WARREN BUFFETT, who on May 3rd hosts the folksy extravaganza that is Berkshire Hathaway's annual shareholders' meeting,is an icon of American capitalism. At 86, he also epitomises a striking demographic trend: for highly skilled people to go on working well into what was once thought to be old age. Across the rich world, well-educated people increasingly work longer than the less-skilled. Some 65% of American men aged 62-74 with a professional degree are in the workforce, compared with 32% of men with only a high-school certificate. In the European Union the pattern is similar.
一年一度的
5
月
3
日都会把伯克希尔·哈撒韦年度股东大会开成乡村盛会的沃伦·巴菲特是美国资本主义的一个象征，除此之外，
86
岁的他还是一种非常明显的人口趋势的缩影：对于拥有高技能的人来说，在进入之前被认为是老年人的年龄后，还能继续工作下去。纵观富裕国家，受过良好教育之人与技能较差之人的工作寿命正在日渐拉大，前者已经远远超过了后者。在美国
62
岁
-74
岁这个年龄段的人中，具有专业学位且仍在工作的人占
65%
。相比之下，仅有高中文凭的占
32%
。欧盟的情况大致也是如此。
This gap is part of a deepening divide between the well-educated well-off and the unskilled poor that is slicing through all age groups. Rapid innovation has raised the incomes of the highly skilled while squeezing those of the unskilled. Those at the top are working longer hours each year than those at the bottom. And the well-qualified are extending their working lives, compared with those of less-educated people. The consequences, for individuals and society, are profound.
这种差距是存在于所有年龄段的受过良好教育的富裕阶层与无技能的穷人阶层之间日渐加深的分化的一部分。快速的创新在增加了高技能之人的收入的同时，也在挤压着无技能之辈的收入。顶层之人的工作寿命每年都要比底层之人延长一些。同受教育程度较低的人相比，已经能够很好地胜任工作的人正在延长他们的工作寿命。其影响，对于个人和社会来说，都是深远的。
The world is on the cusp of a staggering rise in the number of old people, and they will live longer than ever before.Over the next 20 years the global population of those aged 65 or more will almost double, from 600m to 1.1 billion. The experience of the 20th century, when greater longevity translated into more years in retirement rather than more years at work, has persuaded many observers that this shift will lead to slower economic growth and “secular stagnation”, while the swelling ranks of pensioners will bust government budgets.
在老年人人数方面，世界正处于一种蹒跚增长的末端；在老年人寿命方面，他们会活得比往都长。在今后的
20
年中，全球
65
岁以上（包括
65
岁）的人口几乎会翻一番，从
6
亿达到
11
亿。
20
世纪的经历——寿命的延长转化成了退休中的耕读时间而不是工作中的更多时间——已经让许多观察家相信，这种转变将会带来经济增速的放慢和“长期性的经济衰退”。与此同时，领养老金队伍的日渐膨胀也会让政府预算难以为续。
But the notion of a sharp division between the working young and the idle old misses a new trend, the growing gap between the skilled and the unskilled. Employment rates are falling among younger unskilled people, whereas older skilled folk are working longer. The divide is most extreme in America, where well-educated baby-boomers are putting off retirement while many less-skilled younger people have dropped out of the workforce.
但是，这种有关正值工作年龄的年轻人与无所事事的老年之间存在着尖锐分裂的观点会错过一种新的趋势——有技能之人和无技能之人之间的差距正在逐渐拉大。较为年轻又没有技能之人的就业率正在下降；而那些年纪较大且具备技能的家伙工作寿命正在延长。这种分裂在美国表现的最为突出。在那里，受过良好教育的婴儿潮一代正在推迟退休，而许多年纪比他们小而技能又较差的人已经退出了劳动力大军。
Policy is partly responsible. Many European governments have abandoned policies that used to encourage people to retire early. Rising life expectancy, combined with the replacement of generous defined-benefit pension plans with stingier defined-contribution ones, means that even the better-off must work longer to have a comfortable retirement. Butthe changing nature of work also plays a big role. Pay has risen sharply for the highly educated, and those people continue to reap rich rewards into oldage because these days the educated elderly are more productive than their predecessors. Technological change may well reinforce that shift: the skills that complement computers, from management expertise to creativity, do not necessarily decline with age.
政策应当负有部分责任。许多欧洲政府已经放弃了那些以前常被用来鼓励民众尽早退休的政策。随着预期寿命的增加，加之慷慨的固定收益养老金计划已被吝啬的固定缴费养老金计划所取代，这使得即便是较富裕的人也必须多工作几年，才能在退休后过上舒适的生活。但是，工作之本质的变化也在扮演着一个重要的角色。对于受过高等教育的人来说，工资已经大幅提高了，他们之所以能在迈入老年人行列后仍能继续积累财富，是因为当今受过教育的老年人的生产力已经高于他们的前辈。技术的改变很可能会巩固这种转变：作为计算机的补充，像管理特长和创新这些技能并不必然会随着年龄而衰退。
This trend will benefit not just fortunate oldies but also, in some ways, society as a whole. Growth will slow less dramatically than expected; government budgets will be in better shape, as high earners pay taxes for longer. Rich countries with lots of well-educated older people will find the burden of ageing easier to bear than places like China, where half of all 50-to-64-year-olds did not complete primary-school education.
这种趋势不仅会惠及那些幸运的老家伙，从某种程度上来说，还会让作为一个整体的社会从中受益。增长会放慢，但还至于超于预期；政府预算也会随着高收入者纳税时间的延长而变得更好看。相比像中国那样的，在
50
岁
-64
岁这个年龄段的人群中有半数之人没有完成小学教育的国家来说，具有大量的受过良好教育的老年人的富裕国家会发现，老龄化负担更容易承受一些。
At the other end of the social scale,however, things look grim. Manual work gets harder as people get older, and public pensions look more attractive to those on low wages and the unemployed.In the lexicon of popular hate-figures, work-shirking welfare queens breeding at the taxpayer's expense may be replaced by dead beat grandads collecting taxpayer handouts while their hard-working contemporaries strive on.
然而，换个角度看问题，情况就没有那么乐观了。随着年纪的增大，体力劳动会变得越来越艰难。同时，对于那些低收入和没有工作的人来说，公共养老金看上去更具吸引力。在广受欢迎的恶人榜上，不工作而靠纳税人的钱来养活自己的福利女皇可能会被同辈们都在辛苦工作而自己却在收集纳税人施舍的赖账不还的老爹所取代。
Nor are all the effects on the economy beneficial. Wealthy old people will accumulate more savings, which will weaken demand. Inequality will increase and a growing share of wealth will eventually be transferred to the next generation via inheritance, entrenching the division between winners and losers still further.
不是所有的经济方面的影响都是有益的。富有的老年人会积累更多的储备，这会消弱需求。不平等会更加严重，财富份额的日渐增加最终会通过继承而被传给下一代，这会更进一步强化赢家和输家之间的分化。
One likely response is to impose higher inheritance taxes. So long as they replaced less-fair taxes, that might make sense. They would probably encourage old people to spend their cash rather than salt it away. But governments should focus not on redistributing income but on generating more of it by reforming retirement and education.
一种可能的应对是提高遗产税。只要遗产税还在代替较不公平税收，这种做法或许还管用。它们可能会鼓励老年人花掉他们的现金，而不是将其储存起来。但是，政府不仅应当把精力集中在收入再分配上面，还应当通过改革退休和教育给人们带来更多的收入。
