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解析文章首发于唧唧堂网站www.jijitang.com
解析作者 | 唧唧堂经济学研究小组：
abulletdan
；审校编辑 |
悠悠 糖糖
1. 区域性商业周期的总体影响
区域经济与总体经济在发展路径和面对的经济冲击上存在差异，因此仅仅从区域经济差异推断总体商业周期状况是困难的。但是，我们认为区域商业周期依然存在着有价值的信息，因为这些信息可以帮助规范总体波动模型。我们记录了大萧条时期，美国与地方各州就业与工资增长之间的密切关系。从总体来看，两者关系会弱一些。然后，我们提出了一种结合此类区域数据和总体数据的方法，用以估计中等规模的凯恩斯主义DSGE模型。我们发现，总需求冲击是大萧条时期就业的重要推动力，但是为了应对缓慢的就业复苏和适当下降的总工资水平所必需的工资粘性与我们在各州观察到的工资灵活程度并不一致。最后，我们表明，与使用汇总数据估算模型或直接从确定的区域弹性推断出来的包络结果不同，我们的方法在对2007年至2014年总就业和工资变动的原因分析中得出了不同的结论。
Making inferences about aggregate business cycles from regional variation alone is difficult because of economic channels and shocks that differ between regional and aggregate economies. However, we argue that regional business cycles contain valuable information that can help discipline models of aggregate fluctuations. We begin by documenting a strong relationship across U.S. states between local employment and wage growth during the Great Recession. This relationship is much weaker in U.S. aggregates. Then, we present a methodology that combines such regional and aggregate data in order to estimate a medium‐scale New Keynesian DSGE model. We find that aggregate demand shocks were important drivers of aggregate employment during the Great Recession, but the wage stickiness necessary for them to account for the slow employment recovery and the modest fall in aggregate wages is inconsistent with the flexibility of wages we observe across U.S. states. Finally, we show that our methodology yields different conclusions about the causes of aggregate employment and wage dynamics between 2007 and 2014 than either estimating our model with aggregate data alone or performing back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations that directly extrapolate from well‐identified regional elasticities.
来源：Beraja, Martin, Erik Hurst, and Juan Ospina. "The aggregate implications of regional business cycles." Econometrica 87.6 (2019): 1789-1833.
2. 战略不确定下的讨价还价
本文表明，即使不存在支付不确定或者可行性行动的情况下，议价者也可能达成延迟协议。在这种情况下，当议价者面临直接形式的战略不确定，即对手的行为不确定时，延迟就会产生。本文从两个重要方面对这类不确定的性质进行了限制。首先，它假设正在进行的战略是确定的，议价者只有在出其不意的举动后才会面临不确定性。其次，假设Battigalli和Siniscalchi(2002)理性的和普遍强烈理性的信念（RCSBR）要求议价者必须“具有战略上的技巧”。主要结论的结果集特点与进行战略和RCSBR一致。这表明，尽管谈判环境是完全信息，但这些假设仍会导致协议延迟。延迟的根源在于次级乐观：议价者在谈判过程中并不会过早提出优质的方案，因为他们担心这样做会使对方对自己未来的前景更加乐观。
This paper shows that bargainers may reach delayed agreements even in environments where there is no uncertainty about payoffs or feasible actions. Under such conditions, delay may arise when bargainers face direct forms of strategic uncertainty—that is, uncertainty about the opponent's play. The paper restricts the nature of this uncertainty in two important ways. First, it assumes on‐path strategic certainty: Bargainers face uncertainty only after surprise moves. Second, it assumes Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR)—a requirement that bargainers are “strategically sophisticated.” The main result characterizes the set of outcomes consistent with on‐path strategic certainty and RCSBR. It shows that these assumptions allow for delayed agreement, despite the fact that the bargaining environment is one of complete information. The source of delay is second‐order optimism: Bargainers do not put forward “good” offers early in the negotiation process because they fear that doing so will cause the other party to become more optimistic about her future prospects.
来源：Friedenberg, Amanda. "Bargaining Under Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Second‐Order Optimism." Econometrica 87.6 (2019): 1835-1865.
3. 战略性沟通与较低验证
接收方希望从信息发出方得到多维的信息，但她只能够验证一个维度。发出方的收益取决于他通过外生给定的单调函数所归纳的信念。我们表明，在很多情况下，通过随机验证策略，接受者可以充分了解发出者的信息。我们也准确地描述了何时可能做到。特别是当外生收益函数是子模时，我们可以明确地描述一个完整的学习机制；当外生收益函数是（严格）超模数时，全面的学习不可能发生。在可能进行全面学习的主要情况下，可以使用间接机制来实现，在这种机制中，发出者可以选择验证各个维度的可能性。
A receiver wants to learn multidimensional information from a sender, and she has the capacity to verify just one dimension. The sender's payoff depends on the belief he induces, via an exogenously given monotone function. We show that by using a randomized verification strategy, the receiver can learn the sender's information fully in many cases. We characterize exactly when it is possible to do so. In particular, when the exogenous payoff function is submodular, we can explicitly describe a full‐learning mechanism; when it is (strictly) supermodular, full learning is not possible. In leading cases where full learning is possible, it can be attained using an indirect mechanism in which the sender chooses the probability of verifying each dimension.
来源：Carroll, Gabriel, and Georgy Egorov. "Strategic communication with minimal verification." Econometrica 87.6 (2019): 1867-1892.
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4. 理性行为的动态分位数模型
本文建立了不确定下的理性行为的动态模型，其中主体对于未来τ 分位数效用流最大，其中τ ∈ (0,1)。也就是说，代理人具有分位数效用偏好，而不是标准期望效用。分位数偏好具有有用的优势，包括捕获异质性的能力以及分离风险厌恶和跨期替代弹性。虽然分位数不具有期望的某些有用性质，比如线性性和迭代性，但我们能够在动态模型中建立所有标准结果。即，当分位数偏好是动态一致时，相应的动态问题通过定点参数产生一个值函数，该值函数是凹函数，可微，并且满足最优性原理。此外，我们还推导出了相应的欧拉方程，改方程非常适合使用分位数回归法来估计和测试经济模型。这样，模型的参数就可以解释为结构对象。此外，所提出的方法为分位数回归方法提供了微观经济学基础。为了说明这一发展，我们构建了一个跨期消费模型，并估算了跨分位数的跨期替代参数的折现因子和弹性，结果提供了这些参数异质性的证据。
This paper develops a dynamic model of rational behavior under uncertainty, in which the agent maximizes the stream of future τ‐quantile utilities, for τ ∈ (0,1). That is, the agent has a quantile utility preference instead of the standard expected utility. Quantile preferences have useful advantages, including the ability to capture heterogeneity and allowing the separation between risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Although quantiles do not share some of the helpful properties of expectations, such as linearity and the law of iterated expectations, we are able to establish all the standard results in dynamic models. Namely, we show that the quantile preferences are dynamically consistent, the corresponding dynamic problem yields a value function, via a fixed point argument, this value function is concave and differentiable, and the principle of optimality holds. Additionally, we derive the corresponding Euler equation, which is well suited for using well‐known quantile regression methods for estimating and testing the economic model. In this way, the parameters of the model can be interpreted as structural objects. Therefore, the proposed methods provide microeconomic foundations for quantile regression methods. To illustrate the developments, we construct an intertemporal consumption model and estimate the discount factor and elasticity of intertemporal substitution parameters across the quantiles. The results provide evidence of heterogeneity in these parameters.
来源 ：
Luciano de Castro, Antonio F. Galvao."Dynamic Quantile Models of Rational Behavior" Econometrica 87.6 (2019)
5. 动态随机效用
我们提供了一个动态随机效用的公理分析，它通过最大化随机过程(Ut)效用来解决动态代理人动态决策的随机选择行为。我们首先表明，即使(Ut)是任意的，动态随机效用也会在不同时期对行为施加新的可测性跨期限制，就像静态随机公理一样。动态随机效用的一个重要特征是，行为可能体现历史依赖性，因为周期性t的选择揭示了Ut的信息，而这些信息可能是连续且相关的；但是，我们新的公理表明，该模型可能出现的，对历史的依赖性有特定的限制。第二，我们证明了自然贝叶斯理性公理限制了Ut可以显示的随机性形式。相比之下，在实证工作中广泛使用的效用冲击模型违反了这些限制，导致可能出现负的期权价值，参数估计也可能存在偏差。最后，动态随机选择数据使我们能够描述重要的随机效用的特殊情况（尤其是学习以及品味的持久性），这些特殊情况在静态域上与一般模型没有区别。
We provide an axiomatic analysis of dynamic random utility, characterizing the stochastic choice behavior of agents who solve dynamic decision problems by maximizing some stochastic process (Ut) of utilities. We show first that even when (Ut) is arbitrary, dynamic random utility imposes new testable across‐period restrictions on behavior, over and above period‐by‐period analogs of the static random utility axioms. An important feature of dynamic random utility is that behavior may appear history‐dependent, because period‐t choices reveal information about Ut, which may be serially correlated; however, our key new axioms highlight that the model entails specific limits on the form of history dependence that can arise. Second, we show that imposing natural Bayesian rationality axioms restricts the form of randomness that (Ut) can display. By contrast, a specification of utility shocks that is widely used in empirical work violates these restrictions, leading to behavior that may display a negative option value and can produce biased parameter estimates. Finally, dynamic stochastic choice data allow us to characterize important special cases of random utility—in particular, learning and taste persistence—that on static domains are indistinguishable from the general model.
来源：Frick, Mira, Ryota Iijima, and Tomasz Strzalecki. "Dynamic random utility." Econometrica 87.6 (2019): 1941-2002.
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6. 战略简单机制
我们定义并研究了一种称为“战略性简单”机制的性质，这是为了表达一种思想，即在战略简单的机制中，战略选择是面对的战略复杂性是有限的。我们定义了一种机制，即选择可以基于对代理人偏好的一阶信念和对其他代理人合理性的一阶确定性的战略简单机制。代理主体并不需要形成高阶信念，因为这些信念与最优策略无关。所有的主导的战略机制在战略上都很简单。但是更多的机制本质上就是战略简单的。尤其是在双边贸易问题和投票问题上，简单的战略机制可能比主导的战略机制更加灵活
We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call “strategic simplicity,” and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first‐order beliefs about the other agents' preferences and first‐order certainty about the other agents' rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher‐order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple mechanisms may be more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem and the voting problem.
来源：Börgers, Tilman, and Jiangtao Li. "Strategically simple mechanisms." Econometrica 87.6 (2019): 2003-2035.
7. 线性投票规则
如果参与决策的过程是自愿和昂贵的，且转账是不可行的，那么一个社会将会如何在两种社会中进行选择呢？假设独立私人价值是对称的，我们表明，使用线性投票规则的效用最优：投票得到可选的相关权重，如果投票的加权总和保持在某个阈值之下，则默认获得。极值和阈值的任何组合都可以是最优的。标准的仲裁规则只有当其产生于线性规则相同的结果时才是最优。如果默认值在每次精确满足阈值的选择结果时被打乱，则线性规则被称为上限线性。我们提出了一个扰动方案来描述在参与成本很小的情况下，投票规则的均衡性，并表明自愿退出参与可增加任何在强制参与下最优的两侧上线性规则的福利。
How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly, and monetary transfers are not feasible? Assuming symmetric independent private values, we show that it is utilitarian‐optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternative‐dependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Any combination of weights and threshold can be optimal. A standard quorum rule can be optimal only when it yields the same outcome as a linear rule. A linear rule is called upper linear if the default is upset at every election result that meets the threshold exactly. We develop a perturbation method to characterize equilibria of voting rules in the case of small participation costs and show that leaving participation voluntary increases welfare for any two‐sided upper linear rule that is optimal under compulsory participation.
来源：Grüner, Hans Peter, and Thomas Tröger. "Linear voting rules." Econometrica 87.6 (2019): 2037-2077.
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8. 分散资产市场的定价与流动性
我开发了一个场外市场中内生中介的搜寻和讨价还价模型。与现有的工作不同，我的模型在三个同步的维度上考虑了丰富的投资者的异质性：偏好、库存和满足率。通过比较模型中出现的和实践中观察到的交易量模式，我认为满足利率的异质性是中介模式的主要驱动力。我发现，满足率较高的投资者（即快速投资者）对持有存货的厌恶程度较小，对现金收益更感兴趣，这使得模型证实了一些现有模型中未出现的典型事实：（1）快速投资者通过收取速度溢价来提供中介，（2）快速投资者拥有更多的极端库存。然后，我使用该模型研究交易磨齿对流动性供给和价格的影响。关于社会福利，我证明了满足率异质性与最优库存管理的相会作用使均衡效率低下，我也提供了一种金融交易税/补贴方案，可以纠正这种效率抵消的问题，在这些方案中，快速的投资者会交叉补贴慢速投资者。
I develop a search‐and‐bargaining model of endogenous intermediation in over‐the‐counter markets. Unlike the existing work, my model allows for rich investor heterogeneity in three simultaneous dimensions: preferences, inventories, and meeting rates. By comparing trading‐volume patterns that arise in my model and are observed in practice, I argue that the heterogeneity in meeting rates is the main driver of intermediation patterns. I find that investors with higher meeting rates (i.e., fast investors) are less averse to holding inventories and more attracted to cash earnings, which makes the model corroborate a number of stylized facts that do not emerge from existing models: (i) fast investors provide intermediation by charging a speed premium, and (ii) fast investors hold more extreme inventories. Then, I use the model to study the effect of trading frictions on the supply and price of liquidity. On social welfare, I show that the interaction of meeting rate heterogeneity with optimal inventory management makes the equilibrium inefficient. I provide a financial transaction tax/subsidy scheme that corrects this inefficiency, in which fast investors cross‐subsidize slow investors.
来源：
Semih Üslü. "Pricing and Liquidity in Decentralized Asset Markets." Econometrica 87.6 (2019)
9. 论社会学习的效率
