虽然我喜欢彻底的公开透明，并希望每个人都能负责任地对待所接触到的信息，并判断出哪些是事实，知道自己应该做些什么，但我发现这是个理想化的状态，我们朝它努力却永远无法完全实现。每个规则都有例外，在极少数情况下，不宜极度透明。此时，你要仔细考虑何种方式能够既维系极度透明的文化，又不会把你自己和你关心的人置于过度危险的境地。
在权衡是否属于例外时，要用期望值计算的方法，并考虑第二层次和第三层次影响。要问自己这样的问题：
如果保持此事公开透明并防控相应的风险，是否弊大于利？
在绝大多数情况下，答案是否定的。我从经验中发现，导致一件事情不予公开的最常见原因有：
1.信息涉及隐私、个人，或属于保密范畴，而且不会严重影响整个集体的利益。
2.分享并管理此类信息时，可能导致桥水和客户的长期利益受损，或使我们难以维持原则（如我们专有的投资逻辑或一宗法律纠纷）。
3.在整个公司层面分享某一信息的价值甚低，并会严重分散大家的精力（如薪酬）。我的意思是，在尽可能做到彻底透明的同时，也要保持必要的谨慎。
正因为我们几乎把所有事情都进行录音（包括我们犯下的错误或暴露的缺点），以让每个人都了解，因此我们成了某些媒体的目标，它们最喜欢传播耸人听闻的流言蜚语，想方设法获取信息。有一次，有人把有意歪曲的信息透露给媒体，影响了我们的招聘工作。我们被迫对一些超级敏感的信息进行管控，只有那些非常值得信赖的人（相当可观的一部分人）第一时间收到了信息，而发送给其他人时则有意延迟。关于该信息的性质，对一般公司而言，仅会有极少数人被告知，但在桥水，它被分享给了近百位值得信任的员工。换句话说，尽管在这个例子中，我们的极度透明并不彻底，但我们从务实的角度尽可能扩大了知情人范围。这种做法对我们很适用，因为那些最需要知道的人立马被告知了，而且几乎每个人都明白，即使在具有挑战性的环境里，公开透明的承诺依然得到了维系。大家都了解，我的本意总是尽量做到公开透明，唯一阻止我的就是可能涉及公司的利益，此时，我会告诉他们不公开的原因。这样行事遵从了我们公司的文化，它有助于建立信任，即便有时候透明度并没有达到我们所希望的那么高。
While I would like virtually total transparency and wish that everyone would handle the information they have access to responsibly to work out what’s true and what to do about it, I realize that’s an ideal to be approached but never fully achieved. There are exceptions to every rule, and in very rare cases, it is better not to be radically transparent. In those unusual cases, you will need to figure out a way that preserves the culture of radical transparency without exposing you and those you care about to undue risks.
When weighing an exception, approach it as an expected value calculation, taking into consideration the second- and third-order consequences. Ask yourself whether the costs of making the case transparent and managing the risks of that transparency outweigh the benefits. In the vast majority of cases, they don’t. I’ve found that the most common reasons to limit broad transparency are:
1. Where the information is of a private, personal, or confidential nature and doesn’t meaningfully impact the community at large.
2. Where sharing and managing such information puts the long-term interests of the Bridgewater community, its clients, and our ability to uphold our principles at risk (for instance, our proprietary investment logic or a legal dispute).
3. Where the value of sharing the information broadly with the community is very low and the distraction it would cause would be significant (compensation, for instance).
What I’m saying is that I believe one should push the limits of being transparent while remaining prudent.
Because we tape virtually everything—including our mistakes and weaknesses—for everyone to see, we are a target-rich environment for media that thrives on sensationalistic or critical gossip and can find ways of having information leaked to them. In one case when we faced the problem of having information leaked to the press that was intentionally distorted and hurt our recruiting efforts, we were forced to institute some controls on ultrasensitive information, so that only a significant number of ultratrustworthy people received it in real time, and it was distributed to others after a delay. The information was the sort that, in a typical company, would be shared with just a handful but at Bridgewater was shared with nearly a hundred trusted people. In other words, while our radical transparency in that case wasn’t total, I pushed its limits in a practical way. It served us well because the people who most needed the transparency got it right away and most everyone understood that the commitment to being transparent remained very much intact, even in challenging circumstances. People know that my intent is to always push the limits of trying to be transparent and that the only things that would prevent me from doing that will be the interests of the company and that I will tell them if I can’t be transparent and why. It is in our culture to be that way and that fosters trust, even when the transparency is less than we would like it to be.
