Abstract: Firms can become less innovative following a sudden cash “inflow.” Specifically, multinational firms that were eligible to repatriate (and indeed repatriated) cash to the United States under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) generate less valuable patents than otherwise similar firms. They also explore more. This effect only exists among firms in less competitive industries, firms with lower institutional ownership (IO), and firms with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs); this effect is mainly driven by the reduction in the value of U.S.-originated patents. Our evidence suggests that, without appropriate governance, a cash windfall may lead managers to engage in riskier innovation strategy, which can destroy value.
参考文献：Heitor Almeida, Po-Hsuan Hsu, Dongmei Li, Kevin Tseng(2021). More Cash, Less Innovation: The Effect of the American Jobs Creation Act on Patent Value. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1),1-28.
Abstract: We analyze how employee compensation contracts of target firms affect merger terms and outcomes. Using unique data from merger agreements, we document that in 80.0% of all merger and acquisition (M&A) deals, at least some of the target’s employee stock options (ESOs) are canceled by the acquirer and not replaced by new equity-based grants. Contract modifications reduce the value of ESOs by 38.4% in the average M&A deal. Further, the combined merger returns are larger when employees experience greater losses. Overall, our results indicate that the benefits of reducing the number of ESOs outweigh the potential negative effects on firm value.
参考文献：Ilona Babenko, Fangfang Du, Yuri Tserlukevich(2021). Will I Get Paid? Employee Stock Options and Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1),29-64.
Abstract: We show that the prices of risk for factors that are nonlinear in the market return can be obtained using index option prices. The price of coskewness risk corresponds to the market variance risk premium, and the price of cokurtosis risk corresponds to the market skewness risk premium. Option-based estimates of the prices of risk lead to reasonable values of the associated risk premia. An analysis of factor models with coskewness risk indicates that the new estimates of the price of risk improve the models’ performance compared with regression-based estimates.
参考文献：Peter Christoffersen, Mathieu Fournier, Kris Jacobs, Mehdi Karoui(2021). Option-Based Estimation of the Price of Coskewness and Cokurtosis Risk. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1),65-91.
Abstract: We study fragmentation of equity trading using a model of imperfect competition among exchanges. In the model, increased competition drives down trading fees. However, additional arbitrage opportunities arise in fragmented markets, intensifying adverse selection. Due to these opposing forces, the effects of fragmentation are context dependent. To empirically investigate the ambiguity in a single context, we estimate key parameters of the model with order-level data for an Australian security. According to the estimates, the benefits of increased competition are outweighed by the costs of multi-venue arbitrage. Compared with the prevailing duopoly, we predict the counterfactual monopoly spread to be 23% lower.
参考文献：Markus Baldauf, Joshua Mollner(2021). Trading in Fragmented Markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1),93-121.
Abstract: Using a novel database of firm patents and board characteristics across 45 countries, we examine both within- and cross-country determinants of board gender diversity and its relation to corporate innovation. Boards are more likely to include women in countries with narrower gender gaps, higher female labor market participation, and less masculine cultures. Firms with gender diverse boards have more patents and novel patents, and a higher innovative efficiency. Further analyses suggest that gender diverse boards are associated with more failure-tolerant and long-term chief executive officer (CEO) incentives, more innovative corporate cultures, and more diverse inventors, characteristics that are conducive to an improved innovative performance.
参考文献：Dale Griffin, Kai Li, Ting Xu(2021). Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Innovation: International Evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1),123-154.
Abstract: We find that corporate innovation is positively related to board diversity as measured by a multidimensional index. The benefit of board diversity is more pronounced for firms with more complex operations, more experienced boards, and stronger external governance, suggesting that diverse boards have superior advising capacity. We find evidence to suggest that firms with diverse boards engage in more exploratory innovations and develop new technology in unfamiliar areas. As a result, they create a larger number of both most-cited and uncited patents. Finally, of the six different aspects of board diversity, professional diversity matters the most for corporate innovation.
参考文献：Heng An, Carl R. Chen, Qun Wu, Ting Zhang(2021). Corporate Innovation: Do Diverse Boards Help? .Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1),155-182.
Abstract: We examine whether options exchanges’ pricing schedules affect broker order routing behavior and limit order execution quality. We find that some brokers seemingly maximize the value of their order flow by selling marketable orders and sending nonmarketable orders to exchanges that offer large liquidity rebates. Other brokers appear to bypass liquidity rebates by routing both marketable and nonmarketable orders to exchanges that purchase order flow. Using a decision by the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) to change its trading protocol, we provide empirical evidence that brokers can enhance limit order execution quality by routing nonmarketable limit orders to options exchanges that purchase order flow.
参考文献：Robert Battalio, Todd Griffith, Robert Van Ness(2021). Do (Should) Brokers Route Limit Orders to Options Exchanges That Purchase Order Flow?. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1),183-211.
Abstract: We examine how local political corruption affects firm innovation in the United States. We find that firms located in highly corrupt areas are less innovative as measured by their patenting activities. The results are robust to the inclusion of a broad set of regional characteristics, instrumental variable analysis, matching analysis, difference-in-differences test, and alternative proxies for local corruption. Further analysis shows that reduced innovation incentives due to high extortion risk and decreased threat of competition could be the possible economic channels through which corruption affects innovation. Overall, our results indicate that local political corruption impedes corporate innovation in the United States.
参考文献：Qianqian Huang, Tao Yuan(2021). Does Political Corruption Impede Firm Innovation? Evidence from the United States. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1),231-248.
Abstract: Firms strategically borrow in different locations. Approximately one-quarter of Peruvian companies with operations in multiple areas source their financing from more than one province. Mining windfalls generate finance supply shocks, leading to the provision of more credit at lower average rates, and we show that firms exploit geographic financial flexibility by concentrating their borrowing in booming locations. Firms are less likely to initiate borrowing in new markets when their current borrowing provinces are thriving. The pursuit of flexibility in borrowing markets, however, degrades a firm’s relationships with its existing lenders, thereby heightening its risk of future financial distress.
参考文献：Mark J. Garmaise, Gabriel Natividad(2021). Financial Flexibility: At What Cost?. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1),249-282.
Abstract: Despite their claimed advantages, toehold strategies have rarely been adopted in recent corporate takeovers and do not seem to increase acquirer returns. Are toeholds ineffective and becoming obsolete? We show that this is not the case. We find that toeholds are preferred for executing difficult takeovers. After controlling for such endogeneity in toehold-based acquisitions, toeholds do increase returns to acquirers. Moreover, the performance of toehold strategies improves over time due to more selective and more effective acquisition of toeholds. We find that this time trend is in part explained by learning from past toehold acquisitions.
参考文献：Yun Dai, Sebastian Gryglewicz, Han T. J. Smit(2021). Less Popular but More Effective Toeholds in Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1), 283 – 312.
Abstract: Researchers disagree about the impact of board independence on firm value. The disagreement generally stems from the endogenous nature of board appointments. I add new evidence to this discussion by using a sample of closed-end funds to document the value-enhancing effects of independent boards. Using cross-sectional, difference-in-differences, and instrumental variables techniques, I address these endogeneity concerns and find consistent evidence that board independence is associated with higher firm value.
参考文献：Matthew E. Souther(2021). Does Board Independence Increase Firm Value? Evidence from Closed-End Funds. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,56(1), 313 – 336.
