【保险学术前沿】 期刊American Economic Review 2013—2019年保险文章精选目录与摘要

声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。

期刊介绍：

《American Economic Review》（美国经济评论）创刊于1911年，是美国历史最悠久、最受学者尊敬、全球公认的经济学领域顶级期刊之一。该刊每年发行12期，每期发表文章8篇左右，内容涉及经济学领域广泛主题，2022-2023年影响因子为10.7。

本期看点：

●  美国Medicare Advantage计划（由私人保险公司运营，受政府监管的Medicare计划的一部分）：广告能有效吸引符合医疗保险资格的健康新个体，从而有助于Medicare Advantage（联邦医疗保险）的有利选择；在政府增加医疗保险补贴的情况下，MA保险公司保费的下降受到市场力量（竞争激烈程度）的影响。

●  即使为低收入的个体提供慷慨的医疗保险补贴，他们的保险使用率也不高。

●  假设保险消费者是不完全信息的，可以通过独特数据确定风险偏好、信息摩擦和麻烦成本，从而得到更准确的保险计划选择预测。

●  降雨指数保险的近期经验对需求有影响，同时具有溢出效应，但溢出效应的影响会随时间推移而衰减，而自身经验的影响不会。

●  在保险免赔额选择中，概率扭曲（对小概率事件的大幅度高估，对概率变化的轻微不敏感）对选择表现出的风险厌恶的解释起着重要作用。

Amy Finkelstein（麻省理工学院），Nathaniel Hendren（ 哈佛大学），Mark Shepard （哈佛大学）

摘要：How much are low-income individuals willing to pay for health insurance, and what are the implications for insurance markets? Using administrative data from Massachusetts' subsidized insurance exchange, we exploit discontinuities in the subsidy schedule to estimate willingness to pay and costs of insurance among low-income adults. As subsidies decline, insurance take-up falls rapidly, dropping about 25 percent for each $40 increase in monthly enrollee premiums. Marginal enrollees tend to be lower-cost, indicating adverse selection into insurance. But across the entire distribution we can observe (approximately the bottom 70 percent of the willingness to pay distribution) enrollees' willingness to pay is always less than half of their own expected costs that they impose on the insurer. As a result, we estimate that take-up will be highly incomplete even with generous subsidies. If enrollee premiums were 25 percent of insurers' average costs, at most half of potential enrollees would buy insurance; even premiums subsidized to 10 percent of average costs would still leave at least 20 percent uninsured. We briefly consider potential explanations for these findings and their normative implications.

低收入的个体愿意为医疗保险支付多少费用，对保险市场有什么影响？利用马萨诸塞州补贴保险交易所的行政数据，我们利用补贴时间表的不连续性来估计低收入成年人的支付意愿和保险成本。随着补贴的减少，保险的使用率迅速下降，每月参保保费每增加40美元，使用率就下降约25%。边际参保者往往成本较低，这表明保险中存在逆向选择。但在整个分销过程中，我们可以观察到（大约是支付分销意愿的最底层70%）投保人的支付意愿总是低于他们自己估计的保险公司预期成本的一半。因此，我们估计，即使有慷慨的补贴，使用率也将非常不完整。如果投保人的保费是保险公司平均成本的25%，那么最多有一半的潜在投保人会购买保险；即使保费补贴到平均成本的10%，仍有至少20%的人不投保。我们简要地考虑了对这些发现的潜在解释及其规范意义。

原文链接：

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20171455

Judson Boomhower（加州大学）

摘要：This paper measures the effects of bankruptcy protection on industry structure and environmental outcomes in oil and gas extraction. Using administrative data from Texas, I exploit variation in an insurance requirement that reduced firms' ability to avoid liability through bankruptcy. Among small firms, the policy substantially improved environmental outcomes and reduced production. Most production was reallocated to larger firms with better environmental records, but high-cost production where social cost may have exceeded social benefit decreased. These results suggest that incomplete internalization of environmental costs due to bankruptcy is an important determinant of industry structure and safety effort in hazardous industries.

本文衡量了破产保护对石油和天然气开采行业结构和环境结果的影响。利用得克萨斯州的行政数据，本文刨析了降低企业通过破产规避责任的保险要求的变化。在小型企业中，这个要求大大改善了环境结果并降低了产量。大部分产能被重新分配给了环境记录较好的大型企业，但社会成本可能超过社会效益的高成本生产有所减少。这些结果表明，破产导致的环境成本不完全内部化是危险行业产业结构和安全努力的重要决定因素。

原文链接：

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20160346

Naoki Aizawa（威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校）, You Suk Kim（美国联邦储备委员会）

摘要：This paper studies the impact of advertising as a channel for risk selection in Medicare Advantage. We provide evidence that insurer advertising is responsive to the gains from risk selection. Then we develop and estimate an equilibrium model of Medicare Advantage with advertising, allowing rich individual heterogeneity. Our estimates show that advertising is effective in attracting healthy individuals who are newly eligible for Medicare, contributing to advantageous selection into Medicare Advantage. Moreover, risk selection through advertising substantially lowers premiums by improving insurers' risk pools. The distributional implication is that unhealthy consumers may be better off through cross-subsidization from healthy individuals.

本文研究了广告作为联邦医疗保险优势计划（Medicare Advantage）风险选择渠道的影响。我们提供的证据表明，保险公司的广告是对风险选择收益的反应。然后，我们开发并估计了一个带有广告的医疗Medicare Advantage均衡模型，允许丰富的个体异质性。我们的估计表明，广告在吸引符合医疗保险资格的健康的新个体方面是有效的，有助于Medicare Advantage的有利选择。此外，通过广告进行的风险选择改善了保险公司的风险池，大大降低了保费。其含义是不健康的消费者通过健康个人的交叉补贴可能会过得更好。

原文链接：

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20151485

Marika Cabral(得克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校), Michael Geruso(得克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校), Neale Mahoney(芝加哥大学)

摘要：A central question in the debate over privatized Medicare is whether increased government payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans generate lower premiums for consumers or higher profits for producers. Using difference-in-differences variation brought about by a sharp legislative change, we find that MA insurers pass through 45 percent of increased payments in lower premiums and an additional 9 percent in more generous benefits. We show that advantageous selection into MA cannot explain this incomplete pass-through. Instead, our evidence suggests that market power is important, with premium pass-through rates of 13 percent in the least competitive markets and 74 percent in the most competitive.

在关于私有化医疗保险的争论中，一个核心问题是，政府增加对私人医疗保险优势计划 (MA) 的支付是否会降低消费者的保费，还是为生产者带来更高的利润。使用立法变化带来的双重差分变化，我们发现 MA 保险公司将增加的支付的45%转化为较低的保费，将另外 9% 转化为更慷慨的福利。我们表明，进入 MA 的有利选择无法解释这种不完全的传递。相反，我们的证据表明市场力量很重要，在竞争最不激烈的市场中，保费传递率为 13%，而在竞争最激烈的市场中，保费传递率为 74%。

原文链接：

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles？id=10.1257/aer.20151362

Nathaniel Hendren(哈佛大学)

摘要：This paper studies the implications of individuals' knowledge of future job loss for the existence of an unemployment insurance (UI) market. Learning about job loss leads to consumption decreases and spousal labor supply increases. This suggests existing willingness to pay estimates for UI understate its value. But it yields new estimation methodologies that account for and exploit responses to learning about future job loss. Although the new willingness to pay estimates exceed previous estimates, I estimate much larger frictions imposed by private information. This suggests privately traded UI policies would be too adversely selected to be profitable, at any price.

本文研究了个人对未来失业的了解对失业保险 (UI) 市场存在的影响。了解失业会导致消费减少，配偶劳动力供应增加。这表明现有的 UI 支付意愿估计低估了其价值。但它提供了新的估计方法，可以解释和刨析对未来失业了解的反应。虽然本文的新支付意愿估计超过了之前的估计，但我们很大程度的摩擦来自于私人信息。这表明私人交易的UI政策由于逆向选择而无法盈利。

原文链接：

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20151655

Benjamin R. Handel（加州大学伯克利分校），Jonathan T. Kolstad（加州大学伯克利分校）

摘要：Traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk. In practice, choosing an insurance plan is a complicated decision often made without full information. In this paper we combine new administrative data on health plan choices and claims with unique survey data on consumer information to identify risk preferences, information frictions, and hassle costs. Our additional friction measures are important predictors of choices and meaningfully impact risk preference estimates. We study the implications of counterfactual insurance allocations to illustrate the importance of distinguishing between these micro-foundations for welfare analysis.

传统的保险选择模型是以消费者完全知情和理性，并能保护自己免受金融风险为前提的。实际上，选择保险计划是一项复杂的决策，往往是在没有充分信息的情况下做出的。在本文中，我们将有关医疗计划选择和理赔的新行政数据与有关消费者信息的独特调查数据相结合，以确定风险偏好、信息摩擦和麻烦成本（hassle costs）。我们的附加摩擦指标是预测选择的重要依据，并对风险偏好估计值产生了有意义的影响。我们研究了反事实保险分配的影响，以说明区分这些微观基础对福利分析的重要性。

原文链接：

https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20131126

Shawn Cole（哈佛商学院）, Daniel Stein（IDinsight）, Jeremy Tobacman（特拉华大学）

摘要：This paper estimates how experimentally-manipulated experiences with a novel financial product, rainfall index insurance, affect subsequent insurance demand. Using a seven-year panel, we develop three main findings. First, recent experience matters for demand, consistent with overinference from small samples. Second, spillovers also matter, in the sense that the recent payout experience of village co-residents affects insurance demand about as much as one's own recent payout experience. Third, the spillover effect decays as time passes while the effect of one's own experience does not. We discuss implications of this analysis for commercial sustainability of this complicated but promising risk management technology.

本文估算了通过实验操纵的新型金融产品（降雨指数保险）的经验如何影响后续的保险需求。通过使用一个为期七年的面板数据，我们得出了三个主要结论。首先，近期经验对需求有影响，这与小样本的过度推断（overinference）是一致的。其次，溢出效应也很重要，因为同村居民近期的赔付经验对保险需求的影响与个人近期赔付经验的影响一样大。第三，溢出效应会随着时间的推移而减弱，而自身经验的影响则不会。我们将讨论这一分析对这一复杂但有前景的风险管理技术的商业可持续性的影响。