奎因哲学词条：信念

【这个词条的翻译花了可能不止24个小时。用这种方式迎接2025年元旦，值得！】

奎因哲学词条：信念

（ 奎因《短文集：一本不拘泥于分类学标准的哲学词典》，译者：翟玉章 ）

【 相信并不是一种活动，而是一种行为倾向，即在适当的情况下以某种方式做出反应的倾向。 信念不是招之即来挥之即去的东西，而是证据（真实的或幻想的）的结果。一种检验一个人是否持有某个信念的有效方法，是让他把钱押在该信念上，只要该信念的真假的决定能使打赌双方满意。理性人悖论：理性人既相信他的每一个信念都是真的，也相信他的有些信念是假的。】

本文提到的词条：信念

Belief

信念

To believe is to think, in one very limited sense of the latter versatile verb. To believe that beauty is truth is to think that beauty is truth. To believe so is to think so. The two verbs are thus interchangeable before that and so , but they diverge elsewhere. We can think hard, but we cannot believe hard. We can believe something, but we cannot think something. Grammar forbids.

在英语中，多义动词 “think” 有时可以用作 “believe” 。 To believe that beauty is truth （相信美就是真 ) ，就是 to think that beauty is truth （认为美就是真）。 To believe so （相信如此）就是 to think so （认为如此）。在后接 “that” 和 “so” 时，这两个词是可以相互替换的，在其他语境中则不能相互替换。我们可以使劲地 think （想），但我们不能使劲地 believe （相信）。我们可以 believe something （相信某事），但我们不能 think something （想某事），因为 “think” 是个语法上的不及物动词。

Believing is a disposition. Thinking, apart from the contexts that and so , is an activity, however sedentary. We could tire ourselves out thinking, if we put our minds to it, but believing [19]takes no toll. We sit and think, but do we sit and believe? The White Queen, indeed, professed to do so: "When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast. " But it will be agreed that the White Queen was atypical.

Believing （相信）是一种倾向。而在不后接 “that” 或 “so” 的语境中， thinking （想）却是一种活动，尽管它并不涉及身体的运动。我们也许会疲劳不堪，如果我们全神贯注地想的话。但相信却不费吹灰之力。我们可以坐下来想，但我们会坐下来相信吗？白王后声称她就是这样做的： “ 我像你这么大年纪的时候，每天都要练上半个钟头。有时我会在早餐前就已相信了六个之多的不可能的事情。 ” 但大家都认为，白王后并没有典型性。

She represented beliefs, some of them anyway, as voluntary activities rather than dispositions. She was wrong about their being activities; they are dispositions. But we may still ask whether they are ever voluntary, for some dispositions are. We are voluntarily acquiring a disposition, or trying to, when we memorize "II Penseroso" or the multiplication table or make a New Year's resolution. Belief, however, is not that kind of a disposition. To speak of simply deciding to believe something, independently of any evidence real or imagined, is to stretch the term 'belief' beyond belief.

她把信念（至少其中的一些）描述为主动的活动而非倾向。这是错的，因为信念是倾向而不是活动。但我们仍可以问：信念可以是主动的倾向吗？有些倾向确实是主动的。当我们背诵诗歌 “ 忧郁的人 ” （ Il Penseroso ）或乘法表，或制定新年计划时，我们就是在主动地或努力地获得一种倾向。不过，信念并不属于这类倾向。有人谈起信念时，仿佛它们可以招之即来、挥之即去，一切都取决于我们当下的决定，而根本用不着考虑（真实或想像的）证据；我只能说，他们所说的所谓信念已越出了 “ 信念 ” 这个词的外延了。

An enamored （迷恋的） young man has his reasons for subscribing to the tenets of his fiancee's church, and a heretic （异教徒） threatened by the Inquisition （宗教裁判所） had his reasons for a similar move; but these are cases of feigning （假装） belief, of paying lip or pen service, and not of believing. Pascal's notorious wager1 , on the other hand, and Tertullian's credo quia impossibile est , and William James's Will to Believe , strike me as strange distortions of the notion of belief. Hoping or wishing can conduce to believing, but only by seducing the subject into overestimating his fancied evidence.

一个热恋中的年轻男子有理由接受他未婚妻所在教会的教义，一个受到宗教裁判所威胁的异教徒也有理由采取类似的行动；但这些都是假装相信，都是口头或笔头上的敷衍，而不是真的相信。另一方面，臭名昭著的帕斯卡尔赌、特土良的 “ 我相信它，因为它是荒谬的 ” （ credo quia impossibile est ），以及威廉 · 詹姆斯的《信仰意志》2 ，在我看来，是对信念这一概念的奇怪扭曲。希望或愿望可以导致信念，但仍需通过诱使受试者对它所幻想的证据做过高的估计才能做到。

Now that we have agreed that a belief is a disposition, as I trust we have, it is time we went on to consider what it is that the believer is disposed to do. One who believes that beauty is truth, or that his Redeemer liveth , is disposed presumably to respond in the affirmative when asked whether beauty is truth or whether his Redeemer liveth; but lip service, again, is subject to discount. Actions, behaviorism teaches, speak louder than words.

既然相信是一种倾向，那么相信者会倾向于做什么呢？一个相信美就是真（或他的救赎主活着）的人，当被问及美是否就是真3（或 他的救赎主是否 活着4）时，他会倾向于给出肯定的回答；但让我们再次指出，言语上的敷衍是不能算数的。行为主义教导我们，行动胜于言辞。

One way of testing belief, powerful where applicable, is by calling upon the professed believer to put his money where his mouth is. Acceptance of a wager evinces sincerity, and the odds [20]accepted conveniently measure the strength of the belief. But this method is applicable only in cases where the believed proposition is one that can eventually be decided to the satisfaction of both parties, so that the bet can be settled. It is not applicable to the one about beauty, or about one's Redeemer. One wonders whether Keats really believed that one about beauty or whether he was merely bent on creating a bit of beauty on his own, like Christian Morgenstern's weasel （鼬 yòu ，黄鼠狼） who sat on a Kiesel in a Bachgeriesel only for the sake of the rhyme. Or Poe's Lenore, Yaanek, and Guy De Vere . Or Al Smith's Mamie O'Rourke . There are those who would commit mayhem -- not murder, perhaps, but mayhem -- for the sake of a rhyme. I recall a line from a song: " Fair Naples sleeping, a vigil keeping . " Cognitive content to the winds.

一种检验一个人是否持有某个信念的方法，是让他把钱押在该信念上。如果他愿意打赌，就表明他真的持有该信念。而他对该信念的强度，则可以很方便地用他愿意接受的赔率大小来衡量。这种方法很有效，但只适用于这样的场合：被赌博的观点的真假能得到令双方满意的解决，否则他们便无法决出胜负。这种方法并不适用于上面关于美或关于某人的救赎者的观点。也许，济慈并不是真的相信那个关于美的观点，他只是想自己创造一些美，就像克里斯蒂安·莫根斯特恩笔下的黄鼠狼，为了押韵而坐在溪流中的卵石 上5。同样地， 爱伦坡笔下的莱诺尔、 雅尼克 和盖伊·德·维尔6。阿 尔·史密斯 的玛米·奥罗克7。一些人会为了押韵而陷入混乱；注意不是谋杀，而是混乱。我想起一首歌中的一句歌词：“美丽的那不勒斯在沉睡，彻夜不眠”8。确实押韵，但却没有认识内容9。

A belief, in the best and clearest case , is a bundle of dispositions. It may include a disposition to lip service, a disposition to accept a wager, and various dispositions to take precautions, or to book passage, or to tidy up the front room, or the like, depending on what particular belief it may be. It is remarkable that we can apply this single familiar noun or verb effortlessly to such a heterogeneous domain; for, apart from the lip service and perhaps the wager, the dispositions that constitute one belief differ extravagantly from the dispositions that constitute another.

在最理想和最清楚的情况下，一个信念就是一系列倾向，其中可能包括口头表态、接受打赌、采取预防措施、预订行程、整理前厅等等倾向，具体取决于是哪一个信念。除了言语上的表态和接受打赌外，不同信念的组成倾向是迥然不同的；令人惊叹的是，我们可以将同一个熟悉的名词或动词，毫不费力地用于如此五花八门的领域！

Beliefs do sometimes make good behavioral sense without admitting of wagers. This is true of very theoretical beliefs, having to do, say, with the expanding universe or elementary particles or the dawn of language. The turn that one gives to one's research, and the supporting evidence that one marshals or the corollaries that one derives, are substantial indications that one holds the belief, though it be a belief on which a bet could never be settled.

有些信念虽然无法接受打赌，但仍然有不错的行为意义。理论性很强的信念，如关于宇宙膨胀、基本粒子和语言起源方面的信念，就是如此。一个人从事什么样的研究，收集什么样的支持性证据，又做出了什么样的推论，都是他持有某个信念的重要迹象，尽管围绕这个信念的赌局是决不出胜负的。