【AEON】机器人的爱，你会接受吗？

我们的恋人似乎爱着我们，似乎是自由地选择了我们。但倘若机器人能模仿他们的行为，那么我们能否继续有力地否定机器感情的真实性呢？

机器人的爱，你会接受吗？

译者：李林治 & 张嫣

校对：徐唱

编辑：尹子梦

Embracing the robot

与机器人谈场恋爱吧

本文选自 AEON | 取经号原创翻译

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Robot relationships need not be kinky, exploitative or fake. In fact they might give human relationships a helpful boost

机器人的感情不应是变态的、受人利用的、或是虚假的。事实上，与机器人的感情可能会有效地助益人际关系。

There is a heartbreaking scene in the middle of Blade Runner 2049 (2017). The hero of the movie, a replicant called K, lives a drab existence in a dystopian, future Los Angeles. The one bright spot in his life is his patient and sympathetic partner, Joi. They share many affectionate moments on screen. But then she is killed, in the midst of declaring her love, in one of the movie’s most gut-wrenching moments. I know I shed a tear when I first saw it.

电影《银翼杀手2049》有一幕令人心碎。男主角复制人K独自乏味地生活在未来的洛杉矶，一个反乌托邦世界里。他生命中唯一的亮光是耐心且富有同情心的伙伴乔希。银幕上，他们有着许多 深情款款的 镜头。但紧随其后的便是乔希的“死亡”——她死在吐露爱意的中途，死在电影最令人撕心裂肺的瞬间。当我初次观影，我也不禁落泪。

affectionate /əˈfekʃənət/ adj. showing in a gentle way that you love someone and care about them 充满深情的

There is, however, something unusual about Joi. She is a mass-produced, artificially intelligent hologram , designed to be the perfect partner. She learns from her interactions with K, and shifts her personality to suit his moods. Her ‘death’, such as it is, is due to the fact that she can exist only in the presence of a particular holographic emanator. When it is destroyed, so is she.

但是，乔希并不普通。她是批量出产的人工智能 全息像 ，出生便被设计为最佳的伴侣。她从与K的互动中学习，并转换自己的性格来迎合K的情绪。她所谓的“死亡”是因为她只能依靠特定的全息投影设备而存在。当设备被破坏，那便是就是她的消失之时。

Joi would be little more than a science-fiction curio if it were not for the fact that real-world companies are trying to create versions of her. The Japanese company Gatebox, for instance, sells Azuma Hikari. ‘She’ is a holographic AI, projected inside a cylindrical tube, who is intended to be an intimate companion. In an advertisement, we see her waking up her (male) user in affectionate tones and greeting him when he comes home at the end of the day. She provides a simulacrum of married life for the growing population of single Japanese men. And it’s not just emotional support that is on the cards – sex is, too. Although this is not a feature of Azuma Hikari, other companies are eagerly racing to create robotic lovers and sexual partners.

倘若现实世界的公司没有费尽心机地创造如乔希一般的机器人，那么她也不过就是科幻电影中的一件 瑰宝 。日本公司Gatebox贩售了Azuma Hikari——意在成为人类亲密伴侣、投影在圆柱管中的人工智能全息像。广告中，她在清晨用亲昵的语调唤醒男主人，在主人下班回家时向他问好。她为越来越多的日本单身男性提供 模拟 的婚后生活。而且，不仅仅是情感支持，性服务也成为可能。尽管Azuma Hikari没有这样的功能，但其他公司正争先恐后地开发机器爱人及其他机器性伴侣。

Is this a welcome development? A number of critics have voiced their concerns. They claim that relationships with robots would be fake and illusory: perceptual tricks, foisted on us by commercially driven corporations. They are also concerned about how these robotic partners will represent real people, particularly women, and the consequences that their use will have for society.

这是一种受欢迎的发展趋势吗？一部分批评家已经对此表示担忧。他们表示，人机恋是虚假的，是一种幻想。它是认知上的错觉，只是商业公司的营销手段罢了。他们担心这些机器人伴侣未来会替代真人，尤其是女性，也对人们使用机器人伴侣后产生的社会影响忧心忡忡。

Contrary to the critics, I believe our popular discourse about robotic relationships has become too dark and dystopian. We overstate the negatives and overlook the ways in which relationships with robots could complement and enhance existing human relationships.

与这些批评相反，我相信大众对人机恋的看法还是过于黑暗且反面了。我们过分夸大人机恋的缺点，却忽视了人机恋也能够弥补甚至增进现存的人际关系。

Philosophers emphasise the need for mutual commitment in any meaningful relationship. It’s not enough for you to feel a strong, emotional attachment to another; they have to feel a similar attachment to you. Robots might be able to perform love, saying and doing all the right things, but performance is insufficient. Furthermore, even if the robot was capable of some genuine mutual commitment, it would have to give this commitment freely. Robots will not choose to love you; they will be programmed to love you, in order to serve the commercial interests of their corporate overlords.

哲学家们强调，若想恋爱关系有意义，相互承诺是必需的。仅仅是一方感受到与另一方的强烈的牵绊是不够的，另一方也必须能感受到同样的牵绊。机器人也许能 表现 出爱，能说好做好所有的事情，但只有表现是不够的。此外，即便机器人能做出一些真诚的承诺，这些承诺也必须是基于自由的意志。机器人不会自发地选择爱你，只是程序使然。而这也仅是为了满足公司巨头们的商业胃口。

This looks like a powerful set of objections to the possibility of robot-human love. But not all these objections are as persuasive as they first appear. After all, what convinces us that our fellow human beings satisfy the mutuality and free-choice conditions outlined above? It’s hard to see what the answer could be other than the fact that they go through certain behavioural motions that are suggestive of this: they act ‘as if’ they love us and ‘as if’ they have freely chosen us as their partners. If robots can mimic these behavioural motions, it’s not clear that we would have any ground for denying the genuineness of their affection. The philosopher Michael Hauskeller made this point rather well in Mythologies of Transhumanism (2016):

看起来，这些都是反对人机恋强有力的证据。但是，并非所有的证据都如表面所显示的那样具有说服力。归根到底，是什么让我们深信人类在恋爱中满足了上述的相互性和自由性呢？除了参照特定的行为，我们很难回答这个问题：他们“似乎”爱着我们，“好像”是自由地选择了我们。但倘若机器人能模仿这些行为，那么，我们能否继续有力地否定机器感情的真实性呢？这将不得而知。哲学家Michael Hauskeller在 Mythologies of Transhumanism （2016）一书很好地论述了这一观点：

It is difficult to see what this love … should consist in, if not a certain kind of loving behaviour… if our lover’s behaviour toward us is unfailingly caring and loving, and respectful of our needs, then we would not really know what to make of the claim that they do not really love us at all, but only appear to do so.

如果没有某种爱的表现方式，我们便很难感知爱的存在……如果我们的另一半始终如一地关切、爱护并尊重我们的需求，那么我们便无法得知他们是否其实根本不爱我们，只是表现得如此而已。

The same goes for concerns about free choice. It is, of course, notoriously controversial whether or not humans have free choice, and not just the illusion of that; but if we need to believe that our lovers freely choose their ongoing commitment to us, then it is hard to know what could ground that belief other than certain behavioural indicators that are suggestive of this, eg their apparent willingness to break the commitment when we upset or disappoint them. There is no reason why such behavioural mimicry needs to be out of bounds for robots. Elsewhere, I have defended this view of human-robot relations under the label ‘ethical behaviourism’, which is a position that holds that the ultimate epistemic grounding for our beliefs about the value of relationships lies in the detectable behavioural and functional patterns of our partners, not in some deeper metaphysical truths about their existence.

这样的担忧同时适用于自由选择。当然，人类的自由选择是否只是错觉还饱受争议。但如果要相信我们的爱人是基于自由意志自然而然地爱上我们，那除了某些能给出暗示的特定行为（如我们沮丧或对其失望时，他们明确地想要毁坏承诺），我们再无根据。同理，我们也没有理由来怀疑模仿这些行为是超出机器人能力范围的。此外，从“道德行为主义”这一点来看，我也坚决捍卫人机恋。“道德行为主义”者认为：人际关系的价值是基于另一半可观察的行为及功能模式，而非基于在关于他们存在性的一些更深层的形而上真理。

notorious / nəʊˈtɔːriəs/ adj. famous or well known for something bad 臭名昭著的

Ethical behaviourism is a bitter pill for some. Even though he expresses the view well, Hauskeller, to take just one example, ultimately disagrees with it when it comes to human-robot relationships. He argues that the reason why behavioural patterns are enough to convince us that our human partners are in love with us is because we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of those behaviours. The problem with robots is that we do have such reasons:

道德行为主义对一些人来便是一种困扰了。例如Hauskeller，即便他很好地表述了上述想法，但他最终仍反对人机恋。他认为，行为模式之所以能让我们相信，我们的另一半确实与我们坠入爱河，是因为我们没有理由怀疑人类行为是否真诚。但是，机器人的问题在于，我们确实有充分理由去质疑它们的真实性：

As long as we have an alternative explanation for why the robot behaves that way (namely, that it has been designed and programmed to do so), we have no good reason to believe that its actions are expressive of anything at all.

只要我们能够用另一种方式解释机器人的行为模式（即它的设计及方案要求如此），我们便无法相信机器人的行为能自如地表达任意想法。

Put differently: (i) because the robot has a different developmental origin to a human lover and/or (ii) because it is ultimately programmed (and controlled) by others, who might have ulterior motives, there is no reason to think that you are in a meaningful relationship with it.

换句话说，（1）由于机器人与人类的发展起源不同，且/或（2）机器人最终是由他人预设或控制的，设计者可能利用机器人别有所图。因此，人机恋是毫无意义的。

But (i) is difficult to justify in this context. Unless you think that biological tissue is magic, or you are a firm believer in mind-body dualism, there is little reason to doubt that a robot that is behaviourally and functionally equivalent to a human cannot sustain a meaningful relationship. There is, after all, every reason to suspect that we are programmed, by evolution and culture, to develop loving attachments to one another. It might be difficult to reverse-engineer our programming, but this is increasingly true of robots too, particularly when they are programmed with learning rules that help them to develop their own responses to the world.

但是，第一点难以被辩证。除非你认为人的生物组织是凭空出现的魔法，又或者你坚信身心二元论，否则不太可能质疑一个功能与行为都与人类无异的机器人无法保持有意义的联结关系。毕竟，我们也完全有理由怀疑，人类是受文化进化“编码”而成，从而诞生了一颗能够彼此相爱的心。或许我们很难“逆向改变”，但机器人也越渐如此——尤其当它们被设置为能够通过机器学习来改进对周围世界的反馈时。

The second element (ii) provides more reason to doubt the meaningfulness of robot relationships, but two points arise. First, if the real concern is that the robot serves ulterior motives and that it might betray you at some later point, then we should remember that relationships with humans are fraught with similar risks. As the philosopher Alexander Nehamas points out in On Friendship (2016), this fragility and possibility of betrayal is often what makes human relationships so valuable . Second, if the concern is about the ownership and control, then we should remember that ownership and control are socially constructed facts that can be changed if we think it morally appropriate. Humans once owned and controlled other humans but we (or at least most of us) eventually saw the moral error in this practice. We might learn to see a similar moral error in owning and controlling robots, particularly if they are behaviourally indistinguishable from human lovers.

第二点让我们有更多理由去质疑人机恋的意义，但同时我们也需要思考一下两点。首先，如果我们真的担心机器人会被人利用，担心它会在将来的某天背叛我们，那么我们也得记住人类的关系也面对着同样的风险。正如哲学家亚历山大·尼赫玛斯在《论友谊》一书中指出，正是因为脆弱并存在被背叛的风险，人们的感情才显得弥足珍贵。其次，如果我们担心的是机器人的所有权和控制权，那么我们得明白，这种我们认为道德正确的所有权和控制权是由社会建构的并不稳定的。一部分人类曾经也占有并控制其他人类，但最终我们发现这是一种道德错误（至少大部分人是如此）。如果我们试图占有并控制机器人，特别是当机器人在行为上与人类伴侣无异时，我们也会发现自己在犯下同样的道德错误。

ulterior motive/purpose etc. a reason for doing something that you deliberately hide in order to get an advantage for yourself 别有用心

The argument above is merely a defence of the philosophical possibility of robot lovers. There are obviously several technical and ethical obstacles that would need to be cleared in order to realise this possibility. One major ethical obstacle concerns how robots represent (or performatively mimic) human beings. If you look at the current crop of robotic partners, they seem to embody some problematic, gendered assumptions about the nature of love and sexual desire. Azuma Hikari, the holographic partner, represents a sexist ideal of the domestic housewife, and in the world of sex dolls and sexbot prototypes, things are even worse: we see a ‘pornified’ ideal of female sexuality being represented and reinforced.

以上的观点仅仅是在哲学层面对机器爱人的辩护。真正实现这种可能很明显还需要解决一些技术和道德上的阻碍。其中一个主要的道德阻碍在于机器人如何代表（或者行为上模仿）人类。如果你观察现在的机器人伴侣，他们似乎在关于爱和性欲的性别假设上存在问题。全息投影伴侣Azuma Hikari (因为前面用了英文，我这儿就follow了)代表了对于家庭主妇的性别歧视；而在性玩偶和性机器人的世界里，情况则更糟：我们看到机器人呈现和加强了“色情化”的女性性征。

This has a lot of people worried. For instance, Sinziana Gutiu, a lawyer in Vancouver specialising in cyberliability , is concerned that sexbots convey the image of women as sexual tools:

有很多人在担心这个问题。例如森济娅娜·古提——温哥华 网络责任 专业的律师——担心性爱机器人会传达女人就是性工具的观念：

To the user, the sex robot looks and feels like a real woman who is programmed into submission … The sex robot is an ever-consenting sexual partner …

对于用户来说，性爱机器人就像一个因编程而服从的真实女人……性爱机器人永远都会是一个心甘情愿的性伴侣……

Gutiu thinks that this will enable users to ‘act out rape fantasies and confirm rape myths’. Kathleen Richardson, a professor of ethics and culture of robotics at De Montfort University in Leicester and the co-founder of the Campaign Against Sex Robots, has similar concerns, arguing that sexbots effectively represent women as sexual commodities to be bought and sold. While both these critics draw a link between such representations and broader social consequences, others (myself included) focus specifically on the representations themselves. In this sense, the debate plays out much like the long-standing debates about the moral propriety of pornography.

古提认为，这将能够使用户‘宣泄强奸的幻想并实现强奸的荒诞想法’。凯瑟琳·理查德森是莱斯特德蒙福特大学机器人伦理和文化专业的一名教授，她同时也是打击性机器人运动的共同发起人。她同样担心性爱机器人把女性表现成待售的性商品。当这两种批评将表现形式和深远的社会结果联系起来时，其他人（包括我）则特别关注在表现形式本身。从这个角度看，这更像是长久以来关于色情影片道德问题的争论。

Let’s set the concerns about consequences to one side for now, and consider whether there is something representationally disturbing about robot lovers. Do they necessarily convey or express problematic attitudes toward women (or men)? To answer that, we need to think about how symbolic practices and artefacts carry meaning in the first place. Their meaning is a function of their content , ie what they resemble (or, more importantly, what they are taken to resemble by others) and the context in which they are created, interpreted and used. There is a complex interplay between content and context when it comes to meaning. Content that seems offensive and derogatory in one context can be empowering and subversive in another. Videos and images that depict relationships of subordination and domination can be demeaning in certain contexts (eg, when produced and consumed by purveyors of mainstream hardcore pornography), but carry a more positive meaning in others (eg, when produced and consumed by members of the BDSM community or by proponents of ‘feminist pornography’).

让我们先把对于后果的担忧放在一边，想想机器情人是否有什么明显令人讨厌的地方。他们真的传达或表达了对女人（或男人）有问题的态度吗？为了解答这个问题，我们需要思考象征性行为和人工制品一开始是如何变得有意义的。他们的意义其实是内容的一种功能：例如他像什么（或者，更重要的，他们被别人拿来比作什么），以及他们在什么背景下被创造、解读和使用。在谈及意义时，内容和背景之间存在一种复杂的相互作用。在一种背景下看起来冒犯和 不敬的 内容，在另一种背景下会变得有力和具有颠覆性 。 在某些背景下（比如，由主流硬派色情影片的赞助商所生产和消费的背景），描述主从和支配关系的录像和图片是有损人格的，但在其他背景下（比如，由BDSM社区成员或者‘女权色情片’的支持者生产和消费的背景），它们有着更积极的意义。

derogatory / dɪˈrɒɡət ə ri/ adj. derogatory remarks , attitudes etc. are insulting and disapproving 贬损的

This has implications for assessing the representational harms of robot lovers because neither their content nor the context in which they are used is fixed or immutable. It is almost certainly true that the current look and appearance of robot lovers is representationally problematic, particularly in the contexts in which they are produced, promoted and used. But it is possible to change this. We can learn here from the history of the ‘feminist porn’ movement, a sub-culture within pornography that maintains that pornographic representations of women need not be derogatory or subordinating, and that they can play a positive role in sexual self-expression.

这会影响评估机器爱人的代表性伤害，因为他们所使用的内容和背景既不固定也并非不可改变。几乎能确定的是，机器爱人的出现以及它现在的外观是有问题的——尤其是在它们的生产、宣传和使用的背景下。但这是有可能改变的。我们从‘女权色情片’运动的历史中学到，色情片内的次文化坚持认为，代表女人的色情产物不需要有冒犯之意，也不需要表示从属关系。它们可以在性表达上起到积极的作用。

To do this, proponents of the feminist porn movement pursue three main strategies: (i) they try to change the content of porn, so that it is not always from the male gaze, and so that it depicts a more diverse range of activities and forms; (ii) they try to change the processes through which porn is created, making it more ethical and inclusive of female voices; and (iii) they try to change the contexts in which it is consumed, creating networks of feminist sex shops and discussion groups for marketing and interpreting the content.

为了传达这一理念，女权色情片运动的支持者致力于三大战略：（1）他们试图改变色情片的内容，这样一来就不会总是男性观看者居多，而且还能显得更多元；（2）他们试图改变色情片的拍摄过程，让它更合乎道德，包含更多女性的声音；（3）他们试图改变色情片的消费环境，创造出女权性商店网和讨论小组，以此推销和解读他们的理念。

A similar set of strategies could be followed in the case of sexbots. We could work to change the representational forms of sexbots so that they include diverse female, male and non-binary body shapes, and follow behavioural scripts (pre-programmed or learned) that do not serve to reinforce negative stereotypes, and perhaps even promote positive ones. We could also seek to change the processes through which sexbots get created and designed, encouraging a more diverse range of voices in the process. To this end, we could work to promote women who are already active in sextech. Finally, we could also create better contexts for the marketing and use of sex robots. This would require greater ‘consciousness raising’ around the problems of gendered harassment and inequality, and a greater sensitivity to the representational harms that could be implicated by this technology.

机器爱人可以遵循类似的战略。我们可以努力改变机器爱人所代表的样子，以此包含形形色色的女性、男性、或非二元身体；同时我们可以（通过默认程序或机器学习）让机器爱人符合行为规范——减弱负面的固定模式、甚至宣传积极正面的模式。我们还可以改变设计和生产机器爱人的过程、鼓励制造过程中多元化的声音。为此目的，我们可以努力宣传那些已经活跃在性科技领域的女性。最后，我们还能为推销和使用性机器人创造更好的环境。这需要人们提升对性骚扰和不平等问题的意识，也需要人们对可能会遭受此技术牵连的代表性问题更加敏感

We are already starting to do this, but it is undoubtedly an uphill battle that requires more effort. Given this difficulty, it is going to be tempting to slip back into calling for bans on the production of such content, but censorious attitudes are unlikely to be successful. We have always used technology for the purposes of sexual stimulation and gratification, and we will continue to do so in the future.

我们已经开始做这件事。但这场漫长而艰难的战斗无疑需要更多努力。由于这样的困难，退回到呼吁禁止生产那种产品是很吸引人的。但是一昧批评的态度是不太可能会成功的。一直以来，我们都通过技术来达到性刺激和性满足，而以后我们依旧会如此。

Concerns about the representational harms of robots often translate into concerns about their consequences. If robots represent or express misogynistic attitudes, the worry is that these attitudes will get reinforced in how users interact with real people. They will be inclined to sexual aggression and violence, be unwilling to compromise, and possibly become more withdrawn and misanthropic.

对于机器人代表性伤害问题的担忧，经常可以解读为对它们所带来的后果的担忧。如果机器人代表或表达了厌恶女性的态度，需要担忧的是这种态度在用户与现实生活中的真人互动时会变得愈发强烈。他们将会更倾向于性攻击和性暴力、会变得不愿妥协、也可能会变得更内向以及更厌世。

Obviously, the consequences of robot lovers would be extremely relevant to any debate about their desirability. If the consequences were clearly and uncontroversially negative, then this would reinforce any negative social meaning they might have, and provide us with strong reasons to discourage their use. If the consequences were clearly and uncontroversially positive (eg, because their use actually discouraged real-world sexual violence), then their negative social meaning could be reformed, and we might have strong reason to encourage their use.

很显然，机器爱人所带来的后果会和任何关于它们的欲望的争论高度相关。如果这些后果既明显又毫无争议是负面的，那这将深化所有它们可能代表的负面社会意义，并且会给我们足够的、拒绝使用它们的理由。如果这些结果明显且毫无争议是正面的（比如，由于使用它们而阻止了真实世界的性暴力），那么它们负面的社会意义可能会被改善，且为我们提供强力的、使用它们的理由。

The problem is that we don’t know which of these two possibilities is more likely right now. We don’t have any empirical studies on the effects of robot-lovers. One possibility follows directly from the claim that meaningful relationships with robots are possible. If this is correct, it means that the goods we currently associate with human relationships are also realisable in robot relationships. This could be a positive consequence because it would enable us to distribute these relationship goods more widely. The philosopher Neil McArthur at the University of Manitoba makes this point specifically in relation to sexual relationships, arguing that there are many people who are excluded from the possibility of entering into valuable sexual relationships with other human beings. If we grant that sexual experiences are part of the well-lived life, and that there might even be a right to sex, this should be seen as a problem. Furthermore, the problem goes beyond sex: people are shut out from other relationship goods too, such as companionship and care. It is not possible to resolve this imbalance in the distribution of relationship goods by trying to find a human partner for everyone, since doing so would probably require mass coercion or compulsion, but it might be possible to do so with robotic relationship partners.

问题是，我们不知道现在的情况更像哪种可能性。对于机器爱人，我们没有任何实证研究。一种可能性直接源于相信人和机器人之间可能存在有意义的关系。如果这种论调是对的，那这意味着现在在人际关系中产生的的益处在人机关系中也能实现。这可能是一个积极的结果，因为它能使我们更广地传播这些关系益处。马尼托巴大学的哲学教授尼尔·麦克阿瑟把这个观点和性关系直接联系起来。他表示很多人被别人排除在有价值的性关系之外。如果我们认同性经验是幸福生活的一部分，甚至性生活是每个人应有的权利，那么这应该被当成一个问题。此外，问题不止是性：人们同样被排除在如陪伴和关爱这样的关系益处之外的。通过给每一个人找一个伴侣来解决这种关系益处分配不平衡的问题是不可能的，因为这么做可能需要大范围的强制措施。但这可能在机器人伴侣身上实现。

empirical / ɪmˈpɪrɪk ə l/ adj. based on scientific testing or practical experience, not on ideas 基于经验的

In addition to this, it is a mistake to always think of robots as replacements for human lovers; we could also view them as complements to existing relationships. The ideal of human intimacy holds that we should relate to one another on terms of equality. But this is often not possible. Robotic partners could help to redress these imbalances by providing third-party outlets that are less destructive of the human-to-human relationship because they might be less likely to be perceived as rivals.

此外，一直认为机器人是人类情人的代替品是错误的；我们也可以把它们当成现有关系的补充。理想的人类 亲密关系 包括我们应该平等地对待彼此。但这经常是不可能的。机器伴侣或许可以帮助改变这种不平等：作为第三方的一种宣泄口，它比起人对人的关系的破坏性更小，因为他们不太可能被当成对手。

In the coming decades, people will almost certainly be having relationships with more sophisticated robots, whatever we think about this. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with loving a robot, and some forms of human-robot love could complement and enhance human relationships. At the same time, some could be socially destructive, and it is important that they are anticipated and discouraged. The key question, then, is not whether we can prevent this from happening, but what sort of human-robot relationships we should tolerate and encourage.

未来数十年，无论我们怎么想，人们几乎一定会和更多复杂的机器人发展出各种关系。爱上一个机器人 本质上 并没错，一些形式的人机爱恋还可能加强人际关系。但同时，另一些可能对社会造成破坏。而对这些爱恋的预测和阻止是非常重要的。那么，问题的关键就不在于我们是否能够防止它发生，而在于我们应该忍受和鼓励何种类型的人机关系。

intrinsic / ɪnˈtrɪnsɪk/ adj. being part of the natur e or character of someone or something 固有的、本质的

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