【经济学人】欧元思想之战丨2016.10.29丨总第726期

The Euro and the Battle of Ideas. By Markus Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau. Princeton University Press; 440 pages; $35 and £24.95.

欧元思想之战。马科斯•布鲁那米尔，哈罗德•詹姆斯和简•皮埃尔•兰道著。普林斯顿大学出版社;440页;35美元,24.95英镑。（见下图）

《The Euro and the Battle of Ideas》

THE euro crisis that first blew up in late 2009 has revealed deep flaws in the single currency’s design. Yet in part because it began with the bail-out of Greece, many politicians, especially German ones, think the main culprits were not these design flaws but fiscal profligacy and excessive public debt. That meant the only cure was fiscal austerity. In fact, that has often needlessly prolonged the pain. Later bail-outs of countries like Ireland and Spain showed that excessive private debt, property bubbles and over-exuberant banks can cause even bigger problems for financial stability.

在2009年末第一次爆发欧元危机，透露出单一货币设计上的缺陷。然而,部分是因为它来自于希腊的应急措施,许多政治家,尤其是德国,认为罪魁祸首不是这些设计缺陷,而是财政挥霍和过度的公共债务。这意味着唯一的方法是财政紧缩政策。事实上,经常不必要地延长了疼痛。之后国家的应急措施，例如爱尔兰和西班牙这样的国家表明,过度的私人债务,房价扩张和过度旺盛的银行可能为金融稳定造成更大的问题。

• bail-out ['beil,aut]：应急措施

That is one early conclusion of “The Euro and the Battle of Ideas”, by three academics from Germany, Britain and France. They describe thoroughly the watershed moments of the crisis, how power shifted to national governments (especially in Berlin) and the roles played by the IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB). They blame euro-zone governments for failing to sort out troubled banks more quickly, for not realising that current-account deficits matter when public debts are in effect denominated in a foreign currency, for not making the ECB into a lender of last resort and for not pushing through structural reforms in good times.

“欧元思想之战”是由三位来自德国、英国和法国的学者得出的早期结论。他们彻底描述危机的分水岭的时刻,是如何将权力转移到国家政府(尤其是在柏林)和角色扮演的国际货币基金组织和欧洲中央银行(ECB)。期待您的翻译，您可以将翻译留言到文章底部，第二天会有详细解析哦。

Such complaints are often heard, not least from Britain and America. But more originally, the authors find the roots of these failings not in stupidity but in clashing economic ideas. Simplifying a bit, they focus on Germany and France. The Germans like rules and discipline, and fret about excessive debt and the moral hazard created by bail-outs. The French prefer flexibility and discretion, and worry about large current-account surpluses and the lack of a mutualised debt instrument. The Germans favour budget austerity even in hard times; the French favour fiscal stimulus on Keynesian lines. German policymakers are often lawyers, French ones more frequently economists.

这样的抱怨还是经常收到的，不只是来自英国和美国。但是更核心的在于，作者发现这些失败的根源并不在于愚蠢而在于发生冲突的经济策略。简单来说，他们聚焦在德国和法国上。德国人看重规则和原则，担心优先给股东发股所带法国人选择凯恩斯主义利用财政来化解危机。德国政策制定者常常由律师担任，而法国的通常是经济学家。

• Hazard ['hæzəd] n.(c)  冒险，危险

• discretion [dɪ'skreʃ(ə)n] n.(c)  慎重，考虑周到，自行决定的自由，判断力

• austerity [ɒ'sterɪtɪ] n.(u)  苦行，严厉，简朴

• stimulus ['stɪmjʊləs] n.(u)   刺激物

凯恩斯

Examples of such ideological clashes run throughout the book. They range from the design of the Maastricht treaty and the later stability and growth pact to the constitution of the ECB and the application of the fiscal compact. Throughout the crisis the French tended to see bank or national-debt woes as cases of illiquidity whereas the Germans usually viewed them as signs of insolvency. Similar divides have emerged in rows over Eurobonds (backed by France, opposed by Germany) and over accountability and democratic control at supranational level (backed by federal Germany but not by centralised France).

类似的思想方面的冲突例子在书中还有很多。它们包含了从马斯特里赫特条约的设计到后来欧洲中央银行的发展稳定以及财政协议的应用。在经济危机之中，法国把银行或者国债灾难视为病原体，而德国人则将其看作破产的标志。类似的分歧也发生在欧债的讨论(由法国主导的，德国表示反对)以及整体权责和超国家等级的民主管理(由德国主导，法国不在控制中心)上。

• ideological [,aɪdɪəʊ'lɒdʒɪkəl] adj.  思想的，意识形态的

• compact  adj.  紧凑的，简洁的

• [kəm'pækt]  n.(c)  协议，条约

• woe [wəʊ] n.(c)  悲哀，悲伤，灾难

• insolvency [ɪn'sɒlv(ə)nsɪ] n.(u)  破产，倒闭

• accountability [ə,kaʊntə'bɪlɪtɪ] n.(u)  责任制，有责任，有义务

As the authors note, such differences in ideas are not party-political (they persist regardless of whether the two countries have centre-left or centre-right governments). Nor, interestingly, are they fixed forever in history: in the 19th century, and even more in the 1930s, it was France, not Germany, that favoured rigid rules, big surpluses and the discipline of the gold standard. Only after 1945 did that change.

正如作者所说，这些关键差异并非政党的（他们坚持认为不管这两个国家是否有中左或中右政府），有趣地是，这些差异在历史上也不总是固定的：在19世纪，更多的是在1930年代，是法国而非德国更偏好僵化的规则，大量的结余和金本位的纪律。只有在1945年之后才有所改变。

• rigid ['rɪdʒɪd] 严格的；僵硬的

• gold standard 金本位

The authors end on an optimistic note, with proposals for a Europe-wide insurance mechanism built on a form of Eurobonds designed to please both France and Germany. But their analysis might equally lead to pessimism. The euro crisis is far from over, with Greece needing more debt relief, Italy mired in banking problems and chronic slow growth and high unemployment almost everywhere. Britain’s Brexit vote will not help the mood, even if it was greeted by some as one more reason to push towards deeper fiscal and political union in the euro zone.

作者们用一个提案写了一个乐观的结局，该提案认为一个建立一种在欧债之上的覆盖全欧洲的旨在取悦法国和德国的保险机制。但是他们的分析却同样会引起悲观情绪。伴随着希腊需要更多的债务免除，意大利陷入银行问题和长期的增长缓慢以及几乎无处不在的高失业率之中，欧元危机远未结束。英国的脱欧公投也不会对这种情绪有所帮助，甚至被认为是推动更深的欧元区财政和政治联盟的又一种推力。

• insurance mechanism 

• [ɪn'ʃʊər(ə)ns] ['mek(ə)nɪz(ə)m] 保险机制

• pessimism ['pesɪmɪz(ə)m] 悲观,悲观情绪

• chronic  ['krɒnɪk] 慢性的,长期的,习惯的

英国脱欧

The trouble is that, as the book shows, France and Germany still have huge differences over the direction of travel. The French want debt mutualisation and more fiscal flexibility first, and are only then ready to talk about more discipline and deeper integration. The Germans are the reverse, pushing for discipline and integration before being ready even to think about debt mutualisation. After next year’s elections in both countries, such deep differences are likely to cause continuing problems for the single currency.

问题是，就像书里所示，法国和德国在行进方向上依然有巨大的差异。法国想要债务共担和更灵活的财政。只有这样才准备谈论更多的约束和更深的融合。德国恰好相反，希望推动约束和融合之后才考虑债务共担。在下一年两国的选举之后，这些深层次的差异有可能引起单一货币持续不断的问题。

• debt mutualisation [,mju:tʃuəlai'zeiʃən] 债务共担

• integration [ɪntɪ'greɪʃ(ə)n] 集成,综合

翻译 ▍栏目四第三组

审核 ▍薄荷凉

编辑 ▍璃儿