全文翻译自国家利益杂志6月13日文章
原题：The Real Reason China Wants South Korea to Ditch THAAD
作者：Robert E Kelly
译者：冬天毛
冬天毛导读：
本文作者罗伯特·凯利是一位美国政治分析家，目前在韩国釜山大学任教职，是韩朝问题的专家，其对韩朝问题的分析曾被同行赞为“很他妈厉害”（“damn good Korean analyst”），而他今年三月在家接受BBC网络采访时发生了一场直播事故，导致全家人一起出了名。
最后，本文虽然谈及中国时很不客气（美国涉中外交分析的政治正确原则），但逻辑性强，利害分析切实，半句不谈意识形态，体现了该刊本身的国际现实主义风格，尤其结语一针见血：中美之间只会越怼越凶，而萨德只是逼韩国站队的第一步罢了。
国家利益（The National Interest）是美国一本政治外交性杂志，由Irving Kristol在1985年创立，是以报道国际事务为主的双月刊杂志，其内容作者许多是退休外交官、智库或各国大使，也有少数外国学者，杂志立场以美国利益为主轴，但文风走向较为敏感和客观，也有一些较艰深内容，与一般大众在美国电视上接触的讯息有差异，属于国际现实主义。
（维基百科）
韩国的李淳镇将军参观关岛的萨德部署地点
副标题：
The U.S. missile system has fallen victim to South Korea’s tough position between Beijing and Washington.
韩国被夹在北京和华盛顿之间，处境艰难，而美国的（萨德）导弹系统成了其中的牺牲品。
正文：
This month, the new president of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, declared that American missile defense in South Korea must wait out yet another round of delays. The United States military has sought for years to install a high-altitude missile defense system in South Korea. The South Korean government dragged its feet for fear of provoking China, which has objected. Yet years of outreach by United States and South Korean officials—on the Track 1, 1.5 and 2 levels—went unheeded. No matter the solicitation, China turned it down. Eventually, the government of now-impeached ex-President Park Geun-hye chose to accept the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in mid-2016. The system is now partially installed.
本月，韩国新任总统文在寅宣布，美国在韩国的导弹防御系统部署将迎来新一轮的延期。此前数年，美国军方一直在寻求在韩国搭建高空导弹防御系统，韩国政府则由于害怕触怒中国而一直对此故意拖拉——因为中国表示了反对。数年来，美国和韩国官员也一直在尝试和中方沟通，官方、半官方和非官方渠道都试了个遍，后者却无动于衷：无论如何请求，中国都一概拒绝。最终，如今已被弹劾的前总统朴槿惠的政府在2016年年中选择了接受安装末段高空区域防御（萨德）系统。该系统目前已部分搭建完成。
China and THAAD
中国和萨德
The Chinese response was to slap an informal economic embargo on South Korea. As South Korea’s largest export destination, this hurt local producers, leading to pushback. Politicians on the left also argued that THAAD was unnecessary. They said it was overkill for North Korea’s limited missile program and that it did not block the likely vector North Korea would use to strike South Korea. North Koreans, as a fellow Korean people, would never use nuclear weapons against South Korea.
中国人的第一反应是对韩国实行了非正式的经济禁令。由于中国是韩国最大的出口目标国，此举使韩国的生产商蒙受了损失，继而引来了反对声。左翼政治家们也辩称，安装萨德是多此一举，并表示萨德对朝鲜那有限的导弹计划而言是杀鸡用牛刀，而且朝鲜真正会用来打击韩国的武器也不在其拦截目标中：朝鲜人同为朝鲜民族，是不会用核武器对付韩国的。
Hence when liberal Moon took the presidency, there was considerable impetus to halt or slow the deployment. And this summer Moon has thrown up two roadblocks to deployment—legislative approval and an environmental assessment. The response has been widespread skepticism of these objections. As in most democracies, the commander-in-chief has wide latitude to make national-defense decisions at his/her discretion. President Park did not obtain National Assembly approval for THAAD last year. Nor is there obvious precedent demanding that. Even more implausible is the environmental objection. Presumably American operators and builders of this system would have long since been exposed to dangerous levels of whatever toxins the president fears.
这也是为什么当自由主义党派的文就任总统时，韩国有很大势头要中止或放缓萨德系统的部署。这个夏天，文已经在萨德的部署面前设下了两块新的路障——国会批准和环境评估，而人们对此广泛提出了质疑。和大部分民主国家一样，韩国总统在自主进行国防决策方面是有很大自由空间的。去年，朴总统并没有为萨德获取国会批准，而此前也没有明确的先例要求国会批准。至于出于环境理由的反对，听着就更不对劲了：可想而知，不管总统怕的是什么有毒物质，美国的系统操作员和安装人员首先就已经长期暴露在高浓度环境下了。
These objections are so transparent that much of the conservative media has identified them as what they almost certainly are—delaying tactics as a sop to China. They buy Moon time to find a technicality to roll THAAD out if indeed he wants to push that far. That still seems unlikely. Moon only won with 41 percent of the vote and would face punishing criticism in the media for knuckling under to China if he expelled THAAD. But Moon’s awkward dilemma between China and the United States on this issue captures what is likely the biggest challenge for South Korean grand strategy in the future—avoiding an open, zero-sum choice between the United States and China.
这些反对理由实在太浅显，很多保守派媒体已经指出了它们的本质，而且几乎没跑：用来劝慰中国的拖延战术。如果文确实打算做到放弃（冬天毛注：此处多半为作者误用，roll out本意为推出，而非剔除）萨德那一步的话，这也给了他时间寻找具体的法律依据。这种可能性目前很小，因为文只赢得了41%的选票，如果他真的驱除了萨德，那么他将面对媒体批判的惩罚，后者会指责他向中国卑躬屈膝。但是，文在这个问题上在中国和美国间所处的尴尬两难境地，恰恰反映出了韩国未来大战略面临的最大挑战——避免在美国和中国间做出开诚布公、非此即彼的选择。
What THAAD Does and Does Not Do
萨德的能力和限度
THAAD captures this problem well, because China’s objections are almost certainly not technical. THAAD does not impinge on China’s strategic deterrent against the United States. Its anti-missile rockets do not have the range for that. THAAD also does not give America any new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to observe China. The United States already has excellent satellite coverage of China and would rapidly detect a Chinese missile launch. THAAD’s X-band radar, about which so much fuss has been made, does not point into China. Unlike an I-band radar (the sort one sees at airports or in the movies), the X-band does not rotate 360 degrees, generating imagery of China. Rather it projects northward, as its intended target is North Korea.
萨德的矛盾很好地反映出了这个问题，因为中国的反对几乎肯定不是出于技术理由。萨德并不会对中国对美国的战略威慑产生负面影响，它的反导弹火箭没那个射程，萨德也不会在窥探中国方面给美国添加任何新的情报、监控和侦查能力。美国目前的卫星监控已经很好地覆盖了中国，能够很快探测到中国发射的导弹。关于萨德的X-波段雷达有很多小题大作的抱怨，但该雷达并不指向中国内陆。和I-波段雷达不一样（就是你在机场或电影院看到的那种），X-波段雷达并不是360度旋转的，也不会生成中国的图像，而是指向北边，因为它的防御目标是北朝鲜。
Chinese (and Russian) objections that it might then penetrate into northeastern China (or the Russian far east) are also specious. The curvature of the earth means that the X-band signal begins to peel away from the earth after several hundred miles, so coverage north of North Korea is limited too. As its name implies, THAAD is a defensive system. It is designed to shoot down incoming missiles as they approach a target. Unless China, or Russia, intend to strike South Korea or Japanese cities, there is no threat to them. Repeating all this, however, is almost besides the point now. The Chinese (and the Russians) know this. Beijing had ample years before the Park deployment decision last summer to raise technical concerns. It forewent all such opportunities. This strongly suggests a political motive, which Moon’s transparently phony excuses to drag out deployment only further verify.
中国（以及俄罗斯）进一步表示反对的理由是萨德可能会穿过朝鲜探入中国东北（或东边远端的俄罗斯），这同样似是而非。地势的起伏意味着X-波段信号在传播几百英里后就会开始偏离地表，所以萨德连对北边朝鲜的覆盖能力也是有限的。和名称表示的一样，萨德是一套防御系统，是用来击落飞向目标的导弹的。除非中国或俄罗斯打算轰击韩国或日本城市，否则萨德对它们构不成威胁。然而，如今再重复这些几乎已经是和正题不沾边了，因为中国人（还有俄罗斯人）从一开始就知道这些。北京多年来一直可以提出这些技术上的顾虑，但直到去年夏天朴决定部署萨德以前，它都放弃了质疑的机会。这非常有力地暗示了其政治动机，而文为拖延部署而找的那些明显掺假的借口则进一步验证了这一点。
Decision Forks
决策岔路
So once again, THAAD is victim to South Korea’s tough position between the United States and China. As China rises, it exerts pressure on its neighboring states, as most large, expanding states do in their locality. Beijing can mask such pressure in bogus technical language—suggesting that THAAD peers into China, or that South Korean imports suddenly require new health and safety inspection—but these are obvious fakeries. And indeed, Beijing may want them to be flimsy enough so that South Korean elites can actually see the steel in the glove.
再重复一遍，萨德是韩国夹在中美两国间艰难处境的牺牲品。随着中国崛起，它开始向邻国施加压力，这是大部分扩张期的大国都会在周边采取的行动。北京可以用虚假的技术用语遮掩其施压行为——指出萨德窥探了中国，或者从韩国进口的商品忽然就需要接受新的健康和安全检查了——但这些明显都是虚招子，而北京或许也确实想让窗户纸薄一些，这样韩国的高层们就更容易看到绵里藏的针了。
Beijing’s real objection, of course, is the deepening of the South Korea–U.S. alliance, which THAAD represents. THAAD is technically confusing enough that muddying the waters on it masks an open Chinese power-play, but to those who understand THAAD, Beijing’s objections are shallow enough for the real message to come through: that South Korea should not further its military relationship with the United States.
当然，北京真正反对的，是韩国和美国盟友关系的加深，而萨德则是这种关系的象征。萨德在技术上足够令人费解，中国可以通过围绕它搅浑水来掩盖其高压外交攻势，但对于那些了解萨德的人来说，北京的反对理由足够肤浅，从中可以看清它真正想传达的信息：韩国不应再与美国增强军事合作关系了。
This sort of decision point, or fork, is almost certain to recur with greater frequency for South Korea. China is growing relative to the United States. As the gap between them diminishes, pressure will rise on China’s neighbors. South Korea’s ability to walk between the raindrops—to find political spaces congenial to both the United States and China—will invariably contract. THAAD and the Moon government’s decision to once again get on the deploy-or-not merry-go-round is only the beginning. Tussles like this will become a defining feature of South Korean foreign policy.
韩国几乎必然会面临越来越多的这类决策点，或决策岔路。中国相较于美国正在不断壮大，而随着两国间的差距缩小，中国的邻国会面临越来越大的压力。韩国的独木桥会越来越难走，越来越难给自己找到中美两国都能接受的政治定位。文政府决定再次爬上名为“安装萨德与否”的旋转木马，这还只是一切的开端：如今这样的争论拉锯，将会成为韩国外交政策领域的独有特征。
正文到此结束
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