【保险学术前沿】期刊Management Science 2021-2024年精选保险类文章目录与摘要

声明：本系列文章基于原期刊目录和摘要内容整理而得，仅限于读者交流学习。如有侵权，请联系删除。

期刊介绍：

《Management Science》（管理科学）是一本运筹管理领域顶级期刊，发表关于管理理论和实践的科学研究的学术性期刊。该期刊在其范围内包括与战略、创业、创新、技术和组织有关的管理的所有方面，以及商业的所有职能领域，如会计、金融、信息系统、营销和运营。该刊每年发行12期，2022年影响因子为5.4。

本期看点：

● 天气指数保险： 神经网络可以捕捉了高维天气变量与生产损失之间的高度非线性关系，基于预期效用最大化设计的指数保险合同降低了基差风险与保费，且提高了农民效用。

●  保险产品的数字化专家建议可以通过两个不同的渠道影响消费者的选择：通过更新消费者对产品特性的看法（学习）和通过影响消费者对产品特性的重视程度（解释）。

● 债券保险： 对历史数据研究发现，债券保险在解决信用评级和其他可观察的债券特征所无法解决的信息不对称问题上的经济价值极小。发行人出于习惯以及在违约时的便利来购买债券保险，但没有证据表明保险能改善二级市场的流动性。

● 营业中断险： 保险公司在营业中断险业务中存在信息不对称——无法观测到投保人的需求预测与发生中断时的恢复措施，需求预测较低的公司比需求预测较高的公司从营业中断险中获益更多。

● 退货保险： 在信息不对称的情况下，网购交易平台中高品质卖家更有可能采用退货保险，退货保险可以成为高质量的有效信号。

Zhanhui Chen（香港科技大学）, Yang Lu（康考迪亚大学）, Jinggong Zhang（南洋理工大学）, Wenjun Zhu（南洋理工大学）

摘要：Weather risk affects the economy, agricultural production in particular. Index insurance is a promising tool to hedge against weather risk, but current piecewise-linear index insurance contracts face large basis risk and low demand. We propose embedding a neural network-based optimization scheme into an expected utility maximization problem to design the index insurance contract. Neural networks capture a highly nonlinear relationship between the high-dimensional weather variables and production losses. We endogenously solve for the optimal insurance premium and demand. This approach reduces basis risk, lowers insurance premiums, and improves farmers’ utility.

天气风险影响经济，尤其是农业生产。指数保险是规避天气风险的一种有前途的工具，但目前的零散线性指数保险合同面临较大的基差风险，且需求量较低。我们建议将基于神经网络的优化方案嵌入预期效用最大化问题中，以设计指数保险合同。神经网络捕捉了高维天气变量与生产损失之间的高度非线性关系。我们对最优保险费和需求进行内生求解。这种方法降低了基差风险，降低了保险费率，并提高了农民的效用。

原文链接：

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4902

M. Kate Bundorf(杜克大学), Maria Polyakova(斯坦福大学), Ming Tai-Seale(加州大学圣地亚哥分校)

摘要：Consumers increasingly use digital advice when making purchasing decisions. How do such tools change consumer behavior and what types of consumers are likely to use them? We examine these questions with a randomized controlled trial of digital expert advice in the context of prescription drug insurance. The intervention we study was effective at changing consumer choices. We propose that, conceptually, expert advice can affect consumer choices through two distinct channels: by updating consumer beliefs about product features (learning) and by influencing how much consumers value product features (interpretation). Using our trial data to estimate a model of consumer demand, we find that both channels are quantitatively important. Digital expert advice tools not only provide consumers with information, but also alter how consumers value product features. For example, consumers are willing to pay 14% less for a plan with the most popular brand and 37% less for an extra star rating when they incorporate digital expert advice on plan choice relative to only having information about product features. Further, we document substantial selection into the use of digital advice on two margins. Consumers who are inherently less active shoppers and those who we predict would have responded to advice more were less likely to demand it. Our results raise concerns regarding the ability of digital advice to alter consumer preferences as well as the distributional implications of greater access to digital expert advice.

消费者在做出购买决策时越来越多地使用数字建议。这些工具如何改变消费者行为，哪些类型的消费者可能会使用它们？我们通过处方药保险背景下的数字专家建议的随机对照试验来研究这些问题。我们研究的干预措施有效地改变了消费者的选择。我们提出，从概念上讲，专家建议可以通过两个不同的渠道影响消费者的选择：通过更新消费者对产品特性的看法（学习）和通过影响消费者对产品特性的重视程度（解释）。使用我们的试验数据来估计消费者需求模型，我们发现这两个渠道都很重要。数字专家建议工具不仅为消费者提供信息，而且还改变了消费者对产品特性的评价方式。例如，与只了解产品功能信息相比，当他们在计划选择中纳入数字专家的建议时，消费者愿意为最受欢迎品牌的计划少支付14%的费用、愿意为额外的星级评级少支付37%的费用。此外，我们还记录了在两个边际上使用数字建议的大量选择。天生不太活跃的购物者和我们预测会对建议做出更多反应的消费者都不太可能需要它。我们的研究结果引发了人们对数字建议改变消费者偏好能力的担忧，以及更多地获取数字专家建议对分配的影响。

原文链接：

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2020.02453

Kimberly Cornaggia （宾夕法尼亚州立大学斯），John Hund （乔治亚大学），Giang Nguyen （宾夕法尼亚州立大学）

摘要：Economic theory predicts that bond insurance lowers issuers’ financing costs by resolving asymmetric information and mitigating credit risk. With comprehensive data over the last 36 years, we find increasingly diminished empirical support for these models. The value of insurance in resolving asymmetric information beyond that resolved by credit ratings and other observable bond characteristics is economically minimal. The average gross value of insurance ranges from 4 to 14 bps when bond insurers offer Aaa-rated coverage. However, this gross value becomes insignificant after 2008 when Aaa-rated insurance no longer exists. Evidence suggests that the lack of insurance benefit in the postcrisis period is attributable to the deteriorated creditworthiness of insurance companies. Examining noninterest saving explanations for the continued use of insurance in the no-Aaa insurance market, we find evidence that issuers purchase insurance out of habit (with insurance value most diminished for habitual purchasers with low governance quality) and for the convenience it affords in default, but no evidence that insurance improves secondary market liquidity.

经济理论预测，债券保险通过解决信息不对称和减轻信用风险来降低发行人的融资成本。通过对过去36年的综合数据分析，我们发现对这些模型的实证支持逐渐减弱。债券保险在解决信用评级和其他可观察的债券特征所无法解决的信息不对称问题上的经济价值极小。当债券保险公司提供Aaa评级的保险时，保险的平均总价值在4到14个基点之间。然而，在2008年之后，当Aaa评级的保险不再存在时，这一总值变得微不足道。有证据表明，危机后时期保险收益的缺乏归因于保险公司信用度的恶化。通过研究非Aaa保险市场中继续使用保险的非利息储蓄原因，我们发现发行人购买保险是出于习惯（习惯性购买者且治理质量低的发行人保险价值的减少最为显著），也是为了在违约时提供便利，但没有证据表明保险能改善二级市场的流动性。

原文链接：

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4813

Wenli Wang（太原科技大学）, Gangshu (George) Cai（圣克拉拉大学）

摘要：Because of many firms’ lack of collateral, banks have imposed loan limits as a form of risk-control regulations of bank financing. In response, loan insurance has emerged as a useful instrument to lift loan limits. To study the joint value of bank loans and loan insurance, this article investigates a supply chain composed of one supplier and one capital-constrained buyer who takes out a bank loan and potentially purchases loan insurance. The analysis reveals that both the supplier and the buyer can benefit from the bank financing with loan insurance in an insurance-cooperation region wherein the supplier is willing to reduce the wholesale price to entice the buyer to purchase insurance. Further still, in the insurance-cooperation region, worse contract terms of the bank loan benefit the supplier, whereas worse policy terms of loan insurance help the buyer. Such benefits can lead to a higher order quantity than the capital-abundant one and partially coordinate the entire supply chain. However, when production cost is low, the supplier and the buyer can encounter a Stackelberg prisoner’s dilemma, in which both firms no longer cooperate with each other, and both are worse off. Nevertheless, a government subsidy for the insurance premium can not only reduce the Stackelberg prisoner’s dilemma, but also improve the social welfare although it is not always optimal for the government to provide that subsidy. The main qualitative results are robust in a variety of extensions.

由于许多公司缺乏抵押品，银行规定了贷款限额，作为银行融资的一种风险控制条例。作为应对措施，贷款保险成为提高贷款限额的有效工具。为了研究银行贷款和贷款保险的共同价值，本文调查了一条由一个供应商和一个资本受限的买方组成的供应链，买方在获得银行贷款的同时还可能购买贷款保险。分析表明，在保险合作区域，供应商愿意降低批发价格以吸引买方购买保险，供应商和买方都能从银行贷款和贷款保险中获益。此外，在保险合作区域，银行贷款的合同条款越差，对供应商越有利，而贷款保险的政策条款越差，对买方越有利。这种利益会导致订货量高于资金充裕时的订货量，并部分协调整个供应链。然而，当生产成本较低时，供应商和买方可能会遇到Stackelberg囚徒困境，即两家公司不再相互合作，双方的情况都会变得更糟。然而，政府对保险费的补贴不仅可以减少Stackelberg囚徒困境，还可以提高社会福利，尽管政府提供补贴并不总是最优选择。文章主要的定性结果在各种扩展情况中都是稳健的。

原文链接：

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4827

Chong Zhang （蒂尔堡大学）, Man Yu（香港科技大学） , Jian Chen（清华大学）

摘要：This paper examines an innovative return policy, return insurance, emerging on various shopping platforms such as Taobao.com and JD.com. Return insurance is underwritten by an insurer and can be purchased by either a retailer or a consumer. Under such insurance, the insurer partially compensates consumers for their hassle costs associated with product return. We analyze the informational roles of return insurance when product quality is the retailer’s private information, consumers infer quality from the retailer’s price and insurance adoption, and the insurer strategically chooses insurance premiums. We show that return insurance can be an effective signal of high quality. When consumers have little confidence about high quality and expect a significant gap between high and low qualities, a high-quality retailer can be differentiated from a low-quality retailer solely through its adoption of return insurance. We confirm, both analytically and empirically with a data set consisting of more than 10,000 sellers on JD.com, that return insurance is more likely adopted by higher-quality sellers under information asymmetry. Furthermore, we find that the presence of the third party (i.e., the insurer) leads to double marginalization in signaling, which strengthens a signal’s differentiating power and sometimes renders return insurance a preferred signal, in comparison with free return, whereby retailers directly compensate for consumers’ return hassles. As an effective and costly signal of quality, return insurance may also improve consumer surplus and reduce product returns. Its profit advantage to the insurer is most pronounced under significant quality uncertainty.

本文探讨了淘宝网和京东网等各种购物平台上出现的创新退货政策——退货保险。退货保险由保险公司承保，零售商或消费者均可购买。在这种保险下，保险公司会部分补偿消费者因退货而产生的麻烦成本。我们分析了退货保险的信息作用，即产品质量是零售商的私人信息，消费者从零售商的价格和保险采用情况推断产品质量，保险公司战略性地选择保险费。我们的研究表明，退货保险可以成为高质量的有效信号。当消费者对高质量信心不足，并预期高质量与低质量之间存在巨大差距时，高质量零售商与低质量零售商之间的区别就可以仅仅通过采用退货保险来体现。我们通过分析京东网上 10,000 多个卖家的数据集并结合实证表明，在信息不对称的情况下，高品质卖家更有可能采用退货保险。此外，我们还发现，第三方（即保险公司）的存在导致了信号传递的双重边缘化，从而加强了信号的差异化力量，与零售商直接补偿消费者退货麻烦的免费退货相比，退货保险有时会成为一种首选信号。作为一种有效且成本高昂的质量信号，退货保险还可以提高消费者剩余，减少产品退货。在质量存在重大不确定性的情况下，保险公司的利润优势最为明显。

原文链接：

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4186

Yuan-Mao Kao(纽约市立大学), N. Bora Keskin(杜克大学), Kevin Shang(杜克大学)

摘要：We consider a firm that faces a potential disruption in its normal operations can purchase business interruption (BI) insurance from an insurer to guard against the disruption risk. The firm makes demand forecasts and can put a recovery effort if a disruption occurs; both are unobservable to the insurer. Accordingly, the insurer offers BI insurance to the firm while facing adverse selection and moral hazard. We first find that, because of the joint effect of limited production capacity and self-impelled recovery effort, the firm with a lower demand forecast benefits more from BI insurance than that with a higher demand forecast. Anticipating a higher premium, the low-demand firm has an incentive to pretend to have the higher demand forecast to obtain more profit. We then derive the optimal insurance contracts to deal with the information asymmetry and show how the firm’s characteristics affect the optimal contracts. Both high- and low-demand contracts are affected by the firm’s operational characteristics in the same direction, and the informational characteristics impact those contracts differently. We also analyze the case in which the firm can choose its initial capacity and find that, from the firm’s perspective, capacity and BI insurance could be either substitutes or complements.

我们认为，如果一家公司的正常运营面临潜在的中断风险，则可以从保险公司购买业务中断 （BI） 保险，以防范中断风险。该公司进行需求预测，并在发生中断时采取恢复措施，这两者都是保险公司无法观察到的公司行为。因此，保险公司在面临逆选择和道德风险的情况下向公司提供BI保险。我们首先发现，由于有限的产能和自我推动的恢复行动的共同作用，需求预测较低的公司比需求预测较高的公司从BI保险中获益更多，并且有动机假装有更高的需求预测以获得更多的利润。然后，我们得出了处理信息不对称的最优保险合同，并说明公司的特征如何影响最优合同。高需求和低需求合同都受到公司运营特征在同一方向上的影响，而信息特征对这些合同的影响则不同。我们还分析了公司可以选择其初始产能的情况，发现从公司的角度来看，产能和BI保险可以是替代品，也可以是补充品。

原文链接：

https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3776