Implementing a regression discontinuity design as an identification strategy to help mitigate endogeneity concerns, this study examines how employee opinion of chief executive officers’ (CEO) affects firm outcomes. The paper produces several key results and is the first to empirically test the seminal theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) using a unique dataset that matches a company’s financials, CEO, and CEO employee approval for 2013 to 2018. First, the news of a company making Glassdoor’s "Top CEOs Employees’ Choice" award list results in a negative one percent cumulative abnormal stock return corresponding to an average market value loss of 900 million dollars. Second, an ex-ante tradable portfolio strategy that holds companies on the top CEO list generates annual excess stock returns around four percent. Third, using panel regressions and a fuzzy regression discontinuity design at the CEO list threshold, top ranking CEOs cause increases in Tobin’s Q. Fourth, award list inclusion for a CEO implies increases in personal salary and decreases in turnover. The economic mechanisms that these findings operate through are changes in operational expenses and firm efficiency as theory suggests. The findings in this study are the first to establish a causal link between CEO employee approval and firm outcomes, which confirms the hypothesis that exceptional CEO employee relations are not valued by the market as an intangible, are costly in current market values, develop firm value over time, and supply CEOs personal benefits.
原文链接:
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFAPS2020&paper_id=229