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It’s estimated that about 15% of Americans today are descendants of the mostly White, original homesteaders, who were granted 270 million acres of land, a 10th of the country’s area, mostly seized from Native Americans.
据估计，今天大约15%的美国人是白人原始农场所有者的后裔，他们分到了2.7亿英亩的土地，占美国国土面积的十分之一，而这些土地大部分是从印第安人（美国土著）手中夺取的。
本句定语比较多，总体上不难
美国的出生率在2020年降至历史新低，这意料之中，但问题仍然很严峻。推特上，保守党和自由党对这条消息表示悲叹，这些评论暗示这主要是保守主义的错——因为美国资本主义让父母负担不起养孩子的成本，不可能达到工作和生活的平衡。
In a recent essay for New York Magazine, for instance, Eric Levitz argues that the social trends American conservatives most dislike, the rise of expressive individualism and the decline of religion, marriage and the family, are driven by socioeconomic forces the right’s free-market doctrines actively encourage.
“America’s moral traditionalists are
wedded
to an economic system that is radically anti-traditional,” he writes, and “Republicans can neither wage war on capitalism nor
make peace with
its social implications.”
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他写道：“美国的道德传统主义者与一个从根本上反传统的经济体系相结合，共和党既不能向资本主义开战，也不能与资本主义的社会影响和平共处。”
This argument is
intuitively
compelling. But the historical record is more complex. If the anti-traditional churn of capitalism inevitably doomed religious practice, communal associations or the institution of marriage, you would expect those things to simply decline with rapid growth and swift technological change. Imagine, basically, a Tocquevillian early-America of sturdy families, thriving civic life and full-to-bursting
pews
giving way, through industrialization and suburbanization, to an ever-more-individualistic society.
这个观点乍一听很有说服力。但历史更为复杂。如果资本主义反传统的扰动不可避免地注定让宗教、社区协会或婚姻制度走向灭亡，你会认为这些东西不过是因为（经济）快速增长和技术快速变革而出现衰落。想象一下，坚固的托克维尔式的早期美国家庭，繁荣的城市生活，坐满了人的教堂都逐渐退化，从工业化走向郊区化，逐渐变成一个更加个人主义的社会。
But that’s not exactly what you see. Instead, as Lyman Stone points out in a recent report for the American Enterprise Institute, the Tocquevillian utopia didn’t really yet exist when Alexis de Tocqueville was visiting America in the 1830s. Instead the growth of American associational life largely happened during the Industrial Revolution.
但事实不是你看到的这样。相反，正如莱曼•斯通在最近为美国企业研究所撰写的一份报告中所指出的那样，当亚历克西斯•德•托克维尔在19世纪30年代访问美国时，托克维尔式的乌托邦实际上还不存在。相反，美国人社交生活的增长主要发生在工业革命期间。
The rise of
fraternal
societies is a late-19th- and early-20th-century phenomenon. Membership in religious bodies rises across the hyper-capitalist Gilded Age. The share of Americans who married before age 35 stayed remarkably stable from the 1890s till the 1960s, through booms and depressions and drastic economic change.
兄弟会的兴起是发生在19世纪末20世纪初的现象。在超资本主义的“镀金时代”，宗教团体的成员越来越多。从19世纪90年代到20世纪60年代，经历了经济的繁荣、萧条和剧烈的经济变化，35岁之前结婚的美国人的比例一直非常稳定。
This suggests that social conservatism can be undermined by economic dynamism, but also respond dynamically in its turn — through a constant “reinvention of tradition,” you might say, manifested in religious revival, new forms of association, new models of
courtship
, even as older forms
pass away
.
这表明，社会保守主义可以被经济活力摧毁，但也可以通过不断的“重塑传统”反过来做出动态反应，你可能会发现，宗教复兴、新的社交形式、新的恋爱模式，甚至旧形式消失时，都可以表现出这一点。
本文节选自：The New York Times（纽约时报）
发布时间：2021.05.09
作者：Ross Douthat
原文标题：Is Capitalism Killing Conservatism?
