讲座预告 | 管理学院会计学系列讲座第一百零三讲和第一百零四讲

嘉宾简介

Gladys Lee毕业于澳大利亚国立大学，2015年至今任墨尔本大学会计系高级讲师，曾任职于澳大利亚国立大学，并在Dixon咨询公司投资分析师担任兼职导师。

报告文章摘要

This study provides large-scale empirical evidence of a negative relation between firm value and poorer CEO health, proxied by computer vision-derived body mass index (BMI) values of CEOs. The effect of poor CEO health on firm value increases with firm complexity, which is likely to require more attention and effort from the CEO. Finally, we find results to suggest that one mechanism for the negative relation between CEOs with poorer health and firm value is such CEOs not sufficiently delegating their responsibilities. Our findings are robust to a battery of tests to address BMI measurement error and endogeneity.

嘉宾简介

高开娟，博士，现任湖南大学工商管理学院助理教授，台湾政治大学会计系访问学者。目前已在 International Review of Economics & Finance 、 China Journal of Accounting Research 及《管理世界》《金融研究》《南开管理评论》《会计研究》等期刊发表多篇学术成果。担任 International Review of Economics & Finance 及《南开管理评论》等期刊匿名审稿人。主持、参与多项国家及省部级课题。

报告文章摘要

Capitalizing on a quasi-natural experiment in China where some firms become investible to the global market across different times (i.e., pilot firms), we explore the role that stock market liberalization plays in shaping firms’ financial reporting practices. In one direction, market liberalization may benefit firms by generating a revaluation premium, easing their financial constraints, and strengthening their corporate governance, which improve firms’ accounting transparency. In the other direction, the potential volatility stemming from international speculative hot money casts doubt on whether the potential benefits of removing a country’s capital controls outweigh the associated costs. To gauge which force is more dominant, we rely on a staggered difference-in-differences research design and find that pilot firms significantly reduce the magnitude of discretionary total and working capital accruals from the pre-liberalization period to the post liberalization period, compared to non-pilot firms during the same timeframe. Further, we identify two specific mechanisms through which market liberalization curbs firms’ earnings management: (i) auditors more strictly monitor pilot firms; and (ii) pilot firms experience significant increases (decreases) in ownership of dedicated (transient) institutional investors. Our research provides insight on the importance of financial global integration to firms’ discretionary reporting practices.