主讲人:
周艺艺(纽约州立大学石溪分校经济系副教授)
主持老师:
(北大经院)莫家伟
参与老师:
(北大经院)杨汝岱、田巍、李博、刘政文、吴群锋
(北大新结构)王歆、徐铭梽
时间:
2024年6月21日(周五)
10:00-11:30
地点:
北京大学经济学院305会议室
主讲人简介:
周艺艺,纽约州立大学石溪分校经济系副教授(终身教职),博士生导师。博士毕业于弗吉尼亚大学,硕士毕业于北京大学经济研究中心,本科毕业于对外经贸大学。主要研究领域为产业组织,健康经济学,环境经济学。多篇论文发表于Management Science, The RAND Journal of Economics, International Economic Review, Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists等一流国际期刊。主要讲授本科和博士课程:产业经济学,实证产业经济学,健康经济学,管理经济学,商业战略等课程。
摘要:
When public services are subcontracted to private entities, a common concern is that the private firm will underprovide quality relative to the policymaker’s preferences. We study quality incentives in Medicare Advantage (MA), a subsidized market for health insurance for aged or disabled individuals. In MA, the government payments to MA plans are increasing in the plans’ quality rankings; in addition, a second quality incentive requires plans to allocate a portion of government payments directly to plan benefit improvements. To study the welfare implications of quality-dependent payments, we build a structural model of the MA market in which insurers choose plan features including quality subject to program rules. We estimate the demand and supply sides of the model using plan-level and individual-level data. Based on the estimated model, we show that making plan payments dependent on quality indeed leads to higher qualities and improves consumer welfare. However, the 2012 Quality Bonus Program that implemented these changes in MA also included a less-noticed policy change that altered plans’ premium-setting incentives. That policy change more than offset the welfare improvements from the quality-dependent rebates, meaning that the 2012 Quality Bonus Program, taken as whole, was welfare reducing. The second quality-incentive policy, a restriction on the allocation of government payments, is shown to improve plan benefits and enhance consumer welfare.