达利欧：国家是如何破产的？_三思行研的专栏文章_微信文章

Introduction

引言

Are there limits to a country’s’ debt and debt growth?

一个国家的债务和债务增长是否有限度？

What will happen to interest rates and all that they affect if government debt growth isn’t slowed?

如果政府债务增长不放缓，利率及其影响会发生什么？

Can a big, important country that has a major reserve currency like the US go broke—and, if so, what would that look like?

一个拥有像美国这样的主要储备货币的重要大国会破产吗？如果会，那会是什么样子？

Is there such a thing as a “Big Debt Cycle” that we can track that will tell us when to worry about debt and what to do about it?

有没有一个我们可以追踪的“大债务周期”，它会告诉我们什么时候该担心债务，该怎么办？

These aren’t just academic questions for academic economists. They are questions that investors, policy makers, and most everyone must answer because the answers will have huge effects on all our well-beings and what we should do. But definitive answers don’t currently exist.

这些不仅仅是学院派经济学家的学术问题。这些问题是投资者、政策制定者和大多数人都必须回答的，因为答案将对我们所有人的福祉和我们应该做什么产生巨大影响。但目前还没有明确的答案。

At this time, some people believe that there isn't any limit to government debt and debt growth, especially if a country has a reserve currency. That’s because they believe that the central bank of a reserve currency country that has its money widely accepted around the world can always print the money to service its debts. Others believe that the high levels of debt and rapid debt growth are harbingers of a big debt crisis on the horizon, but they do not know exactly how and when the crisis will come—or what its impacts will be.

在这个时候，一些人认为，政府债务和债务增长没有任何限制，特别是如果一个国家有储备货币。这是因为他们认为，一个储备货币国家的中央银行，如果其货币在世界范围内被广泛接受，那么它总是可以印刷货币来偿还债务。其他人则认为，高水平的债务和债务的快速增长是一场大规模债务危机即将到来的预兆，但他们并不确切知道危机将如何以及何时到来，也不知道其影响会是什么。

And what about the big, long-term debt cycle? While the “business cycle” is widely acknowledged and some people recognize that it is driven by a short-term debt cycle, that is not true for the big, long-term debt cycle. Nobody acknowledges it or talks about it. I couldn’t find any good studies or descriptions of it in textbooks, and even the world’s leading economists—including those who are now running, or in the past ran, central banks and government Treasuries—didn’t have much to say about this critically important subject when I explored it with them. That is why I did this study and am passing it along.

那么大的长期债务周期又如何呢？虽然“商业周期”被广泛承认，一些人也承认它是由短期债务周期驱动的，但对于长期的大债务周期来说，情况并非如此。没有人承认或谈论它，我在教科书中找不到任何好的研究或描述，即使是世界领先的经济学家，包括那些现在或过去管理中央银行和政府财政的人，当我与他们探讨这个至关重要的主题时，也没有太多的话要说。这就是为什么我做了这项研究，并把它沿着。

Before I get into all that, I should begin by explaining where I’m coming from. I don’t come to this subject as an economist. I come as a global macro investor who for over 50 years has been through many debt cycles in many countries and has had to navigate and understand them well enough to bet on how they would go. I have carefully studied all the big debt cycles over the last 100 years, and superficially studied many more from the past 500 years, so I believe that I understand how to navigate them. Because I am now deeply concerned, I feel a responsibility to pass along this study for others to assess for themselves.

在我开始之前，我应该开始解释我来自哪里。我不是作为一个经济学家来讨论这个问题的。我是一名全球宏观投资者，50多年来经历了许多国家的许多债务周期，必须很好地驾驭和理解它们，才能押注它们将如何发展。我仔细研究了过去100年来所有的大债务周期，并对过去500年来的许多债务周期进行了肤浅的研究，所以我相信我知道如何驾驭它们。因为我现在深感忧虑，我觉得有责任把这项研究沿着给别人，让他们自己评估。

To gain my understanding, I look at many cases like a doctor studies many cases, examining the mechanics behind them to understand the cause/effect relationships that drive their progressions. I also learn from being in these experiences, reflecting on what I learn, writing it up, and having smart people read and challenge it. Then I build systems to place my bets on what I learned and have new experiences. I do that over and over and will do it until I die because I love it. Because my game has been to bet on the markets and because the debt markets drive just about everything, I have been obsessed with studying debt dynamics for decades. I believe that if you understand these dynamics, you can do very well as an investor, businessperson, or policy maker, and if you don’t, you ultimately will be hurt by them.

为了获得我的理解，我像医生研究许多病例一样研究许多病例，检查它们背后的机制，以了解推动其进展的因果关系。我也从这些经历中学习，反思我学到的东西，把它写下来，让聪明的人阅读并挑战它，然后我建立系统，把我的赌注押在我学到的东西上，并有新的经验。我一遍又一遍地做这件事，直到我死，因为我喜欢它，因为我的游戏一直是押注市场，因为债务市场几乎驱动着一切，几十年来，我一直痴迷于研究债务动态。我相信，如果你了解这些动态，你可以做得很好，作为一个投资者，商人，或政策制定者，如果你不这样做，你最终会受到伤害。

Through my research, I discovered that there are big, long-term debt cycles that have unfailingly led to big debt bubbles and busts. I saw that only about 20% of the roughly 750 currency/debt markets that have existed since 1700 remain and that all these remaining ones have been severely devalued through the mechanistic process I am going to describe in this study. I saw how this big, long-term debt cycle was described in the Old Testament, how it repeatedly played out in Chinese dynasties over thousands of years, and how time and again it has foreshadowed the fall of empires, countries, and provinces.

通过我的研究，我发现存在着长期的大债务周期，这些周期必然会导致大的债务泡沫和泡沫破裂。我看到，自1700年以来存在的大约750个货币/债务市场中，只有大约20%仍然存在，所有这些剩余的市场都通过我将在本研究中描述的机械过程严重贬值。我看到了《旧约》中对这个巨大的长期债务周期的描述，看到了它在中国几千年的朝代中是如何反复上演的，看到了它是如何一次又一次地预示着帝国、国家和省份的衰落。

These Big Debt Cycles have always worked in timeless and universally consistent ways that are not well understood but should be. In this study, I hope to explain how they work with such clarity that my description will serve as a template that can be used to see what is going on with, and what is likely to happen to, money and debt. While I recognize that the Big Debt Cycle template I will describe has not previously been vetted, I am confident it exists because I have made a lot of money using it to bet on how things would go. I am passing it along because I am now at a stage of life in which I want to share what I have learned that I have found of value. You can do what you like with it.

这些大债务周期总是以永恒和普遍一致的方式运作，这些方式没有得到很好的理解，但应该得到很好的理解。在这项研究中，我希望能够清楚地解释它们是如何工作的，我的描述将作为一个模板，可以用来了解货币和债务正在发生什么，以及可能发生什么。虽然我认识到我将要描述的大债务周期模板以前没有经过审查，但我相信它存在，因为我已经用它来打赌事情会如何发展，赚了很多钱。我把它沿着传递下去，因为我现在正处于一个人生阶段，我想分享我所学到的，我发现有价值的东西。你想怎么处理都行。

Why do I think I understand something that others don’t? I theorize that this is for a few reasons. First, this dynamic is not widely understood because big, long-term debt cycles typically last about one lifetime—roughly 80 years (give or take 25 years)—so we don’t get to learn about them through experience. Second, because we focus so much on what is happening to us at the time it is happening, people overlook the big picture. I also think there are biases against being concerned about too much debt because most people like the spending ability that credit gives them, and it is also true that there have been many warnings about pending debt crises that never happened. Memories of big debt crises like the 2008 global financial crisis and the European debt crisis of the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) have faded, and since we have gotten past them, many people assume that policy makers learned how to manage them rather than view these cases as early warnings of bigger crises on the horizon. But whatever the reason, it doesn’t matter exactly why these dynamics are overlooked. I am going to paint a picture of what happens and why, and if there is enough interest in what I’m saying, my template will be assessed and will live or die on its merits.

为什么我认为我理解别人不理解的东西？我推测这是有几个原因的。首先，这种动态并没有得到广泛的理解，因为大的长期债务周期通常持续大约一个生命周期-大约80年（上下25年）-所以我们无法通过经验来了解它们。其次，由于我们过于关注正在发生的事情，人们忽视了大局。我还认为，人们对过多债务的担忧存在偏见，因为大多数人喜欢信贷给他们带来的消费能力，而且确实有很多关于即将发生的债务危机的警告从未发生过。2008年全球金融危机和欧猪五国（葡萄牙、意大利、爱尔兰、希腊和西班牙）的欧债危机等重大债务危机的记忆已经消退，既然我们已经度过了这些危机，许多人认为政策制定者学会了如何管理它们，而不是将这些事件视为更大危机即将到来的早期预警。但不管是什么原因，这些动态被忽视的原因并不重要。我将描绘一幅发生了什么以及为什么发生的画面，如果对我所说的有足够的兴趣，我的模板将被评估，并将根据其优点生存或死亡。

That leads me to a principle:

这让我得出一个原则：

If we don’t agree on how things work, we won’t be able to agree on what’s happening or what is likely to happen. For that reason, I need to lay out my picture of how the machine works and try to triangulate with you and other knowledgeable people about it before moving on to look at what’s happening and what might happen.

如果我们不能就事情的运作方式达成一致，我们就无法就正在发生的事情或可能发生的事情达成一致。出于这个原因，我需要展示我的机器如何工作的图片，并试图与你和其他知识渊博的人进行三角测量，然后再继续看正在发生的事情和可能发生的事情。

At a time when government debt is large and increasing rapidly, it seems to me dangerously negligent to assume that this time will be different from other times without first studying how other cases transpired. It would be like assuming that we will never have a civil war or world war again because they haven’t happened before in our lifetimes without studying the mechanics that brought them about in the past. (By the way, I believe that both the civil war and world war dynamics are also going on today.) As in my other books,[1] I will create a description of the archetypical dynamic and then look at how and why different cases transpired differently so that one can track current cases relative to the template and put into context what’s happening and what’s likely to happen. In that way, you will both see many cases of this happening and get a peek into the future. Comparing what is happening with that template leads me to believe that we are heading into one of those cases in which central governments and central banks will “go broke” in the ways that have happened hundreds of times before and have had big political and geopolitical consequences.

在政府债务庞大且迅速增加的时候，在我看来，如果不首先研究其他情况是如何发生的，就认为这一次会与其他时候不同，这似乎是危险的疏忽。这就像假设我们永远不会再有内战或世界大战，因为它们在我们的有生之年从未发生过，而不研究过去导致它们的机制。(By顺便说一句，我相信内战和世界大战的动态今天也在继续。）和我其他的书一样，[1]我将创建一个对原型动态的描述，然后看看不同的案例是如何以及为什么会有不同的表现，这样人们就可以跟踪与模板相关的当前案例，并将正在发生的事情和可能发生的事情置于上下文中。通过这种方式，你们都会看到许多这种情况的发生，并看到未来。将目前的情况与上述模式进行比较，我相信我们正在进入中央政府和中央银行“破产”的情况之一，这种情况以前已经发生过数百次，并产生了重大的政治和地缘政治后果。

This brings me to an important point. The Big Debt Cycle is just one of several interrelated forces that together make up what I call the overall Big Cycle. For example, 1) Big Debt Cycles influence and are affected by largely coinciding 2) big cycles of political and social harmony and conflict within countries that are both affected by and affect 3) big cycles of geopolitical harmony and conflict between countries. These cycles in turn are affected by both 4) big acts of nature, like droughts, floods, and pandemics and 5) developments of big new technologies. Combined, these five forces make up the overall Big Cycle of peace and prosperity and conflict and depression. Because these forces affect each other and practically everything, they must be thought of together. How these forces have worked and interacted and are working and interacting now is covered in much greater detail in my book and video titled Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order and to a lesser extent in Chapter 17 of this study, which is the concluding chapter. In this study, I will be mostly focusing on the Big Debt Cycle, though we will see many references to the ways in which the Big Debt Cycle interacts with the other forces to create the path that we are on.

这使我想到一个重要的问题。大债务周期只是几个相互关联的力量之一，它们共同构成了我所说的整体大周期。例如，1）大债务周期影响并受到大部分巧合的影响2）国家内部政治和社会和谐与冲突的大周期，这些周期都受到并影响3）国家之间地缘政治和谐与冲突的大周期。这些循环反过来又受到大自然的影响，如干旱、洪水和流行病，以及重大新技术的发展。这五种力量结合在一起，构成了和平与繁荣、冲突与萧条的整体大循环。因为这些力量相互影响，几乎影响一切，它们必须一起考虑。这些力量是如何工作和相互作用的，现在正在工作和相互作用，在我的书和视频《应对不断变化的世界秩序的原则》中有更详细的介绍，在本研究的第17章中也有更详细的介绍，这是最后一章。在本研究中，我将主要关注大债务周期，尽管我们将看到许多关于大债务周期与其他力量相互作用的方式的参考资料，以创造我们所处的道路。

This study consists of four parts and 17 chapters. Part 1 describes the Big Debt Cycle, at first very simply, then in a more complete and mechanical way, and then with some equations that show the mechanics and help with making projections of what is likely to happen. Part 2 shows what has actually happened across 35 Big Debt Cycle cases, laying out in a detailed template the typical sequence of events that signifies how a cycle is transpiring and shows symptoms that can help identify how far the cycle has progressed. Part 3 reviews the most recent Big Debt Cycle, which started when the new monetary and world orders began in 1944 at the end of World War II and brings it up to the present. In that part, in addition to looking at the Big Debt Cycle and the overall Big Cycle with a focus on the US (because it has been the world’s major reserve currency country and the world’s leading power, thus making it the world’s leading shaper of what one might call the American world order since 1944), I also very briefly describe the Big Cycles of both China and Japan, showing them from the 1860s until now. This will give you a more complete picture of what has happened in the world since 1944 and provide two other Big Debt Cycle cases to look at. Finally, in Part 4, I will peek into the future, looking at what my calculations say about what is required for the US to manage its debt burden, and how the five big forces might unfold in the years ahead.

本研究共分四个部分，共十七章。第1部分描述了大债务周期，首先非常简单，然后以更完整和机械的方式，然后用一些方程来显示机制，并帮助预测可能发生的事情。第2部分展示了35个大债务周期案例中实际发生的情况，在一个详细的模板中列出了典型的事件序列，这些事件表明了一个周期是如何发生的，并显示了有助于确定周期进展程度的症状。第三部分回顾了最近的大债务周期，它始于1944年第二次世界大战结束时新的货币和世界秩序开始，并将其带到现在。在这一部分，除了关注大债务周期和以美国为重点的整体大周期之外，（因为它一直是世界上主要的储备货币国家和世界领先的力量，从而使它成为自1944年以来人们可能称之为美国世界秩序的世界领先塑造者），我还非常简要地描述了中国和日本的大周期，展示了从19世纪60年代到现在这将使你对1944年以来世界上发生的事情有一个更完整的了解，并提供另外两个大债务周期案例。最后，在第四部分，我将展望未来，看看我的计算对美国管理其债务负担的要求是什么，以及五大力量在未来几年可能如何发展。

Because I recognize that there are different readers who have different levels of expertise and want to give different amounts of time to this and I want to help you get what you want out of this, I put the most important points in bold so you can read just the most essential stuff and optionally dive into the details that interest you. I put what I believe are timeless and universal principles in italics. If you are a professional or aspiring professional who is really into economics and markets, I recommend that you read the whole thing because I believe that it will give you a unique perspective that you will enjoy and will help you to be successful in your job. If you are not, I recommend that you just read what is in bold. Also, because I’d love to have a two-way conversation with you to try to get in sync about what’s true and what to do about it, I am working on a few new technologies for doing that, which I will tell you about later.

因为我认识到，有不同的读者，他们有不同的专业知识水平，并希望在这方面投入不同的时间，我想帮助你从中得到你想要的，我把最重要的观点用粗体字写出来，这样你就可以只读最基本的东西，并有选择地深入到你感兴趣的细节中。我把我所相信的永恒和普遍的原则用斜体字写出来。如果你是一个专业人士或有抱负的专业人士谁是真正进入经济学和市场，我建议你阅读整个事情，因为我相信它会给你一个独特的视角，你会喜欢，并将帮助你在你的工作取得成功。如果你没有，我建议你只读粗体部分。此外，因为我很想与您进行双向对话，试图同步了解真相以及如何应对，所以我正在研究一些新技术来实现这一目标，稍后我会告诉您。

In the next chapter, I will describe the Big Debt Cycle in just seven pages. If you want to stop there, that’s perfectly fine.

在下一章中，我将用7页的篇幅描述大债务周期。如果你想就此打住，也没关系。

I hope that you will find the study’s analysis helpful.

我希望研究报告的分析对你有所帮助。

Part 1: Overview of the Big Debt Cycle

第一部分：大债务周期概述

Chapter 1: The Big Debt Cycle in a Tiny Nutshell

第一章小小壳里的大债务周期

My goal for this chapter is to convey in seven pages a very brief but complete description of the mechanics of a typical Big Debt Cycle.

本章的目标是用7页的篇幅，对典型的大债务周期的机制做一个简短而完整的描述。

How the Machine Works

机器如何工作

Credit is the primary vehicle for funding spending and it can easily be created.[2] Because one person’s spending is another’s earnings, when there is a lot of credit creation, people spend and earn more, most asset prices go up, and most everyone loves it. Paying back debt is much less enjoyable. As a result, central governments and central banks have a bias toward creating a lot of credit. Credit also creates debt that has to be paid back, which has the opposite effect—i.e., when debts have to be paid back, it creates less spending, lower incomes, and lower asset prices, which people don’t like. In other words, when someone (a borrower-debtor) borrows money (called principal) at a cost (an interest rate), the borrower-debtor can spend more money than they have in earnings and savings over the near term. But over the long term, this requires them to pay back (the principal + interest) and when they have to pay it back, it requires them to spend less money than they have. This dynamic is why the credit/spending/debt-paying-back dynamic is inherently cyclical.

信贷是为支出提供资金的主要工具，而且很容易创造。[2]因为一个人的支出就是另一个人的收入，当有大量的信贷创造时，人们会花更多的钱，赚更多的钱，大多数资产价格都会上涨，而且大多数人都喜欢它，偿还债务就不那么愉快了。因此，中央政府和中央银行倾向于创造大量信贷。信贷也会产生必须偿还的债务，这会产生相反的效果，即，当债务必须偿还时，它会导致支出减少，收入减少，资产价格下降，这是人们不喜欢的。换句话说，当某人（债务人）以成本（利率）借钱（称为本金）时，债务人可以在短期内花费比收入和储蓄更多的钱。但从长远来看，这要求他们偿还（本金+利息），当他们必须偿还时，这要求他们花比他们少的钱。这就是为什么信贷/支出/偿还债务的动态本质上是周期性的。

The Short-Term Debt Cycle

短期债务周期

Everyone who has been around long enough to be affected by it several times should be well-acquainted with the short-term debt cycle. It starts with money and credit being provided readily when economic activity and inflation are lower than desired, and when interest rates are low relative to inflation rates and low in relation to the rates of return on other investments. Those conditions encourage borrowing to spend and invest, which causes asset prices, economic activity, and inflation to pick up until they are higher than desired, at which time money and credit are restrained, and interest rates become relatively high in relation to inflation rates and rates of return on other investments. This leads to less borrowing to spend and invest, which leads to lower asset prices, a slowing of economic activity, and lower inflation, which leads interest rates to come down, money and credit to become easier, and the cycle to begin again. These cycles have typically lasted about six years, give or take three years.

任何一个经历了足够长的时间、多次受到影响的人，都应该非常熟悉短期债务周期。首先，当经济活动和通货膨胀低于预期，利率相对于通货膨胀率和其他投资的回报率都很低时，货币和信贷就很容易提供。这些条件鼓励借贷用于消费和投资，这导致资产价格、经济活动和通货膨胀上升，直到高于预期，这时货币和信贷受到限制，利率相对于通货膨胀率和其他投资回报率变得相对较高。这导致用于消费和投资的借贷减少，从而导致资产价格下跌，经济活动放缓，通货膨胀率降低，导致利率下降，货币和信贷变得更容易，循环再次开始。这些周期通常持续约六年，误差为三年。

Short-Term Debt Cycles Add up to Big, Long-Term Debt Cycles

短期债务周期叠加成长期债务大周期

What isn’t paid enough attention is the way in which these short-term debt cycles add up to big, long-term debt cycles. Because credit is a stimulant that creates a high, people want more of it, so there is a bias toward creating it. This leads debt to rise over time, which typically leads to most of the short-term cyclical highs and lows in debt to be higher than the ones before. These add up to create the long-term debt cycle, which ends when it becomes unsustainable. The capacity to take on more debt is different early in the Big Debt Cycle when debt burdens are lower and there is more potential for credit/debt to be able to fund highly profitable endeavors than it is later in the cycle when debt burdens are higher, and lenders have fewer productive options.

人们没有足够关注的是，这些短期债务周期是如何累积成长期债务周期的。由于信贷是一种刺激物，可以创造一个高点，人们想要更多的信贷，因此存在创造高点的倾向，这导致债务随着时间的推移而上升，这通常会导致大多数短期周期性债务高点和低点都高于之前的水平。这些因素加在一起形成了长期债务周期，当它变得不可持续时就会结束。在大债务周期的早期，当债务负担较低时，承担更多债务的能力是不同的，与债务负担较高时相比，信贷/债务有更大的潜力能够为高利润的努力提供资金，贷款人的生产选择较少。

In that early part, it is easy to borrow—even to borrow a lot—and pay it back. These early short-term cycles are primarily driven by the previously described availability and economics of borrowing and spending, and also a lingering cautiousness brought about by memories of the pain of the most recent time when money was tight.[3] Early in the Big Debt Cycle, when debts and total debt service are relatively low in relation to incomes and other assets, increases and decreases in credit, spending, debt, and debt service are primarily determined by the previously described incentives with less risk. But late in the Big Debt Cycle, when debts and debt service costs get high relative to income and the value of other assets that can be used to meet one’s debt service obligations, the risks of default are higher. Also, late in the Big Debt Cycle, when there are a lot of debt assets and liabilities relative to income, the balancing act of trying to keep interest rates high enough to satisfy lender-creditors without having them too high for borrower-debtors becomes more challenging. That’s because one person’s debts are another’s assets and both must be satisfied. So, while short-term debt cycles end because of the previously described economic considerations, long-term debt cycles end because the debt burdens are too great to be sustained. Said differently, because it is more enjoyable to borrow and spend, if one isn’t careful, debt and debt service can grow like a cancer, eating up one’s buying power and squeezing out other consumption. This is what makes the long-term Big Debt Cycle.

在早期阶段，很容易借钱甚至借很多钱然后偿还。这些早期的短期周期主要是由前面描述的借贷和支出的可用性和经济性以及对最近一次货币紧缩的痛苦记忆所带来的挥之不去的谨慎所驱动的。[3]在大债务周期的早期，当债务和总偿债额相对于收入和其他资产而言相对较低时，信贷、支出、债务和偿债额的增加和减少主要取决于前面描述的风险较小的激励措施。但在大债务周期的后期，当债务和偿债成本相对于收入和可用于偿还债务的其他资产的价值变得很高时，违约的风险就更高了。此外，在大债务周期的后期，当债务资产和负债相对于收入而言都很高时，试图保持利率足够高以满足贷款人债权人，而又不使利率对贷款人债务人来说太高的平衡行为变得更具挑战性。这是因为一个人的债务是另一个人的资产，两者都必须得到满足。因此，虽然短期债务周期的结束是因为前面描述的经济因素，但长期债务周期的结束是因为债务负担太大而无法持续。换句话说，因为借贷和消费更令人愉快，如果一个人不小心，债务和债务服务可以像癌症一样增长，吞噬一个人的购买力并挤出其他消费。这就是长期大债务周期的原因。

Throughout the millennia and across countries, what has driven the Big Debt Cycle and has created the big market and economic problems that go along with it is the creation of unsustainably large amounts of debt assets and debt liabilities relative to the amounts of money, goods, services, and investment assets in existence.

纵观数千年来的历史，在各国，推动大债务周期并造成大市场和随之而来的经济问题的是，相对于现有的货币、商品、服务和投资资产而言，产生了不可持续的大量债务资产和债务负债。

Said more simply, a debt is a promise to deliver money. A debt crisis occurs when there have been more promises made than there is money to deliver on them. When that happens, the central bank is forced to choose between a) printing a lot of money and devaluing it or b) not printing a lot of money and having a big debt default crisis. In the end, they always print and devalue. Either way—via default or devaluation—the creation of too much debt eventually causes debt assets (e.g., bonds) to be worth less.

更简单地说，债务是一个承诺交付金钱。债务危机发生在承诺多于兑现承诺的资金时。当这种情况发生时，中央银行被迫在a）印刷大量货币并使其贬值或B）不印刷大量货币并发生大的债务违约危机之间做出选择。最后，他们总是印刷和贬值。无论哪种方式--通过违约或贬值--过多债务的产生最终都会导致债务资产（例如，债券）的价值较低。

While there are variations in how each of these cases plays out, the most important factor is whether the debt is denominated in a currency that the central bank can “print”. But no matter the variation we almost always see that it becomes relatively undesirable to hold the debt assets (i.e., bonds) relative to holding the productive capacity of the economy (i.e., equities) and/or owning other, more stable forms of money (e.g., gold).

尽管每种情况的结果都有所不同，但最重要的因素是债务是否以央行可以“印刷”的货币计价。但无论变化如何，我们几乎总是看到，持有债务资产变得相对不受欢迎（即，债券）相对于保持经济的生产能力（即，股票）和/或拥有其他更稳定形式的货币（例如，黄金）。

To me it is interesting and inappropriate that, when credit rating agencies rate the credit of a central government, they don’t rate the riskiness of its debt losing value. They only rate the risk of default on the debt, which gives the misimpression that all higher-rated debt is a safe storehold of value. Said differently, because central banks can bail out central governments, the riskiness of central governments’ debts are hidden. Creditors would be better served if the rating agencies rated the riskiness of the debt losing value through both default and devaluation. After all, these bonds are supposed to be storeholds of wealth and should be rated as such. As you will see in this study, that is how I look at bonds. For countries with debts denominated in their own currencies (i.e., in a currency they can print), I rate central governments’ debts separately from their central banks to show how risky they are, and I rate the risks of central banks’ debts by considering the risk of the devaluation of money to be as, if not more, probable than a default on government debt.

在我看来，当信用评级机构对一个中央政府的信用进行评级时，他们并没有对其债务贬值的风险进行评级，这是一件有趣而不恰当的事情。他们只对债务的违约风险进行评级，这给人一种错觉，即所有评级较高的债务都是安全的价值储备。换句话说，由于中央银行可以救助中央政府，中央政府债务的风险是隐藏的。如果评级机构对债务因违约和贬值而贬值的风险进行评级，债权人将得到更好的服务。毕竟，这些债券被认为是财富的储藏地，应该被评为财富。正如你在本书中看到的，这就是我对债券的看法。对于债务以本国货币计值的国家（即我将中央政府的债务与中央银行分开评级，以显示它们的风险有多大，我通过考虑货币贬值的风险与政府债务违约的可能性一样（如果不是更大的话）来评级中央银行的债务风险。

Default or devaluation, I don’t care. What I care about is losing my storehold of wealth, which inevitably will happen one way or another.

不管是违约还是贬值，我都不在乎。我关心的是失去我的财富储备，这不可避免地会以这样或那样的方式发生。

Following the Debt Cycle’s Progression

债务周期的发展

The main difference between a short-term debt cycle and a long-term (big) debt cycle has to do with the central bank’s ability to turn them around. For the short-term debt cycle, its contraction phase can be reversed with a heavy dose of money and credit that brings the economy up from a depressed disinflationary state because the economy has the capacity to produce another phase of noninflationary growth. But the long-term debt cycle’s contraction phase cannot be reversed by producing more money and credit because existing levels of debt growth and debt assets are unsustainable and holders of debt assets want to get out of them because they believe that, one way or another, they will be poor storeholds of wealth.

短期债务周期和长期（大）债务周期之间的主要区别与央行扭转它们的能力有关。对于短期债务周期，其收缩阶段可以通过大量货币和信贷逆转，使经济从低迷的反通胀状态恢复过来，因为经济有能力产生另一个非通胀增长阶段。但长期债务周期的收缩阶段无法通过生产更多货币和信贷来逆转，因为现有的债务增长和债务资产水平是不可持续的，债务资产持有者希望摆脱它们，因为他们相信，无论如何，它们将成为财富的穷人。

Think of the Big Debt Cycle’s progression like the progression of a disease or a life cycle through stages that exhibit different symptoms. By identifying these symptoms one can identify approximately where the cycle is in its progression with some expectations of how it is likely to progress from there. Described most simply, the Big Debt Cycle moves from sound/hard money and credit to increasingly loose money and credit to a debt bust that leads to a return to sound/hard money and credit brought about by necessity. More specifically, at first there is heathy borrowing by the private sector that can be paid back; then the private sector overborrows, has losses, and has problems paying it back; then the government sector tries to help, overborrows, has losses, and has problems paying it back; then the central bank tries to help by “printing money” and buying the government debt, and has problems paying it back, which leads it to monetize a lot more debt if it can (i.e., if the debt is denominated in the currency that it can print). Though not all cases progress in exactly the same way, most cases progress through the following five stages:

把大债务周期的进展想象成疾病的进展或生命周期的各个阶段，表现出不同的症状。通过识别这些症状，人们可以大致确定周期的进展情况，并对从那里开始可能如何进展有所预期。最简单地说，大债务周期从稳健/硬货币和信贷转向日益宽松的货币和信贷，再到债务泡沫破裂，导致必要性所带来的稳健/硬货币和信贷的回归。更具体地说，一开始私营部门的借贷是健康的，可以偿还;然后私营部门过度借贷，出现亏损，难以偿还;然后政府部门试图帮助，过度借贷，出现亏损，难以偿还;然后中央银行试图通过“印钞”和购买政府债务来帮助，并且有偿还问题，这导致它在可能的情况下将更多的债务货币化（即，如果债务是以它可以印刷的货币计价的话）。虽然并非所有病例的进展都完全相同，但大多数病例的进展都经历了以下五个阶段：

1) The Sound Money Stage: When net debt levels are low, money is sound, the country is competitive, and debt growth fuels productivity growth, which creates incomes that are more than enough to pay back the debts. This leads to increases in financial wealth and confidence.

1)Sound Money舞台：当净债务水平较低时，货币是健全的，国家是有竞争力的，债务增长会促进生产力的增长，从而创造出足以偿还债务的收入。这会增加金融财富和信心。

Credit is the promise to deliver money. Unlike credit which requires a payment of money at a later date, money settles transactions—i.e., if money is given the transaction is complete, whereas if credit is given money is owed. It’s easy to create credit. Anyone can create credit but not anyone can create money. For example, I can create credit by accepting your promise to pay me money even if you don’t have the money. As a result, credit easily grows so there is much more credit than there is money. The most effective money is both a medium of exchange and a storehold of wealth that is widely accepted around the world. At the early stage of the Big Debt Cycle money is “hard,” which means that it is a medium of exchange that is also a storehold of wealth that can’t easily be increased in supply, such as gold, sterling silver, and Bitcoin. Cryptocurrency like Bitcoin is now emerging as an accepted hard currency because it is a currency that is widely accepted around the world and is limited in supply. The biggest, most common risk to money becoming an ineffective storehold of wealth is the risk that a lot of it will be created. Imagine having the ability to create money; who wouldn’t be tempted to do a lot of that? Those who can always are. That creates the Big Debt Cycle. In the early part of the Big Debt Cycle, a) money is typically hard—e.g., gold—and the paper money that circulates like money is convertible into the “hard money” at a fixed price and b) there isn’t a lot of paper money and debt (which is the promise to pay money) outstanding. The Big Debt Cycle consists of the building up of a) “paper money” and debt assets/liabilities relative to b) “hard money” and real assets (e.g., goods and services) and relative to the income that is required to service the debt. Basically, the Big Debt Cycle works like a Ponzi scheme or musical chairs with investors holding an increasing amount of debt assets in the belief that they can convert them into money that will have buying power to get real things, yet as the amount of the debt assets that are held up by that faith increases relative to the real things, that conversion becomes more obviously impossible until that is realized and the process of selling the debt to get the hard money and real assets begins.

信用是兑现金钱的承诺。不像信用卡需要在以后的日期付款，货币结算交易-即，如果给了钱，交易就完成了，而如果给了信贷，就欠了钱。创造信用很容易。任何人都可以创造信用，但不是任何人都可以创造货币。例如，我可以通过接受你的承诺来创造信用，即使你没有钱也要付钱给我。因此，信贷很容易增长，所以信贷比货币多得多。最有效的货币既是一种交换媒介，也是一种被全世界广泛接受的财富储备。在大债务周期的早期阶段，货币是“硬”的，这意味着它是一种交换媒介，也是一种财富储备，不能轻易增加供应，如黄金、英镑银和比特币。像比特币这样的加密货币现在正在成为一种被接受的硬通货，因为它是一种在世界各地被广泛接受的货币，而且供应量有限。金钱成为无效财富储存的最大、最常见的风险是大量金钱被创造的风险。想象一下，如果你有能力创造金钱，谁不会被诱惑去做很多事情呢？那些总是可以。这就形成了债务大循环。在大债务周期的早期，a）钱通常是硬的，例如，黄金--而像货币一样流通的纸币可以按固定价格兑换成“硬通货”，B）没有太多的纸币和债务（即支付货币的承诺）。大债务周期包括a）“纸币”和债务资产/负债相对于B）“硬通货”和真实的资产（例如，货物和服务），并相对于所需的收入来偿还债务。基本上，大债务周期就像庞氏骗局或音乐椅，投资者持有越来越多的债务资产，相信他们可以将其转换为具有购买力的货币，以获得真实的东西，然而，随着这种信念所持有的债务资产数量相对于真实的东西增加，这种转换显然变得更加不可能，直到这一点实现，并开始出售债务以获得硬通货和真实的资产。

At the early stage of the debt cycle, private and government debt and debt service ratios are 1) low relative to incomes and/or 2) low relative to liquid assets. For example, government debt and debt service are low relative to government tax revenue and/or low relative to government liquid assets (e.g., reserves and other savings such as sovereign wealth assets) that can easily be converted into money. For example, when the Big Debt Cycle that we are in began in 1944, the ratios of a) US government debt and b) US money supply divided by the amount of gold the US government had were equal to a) 7x and b) 1.3x respectively, whereas now these ratios are a) 37x and b) 6x respectively.

达利欧：国家是如何破产的？

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