Abstract：Game-theoretic modeling of auctions began in the 1960s with a pair of seminal papers by William Vickrey (1961, 1962) and the brilliant but unpublished doctoral dissertation of Armando Ortega-Reichert (1968). Robert Wilson (1977, 1979) became the next important contributor to auction theory research and, as Wilson’s
student, I was inspired to make auctions and bidding the subject of my doctoral dissertation. My research about auction theory and market design has evolved through three quite distinct eras.
参考文献：Milgrom, Paul. 2021. "Auction Research Evolving: Theorems and Market Designs." American Economic Review, 111 (5): 1383-1405.
Abstract：We estimate the degree to which individual police officers practice racial discrimination. Using a bunching estimation design and data from the Florida Highway Patrol, we show that minorities are less likely to receive a discount on their speeding tickets than White drivers. Disaggregating this difference to the individual police officer, we estimate that 42 percent of officers practice discrimination. We then apply our officer-level discrimination measures to various policy-relevant questions in the literature. In particular, reassigning officers across locations based on their lenience can effectively reduce the aggregate disparity in treatment.
参考文献：Goncalves, Felipe, and Steven Mello. 2021. "A Few Bad Apples? Racial Bias in Policing." American Economic Review, 111 (5): 1406-41.
Abstract：Can research findings change political leaders' beliefs and policies? We use experiments with 2,150 Brazilian municipalities to measure mayors' demand for and response to research information. In one experiment, we find that mayors are willing to pay to learn the results of evaluation studies, and update their beliefs when informed of the findings. They value larger-sample studies more, while not distinguishing between studies in rich and poor countries. In a second experiment, we find that informing mayors about research on a simple and effective policy, taxpayer reminder letters, increases the probability the policy is implemented by 10 percentage points.
参考文献：Hjort, Jonas, Diana Moreira, Gautam Rao, and Juan Francisco Santini. 2021. "How Research Affects Policy: Experimental Evidence from 2,150 Brazilian Municipalities." American Economic Review, 111 (5): 1442-80.
Abstract：We study a newly designed survey administered to a large panel of wealthy retail investors. The survey elicits beliefs that are important for macroeconomics and finance, and matches respondents with administrative data on their portfolio composition, their trading activity, and their login behavior. We establish five facts in these data. (i) Beliefs are reflected in portfolio allocations. The sensitivity of portfolios to beliefs is small on average, but varies significantly with investor wealth, attention, trading frequency, and confidence. (ii) Belief changes do not predict when investors trade, but conditional on trading, they affect both the direction and the magnitude of trades. (iii) Beliefs are mostly characterized by large and persistent individual heterogeneity. Demographic characteristics explain only a small part of why some individuals are optimistic and some are pessimistic. (iv) Expected cash flow growth and expected returns are positively related, both within and across investors. (v) Expected returns and the subjective probability of rare disasters are negatively related, both within and across investors. These five facts provide useful guidance for the design of macro-finance models.
参考文献：Giglio, Stefano, Matteo Maggiori, Johannes Stroebel, and Stephen Utkus. 2021. "Five Facts about Beliefs and Portfolios." American Economic Review, 111 (5): 1481-1522.
Abstract：We estimate long-run intergenerational persistence in human capital using information on outcomes for the extended family: the dynasty. A dataset including the entire Swedish population, linking four generations, allows us to identify parents' siblings and cousins, their spouses, and spouses' siblings. Using various human capital measures, we show that traditional parent-child estimates underestimate long-run intergenerational persistence by at least one-third. By adding outcomes for more distant ancestors, we show that almost all of the persistence is captured by the parental generation. Data on adoptees show that at least one-third of long-term persistence is attributed to environmental factors.
参考文献：Adermon, Adrian, Mikael Lindahl, and Mårten Palme. 2021. "Dynastic Human Capital, Inequality, and Intergenerational Mobility." American Economic Review, 111 (5): 1523-48.
Abstract：We experimentally varied information mailed to 87,000 households in California's health insurance marketplace to study the role of frictions in insurance take-up. Reminders about the enrollment deadline raised enrollment by 1.3 pp (16 percent) in this typically low take-up population. Heterogeneous effects of personalized subsidy information indicate misperceptions about program benefits. Consistent with an adverse selection model with frictional enrollment costs, the intervention lowered average spending risk by 5.1 percent, implying that marginal respondents were 37 percent less costly than inframarginal consumers. We observe the largest positive selection among low income consumers, who exhibit the largest frictions in enrollment. Finally, we estimate the implied value of the letter intervention to be $25 to $53 per month in subsidy dollars. These results suggest that frictions may partially explain low take-up for marketplace insurance, and that interventions reducing them can improve enrollment and market risk in exchanges.
参考文献：Domurat, Richard, Isaac Menashe, and Wesley Yin. 2021. "The Role of Behavioral Frictions in Health Insurance Marketplace Enrollment and Risk: Evidence from a Field Experiment." American Economic Review, 111 (5): 1549-74.
Abstract：Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits, like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination, at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters' most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision.
参考文献：Casey, Katherine, Abou Bakarr Kamara, and Niccoló F. Meriggi. 2021. "An Experiment in Candidate Selection." American Economic Review, 111 (5): 1575-1612.
Abstract：We provide evidence of the stock market consumption wealth effect by using a local labor market analysis. An increase in local stock wealth driven by aggregate stock prices increases local employment and payroll in nontradable industries and in total, with no effect on employment in tradable industries. In a model of geographic heterogeneity in stock wealth, these responses imply an MPC of 3.2 cents per year and that a 20 percent increase in stock valuations, unless countered by monetary policy, increases the aggregate labor bill by at least 1.7 percent and aggregate hours by at least 0.7 percent two years after the shock.
参考文献：Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel, Plamen T. Nenov, and Alp Simsek. 2021. "Stock Market Wealth and the Real Economy: A Local Labor Market Approach." American Economic Review, 111 (5): 1613-57.
Abstract：Economic theory suggests that energy subsidies can lead to excessive consumption and environmental degradation. However, the precise impact of energy subsidies is not well understood. We analyze a large energy subsidy: the California Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE). CARE provides a price reduction for low-income consumers of natural gas and electricity. Using a natural field experiment, we estimate the price elasticity of demand for natural gas to be about −0.35 for CARE customers. An economic model of this subsidy yields three results. First, the natural gas subsidy appears to reduce welfare. Second, the economic impact of various policies, such as cap-and-trade, depends on whether prices for various customers move closer to the marginal social cost. Third, benefits to CARE customers need to increase by 6 percent to offset the costs of the program.
参考文献：Hahn, Robert W., and Robert D. Metcalfe. 2021. "Efficiency and Equity Impacts of Energy Subsidies." American Economic Review, 111 (5): 1658-88.
