Abstract: In this article, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.
参考文献：Pasha Andreyanov, Tomasz Sadzik(2021). Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),521–573.
Abstract: Communication is integral to organizations and yet field evidence on the relation between communication and worker productivity remains scarce. We argue that a core role of communication is to transmit information that helps co-workers do their job better. We build a simple model in which workers choose the amount of communication by trading off this benefit against the time cost incurred by the sender, and use it to derive a set of empirical predictions. We then exploit a natural experiment in an organization where problems arrive and must be sequentially dealt with by two workers. For exogenous reasons, the first worker can sometimes communicate face-to-face with their colleague. Consistently with the predictions of our model, we find that: (1) the second worker works faster (at the cost of the first worker having less time to deal with incoming problems) when face-to-face communication is possible, (2) this effect is stronger when the second worker is busier and for homogenous and closely located teams, and (3) the (career) incentives of workers determine how much they communicate with their colleagues. We also find that workers partially internalise social outcomes in their communication decisions. Our findings illustrate how workers in teams adjust the amount of mutual communication to its costs and benefits.
参考文献：Diego Battiston, Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Tom Kirchmaier(2021). Face-to-Face Communication in Organizations. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),574-609.
Abstract: In dynamic games, players may observe a deviation from a pre-play, possibly incomplete, non-binding agreement before the game is over. The attempt to rationalize the deviation may lead players to revise their beliefs about the deviator’s behaviour in the continuation of the game. This instance of forward induction reasoning is based on interactive beliefs about not just rationality, but also the compliance with the agreement itself. I study the effects of such rationalization on the self-enforceability of the agreement. Accordingly, outcomes of the game are deemed implementable by some agreement or not. Conclusions depart substantially from what the traditional equilibrium refinements suggest. A non-subgame perfect equilibrium outcome may be induced by a self-enforcing agreement, while a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome may not. The incompleteness of the agreement can be crucial to implement an outcome.
参考文献：Emiliano Catonini(2021). Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),610-642.
Abstract: We examine how many and what kind of firms ultimately rely on foreign inputs, sell to foreign markets, and are affected by trade shocks. To capture that firms can trade indirectly by buying from or selling to domestic firms that import or export, we use Belgian data with information on both domestic firm-to-firm sales and foreign trade transactions. We find that most firms use a lot of foreign inputs, but only a small number of firms show that dependence through direct imports. While direct exporters are rare, a majority of firms are indirectly exporting. In most firms, however, indirect export is quantitatively modest, and sales at home are the key source of revenue. We show that what matters for the transmission of foreign demand shocks to a firm’s revenue is how much the firm ultimately sells to foreign markets, not whether these sales are from direct or indirect export.
参考文献：Emmanuel Dhyne, Ayumu Ken Kikkawa, Magne Mogstad, Felix Tintelnot(2021). Trade and Domestic Production Networks. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),643-668.
Abstract: We provide new time-varying estimates of the housing wealth effect back to the 1980s. We use three identification strategies: ordinary least squares with a rich set of controls, the Saiz housing supply elasticity instrument, and a new instrument that exploits systematic differences in city-level exposure to regional house price cycles. All three identification strategies indicate that housing wealth elasticities were if anything slightly smaller in the 2000s than in earlier time periods. This implies that the important role housing played in the boom and bust of the 2000s was due to larger price movements rather than an increase in the sensitivity of consumption to house prices. Full-sample estimates based on our new instrument are smaller than recent estimates, though they remain economically important. We find no significant evidence of a boom–bust asymmetry in the housing wealth elasticity. We show that these empirical results are consistent with the behaviour of the housing wealth elasticity in a standard life-cycle model with borrowing constraints, uninsurable income risk, illiquid housing, and long-term mortgages. In our model, the housing wealth elasticity is relatively insensitive to changes in the distribution of loan-to-value (LTV) for two reasons: first, low-leverage homeowners account for a substantial and stable part of the aggregate housing wealth elasticity; second, a rightward shift in the LTV distribution increases not only the number of highly sensitive constrained agents but also the number of underwater agents whose consumption is insensitive to house prices.
参考文献：Adam M Guren, Alisdair McKay, Emi Nakamura, Jón Steinsson(2021). Housing Wealth Effects: The Long View.The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),669-707.
Abstract: We identify a competition-policy-based argument for regulating the secondary features of complex or complexly priced products when consumers have limited attention. Limited attention implies that consumers can only “study” a small number of complex products in full, while—by failing to check secondary features—they can superficially “browse” more. Interventions limiting ex post consumer harm through safety regulations, caps on certain fees, or other methods induce consumers to do more or more meaningful browsing, enhancing competition. We show that for a pro-competitive effect to obtain, the regulation must apply to the secondary features, and not to the total price or value of the product. As an auxiliary positive prediction, we establish that because low-value consumers are often more likely to study—and therefore less likely to browse—than high-value consumers, the average price consumers pay can be increasing in the share of low-value consumers. We discuss applications of our insights to health-insurance choice, the European Union’s principle on unfair contract terms, food safety in developing countries, and the shopping behaviour of (and prices paid by) low-income and high-income consumers.
参考文献：Paul Heidhues, Johannes Johnen, Botond Kőszegi(2021). Browsing versus Studying: A Pro-market Case for Regulation. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),708-729.
Abstract: This article shows that the intensity of violence in Rwanda’s recent past can be traced back to the initial establishment of its pre-colonial state. Villages that were brought under centralized rule one century earlier experienced a doubling of violence during the state-organized 1994 genocide. Instrumental variable estimates exploiting differences in the proximity to Nyanza—an early capital—suggest that these effects are causal. Before the genocide, when the state faced rebel attacks, with longer state presence, violence is lower. Using data from several sources, including a lab-in-the-field experiment across an abandoned historical boundary, I show that the effect of the historical state is primarily sustained by culturally transmitted norms of obedience. The persistent effect of the pre-colonial state interacts with government policy: where the state developed earlier, there is more violence when the Rwandan government mobilized for mass killing and less violence when the government pursued peace.
参考文献：Leander Heldring(2021). The Origins of Violence in Rwanda. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),730-763.
Abstract: We study the Markov perfect equilibrium in a dynamic game where agents have non-constant time preference, decentralized households determine aggregate savings, and a planner chooses climate policy. The article is the first to solve this problem with general discounting and general functional forms. With time-inconsistent preferences, a commitment device that allows a planner to choose climate policy for multiple periods is potentially very valuable. Nevertheless, our quantitative results show that while a permanent commitment device would be very valuable, the ability to commit policy for “only” 100 years adds less than 2% to the value of climate policy without commitment. We solve a log-linear version of the model analytically, generating a formula for the optimal carbon tax that includes the formula in Golosov et al. (2014, Econometrica, 82, 41–88) as a special case. More importantly, we develop new algorithms to solve the general game numerically. Convex damages lead to strategic interactions across generations of planners that lower the optimal carbon tax by 45% relative to the scenario without strategic interactions.
参考文献：Terrence Iverson, Larry Karp(2021). Carbon Taxes and Climate Commitment with Non-constant Time Preference. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),764-799.
Abstract: We study competitive equilibria in a signalling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers. In terms of the classic Spence (1973, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355—374) model of job market signalling, firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types, in addition to observing their education. Firms can be ranked according to the quality of their information, i.e., their expertise. In equilibrium, some high-type workers forgo signalling and are hired by better informed firms, which make positive profits. Workers’ education decisions and firms’ use of their expertise are strategic complements, allowing for multiple equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. We characterize wage dispersion and the extent of signalling as a function of the distribution of expertise among firms. Our model can also be applied to a variety of other signalling problems, including securitization, corporate financial structure, insurance markets, or dividend policy.
参考文献：Pablo Kurlat, Florian Scheuer(2021). Signalling to Experts. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),800-850.
picture from Internet
10、现实世界中议价的效率:来自二手车批发拍卖的证据
摘要：本研究以实证的方式量化了一个现实世界中存在双面不完全信息议价博弈的效率。Myerson and Satterthwaite（1983）和Williams（1987）推导了在双面信息不确定条件下，双边贸易在理论上的事前效率边界，并证明了该边界并没有达到事后效率，但我们对实际交易中议价的具体效果知之甚少。本研究利用二手车批发行业升序拍卖后的26.5万个交替报价议价博弈序列，并估计或界定了买卖双方价值的分布情况，同时评估了实际议价结果相对于有效结果的位置。研究结果表明，事前和事后的有效结果是接近的，但实际的议价没有达到这两种效果，这表明议价确实是无效的，而这种无效结果不仅是由于Myerson和Satterthwaite（1983）强调的信息约束。从数量上看，调查结果表明有超过一半的议价失败中是存在贸易收益的情况，从而导致效率损失为可利用的贸易收益的12％至23％。
Abstract: This study empirically quantifies the efficiency of a real-world bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) derived the theoretical ex-ante efficient frontier for bilateral trade under two-sided uncertainty and demonstrated that it falls short of ex-post efficiency, but little is known about how well bargaining performs in practice. Using about 265,000 sequences of a game of alternating-offer bargaining following an ascending auction in the wholesale used-car industry, this study estimates (or bounds) distributions of buyer and seller values and evaluates where realized bargaining outcomes lie relative to efficient outcomes. Results demonstrate that the ex-ante and ex-post efficient outcomes are close to one another, but that the real bargaining falls short of both, suggesting that the bargaining is indeed inefficient but that this inefficiency is not solely due to the information constraints highlighted in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). Quantitatively, findings indicate that over one-half of failed negotiations are cases where gains from trade exist, leading an efficiency loss of 12–23% of the available gains from trade.
参考文献：Bradley J Larsen(2021). The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),851-882.
Abstract: This article provides the first causal estimates on the popular, cost-saving practice of diversion in the criminal justice system, an intervention that provides offenders with a second chance to avoid a criminal record. We exploit two natural experiments in Harris County, Texas where first-time felony defendants faced abrupt changes in the probability of diversion. Using administrative data and regression discontinuity methods, we find robust evidence across both experiments that diversion cuts reoffending rates in half and grows quarterly employment rates by nearly 50% over 10 years. The change in trajectory persists even 20 years out and is concentrated among young black men. An investigation of mechanisms strongly suggests that stigma associated with a felony conviction plays a key role in generating these results. Other possible mechanisms including changes in incarceration, other universal adjustments in policy or practice, and differences in criminal processing are ruled out empirically.
参考文献：Michael Mueller-Smith, Kevin T. Schnepel(2021). Diversion in the Criminal Justice System. The Review of Economic Studies,88(2),883-936.
Abstract: Markov regime-switching models are very common in economics and finance. Despite persisting interest in them, the asymptotic distributions of likelihood ratio-based tests for detecting regime switching remain unknown. This study examines such tests and establishes their asymptotic distributions in the context of nonlinear models, allowing multiple parameters to be affected by regime switching. The analysis addresses three difficulties: (i) some nuisance parameters are unidentified under the null hypothesis, (ii) the null hypothesis yields a local optimum, and (iii) the conditional regime probabilities follow stochastic processes that can only be represented recursively. Addressing these issues permits substantial power gains in empirically relevant settings. This study also presents the following results: (1) a characterization of the conditional regime probabilities and their derivatives with respect to the model’s parameters, (2) a high-order approximation to the log-likelihood ratio, (3) a refinement of the asymptotic distribution, and (4) a unified algorithm to simulate the critical values. For models that are linear under the null hypothesis, the elements needed for the algorithm can all be computed analytically. Furthermore, the above results explain why some bootstrap procedures can be inconsistent, and why standard information criteria can be sensitive to the hypothesis and the model structure. When applied to US quarterly real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate data, the methods detect relatively strong evidence favouring the regime-switching specification. Lastly, we apply the methods in the context of dynamic stochastic equilibrium models and obtain similar results as the GDP case.
