沈联涛：楼市背后的凯恩斯与哈耶克之争

作者：沈联涛（中国银监会首席顾问）、

　　　肖耿（香港大学金融与公共政策教授）

来源：世界报业辛迪加（Project Syndicate）

中国一线城市房地产价格正在暴涨，导致对经济前景针锋相对的预测：即将来临的泡沫破裂还是可以预见的宏观经济峰回路转？中国红得发紫的房地产市场究竟发生了什么？

国家统计局上周公布，70大中城市新建商品房价格同比增长超过20%的城市有10个，其中一线城市上海和深圳涨幅超过了37%，而二线城市厦门和合肥涨幅超过了40%。

长景经济顾问公司（Longview Economics）的克里斯·沃特林（Chris Watling）将当前的中国房地产市场比作1637年见顶的荷兰郁金香狂热。他特别指出，深圳楼价自2015年初以来上涨了76%，使得当地典型住宅价格已高达800,000美元，仅比硅谷平均房价略低。他认为，这也许是市场崩溃前的最后疯狂。

国务院发展研究中心前副主任刘世锦并不赞同这种悲观的预测。他指出，在经历了六年基础设施和建筑业投资下降后，中国经济，包括房地产，也许正在触底反弹，流动性和消费者信心可能正在上升。

要想判断谁正确，首先要认识到并非所有中国城市楼价都在飙升。在国家统计局所调查的70个城市中，有42个存在工业产能过剩和房地产库存过剩的城市，其楼价增长不到5%，其中更有八个城市楼价不涨或下跌。这一地区间的分化给中国决策者和投资者出了难题，他们必须仔细思考两位经济巨擘的洞见与影响：凯恩斯与哈耶克之争。

在经济增长放缓时期，一般更多人支持凯恩斯的宏观稳定措施，如中国在2008年全球经济危机后的稳增长政策。但在今天，中国许多地区，特别是东北、中部和西部的经济减速问题无法通过加大刺激来解决。

事实上，这些落后地区的刺激大部分都可能随着劳动力和资本一起漏出，并流向沿海领先地区。沿海地区技术更先进，创新动力更高，基础设施更完善，营商环境也更有利于市场。因此，增长较慢地区真正需要的是抓紧时间实施供给侧结构改革，包括去库存、去产能、缩减地方政府和国有企业坏账。

与此同时，楼价飙升的地区总是那些以高增长和高就业机会吸引劳动力和资本的地区。中信建投的一份研究表明，在2000-2010年间，中国东部城市获得了82.4%的总移民流入。到2010年，北京、上海和天津的外来人口翻了一番以上，分别达到了34.5%、37.9%和21%。

这些城市面临巨大的土地、房地产以及城市公共基础设施缺口，为了缓和沿海一线城市的增长，中国政府对这些地区住房的需求和供给都进行了控制。但是，这些城市楼价暴涨的形势表明，过往的政府措施并未奏效。

中国决策者忘记了哈耶克。不然，他们应该可以根据以往楼价的涨势预料到劳动力和资金流向增长和创新型城市的大趋势。他们还应该认识到市场价格往往本能地传递了复杂、具体和不断变化的本地信息，而这些信息往往散布在个人和公司之间，并很难被中央计划者掌控。他们还应该理解，如果要让供给与需求逐渐匹配，房地产和基础设施投资就需要反映这些千变万化的本地信息。

相反，中国决策者在不经意间给高速增长城市的土地供给制造了瓶颈。一、二线城市的住宅用地交易少，饱受城市规划政策的影响，尽管住宅市场已经具备了相当的深度和成熟度。

幸运的是，中国城市规划者还有很大的空间放松土地供给和容积率（楼面总面积与建筑用地面积之比）方面的限制。据中金公司的一份研究报告，上海城市建成面积只占16%，而东京为44%，纽约为60%。在上海的建成面积中，只有36%用于住宅，而东京为60%，纽约为44%。

换句话说，上海可用于销售的住宅土地远远小于纽约甚至东京，这是房地产价格飙升的一个重要原因。而事实上，如果土地和可用楼面面积供给不增加，增加地方公共基础设施支出将导致现有住房价格进一步上涨。

刘世锦有关家庭对住房市场信心越来越强的观察似乎也是正确的。最近住房需求的增加可能反映了家庭为保护其高储蓄不受通胀影响的渴望及行动，也反映了他们在供给有限的情况下亟不可待地想要确保获得住房的心态。不管是哪种情况，他们现在笃定地认为投资于住房是相对安全的赌注。

果真如此的话，中国房地产泡沫的风险可能被夸大了。但这并不意味着中国房地产行业一切正常。如果政府忽视市场发出的价格信号，供求不平衡就会愈演愈烈，破坏活力地区的增长，同时让低增长地区继续面临产能过剩和不良资产上升的重负。

好消息是政策仍有大量调整空间。现在的问题是当局是否能够真正辨认市场信号并有效地据此行动。

Title：Keynes and Hayek in China’s Property Markets

By Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng

Real-estate prices in China’s top cities are spiking, generating contradictory predictions of either bursting bubbles or a coming economic turn-around. What’s really going on in China’s hot property markets?

China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) revealed last week that ten of the 70 large and medium-size Chinese cities surveyed had recorded annual prices increases of more than 20% for newly built commercial housing. In the first-tier cities of Shanghai and Shenzhen, those gains were even higher: above 37%. In the second-tier cities of Xiamen and Hefei, the increases exceeded 40%.

Chris Watling of Longview Economics compares China’s property market today to the Dutch tulip mania that peaked in 1637. He points out that property prices in Shenzhen, in particular, jumped 76% since the start of 2015, bringing a typical home to $800,000, just below the average home price in Silicon Valley. This, he suggests, may be the last hurrah before a market meltdown.

Liu Shijin, former Vice Minister of the Development Reform Center of China’s State Council, disagrees. Instead, he posits that after six years of reduced investment in infrastructure and construction, growth in the Chinese property market may be bottoming out, and liquidity and consumer confidence may be shifting back to housing.

To determine who is right, it is important, first, to recognize that not all Chinese cities’ property markets are surging. In 42 of the cities surveyed by the NBS – those with industrial overcapacity and excessive property inventories – price increases amounted to less than 5%, with eight cities recording falling or stagnant property prices. This pattern of divergence creates a dilemma for Chinese policymakers and investors, who now must weigh carefully the insights of two economic giants: John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek.

At a time of slowing economic growth, some are advocating more Keynesian macro-stabilization measures, much like those China used to sustain growth after the global economic crisis of 2008. But in many areas, particularly in the northeast, central, and western parts of the country, the slowdown cannot be resolved through more stimulus.

In fact, stimulus in those regions would largely flow out, along with the labor and capital that is already being propelled toward coastal areas, which boast more advanced technology, higher rates of innovation, superior infrastructure, and a more market-friendly business environment.

What slower-growth regions need, therefore, is time to carry out supply-side structural reforms, including cutting inventories, reducing overcapacity, and writing off the bad debts of local governments and state-owned enterprises.

The regions with surging property prices, meanwhile, tend to be the ones that are drawing labor and capital with high growth and superior job opportunities. A study by China Securities International showed that, in 2000-2010, cities in eastern China received 82.4% of total migrant inflows. By 2010, the migrant population in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin had more than doubled, to 34.5%, 37.9%, and 21%, respectively.

In an attempt to manage the growth of these cities, which faced a huge shortage of land, housing inventories, and urban public infrastructure, China’s government imposed restrictions on both demand for and supply of housing. But, as the spike in housing prices in these cities shows, their efforts didn’t work.

Chinese policymakers had forgotten about Hayek. Otherwise, they would have expected that labor and capital markets would continue to drift toward growth and innovation in urban centers. They would also have recognized that market prices naturally transmit complex, specific, and changing local knowledge, which is distributed among individuals and corporations, not controlled by central planners. And they would have appreciated that if supply is to be matched with demand over time, real-estate and infrastructure investments must reflect that knowledge.

Instead, China’s policymakers inadvertently created bottlenecks in local land supply. Residential land transactions in first- and second-tier Chinese cities remain thin and heavily influenced by urban planning policies, despite the depth and sophistication of residential property markets.

Fortunately, there is scope for China’s urban planners to relax restrictions on the supply of land and on the floor area ratio (the ratio of gross floor area to the size of the lot on which the building stands). According to a study by China International Capital Corp, the urban built area in Shanghai is only 16%, compared to 44% in Tokyo and 60% in New York City. Within that area, only 36% is used for residential functions in Shanghai, compared to 60% in Tokyo and 44% in New York City.

In other words, the available residential land for sale in Shanghai is considerably smaller than that available in New York City or even Tokyo, which is a major reason for surging property prices in these cities. And, in fact, if the supply of land and usable floor area is not increased, more spending on local public infrastructure will cause prices of existing space to rise even higher.

Liu’s observation that households are becoming increasingly confident in the housing market also seems to be correct. The recent increase in demand for housing may reflect households’ desire to hedge their high savings against inflation or, more fundamentally, the sense that they must secure housing urgently, given limited supply. Either way, they now seem convinced that investment in housing is a relatively safe bet.

If that is the case, the risk of a property bubble in China is probably being overstated. But that does not mean that all is well in China’s property sector. If the government ignores market price signals, mismatches between supply and demand could build up, undermining growth in dynamic regions, while leaving low-growth regions weighed down by excess capacity and bad assets.

The good news is that there is still considerable room for policy maneuver. The question now is whether the Chinese authorities will manage actually to recognize and respond effectively to market signals.