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问询函质疑上市公司审计意见购买，评论前建议下载学习三篇顶刊文献！

会计学术联盟 · 公众号 · · 2021-02-06 08:35

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出品@会计学术联盟(ID：KJXSLM) ,部分转自YCY会计行业观察，文献由会计期刊前沿栏目整理，新西兰梅西大学Sean博士指导。

世间对于新鲜事务，都是格外关注！

行使监管职责，证券监管部门出具监管 问询函 是再正常不过了，但前不久，深交所出具的《关于对深圳赫美集团股份有限公司的关注函中小板关注函【2021】第32 号》，让赫美说明不再续聘永拓会计师事务所，拟改聘深圳堂堂会计师事务所担任你公司 2020 年度审计机构的有关事项。

此文一出，在圈内引起了广泛关注，不知何原因，赫美最终又临时换所。但质询公司 是否存在购买审计意见 的情形，却成为大家讨论的焦点。什么是审计意见购买？如何判定存在审计意见购买？今天小编为朋友们推荐几篇文章，下载学习（详见文后）

1.Do companies successfully engage in opinion-shopping? Evidence from the UK☆

Journal of Accounting and Economics
Volume 29, Issue 3, June 2000, Pages 321-337
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(00)00025-2

Clive Lennox
University of Southern California

Abstract:Since observed audit opinions do not generally become more favourable after companies switch auditors, it has been argued that companies do not successfully engage in opinion-shopping. Rather than comparing observed pre- and post-switch audit reports, this study tests for opinion-shopping by predicting the opinions companies would have received had they made opposite switch decisions. My results indicate that companies would have received unfavourable reports more often under different switch decisions. This suggests that companies do successfully engage in opinion-shopping.

Keywords：Opinion-shopping; Auditor switching; Audit reporting

2.Do Audit Clients Successfully Engage in Opinion Shopping? Partner‐Level Evidence

Journal of Accounting Research
Volume54, Issue1，March 2016，Pages 79-112
DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12097

FENG CHEN
University of Toronto and University of Missouri‐Columbia

SONGLAN PENG
York University

SHUANG XUE
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

ZHIFENG YANG
City University of Hong Kong

FEITENG YE
Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce

ABSTRACT ：This study investigates whether companies engage in audit opinion shopping activities by exerting influence over an audit firm's decision to switch the engagement partner (“partner‐level opinion shopping”) in the Chinese setting, where the identities of engagement partners are publicly disclosed. Adopting the empirical framework developed by Lennox [2000], we show evidence that companies successfully engage in partner‐level opinion shopping. Further, partner‐level opinion shopping is more likely to be successful if a company is economically important to an audit firm, and it is less likely to be successful if the audit firm is formed as a partnership rather than a corporation. We also find that companies successfully engaging in partner‐level opinion shopping exhibit significantly lower earnings quality. Finally, we directly compare audit records between incoming and outgoing partners and find that, for companies that successfully improve audit opinions after partner switching, incoming partners have a significantly higher propensity to issue clean opinions than their outgoing counterparts.

3.Opinion Shopping to Avoid a Going Concern Audit Opinion and Subsequent Audit Quality

AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
2019， 38 (2): 101–123.
https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-52154

Heesun Chung;

Sejong University

Catherine Heyjung Sonu;
Korea National Open University

Yoonseok Zang;
Singapore Management University

Jong-Hag Choi
Seoul National University

ABSTRACT ：Despite regulatory concerns over opinion shopping (OS) behavior, there exists little systematic evidence on the prevalence and consequences of OS to avoid a going concern opinion (GCO). Using Lennox's (2000) framework to identify OS, we find that distressed firms successfully engage in OS to avoid a GCO. Moreover, clients engaging in OS exhibit a higher ex post Type II error rate in audit opinions than clients that do not, and the higher Type II error rate is salient for clients switching auditors for OS but not for clients retaining auditors for OS. We continue to find this asymmetric effect of the two types of OS on audit quality measured by restatements. These results indicate that auditor switching for OS not only results in a higher likelihood of audit reporting failures but also impairs other dimensions of audit quality, while auditor retaining for OS has little adverse effect on audit quality.