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孟晚舟脚绑镣铐软禁加拿大,妹妹姚安娜却在国内唱跳出道!华为除了八卦还剩什么?

西外英语  · 公众号  ·  · 2021-05-03 22:19

正文





4月19日,发生了两件事,一件有关于华为,另一件也与华为有关。

4月19日,国内,华为二公主姚安娜作为WEY品牌全球代言人亮相上海车展。


4月19日,镜头聚焦加拿大,任正非长女、华为副董事长孟晚舟再次现身法院。这一次,孟晚舟有望结束软禁生活。


首先,我简单帮大家梳理一下孟晚舟案件。

2018年12月1日,孟晚舟在加拿大转机时,被加拿大当局代表美国政府予以逮捕。美方指控她违反了美国对伊朗的制裁禁令,并试图将其引渡到美国。

在各方压力下,被关押10天后,孟晚舟于2018年12月12日以1000万加元为代价获得保释。但是从此,她的脚踝就戴上了电子监视器。


期间,美方数次想引渡孟晚舟到美国,均失败。

2020年,人民日报报道称:“北京时间2020年7月24日上午,加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚省高等法院公开孟晚舟引渡案下一阶段庭审的证据材料。早在5月28日,该法院裁定孟晚舟案的本质是“欺诈罪”。公开证据表明,所谓孟晚舟案,完全是美国炮制的政治案件。汇丰银行参与构陷,恶意做局、拼凑材料、捏造罪证,扮演了极不光彩的角色。孟晚舟是清白的!”

2021年4月19日,孟晚舟方律师表示,香港的法院已颁令许可孟方获取新证据。这些证据有助于证明美国在对孟的指控中误导了加方。

华为公司与汇丰银行达成了合作意向,汇丰银行也同意提供孟晚舟案件的相关账单流水。


再来看看我们的二公主。

二公主姚安娜其实也不简单。

15岁成为英皇芭蕾RAD最高级别获得者;


17岁以ACT(美国大学入学考试)满分的成绩提前被哈佛大学本科录取,学习计算机科学与统计学;


20岁受邀参加每年只邀请20个人的巴黎成人礼舞会(Le Ball 该舞会曾拒绝过伊万卡·特朗普和帕丽·斯希尔顿),舞会上与比利时王子共舞。


23岁出道,出了一支单曲,代言了WEY。


然而,姚安娜出现在大众眼前的时机总是那么寸。

第一次展现在世界面前是20岁,2018年参加巴黎名媛舞会。而舞会后一个星期,姐姐孟晚舟在加拿大被逮捕。

第二次大肆出现在国人面前是23岁出道,同一时间,冲上热搜的是姐姐在温哥华多次遭受死亡威胁的词条。


第三次,代言WEY,姐姐同一天在加拿大现身。

可能是姐姐的光环太亮,显得二公主没那么出众。然而,我仔细想了想姚安娜的成绩,更多的还是家族带给她的。相比孟晚舟凭借自己的能力用20年的时间成为华为副总,姚安娜还是太顺利了。

我也并不否认她自己的努力。出身好,自身还努力没有错。被人嘲的也不是她的努力,而是她的言论。

孟晚舟在被软禁期间写到: “忙碌把时间缩短,苦难把岁月拉长。”

姚安娜出道纪录片里问大家: “为什么大家喜欢姐姐不喜欢我?”


吃瓜结束,学习时间到。

美国除了指使加拿大逮捕孟晚舟外,对华为的制裁还包括但不限于切断芯片供应。

2020年9月12日的《经济学人》曾写文指出华为的困境,也提供了三种方案。我们一起来阅读。


原文网址:
https://www.economist.com/business/2020/09/12/how-americas-war-on-huawei-may-boost-chinese-technology

原文标题:
How America’s war on Huawei may boost Chinese technology


原文阅读


Huawei is on the ropes. From midnight on September 14th the Chinese technology giant will be cut off from essential supplies of semiconductors. Without chips it cannot make the smartphones or mobile-network gear on which its business depends. America’s latest rules, finalised on August 17th, prohibit companies worldwide from selling chips to Huawei if they have been made with American chipmaking kit. American semiconductor companies, for which Huawei has been a lucrative customer, have implored their government to extend the deadline, as have their industry bodies. A full reprieve looks unlikely.

Huawei now looks likely to follow one of three paths. The first involves Washington granting licences to suppliers so that they can sell chips to the firm in a limited fashion. This would let Huawei stay in business — just about. MediaTek, a Taiwanese chipmaker that is one of its main suppliers, has petitioned America’s Department of Commerce (DoC) for such a permit. To keep Huawei’s edge blunt, suppliers keen to produce chips designed by its in-house semiconductor unit, HiSilicon, are unlikely to be issued such dispensation.

Even a debilitated Huawei may not satisfy America. The DoC’s default setting is to deny permits. That would force the Chinese firm to take more desperate action, such as making its own chips using older technology that could be sourced from supply chains that do not include American firms. Pierre Ferragu of New Street Research, a telecoms-and-technology research firm, expects Huawei to do this within 12 months.

This path has just become rockier. On September 4th Reuters reported that America’s Department of Defence has proposed putting Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), China’s leading chipmaker, on the same blacklist as Huawei. The Pentagon alleges that SMIC works with China’s armed forces, and so poses a threat to national security. A blacklisting would destroy SMIC’s business, which relies on American machine tools. Its share price fell by almost a quarter on the news. SMIC denies having military ties and said it is in “complete shock”. The threat of such action may dissuade SMIC from teaming up with HiSilicon, as Huawei might have hoped.

This leaves the third eventuality. Huawei may go bust, or be forced to sell off bits of its business. This would not happen immediately: at the end of 2019 it had cash reserves of 371bn yuan ($53bn), enough to cover operating costs for a year and a half. But if push comes to shove, it may offload HiSilicon. Huawei’s chip-design arm is one of the most advanced such outfits in the world. According to ICInsights, a firm of analysts, HiSilicon broke into the global top-ten design companies by revenue in the first half of 2020, the first Chinese firm to do so. Since it will no longer be able to design chips for its owner after September 14th, HiSilicon could profitably focus on doing so for third parties in China. That would generate a new revenue stream for Huawei. If instead Huawei were forced to shut HiSilicon, its laid-off engineers would be snapped up by chip-design teams at other Chinese technology giants like Alibaba, Tencent and ByteDance. Or they could start new design firms of their own; many are said to be slipping out pre-emptively.

Each scenario worries firms like Qualcomm. The big American chip-designer lists Chinese competition as a risk in its annual filings. Last year Chinese sales made up $11.6bn out of Qualcomm’s $24.3bn in revenue. A HiSilicon liberated from Huawei would threaten those sales.

Huawei is putting on a brave face. It says it will spend over $20bn on research and development this year, $5.8bn more than in 2019 and about as much as Amazon, a firm with double its sales. It hopes to gain new revenue streams less vulnerable to American attacks. These are unlikely to let up even if Joe Biden becomes president next year. But as Uncle Sam tightens the grip, it risks squeezing Chinese technology into a form which it no longer controls. Huawei hopes to hang on until then.


精讲解析



第一段
Huawei is on the ropes . From midnight on September 14th the Chinese technology giant will be cut off from essential supplies of semiconductors . Without chips it cannot make the smartphones or mobile-network gear on which its business depends. America’s latest rules, finalised on August 17th, prohibit companies worldwide from selling chips to Huawei if they have been made with American chipmaking kit. American semiconductor companies, for which Huawei has been a lucrative customer, have implored their government to extend the deadline, as have their industry bodies. A full reprieve looks unlikely.

华为岌岌可危。从9月14日午夜开始,这家中国科技巨头将被切断半导体的基本供应。没有芯片,它就无法生产其业务所依赖的智能手机或移动网络设备。据美国于8月17日敲定的最新规定,禁止世界各地的使用美国芯片制造设备制造芯片的公司向华为销售芯片。华为一直是美国半导体公司的大客户,这些公司恳求本国政府延长最后期限,它们的行业机构也是如此。然而,完全缓解似乎不太可能。


  • On the ropes 濒于失败;完全无力回击;处于困境;岌岌可危


【例句】
It is an incredible turnaround for an industry that looked to be on the ropes. FORBES: The Great Private Equity Comeback Is Complete--At Least On Paper
对于一个看起来岌岌可危的行业来说,这是一个令人难以置信的转变。

【近义词】
In a hole 处于困境
In a tight spot 处于困境,处境险恶


  • Semiconductor [ˌsemikənˈdʌktə(r)] n. [电子][物] 半导体


【近义词】
Quasi-conductor n. 半导体

【同根词】
semiconducting adj. 半导体的;有半导体特性的

  • Gear [ɡɪə(r)] vi. 适合;搭上齿轮;开始工作


【词组】 gear with v. 适合;一致

【近义词】
Adapt to something 适合

【同根词】
Gearing n. 传动装置

  • Lucrative [ˈluːkrətɪv] adj. 获利多的


【词组】 lucrative post 旧指收入多的官职 ; 肥缺

【例句】
But the payoff could be lucrative for Merck or whichever drug maker leads the way. FORBES: Cornering A Killer
但对默克或任何一家领先的制药商来说,回报都是丰厚的。

【近义词】
Economical / profitable adj. 有利可图的,赚钱的


第二段
Huawei now looks likely to follow one of three paths. The first involves Washington granting licences to suppliers so that they can sell chips to the firm in a limited fashion. This would let Huawei stay in business—just about. MediaTek, a Taiwanese chipmaker that is one of its main suppliers, has petitioned America’s Department of Commerce (DoC) for such a permit. To keep Huawei’s edge blunt, suppliers keen to produce chips designed by its in-house semiconductor unit, HiSilicon, are unlikely to be issued such dispensation .

现在看来,华为可能会选择以下三条道路之一。第一种是华盛顿向供应商发放许可证,这样他们就可以有限地向华为出售芯片。这将使华为得以继续经营——仅仅是勉强继续。其主要供应商之一的台湾芯片制造商联发科技(MediaTek)已向美国商务部(DoC)申请此类许可。为了持续与华为的交易,供应商渴望生产由其内部半导体部门海思半导体(HiSilicon)设计的芯片,而这类供应商不太可能获得此类授权。


  • Grant licence to 颁发营业执照


Grant [ɡrɑːnt] v. (合法地)授予,允许;(勉强)承认,同意

【词组】
take for granted 认为…理所当然

【例句】
For one thing the federal assistance will be a loan, not a grant in aid. FORBES: Bridge to Nirvana
一方面,联邦政府的援助将是一笔贷款,而不是补助。

【近义词】
Award vt. 授予
Recognize vt. 承认

【同根词】
grantee n. 受让人;被授与者
grantor n. 授予者;[法] 让与人
granter n. 出让方;出让人;授与者;转让者

  • Dispensation [ˌdɪspenˈseɪʃn] n. 分配;免除;豁免;天命


【词组】 grant a dispensation 授予一项豁免 ; 给予特许

【例句】
And neither the seizure nor the dispensation of assets is subject to judicial review. FORBES: Broken Windows, Libya And The Constitution
财产的扣押和分配都不受司法审查的约束。

【近义词】
Immunity n. 豁免权;免除

【同根词】
Dispense vi. 免除,豁免 vt. 分配,分发;免除
Dispenser n. 药剂师;施与者;分配者;自动售货机


第三、四段
Even a debilitated Huawei may not satisfy America. The DoC’s default setting is to deny permits. That would force the Chinese firm to take more desperate action, such as making its own chips using older technology that could be sourced from supply chains that do not include American firms. Pierre Ferragu of New Street Research, a telecoms-and-technology research firm, expects Huawei to do this within 12 months.

即使虚弱的华为也不能让美国满意。美国商务部默认拒绝许可。这将迫使这家中国公司采取更加孤注一击的行动,比如使用旧技术生产自己的芯片,这些技术可以从不包括美国公司的供应链中采购。电信技术研究公司新街研究(New Street Research)的皮埃尔•费拉居(Pierre Ferragu)预计华为将在12个月内做到这一点。

This path has just become rockier. On September 4th Reuters reported that America’s Department of Defence has proposed putting Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), China’s leading chipmaker, on the same blacklist as Huawei. The Pentagon alleges that SMIC works with China’s armed forces, and so poses a threat to national security. A blacklisting would destroy SMIC’s business, which relies on American machine tools. Its share price fell by almost a quarter on the news. SMIC denies having military ties and said it is in “complete shock”. The threat of such action may dissuade SMIC from teaming up with HiSilicon, as Huawei might have hoped.

这条路变得更加崎岖。9月4日路透社报道,美国国防部提议将中国领先的芯片制造商中芯国际半导体制造公司(SMIC)列入跟华为一起的黑名单。五角大楼声称中芯国际与中国军方合作,因此对美国国家安全构成威胁。列入黑名单将会摧毁中芯国际依赖美国机床的业务。消息传出后,其股价下跌了近四分之一。中芯国际否认与军方有联系,并表示“非常震惊”。此类行动的威胁可能会阻止如华为所愿的中芯国际与海思科技的合作。


  • Default setting [dɪˈfɔːlt ˈsetɪŋ] 默认设置


  • Desperate [ˈdespərət] adj. 不顾一切的;令人绝望的;极度渴望的


【例句】
Now Army leaders are desperate to reduce tours from 15 months to 12 months. NPR: Military Officials Focus on Easing Strain on Army
现在,军队领导人迫切希望将服役期从15个月减少到12个月。

【近义词】
venturous / devil-may-care adj. 不顾一切的;令人绝望的;极度渴望的

【同根词】
desperately adv. 拼命地;绝望地;极度地
desperation n. 绝望的境地;不顾一切拼命

【词语辨析】
desperate 因绝望而铤而走险
hopeless 无任何希望的

  • Pentagon [ˈpentəɡən] n. 五角形


提到penta(pref. 表示“五”),玩游戏的同学应该不陌生。

First blood 一杀
Double kill 两杀
Triple kill 三杀
Quadra kill 四杀
Penta kill 五杀

【词组】
The Pentagon 美国五角大楼

  • Pose a threat to 对…造成威胁


【相关词组】
Pose a great threat to 对……有很大威胁
pose a major threat to 对…形成主要威胁

【例句】
Such behavior has long been understood to pose a threat to the United States, as well. CENTERFORSECURITYPOLICY: Don’t Cry for Him, Syria
长期以来,这种行为也被认为对美国构成了威胁。

第五、六、七段
This leaves the third eventuality. Huawei may go bust , or be forced to sell off bits of its business. This would not happen immediately: at the end of 2019 it had cash reserves of 371bn yuan ( $53bn ), enough to cover operating costs for a year and a half. But if push comes to shove , it may offload HiSilicon. Huawei’s chip-design arm is one of the most advanced such outfits in the world. According to ICInsights, a firm of analysts, HiSilicon broke into the global top-ten design companies by revenue in the first half of 2020, the first Chinese firm to do so. Since it will no longer be able to design chips for its owner after September 14th, HiSilicon could profitably focus on doing so for third parties in China. That would generate a new revenue stream for Huawei. If instead Huawei were forced to shut HiSilicon, its laid-off engineers would be snapped up by chip-design teams at other Chinese technology giants like Alibaba, Tencent and ByteDance. Or they could start new design firms of their own; many are said to be slipping out pre-emptively.

这就剩下了第三种可能。华为可能会破产,或者被迫出售其部分业务。这不会立即实现:截至2019年底,该公司拥有3710亿元人民币(合530亿美元)的现金储备,足够负担其一年半的运营成本。但如果到了紧要关头,它可能会放弃海思科技。华为的芯片设计部门是世界上最先进的芯片设计部门之一。根据ICInsights(一家分析公司)的数据显示,海思科技在2020年上半年进入了全球收入排名前十的设计公司,这是第一家进入排名前十的中国公司。自从9月14日以后,海思科技就不能再为其所有者华为设计芯片了,所以海思科技可以专注于为中国的其他公司设计芯片,这依旧可以获利。这将为华为带来新的收入来源。如果华为被迫关闭海思科技,它解雇的工程师将被阿里巴巴、腾讯和字节跳动等其他中国科技巨头的芯片设计团队聘走。或者他们可以自己创办新的设计公司;据说许多人会先发制人地溜走。

Each scenario worries firms like Qualcomm. The big American chip-designer lists Chinese competition as a risk in its annual filings. Last year Chinese sales made up $11.6bn out of Qualcomm’s $24.3bn in revenue. A HiSilicon liberated from Huawei would threaten those sales.

每种情况都让高通这样的公司感到担忧。这家美国芯片设计巨头在其年度申报文件中将来自中国的竞争列为一种风险。去年,在高通243亿美元的营收中,来自中国的销售收入占116亿美元。从华为解放出来的海思科技将威胁到这部分销售。

Huawei is putting on a brave face. It says it will spend over $20bn on research and development this year, $5.8bn more than in 2019 and about as much as Amazon, a firm with double its sales. It hopes to gain new revenue streams less vulnerable to American attacks. These are unlikely to let up even if Joe Biden becomes president next year. But as Uncle Sam tightens the grip, it risks squeezing Chinese technology into a form which it no longer controls. Huawei hopes to hang on until then.

华为正展示着它的勇敢。该公司表示,今年将投入超过200亿美元用于研发,比2019年多58亿美元,与销售额翻倍的亚马逊相当。它希望获得不那么容易受到美国攻击的新收入来源。即使乔·拜登(Joe Biden)明年当选总统,这些问题也不太可能缓解。但随着山姆大叔(指美国)收紧控制,它可能会把中国的技术挤压成一种它不再控制的形式。华为希望能坚持到那一天。


  • Go bust 破产,完蛋;失败


【例句】
Should more banks and brokers go bust, life insurers are unlikely to get this money back. ECONOMIST: And it finally came to tears
如果更多的银行和经纪人破产,寿险公司就不太可能收回这笔钱。

【近义词】
Go bankrupt 破产

  • 371bn = 371 billion = 3710亿; 53bn = 53 billion = 530亿



  • If push comes to shove 到了紧要关头;在情况糟糕时;在迫不得已时;如果事态严重


【例句】
If push comes to shove, the Supreme Court will have to decide. ECONOMIST: The pace quickens in an old dance
如果到了紧要关头,最高法院将不得不做出决定。

  • Offload [ˌɒfˈləʊd] vt. 卸下;卸货


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