1972年2月21日，尼克松访华，中美关系从此进入了一个新的历史时期。今年5月，特朗普或将与金正恩会晤。此次会面面临什么难题？又将给全世界带来怎样的影响？
特朗普与金正恩会晤：三大待定问题
作者：Evan Osnos
译者：
刘 蕊
校对：唐 萧
策划：刘 璠
本文选自 The New Yorker | 取经号原创翻译
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特朗普与金正恩会晤：三大待定问题
Three Key Questions About Donald Trump’s Summit with Kim Jong Un
On February 21st, 1972, President Richard Nixon arrived in Beijing to meet with Chairman Mao Zedong, ending twenty-five years of hostility between the United States and China. The preparations had been painstaking: more than three years earlier, Henry Kissinger, the national-security adviser, began hinting to Beijing that Nixon might be the President to reopen relations. In 1971, Kissinger held secret meetings with Premier Zhou Enlai, logging dozens of hours of negotiations. That July, Nixon announced his plan, but it took another seven months of diplomatic preparation before he finally ventured to China for what he rightly called a “week that changed the world.”
1972年2月21日，时任美国总统理查德·尼克松抵达北京，与中国主席毛泽东会面，结束了中美两国长达25年的敌对状态。此次会面前的准备工作漫长且痛苦：1969年，当时的国家安全顾问亨利·基辛格暗示中国政府，尼克松将正式访华解冻中美关系。1971年，基辛格同周恩来总理秘密会晤，进行了数小时的商谈。同年7月，尼克松正式宣布自己的访华计划，但随后又是长达7个月的外交准备。7个月后，尼克松最终前往中国，度过了在他看来是“影响了整个世界”的一周。
By comparison, Donald Trump’s decision to meet with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, is unfolding in an instant. On Thursday, upon learning that South Korea’s national-security adviser, Chung Eui-yong, was in the West Wing, meeting with various officials, Trump asked him into the Oval Office. When Chung told Trump that Kim wanted to meet with him, Trump gave an immediate yes and invited Chung to announce to the White House press corps the most
audacious
diplomatic gamble by an American President in decades. If the meeting takes place—and that is by no means guaranteed—it will be the first-ever encounter between a sitting American President and a leader of North Korea since the founding of that nation, in 1948.
相较之下，唐纳德·特朗普同朝鲜领导人金正恩会晤的决定则是干净利落。周四，朝鲜国家安保室长郑义溶在白宫西厢会见各界官员。特朗普得知后，随即邀请郑义溶前往自己的办公室。郑义溶告诉特朗普，金正恩期待与他会面，特朗普立即表示欢迎，并希望郑义溶能够向白宫记者团宣布这件事——这大概是几十年里美国总统展开的最为
大胆的
一次外交冒险。如果成功——但谁也无法保证——这将是朝鲜领导人自1948年建国以来与在任美国总统的第一次会面。
audacious
/ɔːˈdeɪʃəs,ɔˋdeʃəs/ showing great courage or confidence in a way that is impressive or slightly shocking大胆的
Many diplomats were appalled by the announcement of a Presidential summit without the usual stages of lower-level talks in advance. But a senior Administration official told reporters that the White House is happy to depart from the usual rules of diplomacy with North Korea. “Literally, going back to 1992, the United States has engaged in direct talks at low levels with the North Koreans, and I think that history speaks for itself.” the official said.
没有任何低级别会谈作为前提，直接在首脑峰会上宣布两国领导人或将会面，这点着实让许多外交官们感到惊讶。但是，美国某政府高级官员告诉记者，白宫很乐意同朝鲜在外交事宜上“不走寻常路”。“老实说，美国曾于1992年与朝鲜进行了低级别的直接会谈，结果如何，相信你们都很清楚。”该官员说道。
The prospect that Trump might attempt a breakthrough on North Korea, much as Nixon, the once-virulent anti-Communist, had turned toward China, has been a
tantalizing
prospect since Trump’s election. In a prescient essay published a year ago in Foreign Affairs, John Delury, a North Korea expert at Yonsei University, in Seoul, wrote, “Like it or not, North Korea’s nukes are a reality. The United States needs a new strategy for dealing with Kim—and Trump is well placed to deliver it.” According to the White House, the summit is due to happen “by May,” leaving a narrow window to settle three essential questions:
尼克松曾对共产主义充满敌意，但最终还是选择了中国。和尼克松处理美中关系一样，特朗普自上任以来试图在美朝问题上有所突破，这一举措可谓是相当英明。去年，首尔延世大学朝鲜关系专家约翰·德勒利在《外交事务》上发表了一篇具有预见性的论文，文章中写道：“不管我们乐意还是不乐意，朝鲜手握核武器已成既定事实。美国在同金正恩打交道时，应采取全新的策略，而特朗普已准备就绪。”白宫称，此次会面或将于“今年5月”进行，如果情况属实，那么解决下述三个问题便迫在眉睫。
tantalizing
/'tænt ə l-aɪzɪŋ,ˋtæntḷ͵aɪzɪŋ/ making you feel a desire to have or do something 逗引人的，撩拨人的
What is a realistic standard of success?
会面成功的真实标准是什么？
Officially, the American objective at the summit is to secure a firm agreement that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons. That should be understood as a notional ideal and a real-life impossibility. No serious analyst believes that Pyongyang is preparing to dismantle its nuclear arsenal anytime soon; it is the cornerstone of the propaganda that the Kim family uses to persuade its people that it deserves to rule. If North Korea gave up its weapons tomorrow, it would be little more than a very poor version of South Korea, a fact that would seriously undermine the family’s claim. North Korea is embracing the vague prospect of denuclearization as a way to get Trump to the table. Once the parties are there, they will need to identify clear, achievable steps forward in order to insure that no one goes home empty-handed. “The White House must prepare effectively and set a clear agenda for talks—insisting on independent inspection and continuing economic sanctions,” Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat of Connecticut, tweeted. “Diplomacy is always a positive step, but high-risk talks between Pres. Trump and Kim Jong-un should be met with skepticism. We cannot afford another Presidential reality show.”
此次会面，美国的目标是同朝鲜就无核化达成一致，不过，“理想很丰满，现实很骨感”。专业人士分析认为，短时间内朝鲜是不会弃核的，核武器作为金氏家族政治的核心，是他们向人民展现自己统治地位合法性的有力武器。如果朝鲜明天就放弃核武器，那么朝鲜或将成为另一个韩国，只是这个版本更加糟糕罢了，放弃核武器这件事将严重影响到金氏家族的统治。朝鲜在核武器问题上暧昧不明的态度，为的只是引诱特朗普走上谈判桌。一旦双方入座，则需提出更加清晰可行的策略，确保双方都不会“空手而归”。“白宫必须坚持独立审查，并继续进行经济制裁，在此基础上，为双方谈判做好充分准备，确保议程明确。”康涅狄格州民主党参议员理查德·布鲁门赛尔在推特上写道，“通常来说，外交手段是非常有效的。不过，特朗普和金正恩之间的会谈确实风险不少，质疑声此起彼伏。再来一场‘总统真人秀’，谁都承受不了。”
Where, what, and how?
在哪进行？内容如何？怎样进行？
In television terms, a summit is not a reality show but a scripted drama. The right location, staging, and
choreography
are all essential components. Within hours of the White House announcement, officials were discussing whether Trump would invite Kim to talks in the United States. It would be astonishing if he were to accept any such invitation. Since taking power, in 2011, Kim has not stepped beyond the borders of his own country, largely out of fear of assassination or a coup. (There is always the chance of a surprise: he dispatched his sister Kim Yo Jong to Pyeongchang for the Olympics last month, making her the first member of the family to set foot in South Korea.) One possible location is Panmunjom, the divided village on the border of North and South Korea where the two Koreas have met for talks. Kim might invite Trump to Pyongyang, but he would be unwise to accept. Foreign leaders have learned that by flattering Trump with red carpets and brass bands, they can elicit compliments and gratitude that undermine his objectives. (Flush with an extravagant reception in Beijing last November, Trump gushed that President Xi Jinping is a “very special man.”) That temptation is especially important to avoid in the case of North Korea, which has sought a meeting with an American President for decades. Now that the White House has conceded to the request for a Presidential summit, it must find a way to convert that gesture into an equivalent concession. The Administration could, for instance, insist that North Korea release three Americans who are being held in jail there. Their safe return would be a natural first step to setting the conditions for a productive summit.
从电视的角度来看，此次会面与其说是一场真人秀，倒不如说是有台本的戏剧，地点、布景和
舞美
都至关重要。会面声明发布的几小时内，白宫官员不停讨论特朗普是否应该邀请金正恩访问美国。金自2011年上任以来，出于对暗杀或政变的担忧，从未踏出国门一步。他若是接受了特朗普的邀请，必定震惊全球。（当然，凡事都有例外：上个月，金正恩派其妹金与正前往平昌奥运会。金与正是第一位拜访韩国的金氏家族成员。）位于朝韩边境上的板门店曾见证过数次朝韩会谈，这里或许是此次美朝两国会面的好地点。金正恩或许会邀请特朗普前往平壤，但特朗普若同意，那就太不明智了。国外领导人都知道，用红毯和管弦乐队来讨好特朗普，可以换来他的称赞与感激，使他飘飘然，忘了自己的目的。（去年11月，特朗普在北京受到了隆重接待，他发自内心地感慨习近平是“独一无二的”。）在朝鲜问题上，美国对于这种“阿谀奉承”要尤为小心。过去几十年里，朝鲜一直试图与美国总统展开会面。既然白宫已经同意与朝方会面，那就要将这份意向转换成为双方的平等让步。例如，美国政府可以要求朝鲜释放三名被关押的美国人。被押美国人的安全归来可以看做是美朝两国会面成功的前提条件之一。
choreography
/‚kɒri'ɒɡrəfi, ‚kɔː-,͵kɔrɪˋɑgrəfɪ/ the art of arranging how dancers should move during a performance编舞（艺术）；舞蹈设计
What is Plan B?
备选方案是什么？
After the announcement of the meeting, Daniel Russel, a former Assistant Secretary of State who is now a diplomat-in-residence at the Asia Society, identified one of the major risks in putting the two leaders together at the beginning of a negotiation rather than the end. “Once you’ve deployed your top gun, there isn’t a lot of diplomatic space left,” Russel told me. “And then, if Trump meets with Kim but fails, what next?” As a hedge against that failure, the sides may well end up postponing firm commitments on denuclearization while focussing on a more achievable goal, such as simply continuing communications. It won’t satisfy hawks on either side, but the symbolism of the meeting itself could be productive.
美朝两国领导人会晤声明发表后，前美国助理国务卿、现任亚洲协会常任外交官的丹尼尔·拉塞尔指出，两国领导人会面的一个主要风险是在谈判前，而非谈判后。“一旦你亮出了自己的外交底牌，就没有什么回旋余地了。”拉塞尔告诉我，“如果特朗普与金正恩成功会面了，可结果不理想，怎么办？”作为对谈判失败的缓冲，双方必将搁置核武器问题，转而将重点更多地放在如何实现双方持续对话等可行目标上。这种结果对任何一方而言都不算满意，但就会议本身来说，也算是取得了一定的成果。
From the outside, it is easy to underestimate how much of North Korea’s threats and bizarre expressions of aggression reflect its sense of vulnerability and wounded pride, its frustration at the isolation and the failure that have characterized so much of its history during the past century. Such internal political chemistry has often played a larger role than we in the West have sometimes realized. During Nixon’s trip to China, he paused at the airport to shake Zhou Enlai’s hand—and in doing so helped mend a decades-old source of Chinese humiliation. In 1954, at a conference in Geneva, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a dedicated anti-Communist, had conspicuously ignored Zhou’s proffered hand. The Chinese political class had never forgotten the slight. Zhou told Nixon, “Your handshake came over the vastest ocean in the world—twenty-five years of no communication.”
在朝鲜对世界的威胁和怪异的挑衅方式背后，实际上反映的是这个国家在过去一个世纪当中因为与世隔绝和国运衰微而受挫的自尊心，和产生的失落感。但外界很容易忽视这点。朝鲜如此封闭的政治生态产生的影响远甚于西方国家的认识。尼克松抵达中国机场时，他上前握住了周恩来的手——借此挽回了中国几十年前的颜面。1954年日内瓦会议上，美国国务卿、反共产主义人士约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯有意忽视了周恩来伸出的手。中国领导人从未忘记过这一幕。周恩来告诉尼克松：“你的手伸过了世界上最辽阔的海洋与我握手——我们25年没有交往了!”
