Abstract: This study investigates whether the benefit firms can extract from team member communication to the team manager—who may use such information for rewarding individual team members—is affected by differences in the type of mutual monitoring information available to team members. We predict and find that team performance is higher when team members can observe only each other's effort than when they can observe both each other's effort and output levels; conversely, team performance is lower when team members can observe only each other's output than when they can observe both each other's effort and output levels. The intuition behind these results is that the type of observable mutual monitoring information creates different degrees of ambiguity regarding what should be considered a fair reward allocation for team members' contributions. Such ambiguity reduces the usefulness of team member communication to the manager for allocating rewards, resulting in lower team performance.
参考文献：Arnold, M. C., Hannan, R. L., & Tafkov, I. D. (2020). Mutual Monitoring and Team Member Communication in Teams. Accounting Review, 95(5), 1–21.
Abstract: We examine whether information technology expertise on audit committees impacts the reliability and timeliness of financial reporting. We find a reduction in the likelihood of material restatement, a reduction in the likelihood of information technology-related material weaknesses (which account for 55 percent of all reported material weaknesses), and more timely earnings announcements at firms with audit committee information technology expertise. These findings are robust to controlling for a firm's other information technology attributes, as well as when using entropy balanced samples, and we mitigate endogeneity concerns with evidence that our findings hold in a subsample of firms that all possess overall high-quality information technology. Finally, a difference-in-differences analysis, inclusion of firm fixed effects, and a falsification test largely support our assertion that the quality of financial reporting is significantly improved by the presence of an audit committee information technology expert.
参考文献：Ashraf, M., Michas, P. N., & Russomanno, D. (2020). The Impact of Audit Committee Information Technology Expertise on the Reliability and Timeliness of Financial Reporting. Accounting Review, 95(5), 23–56.
Abstract: In a standard financial economics model of asset pricing and value-maximizing firms, we show that better public information about firm-specific and economy-wide events affects the allocation of capital investments among firms and over time. The consequences for capital market outcomes, such as risk, risk premia, interest rates, firm prices, and the cost of capital, depend on investor preferences and whether improvements are to firm-specific or economy-wide information. We show that interest rates and risk premia tend to move in opposite directions and that the effects on interest rates often dominate the effects on risk premia in determining firm values and the cost of capital.
参考文献：Christensen, P. O., & Frimor, H. (2020). Public Information and Efficient Capital Investments: Implications for the Cost of Capital and Firm Values. Accounting Review, 95(5), 57–93.
Abstract: We examine how information dissemination via mobile device applications (apps) affects nonprofessional investors' judgments. In response to the prevalence of mobile device use, the media ungroups content into smaller pieces to accommodate users, and apps use push notifications to highlight this content. These changes increase users' ability to access investment information in real time, leaving some investors feeling as if they are missing out if they are not continuously connected. We validate a scale to capture investors' fear of missing out on investment information (I-FoMO) and document that I-FoMO is distinct from traditional FoMO that occurs in social settings. Then, using an experiment, we find that receiving ungrouped content via a mobile device has a greater effect on investment allocations in the presence, rather than absence, of push notifications. Further, we find that these results hold for higher, but not for lower, I-FoMO investors.
参考文献：Clor-Proell, S. M., Guggenmos, R. D., & Rennekamp, K. (2020). Mobile Devices and Investment News Apps: The Effects of Information Release, Push Notification, and the Fear of Missing Out. Accounting Review, 95(5), 95–115.
Abstract: This study examines whether investor-level preferences for director characteristics influence portfolio choices, using data on the U.S. holdings of non-U.S. funds. Consistent with bias-based preferences influencing portfolio allocations, funds from countries with greater gender inequality invest less and hold smaller stakes in firms with more female directors. Since variation in funds' home country gender biases are plausibly unrelated to the selection and performance of female directors in U.S. firms, the empirical strategy mitigates endogeneity concerns arising from estimates based on associations between market performance and gender demographics. The study contributes by linking investments to measured gender biases and by providing evidence, through additional analysis, of potential channels through which gender bias may affect portfolio choice.
参考文献：Friedman, H. L. (2020). Investor Preference for Director Characteristics: Portfolio Choice with Gender Bias. Accounting Review, 95(5), 117–147.
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between societal trust and managers' decisions to voluntarily issue earnings forecasts. We reason that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts in high-trust countries than in low-trust countries because investors view these voluntary disclosures as more credible information about the firm's future profitability. We find evidence consistent with these predictions, suggesting that societal trust fosters corporate voluntary disclosure. We also document that societal trust works as a substitute for country-level formal institutions in terms of its implications for management earnings forecast (MEF) issuance. Additionally, we find a stronger relationship between firm-level commitment to credible disclosure and MEFs in low-trust countries, suggesting that country-level societal trust relates to the effectiveness of firm-level credibility-enhancing mechanisms. Finally, we show that firms from countries with higher societal trust issue more precise and accurate MEFs that contain more information about multiple items.
参考文献：Guan, Y., Lobo, G. J., Tsang, A., & Xin, X. (2020). Societal Trust and Management Earnings Forecasts. Accounting Review, 95(5), 149–184.
Abstract: We provide evidence about allocations of cash flow freed up by not paying taxes ("tax-related cash"). Uncertainty about future repayments suggests firms may use tax-related cash more cautiously than other cash flow. We utilize a flow-of-funds model from finance to quantify the relative amounts of tax-related cash associated with various potential uses of operating cash flow. We find firms allocate tax-related cash differently than other after-tax cash flow. Prior studies find tax avoiders hold more cash, and our results suggest this is because firms invest less (and save more) tax-related cash. We also find that the allocation of tax-related cash varies with relative financial constraints, economic uncertainty, and firms' multinational status in ways consistent with prior findings. For example, firms facing relatively higher levels of financial constraints invest a lower (higher) percentage of tax-related cash in capital expenditures (marketable securities and R&D), possibly to preserve funds for future investment opportunities.
参考文献：Guenther, D. A., Njoroge, K., & Williams, B. M. (2020). Allocation of Internal Cash Flow when Firms Pay Less Tax. Accounting Review, 95(5), 185–210
Abstract: In this paper I revisit the issue of real income smoothing in the setting used by Lambert (1984). I demonstrate that the particular effect identified in his paper is actually an error: under his assumptions, there is no input-driven equilibrium income smoothing of the type he suggests. There are, however, several other drivers of equilibrium behavior ignored in that paper. In this paper, I identify those and, for the particular model structure, show that when all effects are considered together, there is little support for the suggestion that second-best earnings generally are being smoothed through the equilibrium behavior.
参考文献：Hemmer, T. (2020). Income Smoothing as Rational Equilibrium Behavior? A Second Look. Accounting Review, 95(5), 211–226.
Abstract: This paper examines how the interaction of perceived subjectivity and pay transparency in profit allocation is associated with an important aspect of law partners' professional judgment, namely their tendency to accede to the wishes of their client and fellow partner (labeled hereafter as partner accedence). Based on interviews with 56 corporate law partners working in large Canadian law firms, we find higher partner accedence in a less subjective system than in a more subjective system, but only under no pay transparency. We find that pay transparency (versus no transparency) is associated with increased accedence in a more subjective system, but it is marginally associated with decreased accedence in a less subjective system. In an experiment where we randomly assign MTurk participants to conditions, we replicate the finding that pay transparency (versus no transparency) has a more positive effect on partner accedence as subjectivity level increases. Data Availability: Lawyers participated in the study upon which this paper is based only after signing agreements that strict confidentiality of all data would be maintained by the researchers. As such, we are bound by these confidentiality agreements with individual lawyers interviewed for the study. Experiment data from Amazon Mechanical Turk are available from the authors.
参考文献：Kelly, K., Dinovitzer, R., Gunz, H., & Gunz, S. P. (2020). The Interaction of Perceived Subjectivity and Pay Transparency on Professional Judgment in a Profit Pool Setting: The Case of Large Law Firms. Accounting Review, 95(5), 227–246.
Abstract: We conduct an experiment to investigate the differential effect of recognizing versus disclosing reasonable and supportable forecasts of future loss conditions on investors' valuation assessments when economic fundamentals either deteriorate or improve. Our main finding is that when entities enjoy growth at constant risk, the accelerated recognition of future loss conditions can induce valuation assessments that are opposed to the entity's enhanced valuation. Supplementary analyses reveal that investors misattribute (some) expected losses to the entity's past performance and rely on unadjusted current summary earnings to assess the entity's prospects. Our findings provide insight into the cognitive processes that lead investors to incorrectly assess earnings trends and inform regulators, standard setters, investors, and preparers that the accelerated recognition of relevant and unbiased forward-looking loss estimates can impair the decision-usefulness of financial statements.
参考文献：Kunz, A. H., & Staehle, M. (2020). Recognition versus Disclosure of Future Loss Conditions and the Decision-Usefulness of Financial Statements. Accounting Review, 95(5), 247–264.
Abstract: This paper responds to Hemmer's (2020) critique of Lambert's (1984) paper on income smoothing. Lambert develops and analyzes a two-period agency model in which he shows income smoothing, defined as the second-period action being a decreasing function of the first-period outcome, is part of the equilibrium. Hemmer claims Lambert's analysis contains errors, and that income smoothing does not occur in the model for the reasons Lambert claims. Here, I confirm the Lambert results, show why Hemmer's results appear different than mine, and make clearer the economic forces behind why income smoothing occurs.
参考文献：Lambert, R. A. (2020). Income Smoothing as Rational Equilibrium Behavior? A Second Look: A Response. Accounting Review, 95(5), 265–278.
Abstract: I study the information content of management voluntary disclosures disciplined by shareholder litigation. I model the litigation mechanism in which legal liabilities are based on the damages that shareholders suffer from buying a stock at an inflated price. I find that management does not fully reveal private information in equilibrium. Instead, their disclosures reveal only a range in which their private information lies. Thus, the precision of information is, to some extent, lost. Notably, increasing the severity of legal liability does not always reduce the loss of precision. In fact, when the legal liability reaches a certain level, more severe legal liability will result in less precise disclosures. I also find that good news and bad news have different precision. Specifically, good news is more precise than is bad news when legal liabilities are high, and bad news is more precise than is good news when legal liabilities are low.
参考文献：MA, Y. Shareholder Litigation and the Information Content of Management Voluntary Disclosure. Accounting Review, [s. l.], v. 95, n. 5, p. 279–298, 2020.
Abstract: Underreporting, or reporting fewer hours than actually worked, is a prevalent behavior among auditors at all levels. Underreporting can result in negative consequences, such as tight budgets and reductions in future audit quality. In this paper, I propose a low-cost budget formatting procedure that reduces underreporting. Using an experiment, I document that individuals with higher underreporting incentives underreport less when given an aggregated budget relative to a disaggregated budget. When individuals have lower underreporting incentives, aggregating the budget has a smaller effect on underreporting. I also provide evidence of the process by performing a mediation analysis. In a second experiment, I examine a budget formatting procedure that reduces underreporting while also mitigating the loss of data richness that results from aggregation. This study provides important insights to audit firms, partners, managers, and regulators who rely on audit hours for budgets, measures of staff efficiency, and measures of audit quality.
参考文献：Mendoza, K. I. (2020). Reducing Underreporting by Aggregating Budgeted Time. Accounting Review, 95(5), 299–319.
Abstract: In this paper, we use accounting fundamentals to measure systematic risk of distress. Our main testable prediction—that this risk increases with the probability of recessionary failure, P(R|F)—is based on a stylized model that guides our empirical analyses. We first apply the lasso method to select accounting fundamentals that can be combined into P(R|F) estimates. We then use the obtained estimates in asset-pricing tests. This approach successfully extracts systematic risk information from accounting data—we document a significant positive premium associated with P(R|F) estimates. The premium covaries with the news about the business cycle and aggregate failure rates. Additional tests underscore the importance of the "structure" imposed through recessionary-failure-probability estimation. The "agnostic" return predictor that relies only on past correlations between the same fundamental variables and returns exhibits markedly different properties.
参考文献：Ogneva, M., Piotroski, J. D., & Zakolyukina, A. A. (2020). Accounting Fundamentals and Systematic Risk: Corporate Failure over the Business Cycle. Accounting Review, 95(5), 321–350.
