许多投资者都跟格隆汇平台反映希望能多看到价值投资的内容，为此我们特意组织力量按照问题由浅至深的顺序，汇总并翻译了巴菲特近几年在各大公开场合回答的关于投资的问题。本篇文章主要内容是讲述巴菲特对市场及市场将何去何从的看法（
Views on the market and where it's going?
），希望对您有所帮助。
Regardless of the market, I will keep buying businesses. We like low prices.
忽略市场本身，我们将继续买入业务，因为我们喜欢低廉的价位。
We’re not good at forecasting markets. Charlie and I spend no time thinking about where the market’s going. We do know when we’re getting good value [when we’re buying a stock or business].
我们并不擅长预测市场，Charlie和我并没有在思考市场走向上花时间，我们只知道什么时候买入能使收入最大化。
There are always going to be some good and bad things happening.
好事和坏事总是并存的。
I’ve seen more people lose more money by getting focused too much on one factor. We’ve never not bought something due to macroeconomic concerns.
我见过一些人因为过度关注于某一个因素导致浪费了很多金钱，所以我们从不买入那些过度受宏观经济因素支配的业务。
Very infrequently you can say something intelligent about the market as a whole – when circumstances are so extreme that you predict the next 5-10 years with some degree of certainty. This was the case in 1969 and 1974. But most of the time, we’re in some in-between zone.
从整体角度对市场所做出的判断很少有明智的，除了少数极端情况你能根据确定度来预测一下未来5-10年的情况，例如1969和1974年，不过大多数时候我们还是处在一个暧昧的中间地带。
Obviously you can get more for your money now than in 1999 when I wrote that Fortune article (“Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market”). I knew I’d be right.
看了我在1999年写在《财富》杂志上的文章（“Buffett先生在股市”）zhohou1很明显你现在赚的钱比那时候更多，我就知道我说的是对的
If I had to make a choice today between long-term bonds yielding 4.5% vs. equities over the next 20 years, I’d prefer equities. But people who expect 6-7% after-tax or double digits [pre-tax] and think they can do it or hire someone else to do it will likely be disappointed.
如果现在让我在一个4.5%收益率的长期债券和一个20年期的股票之间做选择的话我选择股票，但是那些期待税后收益率6-7%或税前百分之十几收益率还认为他们能直接放开手脚雇佣别人干这些就行的人很可能会失望。
I don’t think we’re in bubble times or bargain times.
我不认为我们处在泡沫时期或者讨价还价时期
I think you’ll get a chance to do something screamingly intelligent within a few years, maybe much sooner, relative to current choices.
我认为你们有机会在几年内搞一些大事情，或早或晚，这取决于你们现在的选择。
Source: BRK Annual Meeting 2005 Tilson Notes
Time: 2005
来源2005年BRK年会Tilson笔记
时间：2005年
Mr. Market is valuing Dow Jones at about 7000, and the S&P at about than 800. What is a fair valuation? (1997)
Market估计的道琼斯指数是大约7000，标普指数是800左右，您觉得相对客观的数值是多少？
If you believe that American businesses in aggregate can earn the kind of returns they have been earning in the past couple of years, and you postulate no change in interest rates, you can justify 7000 on the Dow and 800 on the S&P. Now, if interest rates go higher, the valuation goes down automatically. And, more importantly, if the returns on equity of American industry, which are at historic highs, and which classical economics tells you would be hard to maintain--if those returns go down, that also would pull it down.
如果你相信美国全体本土业务能获得像前几年一样的利润，假设利率不变，那么标普指数和道琼斯指数就和market所估计的差不多。但现在如果利率升高则这两个指数就会下跌，此外更重要的是，如果美国本土工业的资产收益率位于历史高位，且古典经济学会告诉你这很难维持，一旦回报率下跌，那这两个指数也会下跌。
I'll give you a little quiz: What two years has the Dow had the greatest overall gain? The two years in the 1900s are 1933, which most of you don't think of as a banner year, and 1954, and in both of those years the Dow was up over 50%, counting dividends.
In March of 1955, because of the fact that the Dow had gone up, they decided to have Congressional hearings about it (laughter), and my boss Ben Graham was called down to testify, and Ben's opening comments about the market at that time were, "The market looks high, it is high, but it's not as high as it looks." Which brings about the current situation--the market certainly looks high, but there have been huge changes in earnings and return on equity and you've had this big move in interest rates. Now those are underlying fundamentals that have powered a huge bull market. After a while, people get captivated simply by the notion of rising prices without going back to the underlying rationale and that's when you get very dangerous conditions in terms of possible developments. I have no idea where the markets will go, but you have the kind of conditions that could cause real excesses, just like you had excesses in 1973-74 in the other direction, when you could buy businesses for 20 cents on the dollar. People behave in extreme ways in markets and over time that's very good for people who keep their heads.
一个小测验：哪两年道琼斯指数的整体值最高？一个是上世纪三十年代的1933年，并不是大多数人心目中的辉煌年份。另外一个就是1954年，这两个年份的道琼斯指数都上涨了50%。
1955年3月计算股息的时候，因为道琼斯指数上涨过猛，国会决定举办听证会。我当时的老板Ben Graham被传唤与会作证，当时他开场白是这么说的，市场看起来不错，也确实不错，但并不是像看起来的那么不错。这句话一语道破天机，也就是说，当前的市场看起来不错但是里面的利润和股本回报率已经发生了巨大变化，与此同时利率也有很大调整，这些东西是驱动当下这个大牛市的基本面因素。没过多久人们就被这个不受基本原理约束的价格上涨概念所迷住了，此时人们为了发展把自己置于一个很危险的境地。我不知道市场将何去何从，但是你们现在的情况非常容易引发资金过剩，跟1973-74年的情况类似。如果你能以0.2美元的价格买入一个业务，人们在市场中会表现得非常极端，不过这对于想保住脑袋的人倒是很有好处。
Source: BRK Annual Meeting 1997
Time: 1997
来源：1997年BRK年会。
时间：1997年
The S&P 500 has a return on equity of 22%, compared with a 12-13% average for corporate America over the past decade. How did we get to this point of extraordinary profitability? and is it sustainable?
标普指数有22%的股本回报率，相比过去十年美国本土公司的12-13%，这样出众的盈利能力我们是如何达到的，这样的态势是可持续的吗？
22% returns are sustainable in a world where the long-term interest rates are 7% and where the capability of saving large amounts in the economy are quite dramatic. You could just think that there would be some sort of leveling effect between 7 and 22, that as savings got directed within the economy, and as the competitive forces operate that we've been taught will operate over time, will come into play, but I've been wrong on that subject.
Let's say you have a 22% perpetual bond, and let's say a third of that coupon would be paid out. So, a bond with a 22% coupon, and say 7% is paid out, being the dividend payout on the S&P we'll say, and the other 15% is reinvested in more 22% bonds with similar characteristics. Now what's that instrument worth on a present value basis? A lot of money. In fact, it's worth so much that it becomes a mathematical fallacy at some point, because when the compound rate becomes higher than the discount rate you get infinity, and that's a concept we like to think about around Berkshire though we may not attain it.
There's a book called The Petersburg Paradox and the Growth Stock Fallacy by David Durant, written about 25 years ago, and it gets into this bit where the growth rate is higher than the discount rate, and it shouldn't work for an extended period of time. Charlie?
持续的22%的回报率建立在7%的利率的基础以及经济基础所积累的大量资本的基础之上，想象一下大约在7和22之间的均化指数，均化指数的值由经济储量值决定，来作为经济竞争力的表现，但是在这个指标上我犯了错误。
假设你有一个22%的永久债券，这其中三分之一的息票会支出。债券票面利率为22%，7%支出，类似于以标普指数来做指标的股息支出。剩下的15%作重新投资到此债券中。此时以什么来作为衡量当前价值的工具？答案是大量的金钱。事实上，如果以这么多的钱来做价值尺度的话从某种程度上来说就是一种谬论。因为当复利率大于折扣率的时候你的收益会无限增长。这就是为什么我们见贤思齐向Berkshire公司的表现靠拢即使我们知道可能达不到这样的高度。
二十五年前有两本书，一本叫做《圣彼得堡悖论》，另一本是David Durant写的《增长股票悖论》。书中集中探讨了复利率大于折扣率的问题，这样的情况在未来一段时间内也确实是不会出现。Charlie有补充吗?
[CM: I think a couple of things contributed to this phenomenon that we so carefully mispredicted. Number one, it became very fashionable for corporations to buy in shares, and I think that we helped in a very small way to bring on that. I think that was a plus in terms of corporate decision making. The other thing that happened is that the anti-trust administration got way more lenient in allowing people to buy competitors.
And I think that those two factors helped raise returns on capital in the United States, but you wouldn't think that could go on forever. What 15% per annum compounded will do is grow way faster than the economy can grow, way faster than aggregate profits can grow over the long haul ... I don't think we've reached a new order of things where the laws of mathematics have been repealed ... All of you should be aware of this, because all the people who are professional sellers of investment advice and brokerage services, etc., etc., have an immense vested interest in believing that things that can't be true, are true. And not only that, they've been selected in a Darwinian process to have formidable sales skills and large incomes. (laughter) That makes it dangerous for the rest of us.]
