何关系
，除非它能告诉你企业未来现金流入和流出的金额和时间。实际上，如果一个企业或项目早期需要投入的金额超过了它未来能赚到的所有现金的折现值，成长就是在毁灭价值。那些张口闭口“价值”或“成长”投资风格的股评家和基金经理是在展现他们的无知，而不是机智。成长只是估值公式的一部分，通常是加分项，有时候则是减分项。
Alas, though Aesop’s proposition and the
third variable ——that is, interest rates——are simple, plugging in numbers for the other two variables is a
difficult task. Using precise numbers is, in fact, foolish; working with a
range of possibilities is the better approach.
Usually, the range must be so wide that no
useful conclusion can be reached. Occasionally, though, even very conservative
estimates about the future emergence of birds reveal that the price quoted is
startlingly low in relation to value. (Let’s call this phenomenon the IBT——Inefficient Bush Theory.) To be sure, an investor needs some general
understanding of business economics as well as the ability to think
independently to reach a well founded positive conclusion. But the investor
does not need brilliance nor blinding insights.
唉，虽然伊索的建议和它第三个变量（即利率）很简单，但要搞清楚其它两个变量是多少却很困难。想求得一个精确的数字无疑是愚蠢的，更好的办法是估算出一个可能的区间。通常来说，这个区间会很宽以至于得不出任何有用的结论，但是偶尔，即使你对林子里有多少鸟采用最保守的估算，也会发现它的价格相对于价值实在是低得惊人（就叫IBT：低效林子理论
4
吧）。当然，一位投资者需要对商业有基本的认识，也要有独立思考的能力，才可能得出有充分依据的明确结论，但真的用不着才华横溢。
At the other extreme, there are many times
when the
most
brilliant of investors can’t muster a conviction about the
birds to emerge, not even when a very broad range of estimates is employed.
This kind of uncertainty frequently occurs when new businesses and rapidly
changing industries are under examination. In cases of this sort,
any
capital commitment must be labeled speculative.
另一个极端是，很多时候关于林子里有没有鸟，即使
最
聪明的人采用非常宽泛的区间估算，心里也会没点底。这种不确定性经常发生在新兴产业和快速变化的行业中，这种情况下，任何资本投入都是投机。
Now, speculation — in which the focus is
not on what an asset will produce but rather on what the next fellow will pay
for it — is neither illegal, immoral nor un-American. But it is not a game in
which Charlie and I wish to play. We bring nothing to the party, so why should
we expect to take anything home?
投机关注的不是资产的未来产出，而是下一个家伙会出多少钱。在当今社会，投机既不违法，不违背道德，也跟意识形态无关，但这不是查理和我想要玩的游戏。既然两手空空来参加派对，又何必非得带点什么回去？
The line separating investment and
speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further
when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates
rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of
that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of
Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities—that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic
valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future—will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless
hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy
participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There’s a problem,
though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.
投资与投机的界线向来不是清晰的，当大部分市场参与者都沉浸在赚钱的幻觉中时，这一界线变得愈加模糊，没有什么比不劳而获的大量金钱更能使人丧失理性了。体验过这种亢奋经历后，平时理智的人不知不觉也会陷入灰姑娘一样的行为模式，他们知道在舞会上逗留太久，马车会变回南瓜和老鼠，但谁也不愿意错过一分一秒的狂欢，他们不停地在那些相对于未来可能产生的现金而言估值巨高的公司上投机，认为自己能在午夜到来的前一秒中成功离场，但问题是：舞池里没有时钟。
......But a pin lies in wait for every
bubble. And when the two eventually meet, a new wave of investors learns some
very old lessons: First, many in Wall Street—a
community in which quality control is not prized—will
sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most dangerous
when it looks easiest.
每个泡沫都有一枚针在等着它，当两者最终相遇，新韭菜学到了古老的教训：首先，在资本市场（一个没人关心产品质量的地方），只要有人买，他们什么都卖；第二，投机看似最容易，实则最危险。
At Berkshire, we make
no
attempt to
pick the few winners that will emerge from an ocean of unproven enterprises.
We’re not smart enough to do that, and we know it. Instead, we try to apply
Aesop’s 2,600-year-old equation to opportunities in which we have reasonable
confidence as to how many birds are in the bush and when they will emerge (a
formulation that my grandsons would probably update to “A girl in a convertible
is worth five in the phonebook.”). Obviously, we can never precisely predict
the timing of cash flows in and out of a business or their exact amount. We
try, therefore, to keep our estimates conservative and to focus on industries
where business surprises are unlikely to wreak havoc on owners. Even so, we
make many mistakes: I’m the fellow, remember, who thought he understood the
future economics of trading stamps, textiles, shoes and second-tier department
stores......
6
在伯克希尔，我们
从未
试图在一片尚未被（市场）证明的企业海洋中挑选屈指可数的赢家，我们没这么聪明，而且我们知道自己没这么聪明。相反，我们试图运用有着2600年历史的伊索投资公理（我的孙子们可能会把它改成：一个敞篷车里的女孩胜过五个通讯录上的），寻找我们对于林子里有多少鸟以及何时会出现有合理信心的机会。显然，我们没办法精确地预测企业现金流入和流出的时机和准确的金额。因此，我们尽量维持保守估算，同时聚焦在那些就算出了意外也不大可能对其股东造成严重损失的企业。即便如此，我还是犯了很多错误，别忘了，我就是那个自以为懂商品券、纺织业、鞋业和二流百货公司未来的家伙。
