译 | 阑夕
在惴惴不安的情绪中，被普遍认为埋下动荡引线的2016年即将过去，从殚见洽闻的学院教授到长袖善舞的老道政客，从选情倾覆的发达国家到扑朔迷离的战乱地带，再也不会有人怀疑，基于均衡和稳定的惯性正在消失，就像得知所乘列车脱轨的焦急乘客，虽不见得祸在旦夕，却少不了面对不确定性的焦虑症。
这不再是可被允许的局部风险，而是世界秩序的失灵隐患，巨大机器产生故障的时候，没有任何一片齿轮能够幸免，尽快接受和承认坏的结果，然后重新调整经验储备，这是必须摆上议程的备选计划。
由塞缪尔·亨廷顿创办的《外交政策》刊发了这篇文章，我将它翻译了过来，希望你也可以同样从中受益。
以下，是中英双语版的全文：
It’s the Globalization, Stupid
这就是全球化，傻逼
Don’t blame low working-class wages or the financial crisis for the populist wave that produced Trump and Brexit. The data show the tide started decades ago.
不要再把特朗普当选和英国脱欧随意归咎给工薪阶层过低的时薪，或者是为民粹主义铺了路得金融危机。从数据上来看，引线已经早在几十年前就埋下了。
BY ROBERTO STEFAN FOA
The votes for Brexit in the United Kingdom and for Donald Trump in the United States have confounded foreign-policy commentators the world over. How could the world’s two great Anglo-Saxon democracies, for centuries the leaders and advocates of a global, rules-based international trade regime, now be leading a path toward isolationism and mercantilism?
英国的脱欧公投和美国的特朗普当选，两件事接踵而至，让全世界的国际政治分析员措手不及。世界上最伟大的两个盎格鲁-撒克逊国家，几个世纪以来全球的领导者，现代国际贸易制度的奠基者，怎么突然就走上了孤立主义和重商主义的道路？
In the aftermath of a shock, we tend to rationalize that it is a result of contingent factors, the absence of which would leave the world as we imagined it to be. Perhaps the relationship between Britain and the European Union was always contentious. Perhaps the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis left an unusually large pool of underemployed working-class voters, seeking to lash out against the establishment. A few years sooner, a few years later, and it would all be different.
在最初的震惊过后，我们倾向于把这一切归结于一系列偶然因素，那些也许最终会如我们所愿消失掉的偶然因素。也许英国和欧盟的关系会继续保持现状。也许2008年的金融危机导致的大批失业人士在选举里故意乱投票来显示对抗。也许几年后，一切又都会好转。
Yet public opinion data proves the earthquakes of Brexit and Trump are not simply the result of chance or bad timing. Instead, they are the outcome of deepening fissures in the long-running project of globalization. Over several decades, that project has produced significant shifts in public opinion around the world, including ascendant national pride, antipathy to migrants, and growing skepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international institutions. Those were tremors warning of a revolt against globalization. It is a revolt that has already defined politics in countries as far apart as Russia, Venezuela, and the Philippines, and it has now reached the established democracies of the West in the form of Brexit and Trump.
然而公众舆论的数据显示，无论是英国脱欧还是特朗普当选都不是偶然的时运安排。相反，它们都是全球化项目长期运行之后导致的深刻裂痕。几十年来，全球化已经在全球范围内导致了很多公众舆论的重大变化，包括民族感上升、对移民的反感、对于国际机构合法性和有效性的质疑等等。这些动荡的民意一直在给全球化敲响警钟。它们甚至已经在俄罗斯、委内瑞拉、菲律宾等国家里促成了政治上的变革，而如今已经将影响力覆盖到了西方民主国家，从而形成了英国脱欧和特朗普上台这样的事件。
The resilience of national identity
民族认同感的反弹
First, one of the paradoxes of globalization has been that, as cross-border travel, migration, and trade have increased, attachment to national identity has not weakened, but instead grown stronger. Since 1981 the European and World Values Surveys have asked respondents whether they feel “very proud,” “quite proud,” “not very proud,” or “not at all proud” of their national identity (see chart below). That recent decades have seen an upsurge in national attachment in authoritarian regimes such as Russia or China is unsurprising, yet less noted is a return of national pride in societies that were once thought of “post-national,” such as Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. This surge in national pride has been concurrent with the growth of “new right” political parties, such as the Sweden Democrats (SD), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands.
首先，全球化的悖论之一就是，随着国际间旅行、贸易、移民的增加，人们对于国家和民族的依附感却有增无减。自从1981年以来，欧洲世界观调查针对民族自豪感进行问卷调查，选项有「非常自豪」、「很自豪」、「不太自豪」、「不自豪」四个等级。近年来的结果显示，不仅仅是在专制政权国家类似俄罗斯、■■等地有着民族情感热潮，在类似德国、瑞典和荷兰这种后民族国家里也出现了民族自豪感的回归。激进的民族自豪感和「新右派」政党们相伴而生，例如瑞典民主党、德国选择党以及荷兰自由党。
National pride need not take the form of chauvinism or nationalism, and yet, these remain its inherent risks. Pride entails a need for recognition, and a feeling that one’s achievements or way of life are worthy of special value, promotion, and protection. A proud public is easier for political elites to manipulate by instrumentalizing external conflicts, or blaming scapegoats within: “take back control,” and “restore our country” are the universal slogans of populist parties and movements.
民族自豪感这种情绪不需要以沙文主义或者民族主义这种有着潜在威胁的面貌出现。这种情感只是一种认可和情绪，让人们感到自己独特的生活方式和成就是值得保护、促进的，有着某些特殊的价值。这种自豪感可以被精明的政治家们当做应对外敌的工具，或者指向替罪羊的刀枪，「夺回控制权」或者「让国家恢复原貌」是民粹政党常用的口号和宣传攻势。
这张图体现了30多年来民族主义的市场扩张
Hostility toward immigrants
对移民的敌意
Second, as scholars such as Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have documented, over the past thirty years, Western societies have become more tolerant in a remarkable variety of ways, including toward homosexual marriage, abortion, divorce, and the use of soft drugs. And yet, while such “lifestyle tolerance” has risen markedly across Western countries, “identity tolerance” — tolerance of peoples with different ethnic or religious backgrounds — has moved in the opposite direction. In particular, hostile sentiment towards immigrants has increased steadily decade by decade since the 1980s.
第二，就像罗纳德·英格尔哈特和克里斯蒂·韦尔泽等学者说过的，过去三十年间西方社会以一种显著的方式变得更加宽容，包括在对待同性婚姻、堕胎、离婚、软性毒品等方面。然而在「生活方式宽容」的另一侧，人们对不同种族或者宗教所应抱持的「身份宽容」上，却走向了另一个方向。特别是20世纪80年代以来，对移民的敌意与日俱增。
事实上，在叙利亚引起的难民潮出现之前，美国和西欧的移民政策是趋于严厉的
The conjunction of rising lifestyle tolerance with growing intolerance of migrants may appear, at first, contradictory: Should tolerance not extend to all groups and minorities? Yet it has opened the space for a socially libertarian platform within the radical right, defining itself as the defender of a “national way of life” against newcomers who do not share the West’s liberal values. Pim Fortuyn, the openly homosexual Dutch politician who combined a flamboyant social liberalism with unabashed Islamophobia, was the first far-right politician to occupy this ideological space. Yet the same rhetorical strategy has become a cornerstone of Geert Wilders’s PVV in the Netherlands, of Israeli secular nationalists, of the big-tent National Front (FN) of Marine Le Pen, and Donald Trump’s libertarian supporters, such as Breitbart journalist Milo Yiannopoulos. If the true clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, as Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris suggested in these pages, is over social liberties, then the globalization of media and peoples has turned this clash from an international to a domestic one, and one that is reshaping the party systems of major Western democracies. That may be one reason why Western political systems are now following the precedent set by Israel in the early 2000s, in which the collapse of the cosmopolitan center-left in the form of the Labor Party ceded place to a resurgent secular ethnic nationalism led by Likud, Kadima, and Yisrael Beiteinu.
当对生活方式的宽容和对移民的不宽容两种情绪对撞的时候，矛盾的思辨就出现了：是不是所有群体和族群都应该被宽容？于是社会中开始出现了激进右派们的生存空间，他们开始用「国民生活方式」这种理论去对抗那些还没有融入西方自由主义价值观的新进移民。荷兰的平·佛图恩，一位公开同性恋身份的政治家，就用他毫不遮掩的恐伊斯兰主张召集起一个新兴极右翼社团。同样的具有欺骗性的言辞，还培育出了荷兰的新自由党，以色列现在的民族主义者，法国的玛丽娜勒庞，以及像布赖特巴特新闻编辑米洛扬诺普洛斯这样的特朗普支持者们。如果确如罗纳德·英格尔哈特以及皮帕·诺里斯等学者预言的，伊斯兰和西方世界之间的矛盾持续上升，甚至盖过了原本应该追求的社会自由，那么全世界的媒体和人民就会把这种国际矛盾转化成社会内部的矛盾，而这种内化了的矛盾形态会重塑所有西方社会的民主制度。这也许就是21世纪以来，以色列的西方政治模型坍塌的原因，原本延续着中-左路线的劳动党，被现有的少数民族主义政党利库德、家园党和前进党取代。
Loss of faith in international institutions
丧失对国际机构的信任
As national identity has grown and resentment of international migrants increased, there has been a corresponding loss of faith in the value and purpose of international organizations, including the European Union, United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the so-called Bretton Woods institutions. That is most evident in Europe, where since 1990, the European Values Study has asked respondents in Europe their degree of confidence in the European Community, and since 1995, the European Union.
国家认同感的抬升和对移民的怨恨增加，相应也增加了人们对于国际机构的怀疑和不信任——包括欧盟、联合国、国际货币基金组织以及世界银行和布雷顿森林体系。其中在欧洲的表现最为明显，下图是欧洲价值观研究组织的数据统计，调查显示了受访者1990年来对欧洲共同体以及1995年来对欧盟的信心程度。
在进入千禧年后，欧盟不再是一个引人入胜的选项
Already in the 1990s, skepticism about the European Union was growing among the publics of major EU member states. While the launch of the euro and the founding of the European Constitutional Convention at the start of the new century may have felt like an apogee for the European project, already by this point a majority of respondents in major EU member states felt distrust in European institutions. Further efforts at European integration have been forced against the will of European publics, as evinced from the Dutch and French votes against the European Constitution in 2005, or the Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. The vote for Brexit in 2016 shows the inherent limits in elite-led integration — and the project of global governance more generally.
从上世纪90年代开始，对欧盟的质疑之声就在其主要成员国中扩散开来。随着欧元进程和本世纪初欧盟宪法条约的推进，欧洲一体化工程似乎来到了一个顶峰，而正是在这个高峰点上主流欧盟成员却并不信任欧盟本身。关于欧洲一体化的推进实际上违背了民意——就像荷兰与法国在2005年反对欧盟宪法的公投，爱尔兰先后在2001年和2008年拒绝尼斯条约与里斯本条约。2016年的英国脱欧公投则显示出了精英团体领导的一体化所具备的局限性，而这种局限性在全球治理范畴更为显著。
How did we get here?
何以至此？
Why have citizens across Western democracies become increasingly nationalistic, opposed to mass migration, and suspicious of international institutions? One answer is that this is a consequence of the financial crisis, which has left deep pockets of economic deprivation and underemployment. But that answer is clearly wrong, because these trends have been in place for the better part of 30 years. A more accurate answer would be that they reflect an inherent tension between national democratic sovereignty and elite-led efforts at global integration, and that this tension has now reached its breaking point.
为什么西方民主国家的公民们变成了民族主义者，大规模反对移民，并且开始不信任国际机构？有一种声音认为，这种变化是由导致民众财富缩水和失业潮的经济危机所引起的。但是很显然这个说法站不住脚，因为经济发展停滞趋势已经持续了30年。更准确的答案应该是，这种转变是国民内部的国家主权意识和国际精英团体推行的全球化之间，存在的一种固有的紧张的心态冲突。而这种紧张的局面现在到达了濒临崩溃的突破点。
As economies and societies around the globe become more and more interconnected and bound within transnational rules and institutions, the range of policy options available to domestic policymakers has declined. Such constraints range from formal rules, such as the acceptance of the free movement of peoples within the European Union, or the asylum obligations that are outlined under the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, or the limits on deficits stipulated in European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact and the implicit economic constraints imposed by global financial and investment flows. Thus, on issue after issue, from corporate taxation, to control over immigration, to fiscal and monetary policy, national elites frequently find themselves unable to deliver policies consistent with public preferences. Instead they have blamed international institutions for their inability to take actions that they privately do not condone. In this way, politicians feel obliged, in the words of Hillary Clinton, to maintain “both a public and a private position.”
在跨国条约、贸易协定以及国际机构的作用下，全球范围内国家间经济和社会的联系越来越紧密。而这种紧密让国家内部政策的可选择性也随之下降了。那些正式的非正式的条约正在发挥限制作用，例如，欧盟内部公民的自由往来规则，联合国难民地位公约要求的庇护责任，欧盟稳定与增长公约规定的财政赤字范围，以及被全球金融投资流向影响着的经济增长负担。就这样，从企业税收、控制移民，再到财政和货币政策，国家的精英阶层们发现自己越来越无法提供让民众满意的政策。因此他们会指责国际机构，对那些他们私底下无法容忍的事情不作为。在这种情形之下，就像希拉里说的，政客们只能「既有公开的立场，也有私下的立场」。
Yet the constraints on national sovereignty entailed by global markets and institutions has weakened the mechanisms that once translated popular views into public policy, leading to a “democratic deficit”’ that has left citizens increasingly frustrated with democratic politics, and increasingly with the democratic system itself. At the same time, the institutions of “global governance” have failed not only to provide avenues for popular participation, but also to deliver outcomes that such participation would be liable to generate, such as compensation for the losers from global trade, or protection of the identities and ways of life of local and national communities. In the words of Larry Summers, one of global integration’s advocates, it is a project “carried out by elites, for elites, with little consideration for the interests of ordinary people.”
