Club提要
：3月1日，俄罗斯国际事务委员会（RIAC）总干事伊万·季莫菲耶夫在三亚接受北京对话专访，就白宫争吵、美欧矛盾、乌克兰危机、中俄合作等问题进行深入分析。
季莫菲耶夫认为，美欧撕裂对乌克兰局势的影响仍需进一步观察。俄罗斯要求乌克兰保持“非结盟”地位、去军事化、消除极端民族主义等。俄乌长期和解须建立在更广泛的安全框架之上。
他表示，即便美国撤销制裁、恢复与俄正常关系往来，俄罗斯也需要继续与中国保持战略伙伴关系，发展多元化外交战略，以备与美冲突“卷土重来”。
Club Briefing
: on March 1st,
Ivan Timofeev, Director General of RIAC,
gave an exclusive interview to Beijing Club for International Dialogue in Sanya, where he provided an in-depth analysis of issues such as the White House disputes, U.S.-Europe tensions, the Ukraine crisis, and China-Russia cooperation.
Timofeev noted that the impact of U.S.-Europe divisions on the situation in Ukraine still requires further observation. Russia’s demands include Ukraine maintaining a “non-aligned” status, demilitarization, and the elimination of extreme nationalism. He emphasized that long-term reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine must be based on a broader security framework.
He also stated that even if the United States lifts sanctions and restores normal relations with Russia, Russia must continue to maintain a strategic partnership with China and develop a diversified diplomatic strategy to prepare for potential future conflicts with the U.S.
韩桦：
你如何看待泽连斯基在白宫与特朗普总统和JD·万斯之间的那场争吵？
伊万·季莫费耶夫：
我们现在所看到的情况与我们习以为常的完全不同。考虑到过去三年美国及其盟友对乌克兰的全面支持，目前的情况极为反常。特朗普的立场截然不同，他认为和平是当务之急，绝不容忍自己的“小伙伴”提出条件。关键在于，既然是“小伙伴”，就应该服从“大伙伴”的路线。如果“大伙伴”改变主意，“小伙伴”也必须随之调整。
在白宫的这次会面中，“应该（should）”这个词变成了“必须（must）”。
这对乌克兰总统泽连斯基来说是一次相当严重的外交失败，可能会大大削弱他在国内的政治地位。
这件事对乌克兰和平进程将会带来怎样的影响？冲突何时能够结束仍然是一个非常复杂的问题。美俄双方的谈判虽处于初期阶段，有关细节尚不清晰，但目前来看，这对乌克兰领导人来说无疑是一个坏消息。
2月28日，乌克兰总统泽连斯基与美国总统特朗普、副总统万斯在白宫椭圆形办公室会面（图源：路透社）
韩桦：
2022年2月的“特别军事行动”前后，您曾发声反对。三年过去了，您的认识是怎样发展的？
伊万·季莫菲耶夫：
从一开始，我对军事冲突的发展感到非常担忧，原因有很多。其中之一是俄罗斯与西方冲突有进一步升级的风险。这个局部冲突可能演变成更大规模的冲突。在某个时点，西方向乌克兰提供中程巡航导弹，这导致局势变得极为危险。
另一个原因是经济恶化的巨大风险。不过，我很高兴看到，关于俄罗斯经济状况的悲观预测并未发生。一方面，俄罗斯在经济压力下展现了极大的韧性；另一方面，我们也成功避免了全球能源危机、粮食安全危机等问题。
现在，最理智的做法是利用当前俄美关系缓和的机会，推动军事冲突结束。但与此同时，这一解决方案必须考虑到导致冲突的根本原因，考虑俄罗斯的诉求
。否则，我们很难避免未来爆发新的冲突。
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：一个核心诉求是乌克兰的中立“非结盟”地位。换句话说，乌克兰需要去军事化，不能成为西方用来对抗俄罗斯的工具，也不能对俄罗斯构成威胁。
另一项关键诉求是对乌克兰境内各族人民的尊重，包括对语言多样性的保护，并对极端民族主义采取零容忍态度。当前乌克兰社会存在歌颂二战期间纳粹合作者的声音，这种历史篡改行为必须被杜绝，包括对二战历史的任何歪曲。
总的来说，俄罗斯的诉求包括乌克兰的“非结盟”地位、中立性、去军事化、杜绝极端民族主义，以及尊重乌克兰人口的多样性
。当然，俄罗斯官方外交可能会提出更详细的清单，但这是我作为专家的基本看法。
韩桦
：我相信俄罗斯会提出一些诉求。俄美之间的议题不仅限于乌克兰危机，还有许多其他问题需要通过外交渠道讨论。
俄美谈判会如何推进？
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：谈判进程可能会相当复杂，因为
这场冲突本质上是一个更广泛的安全架构问题
，需要消除现存体系的缺陷，而不仅仅关乎乌克兰。值得注意的是，从冲突一开始，中国就指出欧洲安全架构的缺陷，而正是这些缺陷导致了西方忽视俄罗斯的安全利益，并削弱了“安全不可分割原则”。
要实现长期和解，需要在更广泛的安全框架上取得进展
。目前，媒体报道已经提到了一些潜在的解决方案，其中包括乌克兰大选，这可能是推动乌克兰政治进程发展和冲突解决的重要前提。同时，关于领土划分的讨论也必须基于战场上的既成事实，同时兼顾俄罗斯的诉求和当前的军事态势。
还有关键的政治层面的问题，就是乌克兰的“非结盟”地位以及其与北约的关系。众所周知，
俄罗斯的一项核心诉求是乌克兰不得加入北约
。
与此同时，
乌克兰及其欧洲盟友可能会推动在乌克兰境内部署外国军队，以此作为安全保障。但对俄罗斯而言，这是完全不可接受的
，因为无论出于何种理由，这都意味着乌克兰被外国军队占领。
任何所谓的“维和行动”都必须获得联合国安理会的同意，并得到更广泛的国际社会支持。虽然西方势力庞大且具有影响力，但它并不能代表整个国际社会，也无法为维和行动提供最广泛的授权。
唯一合法的维和行动必须由联合国主导，并考虑到俄罗斯和中国的立场
。因此，任何西方国家试图单方面部署军队，都将面临巨大的阻力。
3月2日，十余个欧洲和欧盟国家，以及乌克兰和加拿大的领导人在英国伦敦举行峰会，就乌克兰危机和欧洲防务问题进行讨论（图源：英国首相府 新华社发）
特朗普在这个问题上态度鲜明，他明确表示，如果欧洲军队在乌克兰与俄军发生冲突，美国不会提供军事支持。如果外国军队进入乌克兰，这可能导致冲突升级，甚至引发俄罗斯与北约的直接对抗，而这绝不是一个理性的选择。
正因如此，我最初谈到了对这场军事冲突的风险评估。正如我所提到的，
最大的风险在于局部冲突升级为俄罗斯与北约之间的大规模战争，甚至是第三次世界大战。如果西方军队进入乌克兰，这一风险将始终存在
。
韩桦
：您刚才提到了粮食危机和能源危机，这是冲突爆发前的主要担忧之一。那么，在长期解决这一危机的过程中，某些经济问题或人道主义援助是否会成为关键因素？
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：这是一个重要的问题。其中之一是
恢复因制裁和限制措施而受破坏的全球供应链
。当然，我不认为这在当前起着决定性作用。俄罗斯及其伙伴已经找到绕过这些制裁的方法。需要指出的是，西方本身也在制裁中提供了人道主义豁免。因此，在很大程度上，世界避免了这场冲突对粮食安全和能源安全造成的严重人道主义影响。
但还有另一个严重的人道主义问题，那就是
如何解决战争对乌克兰以及受冲突影响的俄罗斯地区所造成的创伤
。这包括排雷、基础设施的重建，以及对战争中失去亲人的乌克兰人和俄罗斯人的帮助。这将是俄乌经济上的一项沉重负担。
韩桦
：这也涉及到您的经济领域研究。总体而言，俄罗斯如何在西方制裁下维持经济运转并保持韧性？与此同时，俄罗斯面临了哪些挑战，例如通货膨胀等？此外，您如何看待在利雅得会议上关于恢复美国对俄投资的讨论，以及这对中国在俄投资的影响？
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：俄罗斯经济的韧性甚至让俄罗斯人自己感到惊讶。在很大程度上，这归功于俄罗斯央行和政府多年来的前期准备工作。
在发起特别军事行动之前，我们建立了自己的金融信息传输系统（报文系统）和支付系统，减少了对西方体系的依赖。这使得我们在面对西方制裁风暴时能够保持金融稳定。
俄罗斯圣彼得堡大卖场内的自动提款机（图源：彭博社）
与此同时，我们迅速重建了本土工业体系，特别是在军工和军民两用产品生产方面。与中国及其他友好国家的贸易往来，帮助我们减轻了贸易和进口方面的冲击，包括消费品进口。
中国始终保持公正和客观的立场，不参与任何军事联盟，也没有在军事意义上选边站队。在西方对俄制裁的背景下，中俄两国保持正常经贸关系
。中国不仅成为俄罗斯商品的重要市场，还接收了那些被欧洲和美国市场拒之门外的产品。此外，印度也在购买俄罗斯石油和其他大宗商品方面发挥了重要作用。
总体而言，俄罗斯经济能够保持韧性，主要依靠以下几个因素：政府充分的前期准备和有效的危机管理；俄罗斯经济的市场化促使企业自主应对挑战，而非依赖政府救助；良好的外交关系——尤其是与中国的紧密合作。
至于美国投资重返俄罗斯的前景，我们必须保持谨慎。首先，从法律角度来看，这些投资仍然是被禁止的。根据美国法律，目前无法向俄罗斯进行新的投资，因此，相关讨论目前仅停留在初步探讨和观察阶段。
如果乌克兰冲突在所有各方均能接受的条件下达成和平协议，俄罗斯的利益得到满足，那么可以预期某些制裁可能会被取消。但需要警惕的是，
这些解除制裁的措施可能只是临时性的，可能更像是“豁免”而非永久性的法律废除。
因此，俄罗斯可能在相当长的时间内仍需面对制裁框架的影响。这意味着，一旦针对投资的制裁豁免出现，西方投资可能会逐渐回归，但制裁仍将是一个长期风险。
遭受经济制裁后的俄罗斯商场繁荣依旧（图源：纽约时报）
无论如何，
即便西方投资回归，也不会影响中国在俄罗斯市场的地位。中国已成为俄罗斯市场上的重要力量，很难被取代。
韩桦
：我认为，中国和俄罗斯都必须面对“两个西方”：一个是美国，它可能会在某种程度上放松制裁，而欧洲方面则可能会坚持制裁。在这种情况下，我们应该如何应对？
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：您的分析是正确的。最近的制裁情况就说明了这一点：欧盟在特别军事行动三周年之际推出了第16轮制裁，而美国却没有采取新的制裁措施。因此，我们可能会看到这样一种局面：某些美国盟友仍然在实施制裁，而美国本身却没有跟进。
考虑到美国在国际金融体系的核心地位，美国的制裁对我们来说比欧洲的制裁更具威胁性。如果欧洲继续维持制裁，对俄罗斯的影响远小于相反的情况——即美国维持制裁，而欧洲解除制裁。
就中俄合作而言，美国的制裁同样比欧盟的制裁影响大，因为中国的金融界更加担忧美国的“二级制裁”，而对欧盟的制裁并没有那么敏感
。如果美国至少在某种程度上减少金融制裁的风险，那么中国的金融机构会更愿意推动中俄合作，并为双边贸易提供更多金融服务。
韩桦
：希望如此。接下来可以讨论金砖国家货币或金融结算体系？毕竟，特朗普可能会恢复与俄罗斯的部分对话和谈判，但与此同时，他对金砖国家的金融合作、特别是金砖货币持极端敌视态度，而俄罗斯却是金砖货币的坚定支持者。您对此怎么看？
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：是的，俄罗斯支持全球金融体系的多元化。但必须指出，这不仅仅是俄罗斯的立场，印度的立场也类似。印度与美国保持着良好关系，并深度参与全球化，但它仍然支持国际金融体系的多元化，因为它意识到垄断并不是最佳选择。
中国在保护自身金融体系和市场免受制裁和外部干涉方面做了大量工作。中国正在推动人民币在国际交易中的使用。人民币目前尚未对美元构成挑战，其全球占比仍然不高，中国人民银行在推动人民币国际化的过程中一直采取稳健态度，换句话说，中国在“摸着石头过河”，一步一步推进， 这是一种理性的战略。
考虑到这些因素，我不认为金砖货币在短期甚至中期内会成为现实。这个构想仍然更多是一个概念，而非一个切实可行的解决方案。关键问题在于——谁来主导这套货币体系？它将如何运作？其价值基础是什么？这些问题都尚未得到解答。
从这个角度来看，我认为特朗普对金砖货币的过度警惕有些夸张。但另一方面，他确实意识到新的经济中心正在崛起，这对美国构成了挑战。因此，
他的态度可能会相当强硬
。在他第一任期的前几个月，他对中国的表态还算克制，但随后他的政策变得极具攻击性。众所周知，他将中国视为美国的主要竞争对手甚至威胁。因此，我们还需要观察他未来如何处理对华政策。
2月28日，中共中央政治局委员、中央外办主任王毅在北京会见俄罗斯联邦安全会议秘书绍伊古（图源：外交部网站）
韩桦
：对于中国和俄罗斯而言，我们不仅重视两国政府间的合作，也高度重视学术界及其他各个层面的交流。在我看来，特朗普并不愿意在乌克兰危机上投入过多时间和精力，他在国内还有许多更重要的事务需要处理。
虽然预测未来变得越来越困难，但我还是想让您做个预测。特朗普的主要目标是对付华尔街等国内问题，而不是过度关注乌克兰危机，他只是想尽快结束这场冲突。那么，您认为他将采取什么样的政策？
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：
特朗普的关注点始终在未来，而不是过去。
不管我们喜欢他还是不喜欢他，有一点是明确的：冷战已经成为历史，而当前的乌克兰危机则是冷战遗留下来的问题。这一点毋庸置疑。从某种意义上说，我们仍然处于冷战的“回声”之中。
对于特朗普来说，
乌克兰危机是过去的问题，而不是未来的问题。他试图摆脱与过去相关的沉重负担，专注于未来
。事实上，他已经意识到，乌克兰危机无法在军事上取胜。在当前形势下，西方根本不可能战胜俄罗斯，而继续向乌克兰提供武器，只会加剧风险——正如我们在对话开头所谈到的，这可能会导致局势进一步升级，甚至引发美俄直接对抗。
特朗普出身商界，他明白乌克兰危机意味着什么：巨大的财政消耗。数千亿美元的支出本可以用于美国的基础设施建设，比如修路、机场现代化等——这些可不是小钱。他想节省这些资金，并将其用于更具价值的方向。那么，问题来了：
他的下一个方向是什么？
2月27日，特朗普总统和英国首相基尔·斯塔默在白宫会晤（图源：美联社）
韩桦
：从您的专业角度来看，您对特朗普关于美国国内经济政策有何建议？
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：我不是美国人，尽管我长期研究美国。因此，要给他提出建议并不容易。美国是一个富裕国家，是全球主要经济体之一。但同时，美国的贫富差距问题依然严重，比中国或俄罗斯更突出。
然而，共和党的立场并不支持公共服务、医疗和教育投资，而特朗普是共和党人。因此，改善这些社会服务并不符合他的施政方向。
不过，作为一个俄罗斯人，作为一个来自重视社会福利体系的国家的公民，在理想情况下，
我希望这些财政资源能够用于改善人民的生活，比如教育、医疗，而不是用于军事开支
。当然，美国人民对自己的国家最有发言权，而我们则应该专注于如何管理好自己的国家。
回顾我与一些中国同行的交流，我认为在经历了这场“制裁海啸”之后，
俄美贸易关系恶化的风险依然存在
，我们很难相信一切会恢复正常。因此，我们必须做好准备，以防未来再次发生政治化冲突或新一轮制裁。
对莫斯科来说，最合理的做法仍然是对冲风险，保持在经济交易上的自主权，并采用多元化的贸易方式，尤其是在与中国的合作
。为什么在双边贸易中我们要使用美元？我们完全可以使用本国货币——人民币和卢布，这更为合理。
2024喀山峰会上，建立金砖国家支付系统毫无疑问是最重要的议题之一（图源：俄罗斯卫星通讯社）
我们
应该进一步探索由中俄双方共同提供的新金融体系
。中国的CIPS（人民币跨境支付系统）是一个很好的例子，它不仅仅是一个支付系统，还是一个金融信息传输系统，而且其影响力正在不断扩大。此外，俄罗斯的SPFS（金融信息传输系统）也为中国银行提供了进入俄罗斯市场的机会。尽管一些中国银行可能会担忧美国的“次级制裁”，但仍然有一些愿意承担更高风险的银行愿意使用这一系统。
美元在国际金融体系中仍然占据重要地位。对中国企业来说同样如此，许多中国企业在国际贸易中广泛使用美元，中国银行也依赖美元进行交易。
人民币的国际化是中国的一个重要目标，中国的外交政策一直明确表示，中国并不打算破坏全球化。全球化对中国是有利的
，中国为什么要破坏它呢？中国提出了“一带一路”倡议、全球安全倡议等政策，这些并不与全球化进程相矛盾。
2023年在北京召开的中国国际金融展上，跨境银行间支付清算有限责任公司携其最新产品服务亮相，对外传递人民币跨境基础设施建设新进展（图源：南方都市报）
从这个角度来看，
美方主导的全球金融体系政治化的风险依然存在，这不仅是对俄罗斯的挑战，对中国也是如此
。因此，理性的选择是通过发展替代机制来规避这些风险；
我们不只是为了对抗美国而对抗美国，如果有合作的空间，我们当然应该与西方国家合作
。
然而，一旦涉及政治化、利益歧视，甚至干涉中国内政的问题，例如香港、新疆和西藏，包括美国借这些议题实施制裁。但这些是中国的内政，与美国无关。这关乎中国的国家政策，为什么要让其他国家来指手画脚？
我们还记得，美国曾威胁对与香港问题相关的中国银行实施金融制裁。从政治上讲，这完全是不可接受的。最终，美国并没有付诸行动，因为中国太强大了，他们害怕中国的反制。但即便如此，国际金融体系被政治化的风险依然存在，我们必须为这种情况做好准备。过去三年的经验对中国和俄罗斯来说，都是一次深刻的教训。
2024年11月5日，第七届中国国际进口博览会在上海开幕（图源：新华社）
目前，
中国在工业领域越来越不依赖外国供应商。中国正在逐步实现工业品和技术的自主化
。当中国决定与某个外国伙伴合作时，不需要去华盛顿申请许可，也不需要获得授权来向俄罗斯供应某些产品。中国有自己的技术，且自主技术的产品清单正在不断扩大。
韩桦
：没错，但中国一直都非常谦逊。三年前，我们唯一的短板可能是高科技产业，比如芯片。而现在，我们已经在这方面取得了许多突破。我能想到的最后一个领域可能就是大飞机，比如商用大型客机。但我们在这个方向上也在迅速推进。
伊万·
季莫菲耶夫
在2025中俄三亚对话上发言（图源：北京对话）
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：中国人的谦逊和低调是值得高度尊敬的，这也是中华民族的文化特质之一。我曾与许多中国朋友讨论过技术和金融话题，他们总是说：“是的，我们取得了一些成功，但我们仍然需要向美国学习。美国在某些领域仍然很强大，我们应该去看看他们在做什么，并借鉴他们的成功经验。”
这种战略非常理智——你在取得成功的同时，依然保持开放的心态，不会自满，也不会关上学习的大门。你始终保持谦逊，继续学习。
这种文化传统在当今这个充满不确定性的世界中，是非常宝贵的竞争力。
韩桦
：谢谢您的评价！所以，您也应该继续学习中文哦！
伊万·季莫菲耶夫
：是的，我“应该学习汉语（这部分为中文原话）”。
Helen: What do you make of the most recent breakdown between Zelensky with President trump and JD Vance?
Ivan Timofeev
Of course, what we see is completely different to what we got used to. It's a very unusual situation, taking into account the recent 3 years of extensive support by the US and US allies towards Ukraine. Now, the new president has a completely different view that peace is demanded, he is not going to tolerate the situation where his junior partner raises his conditions. The point is that if you're a junior partner, then you should follow the line of the senior partner. If the senior partner changes its mind, you should change your mind as well. In that meeting in the White House, the word should was changed into the word must.
That was quite a significant diplomatic defeat for Volodymir Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, which would probably undermine significantly his positions in Ukraine at home.
So we will see what would be the further consequences for the peace settlement in Ukraine. How fast would it happen for the conflict is still quite complicated. The negotiation positions of the US and Russia are still not clear, taking the into account that the negotiations are on the very start. But what we see is quite bad news for the leader of Ukraine.
Helen
Given you have been against the Ukraine war before and after February 2022, how have you opinions and comments evolved during the past 3 years?
Ivan Timofeev
You see, I was very concerned by the military development due to very different reasons. One of them was the risks of further escalation in relations between Russia and the West. This local conflict could turn into something bigger. At some points, we were close to this escalation when the West supplied mid-range cruise missiles to Ukraine. Russia used intermediate range missile against Ukraine. So quite a dangerous situation.
One other reason was that there was a huge risk of economic deterioration. There, I was happy that the negative forecasts on the economic situation, both in Russia and globally, it did not come true. On the one hand, Russia showed significant resilience to the economic pressure. On the other hand, we managed to avoid global energy crisis, food security crisis, et cetera.
Now, what is advisable? What is reasonable is to use this opportunity in Russia US relations to stop the military conflict. But at the same time, this resolution must take into account their conditions which provoke this conflict. It should take into account the demands of Russia. Otherwise, we will hardly avoid the new conflict in the future.
Helen
What are the demands from Russia, in your opinion?
Ivan TimofeevOne of the major demands is the non-aligned status of Ukraine. It's demilitarization in a sense that it shouldn't be a weapon in the hands of the Western partners of Kiev and should not pose a threat to Russia in its closest neighborhood.
One other thing is about people, respect to the diversity of the population, with respect to the linguistic diversity, with zero tolerance to radical nationalism. There is praise of those who cooperated with Nazi Germany during the second world war; there should be zero tolerance to the falsification of history, including the history of the second world war.
In sum this is the non-aligned, the neutrality, the demilitarization, the issue of radical nationalism and the respect to diversity of the population of Ukraine, I see it in this way, probably we will see another least list by Russian official diplomacy. This is just my expert opinion.
Helen
I believe some of the demands will be proposed. How do you envision the demands or the negotiation process down the road, first between Russia and the United States? There is more than Ukraine crisis between Russia and the United States, a lot of topics will be covered between your diplomatic channels.
Ivan TimofeevThe process may be quite complicated, because the conflict is complex, and this is not just about Ukraine. This is also about wider security architecture and the shortcomings of this architecture. There, by the way, it was from the very start of the conflict the point of the Chinese diplomacy, which stressed the shortcomings of European security architecture, which was one of the factors which actually neglected the security interests of Russia, which undermined the principle of indivisible security.
The long-term settlement demands progress in the realm of wider security framework.
We have already seen in the media that there may be several parameters of this settlement, including the elections in Ukraine, which may be an important internal policy prerequisite for further political development around this conflict. Their discussion on the territorial division line takes into account the status quo on the ground and take into account the demands on Russia on the one hand, the military situation in the field, and the discussion of political parameters like the nonaligned status of Ukraine, its relations with NATO. We know that the one of the demands of Russia is the non-membership of Ukraine in NATO.
European allies of Ukraine and Ukraine itself may try to promote the idea of the presence on the territory of Ukraine of foreign troops, which would guarantee the security. But this is and an unacceptable proposal for Russia, because that would mean that Ukraine will be occupied by foreign troops, regardless of the reason. Any so-called peacekeeping mission demands the agreement, the support of the UN security council and of the wider international community.
The west cannot substitute the international community. The west is big, it's influential, but it's not the international community. It cannot provide the widest mandate for peacekeeping operation. The only legitimate source of peacekeeping operations is the United Nations, taking into account the Russian position, Chinese position, would hardly adopt the emergence of any western contingent on the territory of Ukraine.
Trump is quite transparent and blunt on the issue, saying that he will not support militarily the European forces if they are in a clash with Russians within this mission. So Americans are not supportive. And this is rather good and bad, because this emergence of foreign troops in Ukraine may cause further escalation and direct clash between Russia and NATO, which is not a reasonable scenario.
That's why we began about my perception of risks connected to this military conflict. And as I mentioned, the major risk was the escalation of the local conflict to a greater class between Russia and NATO to the third world war, actually. If the western forces emerge in Ukraine, this would make this risk remain on table.
Helen
You actually mentioned the food crisis, energy crisis, as top concerns of not having the Ukraine war in the first place. So would some economic concerns, some humanitarian assistance be one of the parameters of resolving this crisis in the longer term?
Ivan Timofeev
This is an important question. One of the issues is restoration of international supply chains, distorted by sanctions and distorted by restrictive measures. I wouldn't say that they play a critical role now. Russia and its partners managed to bypass these sanctions. It must be stated that West itself provided humanitarian exemptions to sanctions. So to a large extent, the world managed to avoid the humanitarian impacts of this conflict on food security and energy security.
But on the other hand, there is another humanitarian issue. This is the issue of overcoming the consequences of war in Ukraine and in those Russian regions which suffered from the war and from this military conflict. I mean demining, I mean restoration of the infrastructure, help to those who lost their relatives on both sides. By the way, this would be a huge burden for both economies, for both Ukrainian and Russians.
Helen
Which leads deeper to your expertise in the economic field. How has Russia managed to keep its economy running and resilient under Western sanctions, in general? And at the same time, what has been some of the challenges, for example, with inflation and others down the road? And what do you think of some of the proposal during the Riyadh meeting about Western investment resumption, and its impact on Chinese investment in Russia?
Ivan Timofeev
The resilience of the Russian economy turned to be a surprise, even to Russians themselves; to a large extent, this was the result of preparatory work conducted by the bank of Russia, by the government of Russia.
Several years prior to the special military preparation in Ukraine, we created our own system of financial messaging, our own payment system. We became independent on the Western-led services in this area, which allowed us to maintain financial stability after emergence of this sanctions tsunami.
On the other hand, we managed to rebuild quickly our own industry in a number of areas, especially in the military, in the dual use product productions. Our trade ties with China and other friendly states, but considerably with China, also helped to diminish the shocks connected to trade and to imports, including of consumption goods. China kept an unbiased and objective position, China is not a part of military alliances, and it didn't take any side in the military sense. But China has never distorted the market relations between our countries due to sanctions and even promoted the development of these relations under this sanctions war. And it was one of the critical factors. China turned out to be an important market for our commodities and for the goods which were kicked out from European and American markets; both China and India, by the way, India also played a major role in buying our oil and other commodities.
These were the major factors of resilience: good preparation, well crisis management by the government; by the way, the market structure of Russian economy, when entrepreneurs were responsible for themselves, they didn't wait for the help from above. And good diplomacy, most of all our relations with China.
As for the prospects of Western investments to the Russian economy, we should be cautious about this. First of all, in legal sense, these investments are still prohibited. In terms of US law, no new investment is possible to Russia, so these are just preliminary discussions, observations, et cetera.
If there is peace in Ukraine, on conditions which is satisfactory to all sides, and for us, the Russian interests are a priority. If this meets Russian interests, then it's reasonable to expect that some sanctions may be revoked, though we should be very cautious about this, because these revocations may be temporary, they may be rather in the logic of exemptions, but not long-term revocation of legal mechanisms, so we will leave this sanctions framework for quite a long time. This would mean that so some Western investments may emerge, may loom on the horizon if these exemptions on investment bans happen, but this sanctions framework will be a long-term risk.
Anyway, even if these investments occur, this is not a challenge for China at all. China emerged on the Russian market as a very strong player, and it will be very hard to anyone to outplay China on the Russian market.
Helen
I think both China and Russia mean have to face a two Wests. One is the United States, which probably will lift sanctions to some extent. But the European side will stick to those sanctions. So how should we deal with that?
Ivan Timofeev
You are absolutely right. If you look at recent sanctions, the European Union imposed its 16th package at the 3 years anniversary of the start of special military operation. But US abstained from sanctions. So we may see the situation where some allies are using sanctions, but the US is not.
I would say that, taking into account the centrality of the US in the international financial system, for us, US sanctions are more critical than European sanctions. If Europeans continue sanctions, this is less a problem than the reverse situation, where United States keep their sanctions and Europeans are revoking them.
And for Russia-China cooperation, US sanctions are much more critical than EU sanctions, because Chinese financial community is more concerned about US secondary sanctions than EU sanctions. If Americans are reducing, at least to some extent, this risk of financial sanctions, then Chinese financial community will be more favorable to promote cooperation and provide financial services to the trade between China and Russia.
Ivan TimofeevWe hope so. Yes. At some point, there might be talks regarding the BRICS currency or BRICS financial settlement, because trump on one side may be resuming some of the discussions and negotiations with Russia, but he's so hostile towards a BRICS system, a BRICS currency.
But Russia, on the other hand, is strongly supportive of a BRICS currency. So down the road, what's your take on that?
