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解析作者 | 唧唧堂管理学研究小组：
WINDYH
1.积极财务报告的实行与股东财富
Proactive financial reporting enforcement and shareholder wealth
本文研究了在英国实行的积极财务报告制度中监管审查的提高对股价的影响。研究发现，这一制度实行后，对财务报告发起审查的概率比以往增加了四倍，使得股价平均减少了1.3%。股价的减少在那些聘用私人监管机构的企业中最为明显，因为私人监管机构能够将公司的透明度控制在适当的水平，使公司股价最大化。进一步研究表明，在该制度实施的行业中，监管审查加强还导致了竞争加剧、管理者投资期缩短，表明股价的减少不仅仅是对政策的直接遵从成本导致的。
Within the UK's proactive financial-reporting enforcement regime, we examine the effect of increased regulatory scrutiny on equity values. We find that a fourfold increase in the likelihood of regulator-initiated reviews of financial reports reduces equity values by 1.3% on average. Reductions in equity values are largest for firms with strong private oversight that likely ensures that they are closer to their equity-value-maximizing level of transparency. Additional evidence suggests that competition increases and that managers' investment horizons decrease in industries selected for increased regulatory scrutiny, consistent with direct compliance costs not fully explaining the reduction in equity values.
参考文献：Hans B. Christensen, Lisa Yao Liu, Mark Maffett. Proactive financial reporting enforcement and shareholder wealth. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2020, 69(2-3).
2.额外信息发生时的最优公告
Optimal reporting when additional information might arrive
本文研究了如果公司能够自由披露信息的话，公司将如何设计其公告系统（reporting system，此处指对披露信息内容的选择等）。在本文的模型中，引导外界对公司的观念（belief）并使其超过某一阈值（threshold），是公司首要但并不唯一需要关心的任务。这一阈值存在于多种情境下，包括投资决策、清算/延续的选择、订立契约、审计、减值、上市条件、指数的纳入、信用评级、分析师的建议以及压力测试等。当这一阈值较高时，最优的公告系统是选择提供更加良好的公告；而当这一阈值较低时，可能是选择提供不包含有效信息的公告。对于减值类消息的最优公告系统而言，公告减值的可能性和不包含减值信息的公告，都会增加关注公司私密信息的可能性。
【以下为笔者对这一段的理解：作者构建了一个模型，假设公司能自由披露信息，那么公司会根据所发生事件（即题目的“additional information”）的类型，以及公司想要通过公告引导投资者观念的程度（即所谓的“阈值”），来制定最优公告。如果想要达到比较好的引导效果（阈值高），那么公司就会做出“良好”的公告；如果不追求公告的引导效果（阈值低），那么公司可能会做一个不包含有效信息的公告。既然公司存在这样的策略，那当减值这类负面信息出现时，投资者也就无法判断公司是否会进行公告，也无法判断公司的公告中是否如实包含了这些信息。投资者无法从公开信息中获取，只能更加关注公司的私密信息。】
本文对于公司IPO前的静默期提出了新的观点，并实证研究了自由披露信息的可能性与企业财报内容之间的关系。在扩展研究中，本文进一步考虑了披露信息要求、公告操控、内生性阈值，并更换了其他收益函数。
We study how the potential for discretionary disclosure affects the way a firm designs its reporting system. In our model, the firm's primary but nonexclusive concern is to induce beliefs that exceed a threshold. Such thresholds arise in numerous contexts, including investing decisions, liquidation/continuation choices, covenants, audits, impairments, listing requirements, index inclusion, credit ratings, analyst recommendations, and stress tests. The optimal reporting system is characterized by informative good reports when the threshold is high and, potentially, uninformative reports when the threshold is low. Under an optimal impairment-type reporting system, the likelihood of reported impairments and the information content of non-impairment reports both increase in the probability of the firm observing private information. We provide a novel motivation for the quiet period around an IPO and empirical predictions relating the probability of discretionary disclosure to the properties of financial reports. In extensions, we consider disclosure mandates, report manipulation, endogenous thresholds, and alternative payoff functions.
参考文献：Henry L. Friedman, John S. Hughes, Beatrice Michaeli. Optimal reporting when additional information might arrive. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2020, 69(2-3).
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3.审计业务前几年的费用会打折吗？
Are audit fees discounted in initial year audit engagements?
很多研究表明，审计费用在审计师变更的年份中会打折，监管机构一直对此有所顾虑，担心这会损害审计质量。本文发现，这些研究对费用折扣的度量方式存在显著的偏误。存在偏误的原因在于，审计师变更这一临时程序将由前任和后任审计师共同完成，但只会披露后任审计师的费用。于是，审计师发生变更的年份中所披露的审计费用通常与审计服务的部分年份有关。本文研究发现，在纠正这一测量误差后，审计费用的折扣不复存在。
Many studies report that audit fees are discounted in the year of an auditor change and regulators have long been concerned that such fee discounting could impair audit quality. We find significant bias in the way studies have tested for fee discounting. The bias exists because interim procedures are usually performed by both the predecessor and successor auditors but only the successor's fee needs to be disclosed. Accordingly, the disclosed fee during the auditor change year usually relates to a partial year of auditing services. We find that the evidence for fee discounting disappears after correcting for this measurement bias.
参考文献：Abhijit Barua, Clive Lennox, Aneesh Raghunandan. Are audit fees discounted in initial year audit engagements? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2020, 69(2-3).
4.使用隐性马尔科夫模型衡量盈余质量
Using a hidden Markov model to measure earnings quality
本文提出并验证了一种基于隐性马尔科夫模型的新的盈余质量度量方法。本文将这一测度方法称为“盈余保真度”（earnings fidelity），用以衡量盈余信号在揭示公司真实经济状况方面的可信度。为了对这一指标进行估计，本文使用了一个容纳了横截面异质性的分层贝叶斯模型中的马尔科夫链蒙特卡洛方法。盈余保真度与预期盈余反应系数正相关。在对两种低会计质量的外部指标（重述和美国证券交易委员会的评论函）的预测质量方面，这种测度方法显著超越了已有方法。
We propose and validate a new measure of earnings quality based on a hidden Markov model. This measure, termed earnings fidelity, captures how faithful earnings signals are in revealing the true economic state of the firm. We estimate the measure using a Markov chain Monte Carlo procedure in a Bayesian hierarchical framework that accommodates cross-sectional heterogeneity. Earnings fidelity is positively associated with the forward earnings response coefficient. It significantly outperforms existing measures of quality in predicting two external indicators of low-quality accounting: restatements and Securities and Exchange Commission comment letters.
参考文献：Kai Du, Steven Huddart, Lingzhou Xue, Yifan Zhang. Using a hidden Markov model to measure earnings quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2020, 69(2-3).
5.管理者权利与CEO薪酬
On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay
本文研究了友善董事会如何设计有利于强势（powerful）CEO的最优薪酬契约。本文的研究得到了一些出乎意料的结论。首先，当公司业绩较差时，强势CEO会获得更高的报酬，并订立具有更高薪酬-业绩敏感性（PPS）的契约，反之亦然。此外，本文还考察了董事会的友善性提高了预期薪酬和预期PPS的情况。第二，本文发现友善的董事会为经理人提供了更高的薪酬、更多的股权，但是更少的期权。第三，友善的董事会提供了更高PPS的契约，也会更多地使用相对绩效评估（RPE）。综上，本文研究表明，研究中频繁使用的度量薪酬高低的指标，需要进行更细致谨慎的解释。将这一模型拓展到高管薪酬之外后，本文发现强势的经理人资本投入较低，但是操纵盈余的动机也较低。
We study how friendly boards design the structure of optimal compensation contracts in favor of powerful CEOs. Our study yields unexpected results. First, powerful managers receive higher pay and a contract with a higher pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) if firm performance is low and vice versa. Moreover, we identify conditions where expected pay and expected PPS are both increasing in the friendliness of the board. Second, we show that friendly boards provide managers with higher salaries, more shares, but less options. Third, friendly boards offering contracts with a higher PPS also make more intensive use of relative performance evaluation (RPE). Overall, our results suggest that frequently used indicators of poor (or sound) compensation practices should be interpreted with care. Extending the scope of our model beyond executive pay, we show that powerful managers underinvest in capital but have less incentives to manage earnings.
参考文献：Robert F. Göx, Thomas Hemmer. On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2020, 69(2-3).
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6.证券监管机构间的跨境合作
Cross-border cooperation between securities regulators
2001年发生的9-11事件促使全球的证券监管机构为实现大范围的跨境合作而努力。9-11事件之后，国际证监会组织（IOSCO）达成了一项非约束性协议——合作及信息交换多边谅解备忘录（MMoU），标准化了各参与国的证监机构之间的信息共享协议。由于不同国家监管部门加入MMoU的时间不同，由此造成了一系列交错的冲击。使用这些变量，本文研究发现，由此产生的跨境合作：（a）增加了跨境执法，（b）减少了参与过资本市场流动性产生的成本。这一结果表明，MMoU有助于填补各国监管机构之间的空白，这些空白曾为投资者造成了信息不对称、代理成本和征收风险。
The events of September 11, 2001, prompted sweeping cross-border coordination efforts for securities regulators around the globe. After 9/11, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) forged a nonbinding arrangement—the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU)—that standardized the protocol for information sharing among participating securities regulators. Because regulators from different countries entered the MMoU at different times, their enlistments created a set of staggered shocks. I use these shocks to show that the resulting cross-border cooperation (a) increases cross-border enforcement and (b) reduces the cost of liquidity provision in the capital markets of participating countries. These results support the conclusion that the MMoU helps fill gaps in cross-border regulation that historically exposed investors to information asymmetry, agency costs, and expropriation risks.
参考文献：Roger Silvers. Cross-border cooperation between securities regulators. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2020, 69(2-3).
7.政治生涯与SEC财务不端执法
Politician Careers and SEC enforcement against financial misconduct
本文研究表明，企业的财务不当行为会对政客的选举结果产生重大影响，特别是对于那些在美国国会委员会任职，与SEC（美国证券交易委员会）相关联并具有监管职责的政客（简称“SEC政客”）。如果某地有公司因财务不端而面临SEC执法，这些SEC政客输掉竞选的概率增加了31%。本文还发现，SEC政客似乎会影响SEC，以减少对本地公司实施制裁对自己职业生涯造成的潜在影响。首先，在SEC政客选举前后宣布执法行动的时机，似乎具有机会主义。其次，与其他公司相比，SEC政客所在区域的公司受到SEC执法的可能性更低，且在遭受SEC执法时受到的处罚更低。总之，这些结果表明，政客对职业生涯的关注阻碍了SEC执法。
We document that corporate financial misconduct has significant consequences for politicians' election outcomes and, in particular, those politicians that serve on U.S. congressional committees with SEC-relevant oversight responsibilities (“SEC-relevant politicians”). These politicians display a 31% greater likelihood of losing a reelection campaign after a local firm faces SEC enforcement for financial misconduct. We also document that SEC-relevant politicians appear to influence the SEC to limit career effects due to the potential consequences from enforcement against local firms. First, the timing of enforcement action announcements around SEC-relevant politicians' elections appears opportunistic. Second, firms in the districts of SEC-relevant politicians are less likely to receive SEC enforcement actions relative to other firms and, when faced with enforcement, receive smaller penalties. Collectively, these results suggest that politicians' career concerns impede the SEC's enforcement efforts.
参考文献：Mihir N. Mehta, Wanli Zhao. Politician Careers and SEC enforcement against financial misconduct. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2020, 69(2-3).
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8.“绿色理念”去哪了？
Where's the greenium?
本文研究了投资者是否愿意牺牲财富换取社会利益。本文借助市政证券市场独特的制度特征考察这一问题。自2013年以来，各州和其他政府实体已经发行了超过230亿美元的绿色债券，为环保项目提供资金。通过与同一发行人在同一天发行的几乎相同的非绿色证券进行比较，本文发现二者在经济含义上具有几乎相同的定价。与近来的一些理论和实验研究相比，本文发现在真实的市场环境中，投资者似乎完全不愿意牺牲财富去投资环境可持续发展的项目。当风险与收益不变且可以事先被投资者知晓时，同一发行者发行的绿色和非绿色证券几乎被投资者视为是完全的替代品。因此，“绿色理念”几乎是不存在的。
In this study, we investigate whether investors are willing to trade off wealth for societal benefits. We take advantage of unique institutional features of the municipal securities market to provide insight into this question. Since 2013, states and other governmental entities have issued over $23 billion of green bonds to fund eco-friendly projects. Comparing green securities to nearly identical securities issued for non-green purposes by the same issuers on the same day, we observe economically identical pricing for green and non-green issues. In contrast to a number of recent theoretical and experimental studies, we find that in real market settings investors appear entirely unwilling to forgo wealth to invest in environmentally sustainable projects. When risk and payoffs are held constant and are known to investors ex-ante, investors view green and non-green securities by the same issuer as almost exact substitutes. Thus, the greenium is essentially zero.
